feat(auth): M9 Part 2 — native in-app SSO via the mobile bridge

Add the app client for the Mobile SSO Authorization Bridge (PLAN.md §4.2):
native "Sign in with <provider>" without shipping any OAuth secret.

- Pkce: pure-JVM RFC 7636 S256 verifier/challenge + CSRF state, encoded to
  match the backend's base64url(SHA-256) exactly.
- SsoAuthManager (Singleton): mints PKCE+state, builds the /auth/mobile/sso/start
  URL for a Custom Tab, verifies the returned state, exchanges the one-time code
  with the stashed verifier, and drives the existing SessionManager.onSignedIn —
  no new token-storage or refresh code. Pending flow is in-memory (fails closed on
  process death). Exposes an outcome StateFlow the login screen consumes.
- SsoApi + DTOs: GET /auth/providers discovery and POST /auth/mobile/sso/exchange
  (tagged NO_SESSION so a credential 401 isn't read as an expired session).
- MainActivity: runicgateway://auth/callback intent-filter + singleTop; parses the
  callback Uri (the Android edge) and hands raw params to SsoAuthManager.
- LoginScreen/ViewModel: render a button per discovered provider, opening the
  bridge in a Custom Tab; fall back to the website login hand-off when none.

Additive — no other screen's data flow changes; no backend work. Custom scheme
only for now (App Links deferred, APP_LINKS.md).

Tests (JVM, +14): Pkce vector/charset, start-URL building, and the full
complete() flow over a fake SsoApi + real SessionManager (success signs in;
state mismatch / missing pending fail without exchanging; error callback →
declined; 401 → expired-code; replay finds no pending).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr

app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml

@@ -24,14 +24,32 @@
         android:supportsRtl="true"
         android:theme="@style/Theme.RunicGateway">
 
+        <!-- singleTop so the SSO Custom Tab returning via the deep link reuses the
+             running task (onNewIntent) instead of stacking a second activity. -->
         <activity
             android:name=".MainActivity"
             android:exported="true"
+            android:launchMode="singleTop"
             android:theme="@style/Theme.RunicGateway">
             <intent-filter>
                 <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
                 <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
             </intent-filter>
+
+            <!-- Native SSO callback (M9, PLAN.md §4.2). The bridge deep-links the
+                 one-time authorization code back to this fixed, app-owned custom
+                 scheme; it must match SsoAuthManager.REDIRECT_URI and the backend's
+                 MOBILE_AUTH_REDIRECT_URIS allowlist exactly. Custom scheme only for
+                 now — HTTPS App Links are deferred (docs/android/APP_LINKS.md). -->
+            <intent-filter>
+                <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
+                <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
+                <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
+                <data
+                    android:scheme="runicgateway"
+                    android:host="auth"
+                    android:path="/callback" />
+            </intent-filter>
         </activity>
 
         <!-- The embedded distributor's persistent ntfy connection (M7, PLAN.md §11).

app/src/main/java/com/runicgateway/app/MainActivity.kt

@@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ package com.runicgateway.app
 
 import android.content.Intent
 import android.graphics.Color
+import android.net.Uri
 import android.os.Bundle
 import androidx.activity.ComponentActivity
 import androidx.activity.SystemBarStyle
 import androidx.activity.compose.setContent
 import androidx.activity.enableEdgeToEdge
+import androidx.lifecycle.lifecycleScope
 import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.fillMaxSize
 import androidx.compose.material3.MaterialTheme
 import androidx.compose.material3.Surface
@@ -18,6 +20,7 @@ import androidx.compose.runtime.getValue
 import androidx.compose.runtime.mutableStateOf
 import androidx.compose.runtime.setValue
 import androidx.compose.ui.Modifier
+import com.runicgateway.app.core.auth.sso.SsoAuthManager
 import com.runicgateway.app.core.push.PushNotifier
 import androidx.hilt.navigation.compose.hiltViewModel
 import androidx.lifecycle.compose.collectAsStateWithLifecycle
@@ -30,6 +33,8 @@ import com.runicgateway.app.ui.connect.ConnectScreen
 import com.runicgateway.app.ui.theme.RunicGatewayTheme
 import com.runicgateway.app.ui.theme.parseBrandColor
 import dagger.hilt.android.AndroidEntryPoint
+import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
+import javax.inject.Inject
 
 /**
  * Single-activity host (PLAN.md §2). Gates on [AppViewModel]: the first-run
@@ -40,6 +45,13 @@ import dagger.hilt.android.AndroidEntryPoint
 @AndroidEntryPoint
 class MainActivity : ComponentActivity() {
 
+    // Native SSO bridge — handles the runicgateway://auth/callback deep link (M9,
+    // §4.2). Field-injected because the callback can arrive independent of any
+    // ViewModel; a successful exchange flips the SessionManager the whole app
+    // observes, and the login screen consumes SsoAuthManager.outcome.
+    @Inject
+    lateinit var ssoAuthManager: SsoAuthManager
+
     // The stream a tapped push notification wants to open (§11, M7 Part 2 item 7).
     // Set from the launching intent and from onNewIntent (the activity is singleTop),
     // consumed once by RunicApp which navigates to the stream's screen.
@@ -48,6 +60,7 @@ class MainActivity : ComponentActivity() {
     override fun onCreate(savedInstanceState: Bundle?) {
         super.onCreate(savedInstanceState)
         pendingStream = intent?.getStringExtra(PushNotifier.EXTRA_STREAM)
+        handleSsoCallback(intent)
         // Dark-only app (M5): force light system-bar icons over the transparent bars so
         // they stay legible on the deep blue-black surfaces regardless of system theme.
         val barStyle = SystemBarStyle.dark(Color.TRANSPARENT)
@@ -82,10 +95,30 @@ class MainActivity : ComponentActivity() {
         }
     }
 
-    /** A notification tapped while the activity is already running (singleTop). */
+    /**
+     * A notification tap or an SSO callback arriving while the activity is already
+     * running (singleTop) — the common case, since the Custom Tab overlays the live
+     * app during sign-in.
+     */
     override fun onNewIntent(intent: Intent) {
         super.onNewIntent(intent)
         setIntent(intent)
         intent.getStringExtra(PushNotifier.EXTRA_STREAM)?.let { pendingStream = it }
+        handleSsoCallback(intent)
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Route a `runicgateway://auth/callback` VIEW intent into the SSO bridge (M9,
+     * §4.2). Runs on the activity's lifecycle scope; the exchange result surfaces
+     * on `SsoAuthManager.outcome` (success signs the session in; failure is shown
+     * on the login screen). Non-callback intents are ignored.
+     */
+    private fun handleSsoCallback(intent: Intent?) {
+        val data: Uri = intent?.takeIf { it.action == Intent.ACTION_VIEW }?.data ?: return
+        if (!ssoAuthManager.matchesCallback(data.scheme, data.host, data.path)) return
+        val state = data.getQueryParameter("state")
+        val code = data.getQueryParameter("code")
+        val error = data.getQueryParameter("error")
+        lifecycleScope.launch { ssoAuthManager.complete(state = state, code = code, error = error) }
     }
 }

app/src/main/java/com/runicgateway/app/core/auth/sso/Pkce.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+ */
+package com.runicgateway.app.core.auth.sso
+
+import java.security.MessageDigest
+import java.security.SecureRandom
+import java.util.Base64
+
+/**
+ * PKCE + CSRF-state primitives for the Mobile SSO Authorization Bridge — "Layer B"
+ * of the two PKCE layers (app ↔ website; PLAN.md §4.2, BACKEND_DESIGN "Two PKCE
+ * layers"). The app proves at `/exchange` that it holds the verifier for the
+ * challenge it registered at `/start`, so an intercepted callback code is useless
+ * to anyone but this app.
+ *
+ * Pure JVM (no Android framework types) so it unit-tests on the plain test runner.
+ * The encoding mirrors the backend exactly (RFC 7636 S256): the challenge is
+ * `base64url(SHA-256(verifier))` with no padding, matching Node's
+ * `crypto.createHash('sha256').update(verifier).digest('base64url')`.
+ */
+object Pkce {
+
+    private val random = SecureRandom()
+
+    // RFC 4648 §5 URL-safe base64 without padding — the base64url the backend uses.
+    private val encoder = Base64.getUrlEncoder().withoutPadding()
+
+    /**
+     * A fresh high-entropy `code_verifier`: 32 random bytes → 43 base64url chars,
+     * comfortably inside RFC 7636's 43–128 range and identical in form to the
+     * verifier the website generates for its own IdP layer.
+     */
+    fun newVerifier(): String = randomToken()
+
+    /** A fresh opaque CSRF `state` (same entropy/shape as a verifier). */
+    fun newState(): String = randomToken()
+
+    /** `code_challenge` for [verifier] using the S256 method. */
+    fun challengeOf(verifier: String): String {
+        val digest = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(verifier.toByteArray(Charsets.US_ASCII))
+        return encoder.encodeToString(digest)
+    }
+
+    private fun randomToken(): String {
+        val bytes = ByteArray(32)
+        random.nextBytes(bytes)
+        return encoder.encodeToString(bytes)
+    }
+}

app/src/main/java/com/runicgateway/app/core/auth/sso/SsoAuthManager.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+ */
+package com.runicgateway.app.core.auth.sso
+
+import com.runicgateway.app.core.auth.SessionManager
+import com.runicgateway.app.core.net.BaseUrlHolder
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.SsoApi
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.MobileSsoExchangeRequest
+import kotlinx.coroutines.CancellationException
+import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.MutableStateFlow
+import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.StateFlow
+import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.asStateFlow
+import java.io.IOException
+import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicReference
+import javax.inject.Inject
+import javax.inject.Singleton
+
+/**
+ * Orchestrates the native "Sign in with Google/Discord" flow — the app half of the
+ * Mobile SSO Authorization Bridge (PLAN.md §4.2, BACKEND_DESIGN "Mobile SSO
+ * Authorization Bridge"). It never adds a parallel auth path: a successful exchange
+ * drives the *same* [SessionManager.onSignedIn] the password login uses, so the
+ * menu, push registration, and re-validation all react identically.
+ *
+ * The flow:
+ *  1. [buildStartUrl] mints PKCE (Layer B) + a CSRF `state`, stashes them, and
+ *     returns the `/auth/mobile/sso/start` URL the caller opens in a Custom Tab.
+ *  2. The website bounces through the IdP and deep-links back to
+ *     [REDIRECT_URI] with `?code&state` (success) or `?error&state` (failure).
+ *  3. [complete] verifies `state`, exchanges the `code` with the stashed verifier,
+ *     and signs the user in — publishing the result on [outcome]. `MainActivity`
+ *     parses the callback `Uri` (the Android edge) and hands the raw params here,
+ *     so this class stays free of framework types and unit-tests on the JVM.
+ *
+ * The pending `{state, verifier}` lives only in memory: if the process is killed
+ * while the Custom Tab is foreground it is lost and the exchange **fails closed**
+ * (the user simply retries) — never a security downgrade.
+ *
+ * Threading: [buildStartUrl] runs on the UI thread; [complete] runs on the
+ * activity's coroutine scope after a deep link. The pending holder is an
+ * [AtomicReference] and [outcome] a [StateFlow], so a ViewModel/activity recreation
+ * while the Custom Tab is open cannot drop a result.
+ */
+@Singleton
+class SsoAuthManager @Inject constructor(
+    private val ssoApi: SsoApi,
+    private val sessionManager: SessionManager,
+    private val baseUrlHolder: BaseUrlHolder,
+) {
+
+    /** Why an SSO attempt ended, for a friendly inline message on the login screen. */
+    enum class Failure {
+        /** The user cancelled or the IdP/website refused (e.g. no linked account). */
+        DENIED,
+
+        /** The callback `state` didn't match — CSRF guard, or the pending flow was lost. */
+        STATE_MISMATCH,
+
+        /** The one-time code was unknown / expired / already used, or PKCE failed. */
+        EXPIRED_CODE,
+
+        /** Offline / DNS / TLS / timeout during the exchange. */
+        NETWORK,
+
+        /** Any other server failure, or a missing base URL / malformed callback. */
+        SERVER,
+    }
+
+    /** The observable result of the most recent flow; the login screen consumes it. */
+    sealed interface Outcome {
+        data object Idle : Outcome
+        data object Success : Outcome
+        data class Failed(val reason: Failure) : Outcome
+    }
+
+    private data class Pending(val state: String, val verifier: String)
+
+    private val pending = AtomicReference<Pending?>(null)
+
+    private val _outcome = MutableStateFlow<Outcome>(Outcome.Idle)
+    val outcome: StateFlow<Outcome> = _outcome.asStateFlow()
+
+    /** Ack a delivered [outcome] so it isn't re-handled after a recomposition. */
+    fun consumeOutcome() {
+        _outcome.value = Outcome.Idle
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Build the `/auth/mobile/sso/start` URL for [providerId] and stash the pending
+     * PKCE verifier + CSRF state. Returns null when no shard site is configured yet
+     * (the caller then keeps the website hand-off fallback). Also resets [outcome]
+     * to [Outcome.Idle] so a stale prior result can't fire against the new attempt.
+     */
+    fun buildStartUrl(providerId: String): String? {
+        val base = baseUrlHolder.current ?: return null
+        val verifier = Pkce.newVerifier()
+        val challenge = Pkce.challengeOf(verifier)
+        val state = Pkce.newState()
+        pending.set(Pending(state = state, verifier = verifier))
+        _outcome.value = Outcome.Idle
+        return base.newBuilder()
+            .addPathSegments("api/v1/auth/mobile/sso/start")
+            .addQueryParameter("provider", providerId)
+            .addQueryParameter("code_challenge", challenge)
+            .addQueryParameter("state", state)
+            .addQueryParameter("redirect_uri", REDIRECT_URI)
+            .build()
+            .toString()
+    }
+
+    /** True if a deep link's scheme/host/path are our fixed SSO callback. */
+    fun matchesCallback(scheme: String?, host: String?, path: String?): Boolean =
+        scheme == CALLBACK_SCHEME && host == CALLBACK_HOST && path == CALLBACK_PATH
+
+    /**
+     * Handle the parsed callback params from a returned [REDIRECT_URI] deep link:
+     * verify `state`, map an `error`, else exchange the `code` and sign in.
+     * Publishes the result on [outcome]. Idempotent-safe: the pending is cleared on
+     * entry, so a duplicate delivery of the same callback finds no pending and fails
+     * as [Failure.STATE_MISMATCH] rather than double-exchanging (the backend also
+     * single-uses the code).
+     */
+    suspend fun complete(state: String?, code: String?, error: String?) {
+        val stashed = pending.getAndSet(null)
+
+        // CSRF: the callback must echo the exact state we generated at /start.
+        if (stashed == null || state.isNullOrEmpty() || state != stashed.state) {
+            _outcome.value = Outcome.Failed(Failure.STATE_MISMATCH)
+            return
+        }
+
+        // A website/IdP-side failure comes back as ?error=… (never with a code).
+        if (!error.isNullOrEmpty()) {
+            _outcome.value = Outcome.Failed(mapError(error))
+            return
+        }
+
+        if (code.isNullOrBlank()) {
+            _outcome.value = Outcome.Failed(Failure.SERVER)
+            return
+        }
+
+        val response = try {
+            ssoApi.exchange(MobileSsoExchangeRequest(code = code, codeVerifier = stashed.verifier))
+        } catch (e: CancellationException) {
+            throw e
+        } catch (_: IOException) {
+            _outcome.value = Outcome.Failed(Failure.NETWORK)
+            return
+        } catch (_: Exception) {
+            _outcome.value = Outcome.Failed(Failure.SERVER)
+            return
+        }
+
+        if (response.isSuccessful) {
+            val body = response.body()
+            if (body == null) {
+                _outcome.value = Outcome.Failed(Failure.SERVER)
+                return
+            }
+            sessionManager.onSignedIn(body.accessToken, body.refreshToken, body.user)
+            _outcome.value = Outcome.Success
+            return
+        }
+
+        _outcome.value = Outcome.Failed(if (response.code() == 401) Failure.EXPIRED_CODE else Failure.SERVER)
+    }
+
+    // The bridge's start + callback error codes → user-facing failure reasons.
+    // Start (mobileSso.controller): invalid_provider | provider_unavailable | server_error.
+    // Callback (sso.controller): not_linked | disabled | session_expired | error,
+    // plus a forwarded IdP access_denied.
+    private fun mapError(error: String): Failure = when (error) {
+        // Link-only policy refused, or the account is inactive, or the user declined.
+        "not_linked", "disabled", "access_denied" -> Failure.DENIED
+        // The bridge session aged out mid-flow — start over.
+        "session_expired" -> Failure.EXPIRED_CODE
+        // invalid_provider / provider_unavailable / server_error / error / anything else.
+        else -> Failure.SERVER
+    }
+
+    companion object {
+        const val CALLBACK_SCHEME = "runicgateway"
+        const val CALLBACK_HOST = "auth"
+        const val CALLBACK_PATH = "/callback"
+
+        /**
+         * The one fixed, application-owned callback the bridge redirects to. Must
+         * match the `MOBILE_AUTH_REDIRECT_URIS` allowlist entry on the backend and
+         * the intent-filter in `AndroidManifest.xml` exactly (PLAN.md §4.2).
+         */
+        const val REDIRECT_URI = "$CALLBACK_SCHEME://$CALLBACK_HOST$CALLBACK_PATH"
+    }
+}

app/src/main/java/com/runicgateway/app/data/api/SsoApi.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+ */
+package com.runicgateway.app.data.api
+
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.MobileSsoExchangeRequest
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.MobileTokenResponse
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.SsoProviderDto
+import retrofit2.Response
+import retrofit2.http.Body
+import retrofit2.http.GET
+import retrofit2.http.Headers
+import retrofit2.http.POST
+
+/**
+ * The native SSO bridge surface (PLAN.md §4.2, M9). Discovery lists the shard's
+ * enabled providers; exchange trades a callback authorization code (+ its PKCE
+ * verifier) for the same bearer pair as `/auth/mobile/login`.
+ *
+ * The redirect leg (`/auth/mobile/sso/start`) is **not** here — it is opened in a
+ * Custom Tab as a URL (the browser follows the 302 through the IdP), not called as
+ * an XHR. See [com.runicgateway.app.core.auth.sso.SsoAuthManager].
+ *
+ * Exchange is tagged [com.runicgateway.app.core.net.Http.NO_SESSION_HEADER]: it
+ * carries no bearer (the user isn't signed in yet) and a `401` (bad/expired code or
+ * PKCE mismatch) must never be misread as an expired session or trip the refresh
+ * [com.runicgateway.app.core.net.TokenAuthenticator]. It returns a raw [Response]
+ * so the caller can distinguish `401` from other failures.
+ */
+interface SsoApi {
+
+    /** Public discovery — the enabled providers to render login buttons for. */
+    @GET("api/v1/auth/providers")
+    suspend fun providers(): List<SsoProviderDto>
+
+    // Literal header value required by Retrofit @Headers; matches Http.NO_SESSION_HEADER.
+    @Headers("X-Runic-No-Session: 1")
+    @POST("api/v1/auth/mobile/sso/exchange")
+    suspend fun exchange(@Body body: MobileSsoExchangeRequest): Response<MobileTokenResponse>
+}

app/src/main/java/com/runicgateway/app/data/api/dto/SsoDto.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+ */
+package com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto
+
+import kotlinx.serialization.SerialName
+import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
+
+/**
+ * Wire shapes for the Mobile SSO Authorization Bridge (PLAN.md §4.2, M9). The
+ * success payload of `/auth/mobile/sso/exchange` is the shared [MobileTokenResponse]
+ * (same pair as `/auth/mobile/login`) — this file only adds the two shapes unique
+ * to the bridge. Every DTO ignores unknown keys (NetworkModule's lenient Json), so
+ * additive backend fields stay safe (§8).
+ */
+
+/**
+ * One entry of `GET /auth/providers` — public discovery, never secrets. [icon] is
+ * the provider kind (`google` | `discord` | `oidc` | `oauth2`); the app renders a
+ * button per provider from this list rather than hardcoding a set. [loginUrl] is
+ * the *website* start path (unused by the app, which builds its own
+ * `/auth/mobile/sso/start` URL); kept so the shape matches the backend exactly.
+ */
+@Serializable
+data class SsoProviderDto(
+    val id: String,
+    val name: String,
+    val icon: String? = null,
+    val loginUrl: String? = null,
+    val priority: Int? = null,
+)
+
+/**
+ * `POST /auth/mobile/sso/exchange` body — the one-time authorization code from the
+ * callback deep link plus the PKCE verifier stashed at `/start` (Layer B). Wire
+ * name is snake_case to match the backend's `{ code, code_verifier }`.
+ */
+@Serializable
+data class MobileSsoExchangeRequest(
+    val code: String,
+    @SerialName("code_verifier") val codeVerifier: String,
+)

app/src/main/java/com/runicgateway/app/data/repository/AuthRepository.kt

@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ package com.runicgateway.app.data.repository
 import com.runicgateway.app.core.auth.SessionManager
 import com.runicgateway.app.core.push.PushManager
 import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.AuthApi
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.SsoApi
 import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.MobileLoginRequest
 import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.MobileLogoutRequest
 import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.MobileTokenResponse
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.SsoProviderDto
 import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.TotpRequiredError
 import kotlinx.coroutines.CancellationException
 import kotlinx.serialization.json.Json
@@ -26,11 +28,25 @@ import javax.inject.Singleton
 @Singleton
 class AuthRepository @Inject constructor(
     private val authApi: AuthApi,
+    private val ssoApi: SsoApi,
     private val sessionManager: SessionManager,
     private val pushManager: PushManager,
     private val json: Json,
 ) {
 
+    /**
+     * The shard's enabled SSO providers for the native login buttons (§4.2). Public
+     * discovery, never secrets. Returns an empty list on any failure — the login
+     * screen then keeps the website hand-off fallback rather than showing nothing.
+     */
+    suspend fun ssoProviders(): List<SsoProviderDto> = try {
+        ssoApi.providers()
+    } catch (e: CancellationException) {
+        throw e
+    } catch (_: Exception) {
+        emptyList()
+    }
+
     /** Outcome of a login attempt (§4.1). */
     sealed interface LoginResult {
         data object Success : LoginResult

app/src/main/java/com/runicgateway/app/di/NetworkModule.kt

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.MeApi
 import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.NotificationsApi
 import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.PlayerShardApi
 import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.PublicApi
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.SsoApi
 import dagger.Module
 import dagger.Provides
 import dagger.hilt.InstallIn
@@ -96,6 +97,11 @@ object NetworkModule {
     @Singleton
     fun provideAuthApi(retrofit: Retrofit): AuthApi = retrofit.create(AuthApi::class.java)
 
+    /** Native SSO discovery + code exchange (§4.2, M9) — on the main client. */
+    @Provides
+    @Singleton
+    fun provideSsoApi(retrofit: Retrofit): SsoApi = retrofit.create(SsoApi::class.java)
+
     /** Role-agnostic self-service (§6.4) — bearer-authed on the main client. */
     @Provides
     @Singleton

app/src/main/java/com/runicgateway/app/ui/auth/LoginScreen.kt

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import androidx.compose.foundation.verticalScroll
 import androidx.compose.material3.Button
 import androidx.compose.material3.CircularProgressIndicator
 import androidx.compose.material3.MaterialTheme
+import androidx.compose.material3.OutlinedButton
 import androidx.compose.material3.OutlinedTextField
 import androidx.compose.material3.Text
 import androidx.compose.material3.TextButton
@@ -56,6 +57,13 @@ fun LoginScreen(
         if (state.signedIn) onSignedIn()
     }
 
+    // Open a freshly-minted SSO /start URL in a Custom Tab, exactly once (§4.2).
+    LaunchedEffect(state.ssoLaunchUrl) {
+        val url = state.ssoLaunchUrl ?: return@LaunchedEffect
+        WebHandoff.open(context, url)
+        viewModel.onSsoLaunchConsumed()
+    }
+
     Column(
         modifier = modifier
             .fillMaxSize()
@@ -155,6 +163,29 @@ fun LoginScreen(
             }
         }
 
+        // ── Native SSO (§4.2, M9): a button per enabled provider that opens the
+        // Custom-Tab bridge and returns the user signed in. Falls back to the
+        // website login hand-off when the shard exposes no providers.
+        if (state.ssoProviders.isNotEmpty()) {
+            state.ssoProviders.forEach { provider ->
+                OutlinedButton(
+                    onClick = { viewModel.onSsoProviderClick(provider) },
+                    enabled = !state.submitting,
+                    modifier = Modifier
+                        .fillMaxWidth()
+                        .padding(top = 12.dp),
+                ) {
+                    Text(stringResource(R.string.login_sso_provider, provider.name))
+                }
+            }
+        } else {
+            viewModel.ssoLoginUrl?.let { url ->
+                TextButton(onClick = { WebHandoff.open(context, url) }) {
+                    Text(stringResource(R.string.login_sso))
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
         // ── Website hand-offs (§4.2): open the site's own pages in a Custom Tab ──
         viewModel.registerUrl?.let { url ->
             TextButton(
@@ -167,11 +198,6 @@ fun LoginScreen(
                 Text(stringResource(R.string.login_forgot))
             }
         }
-        viewModel.ssoLoginUrl?.let { url ->
-            TextButton(onClick = { WebHandoff.open(context, url) }) {
-                Text(stringResource(R.string.login_sso))
-            }
-        }
     }
 }
 
@@ -181,4 +207,5 @@ private fun loginErrorRes(error: LoginError): Int = when (error) {
     LoginError.RATE_LIMITED -> R.string.login_error_rate_limited
     LoginError.SERVER -> R.string.login_error_server
     LoginError.NETWORK -> R.string.login_error_network
+    LoginError.SSO -> R.string.login_error_sso
 }

app/src/main/java/com/runicgateway/app/ui/auth/LoginViewModel.kt

@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ package com.runicgateway.app.ui.auth
 
 import androidx.lifecycle.ViewModel
 import androidx.lifecycle.viewModelScope
+import com.runicgateway.app.core.auth.sso.SsoAuthManager
 import com.runicgateway.app.core.web.WebsiteUrls
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.SsoProviderDto
 import com.runicgateway.app.data.repository.AuthRepository
 import com.runicgateway.app.data.repository.AuthRepository.LoginResult
 import dagger.hilt.android.lifecycle.HiltViewModel
@@ -25,11 +27,12 @@ import javax.inject.Inject
 @HiltViewModel
 class LoginViewModel @Inject constructor(
     private val authRepository: AuthRepository,
+    private val ssoAuthManager: SsoAuthManager,
     private val websiteUrls: WebsiteUrls,
 ) : ViewModel() {
 
     /** The transient error surfaced under the form after a failed attempt. */
-    enum class LoginError { INVALID_CREDENTIALS, BAD_CODE, RATE_LIMITED, SERVER, NETWORK }
+    enum class LoginError { INVALID_CREDENTIALS, BAD_CODE, RATE_LIMITED, SERVER, NETWORK, SSO }
 
     data class UiState(
         val username: String = "",
@@ -40,11 +43,40 @@ class LoginViewModel @Inject constructor(
         val submitting: Boolean = false,
         val error: LoginError? = null,
         val signedIn: Boolean = false,
+        /** The shard's enabled SSO providers (§4.2); empty → website hand-off fallback. */
+        val ssoProviders: List<SsoProviderDto> = emptyList(),
+        /** A `/auth/mobile/sso/start` URL the screen should open in a Custom Tab, once. */
+        val ssoLaunchUrl: String? = null,
     )
 
     private val _state = MutableStateFlow(UiState())
     val state: StateFlow<UiState> = _state.asStateFlow()
 
+    init {
+        // Discover the native SSO providers to render buttons for (§4.2).
+        viewModelScope.launch {
+            val providers = authRepository.ssoProviders()
+            if (providers.isNotEmpty()) _state.update { it.copy(ssoProviders = providers) }
+        }
+        // Consume the SSO bridge outcome: a returned callback completes here even if
+        // this ViewModel was recreated while the Custom Tab was foreground (§4.2).
+        viewModelScope.launch {
+            ssoAuthManager.outcome.collect { outcome ->
+                when (outcome) {
+                    SsoAuthManager.Outcome.Success -> {
+                        ssoAuthManager.consumeOutcome()
+                        _state.update { it.copy(submitting = false, signedIn = true) }
+                    }
+                    is SsoAuthManager.Outcome.Failed -> {
+                        ssoAuthManager.consumeOutcome()
+                        _state.update { it.copy(submitting = false, error = mapSsoError(outcome.reason)) }
+                    }
+                    SsoAuthManager.Outcome.Idle -> Unit
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     fun onUsernameChange(value: String) = _state.update { it.copy(username = value, error = null) }
     fun onPasswordChange(value: String) = _state.update { it.copy(password = value, error = null) }
     fun onCodeChange(value: String) =
@@ -52,8 +84,33 @@ class LoginViewModel @Inject constructor(
 
     val registerUrl: String? get() = websiteUrls.register()
     val forgotPasswordUrl: String? get() = websiteUrls.forgotPassword()
+
+    /** Website login hand-off — the fallback when native SSO discovery is empty (§4.2). */
     val ssoLoginUrl: String? get() = websiteUrls.login()
 
+    /**
+     * Begin a native SSO flow for [provider]: mint PKCE + state and surface the
+     * `/start` URL for the screen to open in a Custom Tab. No-op (leaves a SERVER
+     * error) if the base URL isn't set yet — the website fallback still shows.
+     */
+    fun onSsoProviderClick(provider: SsoProviderDto) {
+        if (_state.value.submitting) return
+        val url = ssoAuthManager.buildStartUrl(provider.id)
+        if (url == null) {
+            _state.update { it.copy(error = LoginError.SSO) }
+            return
+        }
+        _state.update { it.copy(error = null, ssoLaunchUrl = url) }
+    }
+
+    /** The screen has opened the Custom Tab; clear so it isn't re-launched on recompose. */
+    fun onSsoLaunchConsumed() = _state.update { it.copy(ssoLaunchUrl = null) }
+
+    private fun mapSsoError(reason: SsoAuthManager.Failure): LoginError = when (reason) {
+        SsoAuthManager.Failure.NETWORK -> LoginError.NETWORK
+        else -> LoginError.SSO
+    }
+
     fun submit() {
         val s = _state.value
         if (s.submitting) return

app/src/main/res/values/strings.xml

@@ -61,11 +61,14 @@
     <string name="login_register">Create an account</string>
     <string name="login_forgot">Forgot your password?</string>
     <string name="login_sso">Sign in with Google or Discord (on the website)</string>
+    <!-- %1$s is the provider name, e.g. "Google" or "Discord" (native SSO, M9). -->
+    <string name="login_sso_provider">Sign in with %1$s</string>
     <string name="login_error_credentials">Incorrect username or password.</string>
     <string name="login_error_code">That code didn\'t match. Try the current code.</string>
     <string name="login_error_rate_limited">Too many attempts. Please try again shortly.</string>
     <string name="login_error_server">Something went wrong. Please try again.</string>
     <string name="login_error_network">Can\'t reach the site. Check your connection and try again.</string>
+    <string name="login_error_sso">Couldn\'t complete that sign-in. Please try again.</string>
 
     <!-- ── Auth: account (§5, §6.3) ────────────────────────────────────── -->
     <string name="account_title">My account</string>

app/src/test/java/com/runicgateway/app/core/auth/sso/PkceTest.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+ */
+package com.runicgateway.app.core.auth.sso
+
+import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
+import org.junit.Assert.assertNotEquals
+import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
+import org.junit.Test
+
+/**
+ * PKCE Layer B primitives (PLAN.md §4.2). The challenge encoding must match the
+ * backend byte-for-byte (`base64url(SHA-256(verifier))`, no padding) or `/exchange`
+ * rejects every code — so it is pinned against the RFC 7636 test vector.
+ */
+class PkceTest {
+
+    // RFC 4648 §5 URL-safe base64 alphabet, no padding.
+    private val base64UrlNoPad = Regex("^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$")
+
+    @Test fun `challenge matches the RFC 7636 vector`() {
+        // RFC 7636 Appendix B.
+        val verifier = "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
+        assertEquals("E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM", Pkce.challengeOf(verifier))
+    }
+
+    @Test fun `verifier is url-safe base64 without padding`() {
+        val verifier = Pkce.newVerifier()
+        assertTrue("verifier charset: $verifier", base64UrlNoPad.matches(verifier))
+        // 32 random bytes → 43 base64 chars (no padding), inside RFC 7636's 43–128.
+        assertEquals(43, verifier.length)
+    }
+
+    @Test fun `challenge is url-safe base64 without padding`() {
+        val challenge = Pkce.challengeOf(Pkce.newVerifier())
+        assertTrue("challenge charset: $challenge", base64UrlNoPad.matches(challenge))
+        // SHA-256 (32 bytes) → 43 base64 chars, no '=' padding.
+        assertEquals(43, challenge.length)
+    }
+
+    @Test fun `verifiers and states are unique per call`() {
+        assertNotEquals(Pkce.newVerifier(), Pkce.newVerifier())
+        assertNotEquals(Pkce.newState(), Pkce.newState())
+    }
+
+    @Test fun `state is url-safe base64 without padding`() {
+        assertTrue(base64UrlNoPad.matches(Pkce.newState()))
+    }
+}

app/src/test/java/com/runicgateway/app/core/auth/sso/SsoAuthManagerTest.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+ */
+package com.runicgateway.app.core.auth.sso
+
+import com.runicgateway.app.core.auth.Session
+import com.runicgateway.app.core.auth.SessionManager
+import com.runicgateway.app.core.auth.StoredSession
+import com.runicgateway.app.core.auth.TokenStore
+import com.runicgateway.app.core.net.BaseUrlHolder
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.SsoApi
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.MobileSsoExchangeRequest
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.MobileTokenResponse
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.SafeUserDto
+import com.runicgateway.app.data.api.dto.SsoProviderDto
+import kotlinx.coroutines.test.runTest
+import okhttp3.HttpUrl.Companion.toHttpUrl
+import okhttp3.MediaType.Companion.toMediaTypeOrNull
+import okhttp3.ResponseBody.Companion.toResponseBody
+import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
+import org.junit.Assert.assertNull
+import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
+import org.junit.Test
+import retrofit2.Response
+
+/**
+ * The native SSO bridge orchestration (PLAN.md §4.2, M9): start-URL building, the
+ * CSRF/state guard, the code→token exchange, and that a success drives the *same*
+ * [SessionManager] the password login uses. Runs over a fake [SsoApi] + a real
+ * [SessionManager] on a fake [TokenStore]; no Android framework types are touched.
+ */
+class SsoAuthManagerTest {
+
+    private class FakeTokenStore(var stored: StoredSession? = null) : TokenStore {
+        override fun load(): StoredSession? = stored
+        override fun save(session: StoredSession) { stored = session }
+        override fun clear() { stored = null }
+    }
+
+    /** Records the exchange it was called with and returns a scripted response. */
+    private class FakeSsoApi(
+        private val exchangeResult: () -> Response<MobileTokenResponse>,
+    ) : SsoApi {
+        var exchangeCalls = 0
+        var lastRequest: MobileSsoExchangeRequest? = null
+
+        override suspend fun providers(): List<SsoProviderDto> = emptyList()
+
+        override suspend fun exchange(body: MobileSsoExchangeRequest): Response<MobileTokenResponse> {
+            exchangeCalls++
+            lastRequest = body
+            return exchangeResult()
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun tokenPair() = MobileTokenResponse(
+        accessToken = "access-A",
+        refreshToken = "refresh-A",
+        expiresIn = "15m",
+        user = SafeUserDto(id = 7, username = "alice", role = "player"),
+    )
+
+    private fun error(code: Int): Response<MobileTokenResponse> =
+        Response.error(code, "".toResponseBody("application/json".toMediaTypeOrNull()))
+
+    private fun managerWith(
+        api: SsoApi,
+        session: SessionManager,
+        base: String? = "https://shard.example.com/",
+    ): SsoAuthManager {
+        val holder = BaseUrlHolder()
+        if (base != null) holder.set(base.toHttpUrl())
+        return SsoAuthManager(api, session, holder)
+    }
+
+    /** Build a start URL and pull the generated `state` back out of it. */
+    private fun startAndState(mgr: SsoAuthManager, provider: String = "google"): String {
+        val url = mgr.buildStartUrl(SsoProviderDto(id = provider, name = "Google").id)!!
+        return url.toHttpUrl().queryParameter("state")!!
+    }
+
+    @Test fun `buildStartUrl carries provider, challenge, state and the fixed redirect`() {
+        val mgr = managerWith(FakeSsoApi { tokenPair().let { Response.success(it) } }, SessionManager(FakeTokenStore()))
+        val url = mgr.buildStartUrl("google")!!
+        val http = url.toHttpUrl()
+
+        assertTrue(url.startsWith("https://shard.example.com/api/v1/auth/mobile/sso/start"))
+        assertEquals("google", http.queryParameter("provider"))
+        assertEquals(SsoAuthManager.REDIRECT_URI, http.queryParameter("redirect_uri"))
+        assertTrue(!http.queryParameter("code_challenge").isNullOrBlank())
+        assertTrue(!http.queryParameter("state").isNullOrBlank())
+    }
+
+    @Test fun `buildStartUrl returns null when no base url is set`() {
+        val mgr = managerWith(FakeSsoApi { Response.success(tokenPair()) }, SessionManager(FakeTokenStore()), base = null)
+        assertNull(mgr.buildStartUrl("google"))
+    }
+
+    @Test fun `successful callback exchanges and signs in`() = runTest {
+        val api = FakeSsoApi { Response.success(tokenPair()) }
+        val session = SessionManager(FakeTokenStore())
+        val mgr = managerWith(api, session)
+
+        val state = startAndState(mgr)
+        mgr.complete(state = state, code = "auth-code-1", error = null)
+
+        assertEquals(1, api.exchangeCalls)
+        assertEquals("auth-code-1", api.lastRequest?.code)
+        assertTrue(session.state.value is Session.SignedIn)
+        assertEquals("access-A", session.currentAccessToken())
+        assertEquals(SsoAuthManager.Outcome.Success, mgr.outcome.value)
+    }
+
+    @Test fun `state mismatch fails without exchanging`() = runTest {
+        val api = FakeSsoApi { Response.success(tokenPair()) }
+        val session = SessionManager(FakeTokenStore())
+        val mgr = managerWith(api, session)
+
+        startAndState(mgr) // establishes a pending with a different state
+        mgr.complete(state = "not-the-state", code = "auth-code-1", error = null)
+
+        assertEquals(0, api.exchangeCalls)
+        assertTrue(session.state.value is Session.SignedOut)
+        assertEquals(SsoAuthManager.Outcome.Failed(SsoAuthManager.Failure.STATE_MISMATCH), mgr.outcome.value)
+    }
+
+    @Test fun `missing pending flow (process death) fails closed`() = runTest {
+        val api = FakeSsoApi { Response.success(tokenPair()) }
+        val mgr = managerWith(api, SessionManager(FakeTokenStore()))
+
+        // No buildStartUrl → nothing stashed; a callback can't be trusted.
+        mgr.complete(state = "anything", code = "auth-code-1", error = null)
+
+        assertEquals(0, api.exchangeCalls)
+        assertEquals(SsoAuthManager.Outcome.Failed(SsoAuthManager.Failure.STATE_MISMATCH), mgr.outcome.value)
+    }
+
+    @Test fun `error callback maps to a declined sign-in and does not exchange`() = runTest {
+        val api = FakeSsoApi { Response.success(tokenPair()) }
+        val mgr = managerWith(api, SessionManager(FakeTokenStore()))
+
+        val state = startAndState(mgr)
+        mgr.complete(state = state, code = null, error = "access_denied")
+
+        assertEquals(0, api.exchangeCalls)
+        assertEquals(SsoAuthManager.Outcome.Failed(SsoAuthManager.Failure.DENIED), mgr.outcome.value)
+    }
+
+    @Test fun `401 exchange maps to expired code`() = runTest {
+        val api = FakeSsoApi { error(401) }
+        val session = SessionManager(FakeTokenStore())
+        val mgr = managerWith(api, session)
+
+        val state = startAndState(mgr)
+        mgr.complete(state = state, code = "stale-code", error = null)
+
+        assertEquals(1, api.exchangeCalls)
+        assertTrue(session.state.value is Session.SignedOut)
+        assertEquals(SsoAuthManager.Outcome.Failed(SsoAuthManager.Failure.EXPIRED_CODE), mgr.outcome.value)
+    }
+
+    @Test fun `a second delivery of the same callback finds no pending`() = runTest {
+        val api = FakeSsoApi { Response.success(tokenPair()) }
+        val mgr = managerWith(api, SessionManager(FakeTokenStore()))
+
+        val state = startAndState(mgr)
+        mgr.complete(state = state, code = "auth-code-1", error = null)
+        mgr.complete(state = state, code = "auth-code-1", error = null) // replay
+
+        // Only the first delivery exchanged; the replay fails the state guard.
+        assertEquals(1, api.exchangeCalls)
+        assertEquals(SsoAuthManager.Outcome.Failed(SsoAuthManager.Failure.STATE_MISMATCH), mgr.outcome.value)
+    }
+
+    @Test fun `matchesCallback only accepts the fixed scheme host and path`() {
+        val mgr = managerWith(FakeSsoApi { Response.success(tokenPair()) }, SessionManager(FakeTokenStore()))
+        assertTrue(mgr.matchesCallback("runicgateway", "auth", "/callback"))
+        assertTrue(!mgr.matchesCallback("https", "auth", "/callback"))
+        assertTrue(!mgr.matchesCallback("runicgateway", "auth", "/other"))
+        assertTrue(!mgr.matchesCallback("runicgateway", "evil", "/callback"))
+    }
+}