Commit Graph

11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
285db0baa7 feat(rust): notifications and engagement (phase 10, protocol 7)
Registers the engagement set R7 put in v1: thirteen triggers, four push
streams, three audiences, four bodies (two triggers, email and in-app)
and thirteen disabled rules in seven groups (PLAN.md §25, D59-D68).

The raid alert goes to everyone authorised on the tool cupboard, one
emit per linked person with ownerUserId, so the owner ceiling holds per
emit. It covers doors and walls (protocol 7), never names the raider,
alerts nobody when there is no cupboard, and carries ownerOnline so
"offline only" is the seeded rule's condition rather than code.

The fan-out runs off ingest before a frame is applied, since applying a
disband deletes the roster the notice is sent to. A replayed event is
told only while it is news: 15 minutes for broadcasts, 24 hours for
personal and staff events. Dedupe keys come from the event, not the
sidecar's row id. Server online/offline and a new kills leader are
in-memory transitions, never on first sight, and a tie is not a lead.
A login with no approval within a minute becomes a staff notice via a
query, so a restart loses nothing.

Also fixes a phase-4 gap (D68): the refresh now asks /health, so a game
that hung, or whose bridge was unloaded, while the sidecar stayed up no
longer reads as online. It stops naming players as online, and a stale
board no longer moves "last seen".

engagement-triggers.json is the committed freeze of all of it, checked
in CI with line endings normalised. The check was verified by breaking
it both ways.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E14m6SuuY6i1vASFeGDBeY
2026-09-23 06:06:19 -05:00
c94271104f feat(rust): Teams from first-party clans (phase 9, protocol 6)
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A first-party Rust clan is a Team (R5). This module becomes the site's
Team provider and answers core from the plugin's `clans` board. Design
of record: docs/modules/rust/PLAN.md §24, D47-D58.

- The store: rust_clans, rust_clan_members and rust_clan_boards. A clan's
  identity is <serverId>:<clanId>:<createdMs> (D52), because the game
  restarts clan ids whenever its clan database version changes.
- The provider (D53): getTeams is complete only when every server's
  board is fresh, supported and untruncated. It is partial when some
  are, and refuses when none are. Freshness is judged by the website's
  clock, from when the board's `t` last advanced.
- Only a complete board may mark a clan gone. A board at the game's
  100-clan ceiling (D55), or one with an unreadable row, proves nothing
  about what it leaves out.
- Leadership is diffed board to board and published (D54). The five clan
  events are published as team.* kinds, and written to the Team feed as
  members-only lines (D49).
- Core only writes feed items for a Team it already holds. So the last 10
  minutes of clan events are re-offered on each board refresh, deduped by
  a sha1 key: core clamps a dedupeKey to 40 characters, and a readable key
  would be truncated into collisions.
- projectRoster and the clan page share one audience rule (D48): the
  clan's linked members and staff by default, re-read from the users row.
  The setting lives on Admin > Rust visibility, which also warns about
  uMod Clans (D47) and the ceiling.
- Public: GET servers/:id/clans (the list is public, D58) and
  GET clans/:externalId. The client adds a Clans tab and
  /rust/clans/:externalId, with three module slots for core's notify,
  activity and forum contributions (D56).
- Linking and unlinking an account ask core to reconcile Teams (D57).
- The clan kinds are staff-class in the public feed allowlist.
- PROTOCOL_VERSION is now 6.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E14m6SuuY6i1vASFeGDBeY
2026-09-23 05:14:18 -05:00
be44839896 fix(rust): nothing names who is online by default
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The org lead's rule, settled 2026-09-22: who is online is always the
narrowest audience - staff - unless an operator deliberately widens it,
and a count is fine where a list of names is not.

The public site broke that in three places since phase 4. The Online
tab named every player, the feed carried joins, respawns, deaths, chat
and tallies, and the leaderboard's lastSeen - refreshed every minute by
a gather tally - said who was on as plainly as either. All three now
sit behind one setting:

* PRESENCE_KINDS, a subset of the public allowlist, gated per request.
  Below the audience the feed keeps the server's own story (wipe, start,
  shutdown) and says presenceHidden rather than looking quiet.
* the Online route answers { players: [], hidden, count, audience } -
  same shape, so an older client renders empty rather than breaking.
* rungs staff / signed_in / public, fleet-wide default in a new
  rust_settings table with an optional per-server override on
  rust_servers; an unknown stored word narrows to staff.
* the viewer's standing is RE-READ from the users row (ctx.users.getById),
  not taken from the token, so a demotion or a ban applies on the next
  request. Walked: a moderator demoted mid-session lost the roll call on
  the same cookie.
* per-viewer answers are Cache-Control: private, no-store.
* GET/PUT /admin/rust/visibility (requireRole admin) and an admin page,
  Rust visibility; every save is one activity-log row.

The browser walk also found every empty state in this module rendering
as a blank box. Core's EmptyState renders children only; this module
passed title/message (the shape the Integration Kit template teaches)
and React dropped both without a word. Fixed module-side with a small
Empty wrapper - nothing core or module-uo renders changes - and a client
test that refuses a titled EmptyState or a PageHeader subtitle.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E14m6SuuY6i1vASFeGDBeY
2026-09-23 00:30:08 -05:00
383e89442e feat(rust): what the site has given a player, as the player reads it
Phase 8's website half. Phase 7 made the site the author of in-game
privilege and gave an operator every view of it; this is the other side,
and it is the first time a player can see what they hold without asking
one.

`GET /player/rust/permissions` is self-scoped in SQL and read-only by
construction — a grant a player could change would not be a grant. Three
things make it a different shape from the admin read rather than a
filtered one:

  * the scope arithmetic is answered on the server. A client handed `*`
    would have to know what the fleet is to say anything, and then
    `inScope` exists twice. Each entry carries the servers it reaches,
    already resolved and already marked.
  * `live` is the pushed ledger, never the authored row. A grant is not a
    privilege in a game until a sync confirmed it, and phase 7 is careful
    never to record a push that silently did nothing — so "waiting" is
    honest, and the alternative is the site claiming to have given
    something it has not.
  * nothing says WHY it is waiting. An offline server, a permission no
    loaded plugin registered and a store that has never seen the account
    all look the same from here; telling them apart is an operator's
    diagnosis and an inventory of what is installed.

An entitlement that reaches nobody still lists, and the page says so —
authored against the website account, it exists before a Steam id does,
and hiding it until one turns up is the defect the admin user page
shipped in phase 7 (PLAN.md §20.5).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PMH6bw1jXMgbyF3ZWGEzSM
2026-09-22 20:09:51 -05:00
e54ae3afb9 feat(rust): mod configuration from the site, and an editor that will not rewrite a float
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R18's two tiers: a form generated from a config file's own values, and raw JSON
for what a form cannot express. Admin → Rust mod config, one live round trip per
action, nothing cached between a browser and a game host's disk.

`configEdit.js` is the part that could not be done naively. JavaScript cannot
tell `1` from `1.0`, and both mod frameworks deserialize a config into typed C#
classes — so a read-modify-write silently rewrites every whole-numbered float as
an integer on fields nobody touched, and a plugin that then throws at load does
not come back. It never parses, mutates and re-serialises: it records the SOURCE
SPAN of every value and splices literals into them, so an untouched `1.0` is
still `1.0` and a number an admin types travels as text the whole way (D35/D36).

The bridge's own config is editable with `Host`, `Port` and `ServerId` locked,
in the form and in the raw tier, because either would cut the link carrying the
edit or strand every row this site holds (D38). Credentials render masked with a
reveal; the raw tier shows them (D37) and the audit trail never does.

`rust_config_writes` records every save including the refused and the rolled
back — an operator asking why a setting is not what they set needs to see that
somebody tried.

Three defects a browser walk found that 179 green tests did not:

* every save of the bridge's own config was refused while the page said the
  opposite — a `<select>` whose value matches no `<option>` shows the first one,
  so the reload guess `RunicGateway` was on the wire and "nothing" was on the
  screen;
* `btn ghost` is not a class this platform defines (`.btn-ghost` is), so every
  secondary button in this module has rendered as a primary one since phase 7 —
  here it made the open file and the active tier indistinguishable;
* a save's refusal rendered at the top of a long form, far from the button.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PMH6bw1jXMgbyF3ZWGEzSM
2026-09-22 08:55:28 -05:00
43147b796a feat(rust): site-owned permissions — the site is the author, the game is the cache
R2, and the first phase where this module WRITES to a game. Groups and grants are
authored on the website and pushed into each server's own permission store, so
every plugin that already calls `UserHasPermission` honours them with no adapter,
and a wipe stops being a data-loss event.

**Seven org-lead decisions (D28-D34).** A grant is keyed to the website USER and
resolved to every Steam id they have linked at push time (D28); every authored row
carries a scope — a server or `*` (D29); groups are mirrored as real groups rather
than flattened (D30); a holder the site did not author is REPORTED, never undone,
with adopt and revoke offered (D31); one verb, with the plugin diffing locally
(D32); a permission no server has registered is reported unresolved and never
self-registered (D33); authoring is people and groups by hand, with rules deferred
(D34).

**Three sets, and every interesting question is a difference between two.**
`desired − pushed` is what to apply; `pushed − desired` is what to RETIRE, because
the site put it there and has since withdrawn it; `present − desired` is drift. The
middle one is why `rust_perm_pushed` exists: a name in the store that is not in the
desired set is either something the site retired or something a human granted, and
those two have opposite correct answers.

**What lands is not what was sent.** A grant naming a permission the server has not
registered did not land — `GrantUserPermission` no-ops silently — and a member the
store has never seen could not be placed. Neither is recorded as pushed, so the
site never believes it gave a privilege it did not.

The loop asks a cheap question every thirty seconds — does the digest of the
desired set still equal what this server last confirmed — and syncs on a change, a
restart, a wipe, a drift hook, a failed attempt past its backoff, or the
fifteen-minute audit that finds drift on a server nobody has touched.

**This module's first admin page**, because a permission model is the first thing
here that has to be composed rather than configured. What is on it is decided by
what an operator can get wrong: four states are invisible from the game and from a
list of grants, and each is a sentence rather than a number.

Walked end to end against a real core at the pinned ref, the real sidecar, and a
stand-in speaking protocol 4 — including a restart that emptied the store and was
fully re-pushed. Four defects the browser found that 133 green tests did not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PMH6bw1jXMgbyF3ZWGEzSM
2026-09-21 18:28:32 -05:00
0876a1d568 fix(rust): answer refusals in the field core reads, and show the name the game last saw
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The two defects the phase 6 browser walk found and #6 described but did not
carry. They were written, walked and left uncommitted; `edge` still has the
shapes the walk condemned.

**Every refusal sentence was invisible.** Core's request primitive reads one
field — `(data && data.message) || res.statusText` — and this module has
answered `{ error: … }` since phase 1. It got away with it because every
failure until phase 6 landed in `ErrorState` on a page whose whole content was
missing, where a generic sentence is honest. A form is different: the sentence
IS the outcome, and the link page showed *Service Unavailable* for all four of
the refusals phase 6 exists to write. All 23 bodies now answer in `message` —
core's `Error` schema, which these routes' own `#swagger.responses` already
referenced, so the annotations stop being a claim the handlers contradict.

`test/errorShape.test.js` drives each outcome rather than grepping for the
field, and asserts the half that is easy to leave behind: a body carrying BOTH
fields renders correctly in a browser and keeps the wrong shape alive for the
next route that copies it.

**The player saw a stale name.** `/player/rust` showed the name recorded at
link time while the admin panel showed the one the game last saw — the same
person labelled two ways on one site, because a Rust name changes on a whim and
only the admin read joined `rust_players`. A LEFT JOIN, because an account can
be linked and never played on.

123 server tests, 39 client tests, `check:imports`, `check:bundle`,
`check:swagger`, `check:externals` — all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PMH6bw1jXMgbyF3ZWGEzSM
2026-09-21 17:34:21 -05:00
baffaa46c9 feat(rust): identity — a link code from the game, and the Steam id inside core's user page
R1's identity link, site-side, and R13's first extension slot. A player types
/link in game, the plugin hands them a six-character code privately, and they
enter it here; the site records who owns which Steam account, and an operator
sees that on core's own `/admin/users/:id` page.

**The site is the author of record and the game holds nothing.** There is no
per-account store in Rust that survives a wipe, and phase 7 needs the site
authoritative anyway — it pushes permissions INTO the game keyed by Steam id. A
copy in the game would be a second thing to reconcile every wipe, for no question
it could answer better.

## D24 — a code is minted by ONE server, so every server is asked

Nothing in six characters says where it came from. The fleet is asked in turn and
the first `link.ok` wins; the others answer `unknown` and nothing happens there,
because a code is only spent at the server that actually holds it. Asking the
player to pick was rejected: a wrong pick would come back indistinguishable from
a wrong code, and that is the one refusal which must not be ambiguous.

**"Every reachable server refused" is not the same answer as "a server was
unreachable."** Collapsing them tells a player whose server is down that their
code is wrong — so they run /link again on that same server and are told the same
thing for as long as it stays down. `unsure` is that case, and it says to try
again rather than to fetch a new code.

## D23 — a Steam id another account holds is refused, never moved

The primary key is `steam_id`, and it is load-bearing rather than tidy: phase 7
grants permissions against a link and phase 13 hangs entitlements off it, so a
silent move is an account takeover performed by typing six characters. The
refusal names the holder, because the advice is unusable without it. The INSERT
is a plain INSERT for the same reason — `ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE` here would BE
that move — and the duplicate-key error is the refusal for the race the check
above cannot close.

The way out is `/unlink` in game, which reaches the site off the ingest feed
rather than through a route (the plugin has no link to delete). D25 adds the
other way out: staff can sever a link from the admin panel, for a player who
cannot reach that Steam account in game.

## The slot, and the hole it found in this repo's own generator

`admin.users.detail` is declared in `module.json` AND registered in `index.js`
AND filled by the chunk — three places, because the server half and the client
half are different registrations that share one name.

`swaggerFragment.js` knew only about tier routers, so the two routes under
`/admin/users/:id` were generated by nothing: a fragment that was internally
consistent and described two routes fewer than the module serves. A slot's mount
is core's and cannot be derived here, so it is a fourth constant beside
`TIER_BASE` — held to account by the frozen-manifest job, which was verified to
catch exactly this by removing the two paths and watching it fail.

## Smaller things worth knowing

- **Core's `useAsync` has no `refresh`.** A counter in the deps is how a page
  re-reads after its own write; it blanks while it re-reads, which is right here
  and is exactly what made it wrong for a poll.
- **Every player-portal nav row needs an `icon`** — core draws one on every row,
  and the client suite says so. This module had no icons file until now, because
  the public header is text buttons.
- The two new frame kinds are STAFF-only. Neither carries a code, but both name a
  Steam id beside a website account's activity, and that join is not a public
  fact about what happened on a server.
- The link code route carries its own rate limiter rather than core's
  `accountChangeLimiter`: this is guessing somebody else's secret, not changing
  your own password, and a shared counter would let one policy set the other.

Protocol 3 on all three declaration sites; 17 new tests, 136 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PMH6bw1jXMgbyF3ZWGEzSM
2026-09-21 08:18:48 -05:00
22fd8c5da7 feat: the first pages, and what a browser walk found behind them
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Phase 4. `/rust` is the server list and the module's landing page (D12);
`/rust/servers/:id` is one server with four tabs — feed, leaderboard, who is
on, wipes (D13). Everything selectable lives in the URL, so any view of the
page is a link. The feed and the presence list poll every twenty seconds while
the tab is visible and not at all when it is not (D14); the leaderboard and the
wipe list load once. `site.footer.status` is filled with a live server and
player count (D15).

Nothing on these pages calls a game server. Every field comes from this
module's own tables, which is what the phase criterion is about: the site
renders the last thing each server said while every server is off.

Walking that criterion in a browser against a live rig found four defects, two
of them already shipped in phase 3:

  * An unreachable refresh called `putState` — the whole-row write — with two
    fields, so a host that rebooted lost its hostname, map, size, seed and wipe
    id. The list then read "Offline" with nothing beside it, which is not "here
    is what we know" but "we have never heard of it". `markUnreachable` now
    moves three columns and mentions no others.
  * "Last reported" read `updated_at`, which a FAILED poll writes too — so an
    offline server claimed it had reported just now, every thirty seconds, for
    as long as it stayed down. `last_seen_at` is the new column, moved only by a
    frame that arrived.
  * Feed rows showed a bare time of day, so three events from six weeks ago all
    read as this afternoon once the feed was filtered to a past wipe.
  * `/rust/servers/typo` rendered core's ErrorState under its own heading and
    read "No such server / Something went wrong", sending a reader who mistyped
    a URL looking for an outage.

Also: a detail route (`GET …/servers/:id`), because it is the only route under
that path that can say a server does not exist — the other four answer an empty
list for an id nobody configured, and each of those is a good answer to its own
question.

`useAsync` cannot poll: it blanks its data on every dependency change, so a
twenty-second refresh built on it would clear the killfeed and re-fill it four
times a minute. `hooks/usePolled.js` is the module's own, invisible when it
succeeds and keeping the rows when it fails.

The client test fake was *nearly* core — it prefixed routes without stripping
the trailing separator, so the first module to register an index route failed
the nav check for a link that works in a browser. It now copies core's line
character for character.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
2026-09-16 21:40:28 -05:00
f211969ee1 feat: ingest protocol 2, and keep the record a wipe cannot erase
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The module half of the read path. Seven tables, an ingest cursor, four public
routes, and one file whose only job is deciding who may see what.

**The record and the window are different things.** `rust_player_wipe_stats` and
`rust_gather_totals` are permanent and per-wipe, so all-time is those rows SUMmed
rather than a second set of counters that can disagree with them — that is R12's
"per-wipe detail plus all-time rollups" in one table instead of two.
`rust_events` is a bounded 30-day window of raw frames for the killfeed, and
`rust_presence` is a board: replaced wholesale, never appended.

**The feed is a cursor, not a socket, and the header says why.** Core runs Node
20, where a global WebSocket is still behind a flag, so a socket means taking
`ws` — against a release that asserts it has no runtime dependencies (D5). The
deciding argument is the other one though: a socket needs a cursor anyway, for
whatever it missed while the module was restarting, and the catch-up path is the
one that has to be right. A cursor alone is one mechanism exercised every five
seconds rather than two where the second only runs after an outage.

**The cursor advances after the batch, never before.** A crash between the two
re-reads events already counted, which inflates a total; the other order loses
them silently and for ever. One is visible and bounded, the other is invisible
and permanent, so the code fails in the visible direction. A server with no
cursor starts at the sidecar's current END rather than at zero — replaying a
fortnight of deaths into stats for wipes the site never saw is not a catch-up.

**`catalogue.js` is a security boundary, default-deny.** Protocol 2 carries IP
addresses (login attempts, approvals, bans), one player's report about another,
and the grid reference of somebody's base. They are stored, because an operator
chasing ban evasion needs them; they are not served below the admin tier. The
allowlist lives here rather than as a field on the wire, because a boundary
declared by the sender is one a compromised or merely out-of-date game host can
widen — the same reason core's own shard fan-out filters on the serving side. A
kind this build has never heard of is not public, and a test holds the list
against PROTOCOL.md §8.4 so that adding a kind to the protocol without
classifying it fails a build.

`PROTOCOL_VERSION` goes to 2 here in the same change as the emitters, though this
module consumes none of the new frames yet: the sidecar refuses a mismatched
client with a 409, so a module left on 1 would stop being able to read the board
it has been reading all along. A constant that lags the deployment is an outage
with a version number on it.

95 server tests, 20 client tests, every guard green, and `routes.manifest.json`
regenerated against a real core at the pinned ref: 10 routes, all documented,
none of core's moved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
2026-09-16 08:37:16 -05:00
862c328176 feat: the module skeleton and every bundle seam
module-rust, id 'rust', built from the Integration Kit's template. Phase 1's job
is the kit's own argument: get every seam working at once with almost nothing in
them, so that afterwards you break exactly one at a time.

What is here:

* /rust on all three tiers, because the loader holds module.json's mounts against
  what is registered in BOTH directions -- so the declaration and the
  registration land together or not at all. The player tier is honestly thin: it
  answers the server list on the authenticated tier, delegating to the same model
  the public tier uses so the two cannot drift while they are meant to be the
  same. It is the address the app will call, registered now rather than moved
  later.
* Two tables. rust_servers is configuration an operator writes; rust_server_state
  is what a sidecar reported. Separate tables because they have different
  writers, lifetimes and audiences -- and because purging observed state while
  keeping the configuration is a thing an operator will want.
* Per-server sidecar tokens through ctx.secretBox, write-only in the API. The
  admin list reports hasToken and never the credential, and an empty token on a
  save leaves the stored one alone -- a form that posts its own blank field would
  otherwise erase a credential every time somebody renamed a server.
* A real sidecar client. It never throws: every call answers {ok, status, data},
  and the status is what tells a wrong URL from a wrong token from a mismatched
  protocol -- all three present as 'the site says my server is offline' and each
  has a different fix.
* The five guards, green: check:imports, check:swagger, check:externals, and both
  suites.

What is deliberately NOT registered: the Team provider, triggers, audiences,
engagement seeds, notification streams, the four event catalogues, and the two
extension slots. Each arrives with the phase that has something real to put in
it, and a test asserts their absence so that removing it is deliberate. A
declared trigger nothing emits and a declared slot nothing fills are both
surfaces an operator can configure and then wait on, which is worse than an
absent one because the absence is visible.

Two corrections to the kit's template, both feedback for a later phase:

* registration.test.js read one page BY NAME to check declared slots are
  rendered, so a module declaring none dies on ENOENT before reaching the loop
  that would have been empty. It now scans every file under src/routes.
* test/_fakes.js supplied validator: {}. An admin router that builds validation
  chains at file scope cannot be required with that, so the fake holds the real
  express-validator -- for the same reason it holds a real express Router.

The kit was right about noGameConnection.test.js: its header predicts that a
module adding a sidecar client will see the check go red, names sidecarClient.js
as the file to allow, and says narrow it rather than delete it. That is exactly
what happened on the first run, and the fix was the one line the header names.

Installed into a real core and verified: the module reaches 'started', publishes
its capability, serves its chunk, and renders a server whose server.hello
originated in a live Rust server.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
2026-09-15 19:54:08 -05:00