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10fde87724 feat(events): what an author borrows, and two one-shots (Phase 12b)
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Five targeted leases over two planes, the item grant, the world save, and the
atlas work the spawner dropdown needed.

FIVE LEASES, ONE FACTORY

`uo.spawner.maxcount`, `.mindelay`, `.maxdelay`, `.running` and
`uo.seasonal.status`. The four callables differ only in which key they name, so
they are built rather than repeated: five copies would be five chances for one of
them to forget the drift check, which is the one thing §F says a lease must not
be allowed to skip.

It is `MaxCount`, not the `Amount` EVENTS_PLAN.md named -- there is no such
property on ServUO 57.4. `MinDelay`/`MaxDelay` are TimeSpans, so the wire carries
SECONDS: the spawn files' own `DelayInSec` flag proves both units are in use on a
real tree, and a unit that cannot express five seconds cannot express this
shard's own data.

The seasonal lease is a THREE-value enum over EIGHT events. §G called
`GetEntry(type).Status` "a nine-value enum" and had it backwards: `EventStatus`
has three values and it is `EventType` that has nine entries. Eight rather than
nine because `TreasuresOfTokuno` is excluded -- `IsActive()` reads its own
`DropEra` rather than `Status`, so leasing it would apply cleanly, read back,
restore cleanly and do nothing at all.

Two behaviours worth the review. `inForce()` reads the frame's `holds` rather
than a row's `held` flag, because a catalog walk can enumerate the keys but never
the holds on a targeted one. And a target that VANISHED mid-run is a SUCCESSFUL
restore: there is nothing to give back, and reporting it failed would leave a
ledger row unresolved for ever over an object that is gone -- 12a's `gone` in the
lease plane's vocabulary.

THE GRANT NAMES A RUN, NEVER A RECIPIENT LIST

Core has the participants in `event_run_participants`, but a module cannot read
core's tables -- so the alternative was a new core surface handing them over. Not
needed: the shard has held the run's ledger since it opened, keyed by the same
serials core stores as `member_key`.

And the grant is RETRYABLE. §G called it un-retryable because a lost
acknowledgement and a grant that never applied were the same event, which is
exactly the argument that made `uo.broadcast` answer `retry: false` in Phase 9.
Protocol 6's idempotency key closes it. `uo.rewards` counts ITEMS rather than
grants: 500 gold to forty people and a candle to forty people are not the same
imposition.

THE ATLAS KEEPS UniqueId AGAIN, AND THE SPAWNER SOURCE SEARCHES

The parser has read `<UniqueId>` and thrown it away since the atlas shipped, on a
line citing a committed artifact -- there is no committed artifact, as
`spawnAtlasSource.js` says in its own header. It is the ONLY name for one
particular spawner that exists off the shard, so a property lease could not have
had a dropdown without it. `PARSER_VERSION` -> 4 so an unchanged tree is re-read.

`uo.options.spawners` is the first searchable source and the first that had to
be: 6,707 spawn points against `MAX_OPTIONS`' 2,000, so a flat list would drop
two thirds of the world and say nothing about which two thirds.

ONE DEFECT IN ALREADY-MERGED CODE, AND IT WOULD HAVE BROKEN EVERYTHING

The protocol pin never left 5. `uo_link_config.protocol` reaches the sidecar as
`X-UOLink-Version` on every REST call and an exact mismatch is a 409, so from
Phase 11a onward every sidecar call on a real deployment would have been refused
-- the whole event plane dead, loudly, for a reason nobody would look here for.
11a took the wire to 6 and 12a to 7; neither moved the pin, in either of the two
places this repo declares it. It survived both because both live walks set the
column by hand while standing the rig up, which is exactly what makes a migration
nobody runs invisible. All three sites go to 7.

The test that guards them is worth understanding before trusting it:
`schemaFragment.test.js` asserts the three declarations agree WITH EACH OTHER --
a real check they once failed -- but all three being equally stale passes it, and
nothing in this repo can anchor it to the wire. Recorded in the model's own
header so the next reader knows.

CHECKS

`npm test`: 620 pass, 0 fail (was 605). `check:imports` and `check:externals`
clean; the client builds and its 42 tests pass. `check:swagger` reports the
fragment stale -- it is ALREADY stale on `edge` (verified by stashing this
branch's changes and re-running) and this phase adds no route, so it is left
alone rather than regenerated inside an unrelated change.

Two bugs the new tests caught in this branch's own code before it left: `counted()`
returns `.count` and the grant read `.value`, so every grant went out with
`amount: undefined` and the non-stackable guard never fired; and `optionalInt`'s
`ok` was ignored, so a bad hue passed silently instead of refusing.

Refs: docs/link/v7.md §11-§14, docs/website/EVENTS_PLAN.md Phase 12b

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
2026-09-07 08:08:08 -05:00
89be9d6a4e feat(events): the five world verbs an author sees (Phase 12a)
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`uo.creature.spawn`, `uo.boss.spawn`, `uo.npc.place`, `uo.gate.open` and
`uo.decor.place`, over protocol 7's one command family. Five actions because
five is what an author has; one `perform`/`revert`/`reconcile` because on the
wire they are one thing.

Five new budget dimensions -- `uo.creatures`, `uo.bosses`, `uo.npcs`,
`uo.decor`, `uo.gate.minutes` -- all declared by THIS MODULE (org lead,
2026-09-07). Core meters whatever dimensions a module declares and holds no UO
knowledge, which is the whole of what MODULE_API means by game-agnostic. A gate
is priced in minutes rather than in gates: one standing all day and twelve
standing five minutes each are not the same imposition on a world.

`reconcile()` ASKS the shard, and is the one place in this file that must not
use `reconcileByBootId`. A crier line lives in shard memory, so a changed
`bootId` IS proof it is gone; a spawned creature is in the world SAVE and
survives the restart the stamp would report it lost by. Anything `world.owned`
does not list is gone -- safe only because the shard's registry and the objects
it describes are written by the same save.

Teardown reports `gone` as success and `refused` as failed. A creature a player
killed is the point of having spawned it, and a run that ended `incomplete`
because its event worked would be a report nobody could read. `refused` means
the shard denies this run ever owned the serial, so nothing will delete it
through this path and the row must land unresolved with a reason.

The atlas gains a decoration index, parsed from the shard's own
`Data/Decoration/**/*.cfg` -- 120 files, read RECURSIVELY because the real tree
nests two deep and a flat read would index a fraction of it while looking like
it worked. 313 distinct types. The decor verb resolves through it rather than
passing a type name through, which keeps the verb to this shard's own decoration
vocabulary AND fetches the item id: `Static` alone accounts for 5031 placements
under 1992 different graphics, so a bare type name places the wrong thing.
`PARSER_VERSION` -> 3, so an already-imported tree is re-read.

Two things the build found in code that had already shipped:

`uo.options.creatures` answered with the atlas SLUG -- unique, stable, and not
something the shard can build, because a creature is constructed from a ServUO
class name and `orc-brute` is not one. The atlas's `name` is the raw type token
from the spawn files, so the fix was to stop discarding the half that works.
Safe to change because Phase 12a is the source's first consumer; the file said
so when it shipped.

`uo.npc.place` could not be performed from its own required params. Both ends
refuse an oracle with neither a greeting nor a line, but both fields were
optional -- so a cross-field rule sat where no authoring form could render it.
The greeting is now `required`, which says the same thing in the contract
itself. Caught by the existing dry-run sweep, which is a better argument for
that test than anything written about it when it shipped.

605 tests pass. `swagger-fragment.json` is stale on `edge` already and this
phase adds no route, so it is left alone.

Refs: docs/link/v7.md, docs/website/EVENTS_PLAN.md Phase 12a

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
2026-09-07 01:52:15 -05:00
88bfe9310e feat(events): one lease and the participation verbs (Phase 11b)
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The UO half of protocol 6 part b. No route added, no schema change, no
MODULE_API bump.

`uo.playercaps.skillcap` is the one lease, and the catalog is short because
ServUO made it short: of the 158 non-Bridge `Config.Get` call sites in
`Scripts/`, roughly eight are read live. This one is read inside
`CharacterCreation.cs`'s per-character path, so it is both live and observable --
which is what "proven" has to mean, since the failure an allowlist exists to
prevent is a key that applies cleanly and changes nothing.

Its `apply()` sends a DURATION rather than the deadline: an absolute time
computed here and honoured there is measured against two clocks, and a shard
running ten minutes fast would restore a ten-minute lease the instant it took it.
Its `restore()` turns `lease.drifted` into `{ drifted: true, current }` rather
than an error, because core records drift as a distinct successful outcome and an
error would put the row on the retry ladder. Its `inForce()` asks whether the
shard still HOLDS the lease, never whether the value still matches -- see the
core PR.

`uo.participation.open` / `.collect` count who took part and file them on the
success envelope. `open` is the one resource in this module that must NOT
reconcile by boot stamp: every other resource here lives in shard memory, so a
changed bootId IS the proof it is gone, while the participation ledger is written
into the world save precisely so it survives that restart. It asks instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 19:31:57 -05:00
dc13515927 feat(events): send the idempotency key, and declare champ.boss.killed (Phase 11a)
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The website's half of protocol 6.

Every event-driven write now carries the step's idempotency key, and `uo.broadcast`
stops being un-retryable. Phase 9 shipped it answering `retry: false` to everything
including a 503 from a shard that was merely restarting, with a comment naming the
line that would change when the wire could refuse a repeat. This is that line: it
defers to `sidecarFailure`, the same helper its two siblings already used, so the
hand-rolled variant that forced every outcome terminal is gone rather than re-tuned.

One verb was less idempotent than its own id made it look. Both keyed verbs post
under a run-scoped id and a repeat replaces — but `news.add` with `announce: true`
makes the criers proclaim the title on every post, so a retry replaced the article
silently and proclaimed it again. The key stops the second proclamation.

`champ.boss.killed` is mapped to the `champs` feature (rule 2 would otherwise fail
it closed to admin), with `damagers` a nested `staff` field rule: the kill is public
because a champion falling is what the board is for, the ranked roll of who was
strong enough to fell it is not. `uo.champ.boss_killed` is declared as a trigger —
which is what makes it usable as an event PHASE CONDITION, since a condition is
written over a trigger firing — and it carries `damagerCount`, never a damager name,
because a trigger variable reaches mail an operator may address to every subscriber.

Its seeded rule is its own group, `champ-boss-killed-v1`: `triggers-v1` is stamped
once under a settings guard, so appending a 27th entry would have reached fresh
installs and nothing else. It also ships email+inapp and NOT push, and the comment
says why — no trigger in this module is also a registered stream, so no engagement
rule here can push. That is pre-existing in twenty rules and flagged rather than
fixed; this one declines to be the twenty-first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 14:57:26 -05:00
021f191f65 fix(events): three defects the live rig found, two of them data loss
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The whole-rig walk (ServUO + sidecar + website) against a real two-phase event.

- **A WS reconnect would have orphaned every live resource.** The backfill
  replays the last several `server.hello` frames in order — this rig saw three,
  each with a different `bootId` — so every replayed frame reads as a restart,
  and the intermediate ones compare a resource stamped with the CURRENT boot
  against a boot that ended hours ago. The row is then `orphaned`: a live crier
  line core will never take down again, lost to nothing worse than the website
  reconnecting. Gated on `!fromBackfill`, the rule the engagement fan-out and
  the SSE broadcast beside it already state. The website-was-down case is not
  missed — core asks every module at its own boot.
- **The shard explains its refusals and the run log dropped the explanation.**
  A 403 body reads `{"reason":"admin write plane disabled"}`; `legError` looks
  for `data.message`, finds nothing, and reports "sidecar responded 403". For a
  staff member clicking a button that is survivable. For an event that ran at
  four in the morning the run log is the only place anyone will learn why.
- **The "not retried" clause explained the wrong thing on a permanent status.**
  A 403 will not succeed on any attempt, so telling an operator it was not
  retried "because a repeat would announce twice" points them at a policy
  decision instead of at the switch they have to flip. The clause is now added
  only where a retry was genuinely given up, and 403/404 join the statuses the
  keyed verbs treat as terminal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 07:36:03 -05:00
57419111e6 feat(events): UO wave 1 — the verbs that need no protocol change (Phase 9)
module-uo registers its first event actions: `uo.broadcast`,
`uo.towncrier.post` and `uo.news.post`, plus the `uo.broadcasts` budget
dimension and the three spawn-atlas option sources. The write plane they use
has existed since protocol 2.1; what is new is the declaration that lets the
event engine drive it unattended.

Three things the tree corrected about the plan:

- The plan's `on_failure: 'skip'` for `uo.broadcast` is already the default for
  `risk: 'notify'`, and `on_failure` is what happens AFTER the retries. The
  lever a module actually has is the failure envelope, so the action answers
  `retry: false` to everything — and every action declares `budgetMs: 15000`,
  because core's 10s default deadline fires before `uoLinkClient`'s 12s timeout
  and `classify()` answers `retry` for a timeout without asking the module.
  Without the budget the retry refusal is unreachable.
- `reconcile()` needs no protocol work. A shard restart wipes both the crier
  lines and an event's news article, so `perform()` stamps the shard `bootId`
  into the resource payload and `reconcile()` reports in force exactly the rows
  whose stamp still matches — correct for the module's own trigger and for
  core's boot sweep alike. `shardIngest` fires `ctx.events.reconcile()` on a
  changed `bootId`, after `recordStatus` so the comparison reads the new boot.
- Event articles post under `evt-<idempotencyKey>`, because `newsGump.js` uses
  the bare website post id and re-pushes that set on every reconnect.

`ci/core-ref.json` moves to a website `edge` sha for the length of this
workstream: `registerEventActions` exists only from MODULE_API 1.10.0, so under
the old `main` pin the module does not load at all. Verified locally — the
frozen-manifest rig passes against the new pin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 07:23:03 -05:00
849d4b10e8 fix(engagement): four defects the Phase 11b live walk found, and the 26th trigger
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Needs website#<core> (the cooldown key and the seed-rule ceiling).

1. Every owner-audienced trigger reached NOBODY. `resolveTarget` read
   `link.user_id`; the model's `toSafe` returns `userId`. So the whole flagship
   family -- houses, vendors, logins, unlinks, deaths, the governor's letter --
   resolved to null and looked exactly like the ordinary unlinked-account case,
   which the code treats as normal and deliberately does not log.

   The test fake returned `user_id` and therefore agreed with the bug, while
   `shardStreams.test.js`'s fake next door -- same model, the path this file says
   it copies -- returned `userId`. The fake is now built by running the real
   `toSafe` over a stubbed db row, so the shape is not a hand-written opinion.

2. `uo.house.refreshed`, the 26th trigger (the org lead's decision 11). The
   warning's rule carries `delay_seconds: 900` so a player who repairs the house
   inside the quarter-hour is never told it is in peril -- and nothing could
   cancel it: `cancel_on` named only the collapse. The wire had carried the
   transition all along; the mapper returned early on it.

   It fires on `Ageless` as well as `LikeNew`, and `Ageless` is the common case:
   a condemned house cannot be refreshed at all (`RefreshDecay()` refuses
   `DecayType.Condemned`), so the rescue is the owner logging in, and their
   newest house then reads `Ageless`. Ships a body and a seeded (disabled) rule
   of its own; the cancellation is read off the WARNING's rule and works whether
   or not the new one is enabled.

3. Every call-to-action in every in-universe body was a dead link, from two
   independent mistakes. The client router prefixes a module's routes with its
   ID (`/uo/houses`), not with module.json's `mounts` (`/shard/...`), so every
   declared `example` was a 404 -- and an example is what the template editor
   previews and test-sends with. And no `url` variable was ever populated by the
   mapper, so the buttons rendered with an empty href and dropped out of the text
   part entirely. Both now read `config/clientPaths.js`. Two tests close it.

4. A raw wire timestamp was signing off the Merchants' Guild's letter
   (`2026-09-02T04:06:43.8397548Z`, mid-sentence). Core has no interpolation
   filters by design, so the readable form is assembled in the mapper and arrives
   as its own variable; the machine value stays, because an operator writes
   `is at most` conditions against it.

Also fixes a latent flake: `hoursRemaining` floors a live clock, so a fixture at
a whole number asserted 19 or 20 depending on sub-millisecond timing.

527 module tests green (3 new). Proved end to end against real ServUO + the
release sidecar + a live SMTP catcher; see docs#<docs>.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 07:12:29 -05:00
50a89b48e2 feat(engagement): sixteen in-universe bodies, 25 seeded rules, the governor's letter (Phase 11b)
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11a declared the triggers; this is the content behind them. Ships through
core's new api.registerEngagementSeeds (MODULE_API 1.9.0): 32 templates and 25
rules, every rule enabled = 0.

THE VOICE (decision 8). The game-powered families read from inside Britannia,
with a per-family in-fiction sender rather than one voice across all sixteen —
Lord Blackthorn's court writes about the crown's business (the seat, the ballot)
and nothing else, because a shard where Blackthorn writes to you personally about
a champion spawn is a shard where the letter about your governorship means
nothing. The Office of Deeds has houses, the Merchants' Guild vendors, a herald
guilds, the town crier champion spawns, a guildmaster skills and quests, the
Chronicler deaths, the keeper of the rolls leaderboards.

WHAT STAYS PLAIN (decision 9). Nine of the 25 point at core's notify.event /
inapp.event and author nothing, and the line is drawn where fiction costs
something real: a failed-login notice written as "a stranger sought entry to thy
account" is indistinguishable in register from the phishing mail it warns about,
and a moderator reading uo.cheat.detected at 2am wants a name, a rule and a
timestamp rather than a scroll. Both account-security triggers, server up/down,
and the five staff/admin-ceiling ones.

THE GOVERNOR'S LETTER (decision 10) — uo.governor.appointed, the 25th trigger.
§8.6 records that uo.points.rank_changed cannot address a person because top[]
names a mobile serial, and the same reasoning was silently assumed to cover the
governor. It does not: city.update's `governor` is written by BridgeJson.Actor(),
which emits serial, name, acct AND webId. The winner is addressable today with no
protocol change. It fires from the same frame, the same transition and the same
never-on-first-sight guard as uo.governor.elected, which stays exactly as
declared — the town's bulletin and the governor's letter are two triggers because
one trigger means one rule means one template, and they are not the same text.
An operator can run either alone.

PRESENTATIONAL FRAGMENTS, because a template has no conditionals by design and an
unset optional interpolates to the empty string. Phase 5a's `forWhom` precedent:
the ternary stays in the mapper and its result arrives as a declared optional.
Two shapes — a LABEL always has a value and carries a sentence's spine
(houseLabel falls back to a seal number); a TRAILING FRAGMENT may be empty and
leads with its own space, so `{{slainBy}}.` closes as "has fallen." either way.
Additive, so no version bump.

A render sweep over all 32 bodies, twice — once with every declared example and
once with required variables only — is what found these. Three defects it caught:
an optional `{{region}}` in a subject line ("A notice concerning thy house at ");
multi-optional ledger lines rendering "On hand:  gold. Charged each period:
gold." on a pre-v5 frame, now assembled in the mapper from the parts actually
present, the same argument place() already makes; and a leading trailing-fragment
opening a body with a stray space.

The labels stay `required: false` deliberately — a missing one must never REFUSE
an emit, since a dropped notification is worse than a cosmetic hole — so nothing
at runtime would notice a mapper that forgot one. engagementSeeds.test.js is what
notices.

524 module tests green; check:imports and check:bundle clean. check:swagger
reports STALE from CRLF alone and regenerates byte-identical — no route changed.

Refs docs ENGAGEMENT.md Phase 11b, decisions 8, 9, 10.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 01:02:15 -05:00
419dee3e49 feat(engagement): declare 24 shard triggers and 3 audiences (Phase 11a)
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module-uo's half of ENGAGEMENT.md Phase 11: every trigger DECLARATION, the
wire-kind mapping that fires them, and the three registered audiences. No rule
and no template is seeded here -- that is 11b -- so nothing this adds sends
anybody anything until an operator writes a rule.

server/config/shardTriggers.js declares the 24, grouped by the audience kind
each family exercises, and every variable carries the `example` the template
editor previews and test-sends with. Ceilings: 10 `owner`, 2 `members`, 7
`authenticated`, 2 `staff`, 3 `admin` (the value core adds in the same window).
`uo.cheat.detected` at `staff` is the declaration the lattice exists for.

server/utils/shardEngagement.js maps the wire to those ids, hung off
shardIngest.ingest beside the SSE broadcast and the push tickle, and reads like
shardPush.js on purpose -- owner resolution is why neither can be a pure mapper.
Three things live here because a rule cannot express them:

  * Transitions. champ.update and city.update are full-state upserts, so without
    a per-process tracker a sidecar reconnect reads as twenty spawns starting.
    A FIRST sighting is never a transition.
  * Thresholds. conditions.js compares a declared variable against a LITERAL, so
    "within 24 hours of dismissal" is not expressible; and vendor.listing is a
    sweep frame re-emitted on any price change, so per-frame would flood. The
    crossing is tracked here and `hoursRemaining` is declared so an operator can
    still narrow with `is at most`.
  * The members audience. "The members of THIS guild" differs every firing, so
    it travels on the envelope as recipientUserIds (Phase 6 decision 2).

**The fan-out runs BEFORE the state write, and that ordering is load-bearing.**
account.unlinked drops the shard_account_links row that names the one person who
needs to be told; house.remove drops the house whose stored ownerAcct is the only
place a collapsed house's owner appears; guild.leave/remove need the roster and
board mirrors to name who left. Resolving afterwards finds nobody, every time.

Four rows of 8.6 deliberately do not ship, each with its reason recorded in
docs (docs#194): uo.market.item_listed (a saved search, no per-user query store),
uo.guild.joined (core's team.member.joined already fires for it -- a UO guild IS
a Team and this module is the provider), uo.link.requested (no addressable
recipient by construction, ~5-minute TTL), and uo.points.rank_changed's personal
half (top[] names a serial, links are keyed by account).

coreApi -> ^1.8.0: the module now calls registerEventTriggers and declares
`ceiling: 'admin'`, so a 1.7.0 core would refuse the ceiling and a 1.6.0 one
would not have the method at all.

39 new tests; 509/509 pass. check:imports, check:bundle and check:swagger clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 20:28:17 -05:00
6a276a7ec3 feat(shard): ingest protocol 5 — decay schedule, vendor fees, login result
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The website half of the protocol-5 bump. Engagement Phase 10.

Schema — twelve columns and two indexes.

shard_houses gains next_stage, estimated_collapse, decay_period_sec and
dynamic_decay. estimated_collapse is nullable and stays null far more often than
not, deliberately: under dynamic decay ServUO draws each stage at random on entry,
so collapse is knowable only at IDOC. A null means "not knowable", never "not yet
read".

shard_vendors gains owner_acct plus seven fee columns and an index on dismissal_at.
owner_acct is the structural one — the table has carried owner_name since protocol
3, but a character name joins to nothing, and only the game account reaches
shard_account_links. Until now a vendor row named an owner the site could not
resolve to a person. dismissal_at + owner_acct are what let Phase 11's
uo.vendor.expiring find "vendors about to be dismissed" and turn each into a
person, without scanning every shop.

Ingest.

Both new field groups arrive NESTED and are flattened into columns on the way in,
then re-nested on the way out — the same trick shardMarket already uses for
`location`. That is not stylistic: the visibility projection matches literal JSON
keys, so the stored read model and the live wire frame have to spell a group
identically or one admin rule covers only one of the two paths. It also means a
field added inside a group later inherits the group's gate instead of defaulting to
visible; there is a test that adds an imaginary future fee field and asserts exactly
that.

Two write-back asymmetries, both load-bearing:

  * ownerName is written ONLY when the frame carries one. house.update also writes
    that column, from a different sweep, and a pre-v5 overlay's house.decay carries
    no ownerName at all — coalescing to null would let every decay transition erase
    a name the registry had already resolved.
  * The schedule and fee columns are written UNCONDITIONALLY, including as nulls. A
    schedule is a claim about the future and goes stale on its own: roll a shard
    back to a pre-v5 overlay, or let a house leave IDOC, and the right stored value
    is nothing. A dismissal date nobody is maintaining is worse than none.

dismissalAt is taken from the shard rather than recomputed. The shard resolved it
against ServUO's two vendor systems, whose charge, funds and pay interval all
differ; re-deriving it here would be a second implementation of PlayerVendor's own
rule.

Visibility — three classifications, each chosen rather than inherited.

  * house.decay's `schedule` defaults to `anonymous`. The countdown IS the public
    IDOC page's content and a house at IDOC is already announced in game. Listed
    anyway so a shard that considers a precise collapse time an unfair advantage can
    raise it — and one nested rule takes the whole schedule with it.
  * vendor.listing's `fees` defaults to `admin`, the only default in the market
    feature that does not reproduce prior behaviour, because there is no prior
    behaviour to reproduce. Shop name, owner and location are already visible to any
    player through the in-game Vendor Search gump, which is the argument for
    publishing them. Held gold, daily charge and dismissal date are visible to the
    OWNER only, on that vendor's own gump. Publishing them anonymously would be a
    new disclosure and a targeting aid — which shops are about to be abandoned, and
    how much coin is in each.
  * account.login.result is admin-only BY OMISSION. KIND_FEATURE is the map of kinds
    an admin may widen, and there is no rung below admin that an IP plus an auth
    verdict belongs on. The omission is the decision, and a test says so by name.

owner_acct needs no rule: rule 1 locks it by suffix. And the new columns are in no
REST read model's column list — they exist for Phase 11's server-side trigger and
reach no client at all.

The pin, and the protocol-4 bug seen from the other side.

Both declaration sites go to 5 (the model constant and schema.sql's CREATE default),
plus the one-shot migration, guarded `protocol < 5` so an install that missed an
earlier step is carried the whole way.

The schema test used to assert `DEFAULT 4` at each site. That is exactly how
protocol 4 shipped with the emitters moved and one site left behind: every site
agreed with itself and the test passed. It now reads DEFAULT_PROTOCOL from the
model, so the assertion is "the declarations AGREE", and the one-shot migration
test is written once against the current version instead of being hand-copied per
bump.

470 tests pass, 16 new. Verified end to end on the live rig against a real ServUO
and the release sidecar.

Docs: RunicGateway/docs link/v5.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 19:20:15 -05:00
2fa4d87a40 feat(shard): ingest guild rosters and departures (protocol 4)
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Protocol 2 gave the guild board a member *count* and nothing else, so the Guilds
page could say a guild had 155 members but never who they were, and
findGuildForActor deliberately answered only for leaders because membership for
rank-and-file was not in the feed at all. Protocol 4 puts it there.

`shard_guild_members` holds one row per member per guild, keyed on
(guild_id, serial). `guild.roster` replaces a guild's rows; `guild.leave` removes
one. A guild.remove now clears the membership too, so a disbanded guild does not
leave orphaned rows behind.

The chunking needs explaining. A roster over the shard's per-frame cap arrives as
several frames carrying seq/more/total. The sidecar reassembles them for its own
GET /guilds board, but the live WebSocket feed and the /history backfill both
carry the individual frames — so this ingest sees them unreassembled.

It copes without buffering, because a table expresses what the sidecar's single
JSON column could not: the frame carrying seq 0 clears the guild first, and every
frame then upserts its own rows. Upsert rather than insert because the /history
backfill replays stored frames on every reconnect, and a redelivery has to be a
no-op rather than a duplicate-key error. The cost is a sub-second window during a
multi-frame update where the table holds part of a roster; buffering to close it
would duplicate the sidecar's reassembly for a projection that is already only as
fresh as a 60s sweep.

On visibility: both kinds are mapped to the existing `guilds` feature. Without
that mapping rule 2 fails an unmapped kind closed to admin-only, which would have
quietly kept rosters off the public page forever. Mapping them is safe because a
roster is the first frame carrying locked fields inside an ARRAY of actors rather
than one nested actor, and the projection walker already recurses into arrays and
matches acct/webId by suffix — so a member's account name is stripped below admin
by exactly the rule that already strips guild.leader.acct. There is a test for
that specifically, because the difference is a public page listing character names
versus one publishing 150 account names.

`acct`/`web_id` are still stored, since that is what lets a linked member be
matched to a site user; they are just never projected below admin.

guild.leave is appended to the event log, as the departure counterpart to
guild.join and for the same reason — it is what a "so-and-so left" feed reads.
guild.roster stays out: it is board state like guild.update, and it is the one fat
frame on the wire, so logging it would put a full membership snapshot into
shard_events on every membership change.

The PUBLIC_KINDS guard test caught the addition, which is what it is for; its
expected set now carries a v4 group alongside the v3 one.

Refs: docs/website/TEAMS.md Part 12 Phase 1

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 12:57:26 -05:00
493cf296ab fix(server): own game-account signup, and repair the gate slice 1 broke
`POST /player/shard/account` and its staff twin have answered 500 for every
caller since slice 1: the ported controller called
`settings.isGameAccountSignupEnabled()`, which is a member of core's settings
model and not of `ctx.settings` — three functions, deliberately. The call was
`undefined(...)`, the TypeError landed in the catch, and no test reached the
branch.

The gate now lives on the side that uses it (`utils/gameSignup.js`), which is
also where the policy belongs: the setting's own help text names Bridge.cfg and
says the shard's SignupMode must agree, and core cannot own a sentence about a
UO shard. The admin field moves to this module's Shard page and the derived
flag onto `/public/shard/features`, beside the visibility flags the same
callers already read.

The setting KEY is unchanged. Renaming `game_account_signup` would silently
reset every configured instance to `disabled` on upgrade, with players
reporting broken signup as the only clue — the same grandfathering as
`spawn_atlas_servuo_path` and the seven stream ids.

Both regression tests were shown to fail against the bug before it was fixed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 18:00:37 -05:00
fe3251a543 feat(server): port the UO models, utils and schema fragment
The data half of the extraction: 8 model directories, 13 utils, the shard
stream catalog and the 27-table schema fragment with its purge.

server/core.js is what makes the port a one-line import change per file rather
than a signature change per function. Ported code requires its dependencies at
file scope -- `const { query } = require('../../core')` -- which runs before
register() has been called and before any ctx exists. So every member is a
stable function that resolves ctx when CALLED, and nothing may be destructured
off ctx at init either, because core is free to hand over a getter.

Two helpers are vendored rather than taken from ctx, and the line between them
is the point. utils/excerpt.js is core's deriveExcerpt -- nine lines of pure
text handling. Core's sanitiser next to it was NOT copied: a second copy of a
security control diverges silently the moment either is fixed. announceLinks.js
vendors legError and articleUrl the same way, but baseUrl could not be: core's
reads APP_BASE_URL, and §2.7 forbids a module reading core's environment, so it
comes off ctx.site.baseUrl.

The schema fragment is core's 27 shard_*/uo_link_* statements, verbs CREATE,
ALTER and UPDATE only, every CREATE TABLE guarded. Two of its tables carry a
foreign key INTO users, which is allowed and is why the replay order matters --
core's schema is in place before this runs. The reverse never occurs and must
not: it would make core unable to boot without a module installed.

One real port bug caught by the integration run, not by tests: the atlas art
map resolved `../../../db/data`, which pointed at core's tree when this file
lived there and points outside server/ now. A path that happens to resolve is
exactly what survives a green suite, because the absent-file branch returns {}
and looks like the normal case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 12:06:26 -05:00