Files
Module-Rust/server/ingest.js
wtclaude 43147b796a feat(rust): site-owned permissions — the site is the author, the game is the cache
R2, and the first phase where this module WRITES to a game. Groups and grants are
authored on the website and pushed into each server's own permission store, so
every plugin that already calls `UserHasPermission` honours them with no adapter,
and a wipe stops being a data-loss event.

**Seven org-lead decisions (D28-D34).** A grant is keyed to the website USER and
resolved to every Steam id they have linked at push time (D28); every authored row
carries a scope — a server or `*` (D29); groups are mirrored as real groups rather
than flattened (D30); a holder the site did not author is REPORTED, never undone,
with adopt and revoke offered (D31); one verb, with the plugin diffing locally
(D32); a permission no server has registered is reported unresolved and never
self-registered (D33); authoring is people and groups by hand, with rules deferred
(D34).

**Three sets, and every interesting question is a difference between two.**
`desired − pushed` is what to apply; `pushed − desired` is what to RETIRE, because
the site put it there and has since withdrawn it; `present − desired` is drift. The
middle one is why `rust_perm_pushed` exists: a name in the store that is not in the
desired set is either something the site retired or something a human granted, and
those two have opposite correct answers.

**What lands is not what was sent.** A grant naming a permission the server has not
registered did not land — `GrantUserPermission` no-ops silently — and a member the
store has never seen could not be placed. Neither is recorded as pushed, so the
site never believes it gave a privilege it did not.

The loop asks a cheap question every thirty seconds — does the digest of the
desired set still equal what this server last confirmed — and syncs on a change, a
restart, a wipe, a drift hook, a failed attempt past its backoff, or the
fifteen-minute audit that finds drift on a server nobody has touched.

**This module's first admin page**, because a permission model is the first thing
here that has to be composed rather than configured. What is on it is decided by
what an operator can get wrong: four states are invisible from the game and from a
list of grants, and each is a sentence rather than a number.

Walked end to end against a real core at the pinned ref, the real sidecar, and a
stand-in speaking protocol 4 — including a restart that emptied the store and was
fully re-pushed. Four defects the browser found that 133 green tests did not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PMH6bw1jXMgbyF3ZWGEzSM
2026-09-21 18:28:32 -05:00

290 lines
12 KiB
JavaScript

// ── Reading a sidecar's feed, and turning it into a record ────────────────
//
// One job: move each server's cursor forward, and apply what it passed.
//
// ── Why a cursor and not a socket ─────────────────────────────────────────
//
// The obvious design is a WebSocket — the sidecar has one, and module-uo takes
// exactly that route for the UO bridge. This module polls a cursor instead, and
// the reason is not laziness about latency.
//
// Core runs on Node 20, where a global `WebSocket` is still behind a flag, so a
// socket means taking `ws` as a runtime dependency — and this module's release
// asserts that it has none (D5: everything it needs arrives on `ctx`, and the
// bundle ships no `node_modules`). That is a cost worth paying for latency, but
// the deciding argument is the other one: **a socket needs a cursor anyway.**
// Whatever a feed misses while a module is restarting has to be caught up from
// somewhere, and the catch-up path is the one that must be right. A socket on
// top of a cursor is two mechanisms where the second is load-bearing; a cursor
// alone is one mechanism that is exercised every few seconds rather than only
// after an outage nobody planned.
//
// What it costs is seconds of latency on a killfeed. What it buys is that the
// path which recovers from a five-hour outage is the same path that ran a moment
// ago.
//
// ── The ordering the whole thing rests on ─────────────────────────────────
//
// **The cursor advances after the batch is written, never before.** A crash
// between the two re-reads events already counted, which inflates a total; a
// crash the other way round loses them silently and for ever. Neither is good and
// they are not equally bad — one is visible and bounded, the other is invisible
// and permanent — so the code is arranged to fail in the visible direction.
const core = require('./core')
const db = require('./model/events/events.db')
const links = require('./model/links/links.model')
const permissionsDb = require('./model/permissions/permissions.db')
const sidecar = require('./sidecarClient')
const log = core.logger('ingest')
/** How many events to ask for at once. */
const BATCH = 200
/**
* How many batches one tick will drain before letting the loop breathe.
*
* A module that has been down for a day has thousands of events waiting, and
* draining them in one unbounded loop would hold the tick — and a pool
* connection — for as long as that takes. Bounded, it catches up over several
* ticks and the site stays responsive while it does.
*/
const MAX_BATCHES_PER_TICK = 10
/**
* Applies one feed item.
*
* Every frame is stored raw, and only some of them move a counter. That split is
* deliberate: the raw row is what an admin reads and what a later phase can
* re-derive from, and the counters are what a leaderboard sums. A kind this
* build has never heard of still lands in `rust_events` — it costs nothing and
* the alternative is losing the one copy of an event the next version will know
* how to read.
*/
async function apply(serverId, item) {
const frame = (item && item.frame) || {}
const kind = item.kind || frame.kind
const wipeId = frame.wipeId || null
// A wipe exists because something mentioned it. There is no "a wipe started"
// call and there must not be one: the website is not there when a wipe happens.
await db.touchWipe(serverId, wipeId, frame.saveCreatedAt || null)
await db.insertEvent({
serverId,
wipeId,
kind,
t: Number(frame.t) || item.t || Date.now(),
steamId: frame.steamId || null,
raw: frame,
})
const at = { serverId, wipeId, steamId: frame.steamId }
switch (kind) {
case 'player.connected':
await db.touchPlayer(frame.steamId, frame.name || null)
break
case 'player.disconnected': {
await db.touchPlayer(frame.steamId, frame.name || null)
// `sessionSec` is ABSENT when the plugin never saw the connect — a player
// already on the server when it loaded. Absent is not zero: adding a zero
// would be recording a session of no length, which is a different claim
// from recording no session, and it is the one that quietly under-reports
// playtime for ever.
const seconds = Number(frame.sessionSec)
await db.addStats(at, {
sessions: Number.isFinite(seconds) ? 1 : 0,
playtimeSec: Number.isFinite(seconds) && seconds > 0 ? seconds : 0,
})
break
}
case 'player.death': {
await db.touchPlayer(frame.steamId, frame.name || null)
// A suicide is a death AND a suicide, not one instead of the other: the
// deaths column is "how many times did this player die", and a leaderboard
// that silently omitted self-inflicted ones would disagree with the
// killfeed sitting next to it on the same page.
await db.addStats(at, { deaths: 1, suicides: frame.attackerType === 'self' ? 1 : 0 })
// Only a real player's kill counts. `npc` and `environment` have no
// attacker to credit, and `self` must not credit the victim with a kill —
// which is the one line here that would look right in review and produce a
// leaderboard topped by whoever died the most.
if (frame.attackerType === 'player' && frame.attackerId) {
await db.touchPlayer(frame.attackerId, frame.attackerName || null)
await db.addStats({ ...at, steamId: frame.attackerId }, { kills: 1 })
}
break
}
case 'player.tally': {
await db.touchPlayer(frame.steamId, frame.name || null)
await db.addStats(at, {
npcKills: Number(frame.npcKills) || 0,
structures: Number(frame.structures) || 0,
})
// A tally is a DELTA since the last flush, which is what makes adding it
// correct. If it ever becomes a running total this loop doubles every
// number in it, slowly, and looks right the whole time.
const gathered = frame.gathered || {}
for (const [resource, amount] of Object.entries(gathered)) {
await db.addGathered(at, resource, Number(amount) || 0)
}
break
}
case 'player.chat':
case 'player.respawned':
await db.touchPlayer(frame.steamId, frame.name || null)
break
// ── Protocol 3: the one frame that changes something other than a counter ──
//
// `/unlink` in game severs the site's link, and it is the only way out of a
// link on the wrong account: the site REFUSES to move a Steam id another
// website account already holds (D23), so without this a player who linked
// while signed in as the wrong account would need staff.
//
// It arrives here rather than through a route because the plugin has nothing
// to delete — the site is the author of record and the game holds no link —
// so `/unlink` is the game reporting what the player asked for, applied off
// the feed like every other frame.
//
// **The authority is the Steam account itself.** Whoever is connected to the
// game as it is who it is, which is a stronger proof of ownership than the
// site can obtain any other way, so this is not scoped by website user.
case 'account.unlinked':
await db.touchPlayer(frame.steamId, frame.name || null)
await links.unlinkFromGame(frame.steamId)
break
// Stored and counted as a sighting, nothing more. The code is deliberately
// NOT on this frame — it travels through the player — so there is nothing
// here to redeem and no pending state for the site to hold. It exists so an
// operator can see linking being used at all.
case 'account.link.requested':
await db.touchPlayer(frame.steamId, frame.name || null)
break
// ── Protocol 4: somebody changed the permission store, and it was not us ──
//
// The plugin raises this only for writes it did not make itself — its own
// sync suppresses the hooks while it applies (PROTOCOL.md §10.4). What
// arrives here is therefore a hand edit, a console command, or another
// plugin granting something.
//
// **It is a reason to reconcile, not the reconciliation.** This frame cannot
// say whether the change is foreign: only the desired set can, and that
// comparison happens in the sync. So the server is marked dirty and the next
// tick produces the authoritative answer — which means a hook that stops
// firing on a framework upgrade costs latency and nothing else. The audit
// interval finds the same drift within fifteen minutes either way.
case 'perm.drift':
await permissionsDb.markDirty(serverId)
break
default:
// Stored, not counted. Moderation frames, the server lifecycle, and
// anything a newer protocol sends that this build does not understand.
break
}
}
/**
* Brings one server's cursor up to date.
*
* Returns the number of events applied, for the log and for the tests.
*/
async function ingestServer(server) {
const cursor = await db.getCursor(server.id)
// A server this module has never ingested starts at the sidecar's CURRENT end,
// not at zero. A module installed today against a sidecar that has been running
// for a month should read what happens next — replaying a fortnight of deaths
// into stats for wipes it never saw is not a catch-up, it is inventing a
// history it was not present for. `/feed` with no `since` asks exactly that
// question, which is why the sidecar answers it that way.
if (!cursor) {
const tail = await sidecar.feedTail(server)
if (!tail.ok || !tail.data) {
// Unreachable. Write nothing: a cursor of 0 written now would replay the
// whole retained history the moment the sidecar came back.
return 0
}
await db.setCursor(server.id, Number(tail.data.lastId) || 0, 0)
log.info('cursor started at the feed tail', { server: server.id, at: tail.data.lastId })
return 0
}
let since = Number(cursor.lastEventId) || 0
let applied = 0
for (let batch = 0; batch < MAX_BATCHES_PER_TICK; batch += 1) {
const res = await sidecar.feed(server, since, BATCH)
if (!res.ok || !res.data) return applied
const items = Array.isArray(res.data.items) ? res.data.items : []
for (const item of items) {
try {
await apply(server.id, item)
applied += 1
} catch (err) {
// One malformed event must not wedge a server's cursor for ever. It is
// logged with its id so it can be found, and the cursor moves past it:
// the alternative is an ingest that stops at a single bad row and then
// silently stops being a feed at all.
log.warn('could not apply an event', {
server: server.id,
id: item && item.id,
kind: item && item.kind,
error: err.message,
})
}
}
const lastId = Number(res.data.lastId)
if (Number.isFinite(lastId) && lastId > since) {
// AFTER the batch. See the header.
await db.setCursor(server.id, lastId, items.length)
since = lastId
}
if (!res.data.more) break
}
if (applied > 0) log.info('ingested', { server: server.id, events: applied, cursor: since })
return applied
}
/**
* Applies the boards: what is true right now, rather than what happened.
*
* `players.online` replaces the presence rows wholesale, because that is what a
* board is. Storing it as history is the mistake the wire's `type` field exists
* to prevent, and it would be a poor return for the sidecar's trouble to make it
* here after it went out of its way not to make it there.
*/
async function applyBoards(serverId, boards) {
const presence = boards && boards['players.online']
if (presence && Array.isArray(presence.players)) {
await db.replacePresence(serverId, presence.players)
}
}
module.exports = { apply, applyBoards, ingestServer, BATCH, MAX_BATCHES_PER_TICK }