R1's identity link, site-side, and R13's first extension slot. A player types /link in game, the plugin hands them a six-character code privately, and they enter it here; the site records who owns which Steam account, and an operator sees that on core's own `/admin/users/:id` page. **The site is the author of record and the game holds nothing.** There is no per-account store in Rust that survives a wipe, and phase 7 needs the site authoritative anyway — it pushes permissions INTO the game keyed by Steam id. A copy in the game would be a second thing to reconcile every wipe, for no question it could answer better. ## D24 — a code is minted by ONE server, so every server is asked Nothing in six characters says where it came from. The fleet is asked in turn and the first `link.ok` wins; the others answer `unknown` and nothing happens there, because a code is only spent at the server that actually holds it. Asking the player to pick was rejected: a wrong pick would come back indistinguishable from a wrong code, and that is the one refusal which must not be ambiguous. **"Every reachable server refused" is not the same answer as "a server was unreachable."** Collapsing them tells a player whose server is down that their code is wrong — so they run /link again on that same server and are told the same thing for as long as it stays down. `unsure` is that case, and it says to try again rather than to fetch a new code. ## D23 — a Steam id another account holds is refused, never moved The primary key is `steam_id`, and it is load-bearing rather than tidy: phase 7 grants permissions against a link and phase 13 hangs entitlements off it, so a silent move is an account takeover performed by typing six characters. The refusal names the holder, because the advice is unusable without it. The INSERT is a plain INSERT for the same reason — `ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE` here would BE that move — and the duplicate-key error is the refusal for the race the check above cannot close. The way out is `/unlink` in game, which reaches the site off the ingest feed rather than through a route (the plugin has no link to delete). D25 adds the other way out: staff can sever a link from the admin panel, for a player who cannot reach that Steam account in game. ## The slot, and the hole it found in this repo's own generator `admin.users.detail` is declared in `module.json` AND registered in `index.js` AND filled by the chunk — three places, because the server half and the client half are different registrations that share one name. `swaggerFragment.js` knew only about tier routers, so the two routes under `/admin/users/:id` were generated by nothing: a fragment that was internally consistent and described two routes fewer than the module serves. A slot's mount is core's and cannot be derived here, so it is a fourth constant beside `TIER_BASE` — held to account by the frozen-manifest job, which was verified to catch exactly this by removing the two paths and watching it fail. ## Smaller things worth knowing - **Core's `useAsync` has no `refresh`.** A counter in the deps is how a page re-reads after its own write; it blanks while it re-reads, which is right here and is exactly what made it wrong for a poll. - **Every player-portal nav row needs an `icon`** — core draws one on every row, and the client suite says so. This module had no icons file until now, because the public header is text buttons. - The two new frame kinds are STAFF-only. Neither carries a code, but both name a Steam id beside a website account's activity, and that join is not a public fact about what happened on a server. - The link code route carries its own rate limiter rather than core's `accountChangeLimiter`: this is guessing somebody else's secret, not changing your own password, and a shared counter would let one policy set the other. Protocol 3 on all three declaration sites; 17 new tests, 136 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PMH6bw1jXMgbyF3ZWGEzSM
83 lines
3.4 KiB
JavaScript
83 lines
3.4 KiB
JavaScript
// ── The shape of the identity surface ─────────────────────────────────────
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//
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// Three properties that are invisible in review and expensive in production:
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//
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// • **the link route is rate-limited** (R1). Six characters from a 32-glyph
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// alphabet is a good code only while a guesser is made to pay per attempt,
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// and once phase 7 grants permissions against a link, guessing one is a
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// privilege-escalation path rather than a nuisance.
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// • **the extension router merges its parent's params**. Without
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// `mergeParams`, `req.params.id` is `undefined` and every statement in that
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// panel silently scopes to no user — a panel that reads as "this user has no
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// Rust account" for everybody.
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// • **the extension's paths keep the module's own segment.** Core owns
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// `/admin/users/:id`; a bare `/links` would be this module claiming a word on
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// a URL it does not own, and the next module to fill a slot would collide.
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const test = require('node:test')
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const assert = require('node:assert')
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const { fakeCtx, fakeApi } = require('./_fakes')
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function register(ctx = fakeCtx()) {
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require('../core')._reset()
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const api = fakeApi()
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require('../index')(ctx, api)
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return api
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}
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/** `[{ method, path, handlers }]` for one express router. */
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function routesOf(router) {
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return router.stack
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.filter((layer) => layer.route)
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.map((layer) => ({
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path: layer.route.path,
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method: Object.keys(layer.route.methods)[0].toUpperCase(),
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handlers: layer.route.stack.map((s) => s.handle),
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}))
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}
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test('the player tier serves the three identity routes, and nothing else new', () => {
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const api = register()
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const routes = routesOf(api.record.routes.player['/rust'])
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assert.deepEqual(
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routes.map((r) => `${r.method} ${r.path}`).sort(),
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['DELETE /links/:steamId', 'GET /links', 'GET /servers', 'POST /link'],
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)
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})
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test('redeeming a code is rate-limited, and by a limiter of its own', () => {
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const api = register()
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const post = routesOf(api.record.routes.player['/rust']).find((r) => r.method === 'POST')
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// The fake's `rateLimit` hands back a pass-through carrying the options it was
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// given, so the policy itself is assertable — a limiter that was quietly
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// removed, or one built with core's `accountChangeLimiter` shared counter,
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// both fail here.
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const limiter = post.handlers.find((h) => h.options && h.options.label === 'rust-link-code')
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assert.ok(limiter, 'POST /link must carry its own rate limiter (R1)')
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assert.equal(limiter.options.max, 10)
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assert.equal(limiter.options.windowMs, 15 * 60 * 1000)
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// First in the chain: a limiter behind the validator would let an attacker
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// spend the cheap half of the request unbounded.
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assert.equal(post.handlers[0], limiter)
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})
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test('the admin.users.detail router merges the parent’s params and keeps its own segment', () => {
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const api = register()
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const slot = api.record.extensions.find((e) => e.slot === 'admin.users.detail')
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assert.ok(slot, 'the server half of admin.users.detail must be registered')
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assert.equal(slot.router.mergeParams, true)
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const paths = routesOf(slot.router).map((r) => `${r.method} ${r.path}`).sort()
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assert.deepEqual(paths, ['DELETE /rust/links/:steamId', 'GET /rust/links'])
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for (const route of routesOf(slot.router)) {
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assert.ok(route.path.startsWith('/rust/'), `${route.path} must live under this module's own segment`)
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}
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})
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