8df850f73e9bdd7e56c4766c8e95d582338bfc3f
3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 22fd8c5da7 |
feat: the first pages, and what a browser walk found behind them
Phase 4. `/rust` is the server list and the module's landing page (D12);
`/rust/servers/:id` is one server with four tabs — feed, leaderboard, who is
on, wipes (D13). Everything selectable lives in the URL, so any view of the
page is a link. The feed and the presence list poll every twenty seconds while
the tab is visible and not at all when it is not (D14); the leaderboard and the
wipe list load once. `site.footer.status` is filled with a live server and
player count (D15).
Nothing on these pages calls a game server. Every field comes from this
module's own tables, which is what the phase criterion is about: the site
renders the last thing each server said while every server is off.
Walking that criterion in a browser against a live rig found four defects, two
of them already shipped in phase 3:
* An unreachable refresh called `putState` — the whole-row write — with two
fields, so a host that rebooted lost its hostname, map, size, seed and wipe
id. The list then read "Offline" with nothing beside it, which is not "here
is what we know" but "we have never heard of it". `markUnreachable` now
moves three columns and mentions no others.
* "Last reported" read `updated_at`, which a FAILED poll writes too — so an
offline server claimed it had reported just now, every thirty seconds, for
as long as it stayed down. `last_seen_at` is the new column, moved only by a
frame that arrived.
* Feed rows showed a bare time of day, so three events from six weeks ago all
read as this afternoon once the feed was filtered to a past wipe.
* `/rust/servers/typo` rendered core's ErrorState under its own heading and
read "No such server / Something went wrong", sending a reader who mistyped
a URL looking for an outage.
Also: a detail route (`GET …/servers/:id`), because it is the only route under
that path that can say a server does not exist — the other four answer an empty
list for an id nobody configured, and each of those is a good answer to its own
question.
`useAsync` cannot poll: it blanks its data on every dependency change, so a
twenty-second refresh built on it would clear the killfeed and re-fill it four
times a minute. `hooks/usePolled.js` is the module's own, invisible when it
succeeds and keeping the rows when it fails.
The client test fake was *nearly* core — it prefixed routes without stripping
the trailing separator, so the first module to register an index route failed
the nav check for a link that works in a browser. It now copies core's line
character for character.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
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| f211969ee1 |
feat: ingest protocol 2, and keep the record a wipe cannot erase
The module half of the read path. Seven tables, an ingest cursor, four public routes, and one file whose only job is deciding who may see what. **The record and the window are different things.** `rust_player_wipe_stats` and `rust_gather_totals` are permanent and per-wipe, so all-time is those rows SUMmed rather than a second set of counters that can disagree with them — that is R12's "per-wipe detail plus all-time rollups" in one table instead of two. `rust_events` is a bounded 30-day window of raw frames for the killfeed, and `rust_presence` is a board: replaced wholesale, never appended. **The feed is a cursor, not a socket, and the header says why.** Core runs Node 20, where a global WebSocket is still behind a flag, so a socket means taking `ws` — against a release that asserts it has no runtime dependencies (D5). The deciding argument is the other one though: a socket needs a cursor anyway, for whatever it missed while the module was restarting, and the catch-up path is the one that has to be right. A cursor alone is one mechanism exercised every five seconds rather than two where the second only runs after an outage. **The cursor advances after the batch, never before.** A crash between the two re-reads events already counted, which inflates a total; the other order loses them silently and for ever. One is visible and bounded, the other is invisible and permanent, so the code fails in the visible direction. A server with no cursor starts at the sidecar's current END rather than at zero — replaying a fortnight of deaths into stats for wipes the site never saw is not a catch-up. **`catalogue.js` is a security boundary, default-deny.** Protocol 2 carries IP addresses (login attempts, approvals, bans), one player's report about another, and the grid reference of somebody's base. They are stored, because an operator chasing ban evasion needs them; they are not served below the admin tier. The allowlist lives here rather than as a field on the wire, because a boundary declared by the sender is one a compromised or merely out-of-date game host can widen — the same reason core's own shard fan-out filters on the serving side. A kind this build has never heard of is not public, and a test holds the list against PROTOCOL.md §8.4 so that adding a kind to the protocol without classifying it fails a build. `PROTOCOL_VERSION` goes to 2 here in the same change as the emitters, though this module consumes none of the new frames yet: the sidecar refuses a mismatched client with a 409, so a module left on 1 would stop being able to read the board it has been reading all along. A constant that lags the deployment is an outage with a version number on it. 95 server tests, 20 client tests, every guard green, and `routes.manifest.json` regenerated against a real core at the pinned ref: 10 routes, all documented, none of core's moved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4 |
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| b33d21d71b |
feat(ci): packaging, release and the frozen manifest
Phase 2 of docs/modules/rust/PLAN.md. Phase 1 built five guards and ran them by hand; this repo had no workflows at all, so nothing gated the branch that gets released and there was no way to release it. Three pieces: - **release.yml** — the derived-version engine link, installer and Module-uo already run (conventional-commit subjects since the newest tag; module.json's version survives as a floor; workflow_dispatch as the backdoor), assembling the bundle from an include list and publishing the tarball, the install manifest carrying its sha256, and SHA256SUMS. The tag is the number that ships and CI stamps it into the bundle's own module.json. - **pr-checks.yml** — server tests, check:imports, check:bundle, check:swagger, the client build, client tests and check:externals, plus frozen-manifest. - **frozen-manifest** — clones core at the sha pinned in ci/core-ref.json, generates its route table without this module and with it, and takes the difference. It ran locally against that exact ref: six routes, all documented, no core route moved. That is the first proof by a running core that /rust collides with nothing — phase 1 could only check it by reading, because core mounts /status and /version at a tier root where the loader's own collision probe cannot see them. The bundle carries no node_modules, because the shipped half declares no runtime dependencies (org lead, phase 2). checkBundle.js holds both halves of that: the include list still covers everything server/index.js reaches, and no dependency has appeared without the release learning to pack it. Verified by breaking it — dropping "model" from the list names the exact edit and exits 1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4 |
