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Module-Rust/server/model/links/links.db.js
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fix(rust): protocol 13 step 2 — expiry, plugin loads, the loading hold, NPC names, the link fleet (F2 F5 F6 F7 F8 F13 F14)
The module's half of PLAN_FIXES §6 step 2 (decisions D181-D185, docs#288).

- F13/F14 (D170, D183): `world.expired`, recognisable from protocol 13 by its
  `what`, is handed to core as the resource the zone step ledgered
  (`world`, `<serverId>:<id>`) through ctx.events.expired, which records it
  `expired`. coreApi moves to ^1.11.0 (website#209).
- F8 (D184): `plugin.loaded` / `plugin.unloaded` mark the permission sync dirty
  when the plugin added or removed permissions, so an unresolved grant lands on
  the next tick instead of the fifteen-minute audit.
- Catalogue: plugin.loaded/unloaded, world.expired and lease.expired are staff
  kinds. The last two were never classified (default deny kept them off public
  pages); the test now covers every event kind through protocol 13.
- F7: permission and title pushes hold while the stored hello says
  `worldReady: false` (a human's "sync now" does not); a failed or refused
  permission sync now logs at warn.
- F2 (D185): the killfeed names an NPC attacker — a family (Scientist, Bandit
  guard, Bradley APC…) or the prefab without its variant digits (wolf2 → Wolf).
- F5/F6: a link code is asked of the servers that minted one in the last six
  minutes first, then of the rest, each group in parallel; "unsure" only when
  one of the minting servers is unreachable.
- D182: the admin server list carries the ZoneManager helper's state from the
  hello, and the servers page says what a missing or failed helper costs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E14m6SuuY6i1vASFeGDBeY
2026-09-26 21:35:46 -05:00

199 lines
7.3 KiB
JavaScript

// ── SQL, and nothing else ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// The `.db.js` half of the pair (see `servers.db.js` for why the split earns its
// keep). Raw parameterised SQL through `core.query`, placeholders always.
const core = require('../../core')
const LINKS = 'rust_account_links'
const PLAYERS = 'rust_players'
const STATS = 'rust_player_wipe_stats'
const EVENTS = 'rust_events'
/**
* The link for one Steam id, or undefined.
*
* Joins core's `users` for the username, because every caller that asks "who
* owns this?" wants a name rather than an integer — and the one caller that
* refuses a re-link has to be able to say *whose* it is.
*/
async function getBySteamId(steamId) {
const rows = await core.query(
`SELECT l.steam_id AS steamId, l.user_id AS userId, l.name, l.server_id AS serverId,
l.linked_at AS linkedAt, u.username
FROM ${LINKS} l
JOIN users u ON u.id = l.user_id
WHERE l.steam_id = ?`,
[steamId],
)
return rows[0]
}
/**
* Every Steam account one website user holds, newest first.
*
* **It joins `rust_players` for the name the game last saw**, and that is not a
* convenience. The name on the LINK is what the player was called at the moment
* they linked, which is a Rust name and changes on a whim — so a player who has
* renamed since sees a name they no longer use, on the one page of the site that
* is about who they are. The admin panel already preferred the newer one; this
* is the same rule applied where the person themselves is reading.
*
* A LEFT JOIN, because a player can link an account and never play on it.
*/
async function listForUser(userId) {
return core.query(
`SELECT l.steam_id AS steamId, l.user_id AS userId, l.name, l.server_id AS serverId,
l.linked_at AS linkedAt, p.name AS playerName
FROM ${LINKS} l
LEFT JOIN ${PLAYERS} p ON p.steam_id = l.steam_id
WHERE l.user_id = ?
ORDER BY l.linked_at DESC`,
[userId],
)
}
/**
* Record a link.
*
* **A plain INSERT, never an upsert**, and that is the whole of D23 expressed in
* SQL. `ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE` here would silently move a Steam id from one
* website account to another — which, once phase 7 makes a link a privilege path
* and phase 13 makes it an entitlement, is an account takeover performed by
* typing a six-character code. The duplicate-key error is the refusal, and the
* controller turns it into a sentence.
*/
async function insert({ steamId, userId, name, serverId }) {
await core.query(
`INSERT INTO ${LINKS} (steam_id, user_id, name, server_id)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)`,
[steamId, userId, name || null, serverId || null],
)
}
/**
* Remove a link the caller owns.
*
* Scoped by `user_id` in the statement rather than checked before it: a delete
* that reads, decides, then writes has a gap between the read and the write, and
* this way the ownership test and the deletion are the same operation. Answers
* how many rows went, so a caller can tell "removed" from "was not yours".
*/
async function removeOwned(steamId, userId) {
const result = await core.query(
`DELETE FROM ${LINKS} WHERE steam_id = ? AND user_id = ?`,
[steamId, userId],
)
return Number(result && result.affectedRows) || 0
}
/**
* Remove a link whoever holds it — the in-game `/unlink` path, and the staff
* unlink on the `admin.users.detail` panel (D25).
*
* Unscoped by user on purpose: neither caller is the link's owner and both have
* already established their authority another way. In game the authority is the
* Steam account itself — whoever is connected as it is who it is; on the admin
* panel it is the tier gate. Which is why the admin caller writes an
* `activity.log` entry naming the operator and this does not: it cannot tell the
* two apart, and a log line that guessed would be worse than none.
*/
async function removeBySteamId(steamId) {
const result = await core.query(`DELETE FROM ${LINKS} WHERE steam_id = ?`, [steamId])
return Number(result && result.affectedRows) || 0
}
/**
* Every link one user holds, enriched with what this module knows about that
* player — for the `admin.users.detail` panel.
*
* A LEFT JOIN, because a player can link an account and never play on it. An
* operator looking at that user should see the link, not an empty panel.
*/
async function listForUserWithPlayer(userId) {
return core.query(
`SELECT l.steam_id AS steamId, l.name, l.server_id AS serverId, l.linked_at AS linkedAt,
p.name AS playerName, p.first_seen AS firstSeen, p.last_seen AS lastSeen
FROM ${LINKS} l
LEFT JOIN ${PLAYERS} p ON p.steam_id = l.steam_id
WHERE l.user_id = ?
ORDER BY l.linked_at DESC`,
[userId],
)
}
/**
* Per-server all-time totals for one Steam id.
*
* The same rows the public leaderboard sums, grouped by server instead of
* filtered to one — so an operator sees a player across the fleet in one read.
* All-time, deliberately: an admin looking at a user wants their history, not
* this week's.
*/
async function statsForSteamId(steamId) {
return core.query(
`SELECT s.server_id AS serverId, srv.name AS serverName,
SUM(s.kills) AS kills,
SUM(s.deaths) AS deaths,
SUM(s.npc_kills) AS npcKills,
SUM(s.structures) AS structures,
SUM(s.playtime_sec) AS playtimeSec,
MAX(s.last_seen) AS lastSeen,
COUNT(DISTINCT s.wipe_id) AS wipes
FROM ${STATS} s
LEFT JOIN rust_servers srv ON srv.id = s.server_id
WHERE s.steam_id = ?
GROUP BY s.server_id, srv.name
ORDER BY SUM(s.playtime_sec) DESC`,
[steamId],
)
}
/**
* Which of these Steam ids are linked, and to whom.
*
* The one question every notification asks — "who on the website is this
* player?" — asked for a set at once, because a raid names a cupboard's whole
* authorisation list and a clan event a whole roster. An unlinked id is simply
* absent from the answer: there is nobody to tell.
*/
async function userIdsForSteamIds(steamIds) {
if (!steamIds.length) return []
const marks = steamIds.map(() => '?').join(', ')
return core.query(
`SELECT steam_id AS steamId, user_id AS userId FROM ${LINKS} WHERE steam_id IN (${marks})`,
steamIds,
)
}
/**
* The servers that handed out a link code in the last `windowSec` (PLAN_FIXES F5).
*
* Every `/link` in game emits `account.link.requested`, which ingest stores like
* any frame — without the code, which travels through the player. So the site
* cannot know WHICH server minted a code, but it does know which servers minted
* one at all. Read on the database's clock (`created_at`, set at ingest) rather
* than the frame's `t`, which is the game host's clock.
*/
async function recentLinkIssuers(windowSec) {
const rows = await core.query(
`SELECT DISTINCT server_id AS serverId FROM ${EVENTS}
WHERE kind = 'account.link.requested'
AND created_at >= NOW() - INTERVAL ? SECOND`,
[Number(windowSec)],
)
return rows.map((row) => String(row.serverId))
}
module.exports = {
recentLinkIssuers,
getBySteamId,
listForUser,
listForUserWithPlayer,
insert,
removeOwned,
removeBySteamId,
statsForSteamId,
userIdsForSteamIds,
}