wtclaude
baffaa46c9
R1's identity link, site-side, and R13's first extension slot. A player types /link in game, the plugin hands them a six-character code privately, and they enter it here; the site records who owns which Steam account, and an operator sees that on core's own `/admin/users/:id` page. **The site is the author of record and the game holds nothing.** There is no per-account store in Rust that survives a wipe, and phase 7 needs the site authoritative anyway — it pushes permissions INTO the game keyed by Steam id. A copy in the game would be a second thing to reconcile every wipe, for no question it could answer better. ## D24 — a code is minted by ONE server, so every server is asked Nothing in six characters says where it came from. The fleet is asked in turn and the first `link.ok` wins; the others answer `unknown` and nothing happens there, because a code is only spent at the server that actually holds it. Asking the player to pick was rejected: a wrong pick would come back indistinguishable from a wrong code, and that is the one refusal which must not be ambiguous. **"Every reachable server refused" is not the same answer as "a server was unreachable."** Collapsing them tells a player whose server is down that their code is wrong — so they run /link again on that same server and are told the same thing for as long as it stays down. `unsure` is that case, and it says to try again rather than to fetch a new code. ## D23 — a Steam id another account holds is refused, never moved The primary key is `steam_id`, and it is load-bearing rather than tidy: phase 7 grants permissions against a link and phase 13 hangs entitlements off it, so a silent move is an account takeover performed by typing six characters. The refusal names the holder, because the advice is unusable without it. The INSERT is a plain INSERT for the same reason — `ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE` here would BE that move — and the duplicate-key error is the refusal for the race the check above cannot close. The way out is `/unlink` in game, which reaches the site off the ingest feed rather than through a route (the plugin has no link to delete). D25 adds the other way out: staff can sever a link from the admin panel, for a player who cannot reach that Steam account in game. ## The slot, and the hole it found in this repo's own generator `admin.users.detail` is declared in `module.json` AND registered in `index.js` AND filled by the chunk — three places, because the server half and the client half are different registrations that share one name. `swaggerFragment.js` knew only about tier routers, so the two routes under `/admin/users/:id` were generated by nothing: a fragment that was internally consistent and described two routes fewer than the module serves. A slot's mount is core's and cannot be derived here, so it is a fourth constant beside `TIER_BASE` — held to account by the frozen-manifest job, which was verified to catch exactly this by removing the two paths and watching it fail. ## Smaller things worth knowing - **Core's `useAsync` has no `refresh`.** A counter in the deps is how a page re-reads after its own write; it blanks while it re-reads, which is right here and is exactly what made it wrong for a poll. - **Every player-portal nav row needs an `icon`** — core draws one on every row, and the client suite says so. This module had no icons file until now, because the public header is text buttons. - The two new frame kinds are STAFF-only. Neither carries a code, but both name a Steam id beside a website account's activity, and that join is not a public fact about what happened on a server. - The link code route carries its own rate limiter rather than core's `accountChangeLimiter`: this is guessing somebody else's secret, not changing your own password, and a shared counter would let one policy set the other. Protocol 3 on all three declaration sites; 17 new tests, 136 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PMH6bw1jXMgbyF3ZWGEzSM
32 lines
1.6 KiB
SQL
32 lines
1.6 KiB
SQL
-- ── The teardown ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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--
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-- Destructive, and run ONLY by an explicit admin purge (MODULE_API.md §2.6).
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-- Nothing on the boot path executes this file, and uninstalling the module does
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-- not either: removing an operator's data is a second decision they make on
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-- purpose, offered inside the uninstall flow and confirmed separately.
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--
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-- It exists because `schema.sql` does. A module that can create tables and
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-- cannot drop them leaves an operator with orphaned data and no supported way to
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-- remove it, so core refuses to load a module that declares one without the
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-- other.
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--
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-- **Drop in the reverse of creation order**, which this file depends on:
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-- `rust_server_state` carries a foreign key into `rust_servers`, so dropping the
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-- parent first fails on the constraint — and a purge that fails halfway leaves
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-- exactly the orphaned data it exists to remove.
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--
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-- What does NOT belong here: rows written into core's tables. Core prunes what
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-- it knows this module registered, because it is the side that knows which
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-- registrant owned what.
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rust_account_links;
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rust_ingest_cursor;
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rust_presence;
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rust_events;
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rust_gather_totals;
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rust_player_wipe_stats;
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rust_players;
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rust_wipes;
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rust_server_state;
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rust_servers;
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