ea63ad019c5f221acd34dfff5accbe61bd7668c0
32 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8def6e19f4 |
fix(events): the atlas import, and a teardown that was a no-op (Phase 16a)
Two defects the acceptance walk found in shipped code, both invisible to the suites that were green on either side of them. **The spawn atlas cannot import on a stock ServUO tree.** `spawnAtlasSource.js` dedupes decoration types with a case-SENSITIVE `Map`, but `shard_decor_types.type` is a PRIMARY KEY under MariaDB's default `..._ai_ci` collation, which folds case. Stock 57.4's own `Data/Decoration/` names four types under two spellings each (CheckerBoard/Checkerboard, ChessBoard/Chessboard, MetalChest/Metalchest, SpinningWheelEastAddon/SpinningwheelEastAddon), and in every pair exactly one is a real class. The second row raised `1062 Duplicate entry` and took the WHOLE import transaction down. The blast radius is not decoration: with no atlas, EVERY option source answers empty and no Phase 12 world verb can be authored at all. The shard end already knew — `BridgeWorld.cs` resolves a decor type with `FindTypeByName(name, ignoreCase: true)` and its comment says the atlas and the decoration files disagree about casing. Folding here is the two ends agreeing. **Teardown of every world verb was a no-op that reported success.** `revertOwned` forwarded core's `idempotencyKey` as the despawn's OWN key — and core's key is the step's, the one `placeOwned` spawned under. `BridgeIdempotency` keys on the key alone, so the despawn was taken for a repeat and answered with the SPAWN's stored reply; `OnDespawn` never ran. Core read `ok` with no `refused` and marked every row `reverted` while the shard still held every object. Measured on the rig: ledger `world | reverted | 21`, shard `world.owned` 21 alive with `pruned: 0`, and the identical despawn re-sent with a fresh key removed all 21. It affected all five world verbs, so an invasion's creatures, boss, oracle, gate and decoration stayed in the world for ever while the console reported a clean teardown. `MODULE_API.md` says what that key is for and it is not this: it identifies a dispatch core never learned the outcome of, so the module can ask about it. No key is needed on a despawn — a repeat answers `gone`, which both ends already treat as success — and dropping it also makes the documented empty-`resources` case work, since no serials means "everything this run owns". The parameter is removed from `despawnWorld`'s signature rather than left optional. Both fixes are verified end to end against a real ServUO + sidecar + website rig: the import now yields 309 decor types (was failing at 313 with 4 collisions), 6,455 spawn points, 800 creatures, 558 landmarks; and a full four-phase run's teardown left the shard owning 0 objects. Each new test was confirmed to FAIL without its fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4 |
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| 10fde87724 |
feat(events): what an author borrows, and two one-shots (Phase 12b)
Five targeted leases over two planes, the item grant, the world save, and the atlas work the spawner dropdown needed. FIVE LEASES, ONE FACTORY `uo.spawner.maxcount`, `.mindelay`, `.maxdelay`, `.running` and `uo.seasonal.status`. The four callables differ only in which key they name, so they are built rather than repeated: five copies would be five chances for one of them to forget the drift check, which is the one thing §F says a lease must not be allowed to skip. It is `MaxCount`, not the `Amount` EVENTS_PLAN.md named -- there is no such property on ServUO 57.4. `MinDelay`/`MaxDelay` are TimeSpans, so the wire carries SECONDS: the spawn files' own `DelayInSec` flag proves both units are in use on a real tree, and a unit that cannot express five seconds cannot express this shard's own data. The seasonal lease is a THREE-value enum over EIGHT events. §G called `GetEntry(type).Status` "a nine-value enum" and had it backwards: `EventStatus` has three values and it is `EventType` that has nine entries. Eight rather than nine because `TreasuresOfTokuno` is excluded -- `IsActive()` reads its own `DropEra` rather than `Status`, so leasing it would apply cleanly, read back, restore cleanly and do nothing at all. Two behaviours worth the review. `inForce()` reads the frame's `holds` rather than a row's `held` flag, because a catalog walk can enumerate the keys but never the holds on a targeted one. And a target that VANISHED mid-run is a SUCCESSFUL restore: there is nothing to give back, and reporting it failed would leave a ledger row unresolved for ever over an object that is gone -- 12a's `gone` in the lease plane's vocabulary. THE GRANT NAMES A RUN, NEVER A RECIPIENT LIST Core has the participants in `event_run_participants`, but a module cannot read core's tables -- so the alternative was a new core surface handing them over. Not needed: the shard has held the run's ledger since it opened, keyed by the same serials core stores as `member_key`. And the grant is RETRYABLE. §G called it un-retryable because a lost acknowledgement and a grant that never applied were the same event, which is exactly the argument that made `uo.broadcast` answer `retry: false` in Phase 9. Protocol 6's idempotency key closes it. `uo.rewards` counts ITEMS rather than grants: 500 gold to forty people and a candle to forty people are not the same imposition. THE ATLAS KEEPS UniqueId AGAIN, AND THE SPAWNER SOURCE SEARCHES The parser has read `<UniqueId>` and thrown it away since the atlas shipped, on a line citing a committed artifact -- there is no committed artifact, as `spawnAtlasSource.js` says in its own header. It is the ONLY name for one particular spawner that exists off the shard, so a property lease could not have had a dropdown without it. `PARSER_VERSION` -> 4 so an unchanged tree is re-read. `uo.options.spawners` is the first searchable source and the first that had to be: 6,707 spawn points against `MAX_OPTIONS`' 2,000, so a flat list would drop two thirds of the world and say nothing about which two thirds. ONE DEFECT IN ALREADY-MERGED CODE, AND IT WOULD HAVE BROKEN EVERYTHING The protocol pin never left 5. `uo_link_config.protocol` reaches the sidecar as `X-UOLink-Version` on every REST call and an exact mismatch is a 409, so from Phase 11a onward every sidecar call on a real deployment would have been refused -- the whole event plane dead, loudly, for a reason nobody would look here for. 11a took the wire to 6 and 12a to 7; neither moved the pin, in either of the two places this repo declares it. It survived both because both live walks set the column by hand while standing the rig up, which is exactly what makes a migration nobody runs invisible. All three sites go to 7. The test that guards them is worth understanding before trusting it: `schemaFragment.test.js` asserts the three declarations agree WITH EACH OTHER -- a real check they once failed -- but all three being equally stale passes it, and nothing in this repo can anchor it to the wire. Recorded in the model's own header so the next reader knows. CHECKS `npm test`: 620 pass, 0 fail (was 605). `check:imports` and `check:externals` clean; the client builds and its 42 tests pass. `check:swagger` reports the fragment stale -- it is ALREADY stale on `edge` (verified by stashing this branch's changes and re-running) and this phase adds no route, so it is left alone rather than regenerated inside an unrelated change. Two bugs the new tests caught in this branch's own code before it left: `counted()` returns `.count` and the grant read `.value`, so every grant went out with `amount: undefined` and the non-stackable guard never fired; and `optionalInt`'s `ok` was ignored, so a bad hue passed silently instead of refusing. Refs: docs/link/v7.md §11-§14, docs/website/EVENTS_PLAN.md Phase 12b Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4 |
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| 89be9d6a4e |
feat(events): the five world verbs an author sees (Phase 12a)
`uo.creature.spawn`, `uo.boss.spawn`, `uo.npc.place`, `uo.gate.open` and `uo.decor.place`, over protocol 7's one command family. Five actions because five is what an author has; one `perform`/`revert`/`reconcile` because on the wire they are one thing. Five new budget dimensions -- `uo.creatures`, `uo.bosses`, `uo.npcs`, `uo.decor`, `uo.gate.minutes` -- all declared by THIS MODULE (org lead, 2026-09-07). Core meters whatever dimensions a module declares and holds no UO knowledge, which is the whole of what MODULE_API means by game-agnostic. A gate is priced in minutes rather than in gates: one standing all day and twelve standing five minutes each are not the same imposition on a world. `reconcile()` ASKS the shard, and is the one place in this file that must not use `reconcileByBootId`. A crier line lives in shard memory, so a changed `bootId` IS proof it is gone; a spawned creature is in the world SAVE and survives the restart the stamp would report it lost by. Anything `world.owned` does not list is gone -- safe only because the shard's registry and the objects it describes are written by the same save. Teardown reports `gone` as success and `refused` as failed. A creature a player killed is the point of having spawned it, and a run that ended `incomplete` because its event worked would be a report nobody could read. `refused` means the shard denies this run ever owned the serial, so nothing will delete it through this path and the row must land unresolved with a reason. The atlas gains a decoration index, parsed from the shard's own `Data/Decoration/**/*.cfg` -- 120 files, read RECURSIVELY because the real tree nests two deep and a flat read would index a fraction of it while looking like it worked. 313 distinct types. The decor verb resolves through it rather than passing a type name through, which keeps the verb to this shard's own decoration vocabulary AND fetches the item id: `Static` alone accounts for 5031 placements under 1992 different graphics, so a bare type name places the wrong thing. `PARSER_VERSION` -> 3, so an already-imported tree is re-read. Two things the build found in code that had already shipped: `uo.options.creatures` answered with the atlas SLUG -- unique, stable, and not something the shard can build, because a creature is constructed from a ServUO class name and `orc-brute` is not one. The atlas's `name` is the raw type token from the spawn files, so the fix was to stop discarding the half that works. Safe to change because Phase 12a is the source's first consumer; the file said so when it shipped. `uo.npc.place` could not be performed from its own required params. Both ends refuse an oracle with neither a greeting nor a line, but both fields were optional -- so a cross-field rule sat where no authoring form could render it. The greeting is now `required`, which says the same thing in the contract itself. Caught by the existing dry-run sweep, which is a better argument for that test than anything written about it when it shipped. 605 tests pass. `swagger-fragment.json` is stale on `edge` already and this phase adds no route, so it is left alone. Refs: docs/link/v7.md, docs/website/EVENTS_PLAN.md Phase 12a Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4 |
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| 88bfe9310e |
feat(events): one lease and the participation verbs (Phase 11b)
The UO half of protocol 6 part b. No route added, no schema change, no
MODULE_API bump.
`uo.playercaps.skillcap` is the one lease, and the catalog is short because
ServUO made it short: of the 158 non-Bridge `Config.Get` call sites in
`Scripts/`, roughly eight are read live. This one is read inside
`CharacterCreation.cs`'s per-character path, so it is both live and observable --
which is what "proven" has to mean, since the failure an allowlist exists to
prevent is a key that applies cleanly and changes nothing.
Its `apply()` sends a DURATION rather than the deadline: an absolute time
computed here and honoured there is measured against two clocks, and a shard
running ten minutes fast would restore a ten-minute lease the instant it took it.
Its `restore()` turns `lease.drifted` into `{ drifted: true, current }` rather
than an error, because core records drift as a distinct successful outcome and an
error would put the row on the retry ladder. Its `inForce()` asks whether the
shard still HOLDS the lease, never whether the value still matches -- see the
core PR.
`uo.participation.open` / `.collect` count who took part and file them on the
success envelope. `open` is the one resource in this module that must NOT
reconcile by boot stamp: every other resource here lives in shard memory, so a
changed bootId IS the proof it is gone, while the participation ledger is written
into the world save precisely so it survives that restart. It asks instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| dc13515927 |
feat(events): send the idempotency key, and declare champ.boss.killed (Phase 11a)
The website's half of protocol 6. Every event-driven write now carries the step's idempotency key, and `uo.broadcast` stops being un-retryable. Phase 9 shipped it answering `retry: false` to everything including a 503 from a shard that was merely restarting, with a comment naming the line that would change when the wire could refuse a repeat. This is that line: it defers to `sidecarFailure`, the same helper its two siblings already used, so the hand-rolled variant that forced every outcome terminal is gone rather than re-tuned. One verb was less idempotent than its own id made it look. Both keyed verbs post under a run-scoped id and a repeat replaces — but `news.add` with `announce: true` makes the criers proclaim the title on every post, so a retry replaced the article silently and proclaimed it again. The key stops the second proclamation. `champ.boss.killed` is mapped to the `champs` feature (rule 2 would otherwise fail it closed to admin), with `damagers` a nested `staff` field rule: the kill is public because a champion falling is what the board is for, the ranked roll of who was strong enough to fell it is not. `uo.champ.boss_killed` is declared as a trigger — which is what makes it usable as an event PHASE CONDITION, since a condition is written over a trigger firing — and it carries `damagerCount`, never a damager name, because a trigger variable reaches mail an operator may address to every subscriber. Its seeded rule is its own group, `champ-boss-killed-v1`: `triggers-v1` is stamped once under a settings guard, so appending a 27th entry would have reached fresh installs and nothing else. It also ships email+inapp and NOT push, and the comment says why — no trigger in this module is also a registered stream, so no engagement rule here can push. That is pre-existing in twenty rules and flagged rather than fixed; this one declines to be the twenty-first. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 021f191f65 |
fix(events): three defects the live rig found, two of them data loss
The whole-rig walk (ServUO + sidecar + website) against a real two-phase event.
- **A WS reconnect would have orphaned every live resource.** The backfill
replays the last several `server.hello` frames in order — this rig saw three,
each with a different `bootId` — so every replayed frame reads as a restart,
and the intermediate ones compare a resource stamped with the CURRENT boot
against a boot that ended hours ago. The row is then `orphaned`: a live crier
line core will never take down again, lost to nothing worse than the website
reconnecting. Gated on `!fromBackfill`, the rule the engagement fan-out and
the SSE broadcast beside it already state. The website-was-down case is not
missed — core asks every module at its own boot.
- **The shard explains its refusals and the run log dropped the explanation.**
A 403 body reads `{"reason":"admin write plane disabled"}`; `legError` looks
for `data.message`, finds nothing, and reports "sidecar responded 403". For a
staff member clicking a button that is survivable. For an event that ran at
four in the morning the run log is the only place anyone will learn why.
- **The "not retried" clause explained the wrong thing on a permanent status.**
A 403 will not succeed on any attempt, so telling an operator it was not
retried "because a repeat would announce twice" points them at a policy
decision instead of at the switch they have to flip. The clause is now added
only where a retry was genuinely given up, and 403/404 join the statuses the
keyed verbs treat as terminal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| 57419111e6 |
feat(events): UO wave 1 — the verbs that need no protocol change (Phase 9)
module-uo registers its first event actions: `uo.broadcast`, `uo.towncrier.post` and `uo.news.post`, plus the `uo.broadcasts` budget dimension and the three spawn-atlas option sources. The write plane they use has existed since protocol 2.1; what is new is the declaration that lets the event engine drive it unattended. Three things the tree corrected about the plan: - The plan's `on_failure: 'skip'` for `uo.broadcast` is already the default for `risk: 'notify'`, and `on_failure` is what happens AFTER the retries. The lever a module actually has is the failure envelope, so the action answers `retry: false` to everything — and every action declares `budgetMs: 15000`, because core's 10s default deadline fires before `uoLinkClient`'s 12s timeout and `classify()` answers `retry` for a timeout without asking the module. Without the budget the retry refusal is unreachable. - `reconcile()` needs no protocol work. A shard restart wipes both the crier lines and an event's news article, so `perform()` stamps the shard `bootId` into the resource payload and `reconcile()` reports in force exactly the rows whose stamp still matches — correct for the module's own trigger and for core's boot sweep alike. `shardIngest` fires `ctx.events.reconcile()` on a changed `bootId`, after `recordStatus` so the comparison reads the new boot. - Event articles post under `evt-<idempotencyKey>`, because `newsGump.js` uses the bare website post id and re-pushes that set on every reconnect. `ci/core-ref.json` moves to a website `edge` sha for the length of this workstream: `registerEventActions` exists only from MODULE_API 1.10.0, so under the old `main` pin the module does not load at all. Verified locally — the frozen-manifest rig passes against the new pin. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 849d4b10e8 |
fix(engagement): four defects the Phase 11b live walk found, and the 26th trigger
Needs website#<core> (the cooldown key and the seed-rule ceiling). 1. Every owner-audienced trigger reached NOBODY. `resolveTarget` read `link.user_id`; the model's `toSafe` returns `userId`. So the whole flagship family -- houses, vendors, logins, unlinks, deaths, the governor's letter -- resolved to null and looked exactly like the ordinary unlinked-account case, which the code treats as normal and deliberately does not log. The test fake returned `user_id` and therefore agreed with the bug, while `shardStreams.test.js`'s fake next door -- same model, the path this file says it copies -- returned `userId`. The fake is now built by running the real `toSafe` over a stubbed db row, so the shape is not a hand-written opinion. 2. `uo.house.refreshed`, the 26th trigger (the org lead's decision 11). The warning's rule carries `delay_seconds: 900` so a player who repairs the house inside the quarter-hour is never told it is in peril -- and nothing could cancel it: `cancel_on` named only the collapse. The wire had carried the transition all along; the mapper returned early on it. It fires on `Ageless` as well as `LikeNew`, and `Ageless` is the common case: a condemned house cannot be refreshed at all (`RefreshDecay()` refuses `DecayType.Condemned`), so the rescue is the owner logging in, and their newest house then reads `Ageless`. Ships a body and a seeded (disabled) rule of its own; the cancellation is read off the WARNING's rule and works whether or not the new one is enabled. 3. Every call-to-action in every in-universe body was a dead link, from two independent mistakes. The client router prefixes a module's routes with its ID (`/uo/houses`), not with module.json's `mounts` (`/shard/...`), so every declared `example` was a 404 -- and an example is what the template editor previews and test-sends with. And no `url` variable was ever populated by the mapper, so the buttons rendered with an empty href and dropped out of the text part entirely. Both now read `config/clientPaths.js`. Two tests close it. 4. A raw wire timestamp was signing off the Merchants' Guild's letter (`2026-09-02T04:06:43.8397548Z`, mid-sentence). Core has no interpolation filters by design, so the readable form is assembled in the mapper and arrives as its own variable; the machine value stays, because an operator writes `is at most` conditions against it. Also fixes a latent flake: `hoursRemaining` floors a live clock, so a fixture at a whole number asserted 19 or 20 depending on sub-millisecond timing. 527 module tests green (3 new). Proved end to end against real ServUO + the release sidecar + a live SMTP catcher; see docs#<docs>. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 50a89b48e2 |
feat(engagement): sixteen in-universe bodies, 25 seeded rules, the governor's letter (Phase 11b)
11a declared the triggers; this is the content behind them. Ships through
core's new api.registerEngagementSeeds (MODULE_API 1.9.0): 32 templates and 25
rules, every rule enabled = 0.
THE VOICE (decision 8). The game-powered families read from inside Britannia,
with a per-family in-fiction sender rather than one voice across all sixteen —
Lord Blackthorn's court writes about the crown's business (the seat, the ballot)
and nothing else, because a shard where Blackthorn writes to you personally about
a champion spawn is a shard where the letter about your governorship means
nothing. The Office of Deeds has houses, the Merchants' Guild vendors, a herald
guilds, the town crier champion spawns, a guildmaster skills and quests, the
Chronicler deaths, the keeper of the rolls leaderboards.
WHAT STAYS PLAIN (decision 9). Nine of the 25 point at core's notify.event /
inapp.event and author nothing, and the line is drawn where fiction costs
something real: a failed-login notice written as "a stranger sought entry to thy
account" is indistinguishable in register from the phishing mail it warns about,
and a moderator reading uo.cheat.detected at 2am wants a name, a rule and a
timestamp rather than a scroll. Both account-security triggers, server up/down,
and the five staff/admin-ceiling ones.
THE GOVERNOR'S LETTER (decision 10) — uo.governor.appointed, the 25th trigger.
§8.6 records that uo.points.rank_changed cannot address a person because top[]
names a mobile serial, and the same reasoning was silently assumed to cover the
governor. It does not: city.update's `governor` is written by BridgeJson.Actor(),
which emits serial, name, acct AND webId. The winner is addressable today with no
protocol change. It fires from the same frame, the same transition and the same
never-on-first-sight guard as uo.governor.elected, which stays exactly as
declared — the town's bulletin and the governor's letter are two triggers because
one trigger means one rule means one template, and they are not the same text.
An operator can run either alone.
PRESENTATIONAL FRAGMENTS, because a template has no conditionals by design and an
unset optional interpolates to the empty string. Phase 5a's `forWhom` precedent:
the ternary stays in the mapper and its result arrives as a declared optional.
Two shapes — a LABEL always has a value and carries a sentence's spine
(houseLabel falls back to a seal number); a TRAILING FRAGMENT may be empty and
leads with its own space, so `{{slainBy}}.` closes as "has fallen." either way.
Additive, so no version bump.
A render sweep over all 32 bodies, twice — once with every declared example and
once with required variables only — is what found these. Three defects it caught:
an optional `{{region}}` in a subject line ("A notice concerning thy house at ");
multi-optional ledger lines rendering "On hand: gold. Charged each period:
gold." on a pre-v5 frame, now assembled in the mapper from the parts actually
present, the same argument place() already makes; and a leading trailing-fragment
opening a body with a stray space.
The labels stay `required: false` deliberately — a missing one must never REFUSE
an emit, since a dropped notification is worse than a cosmetic hole — so nothing
at runtime would notice a mapper that forgot one. engagementSeeds.test.js is what
notices.
524 module tests green; check:imports and check:bundle clean. check:swagger
reports STALE from CRLF alone and regenerates byte-identical — no route changed.
Refs docs ENGAGEMENT.md Phase 11b, decisions 8, 9, 10.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| 419dee3e49 |
feat(engagement): declare 24 shard triggers and 3 audiences (Phase 11a)
module-uo's half of ENGAGEMENT.md Phase 11: every trigger DECLARATION, the
wire-kind mapping that fires them, and the three registered audiences. No rule
and no template is seeded here -- that is 11b -- so nothing this adds sends
anybody anything until an operator writes a rule.
server/config/shardTriggers.js declares the 24, grouped by the audience kind
each family exercises, and every variable carries the `example` the template
editor previews and test-sends with. Ceilings: 10 `owner`, 2 `members`, 7
`authenticated`, 2 `staff`, 3 `admin` (the value core adds in the same window).
`uo.cheat.detected` at `staff` is the declaration the lattice exists for.
server/utils/shardEngagement.js maps the wire to those ids, hung off
shardIngest.ingest beside the SSE broadcast and the push tickle, and reads like
shardPush.js on purpose -- owner resolution is why neither can be a pure mapper.
Three things live here because a rule cannot express them:
* Transitions. champ.update and city.update are full-state upserts, so without
a per-process tracker a sidecar reconnect reads as twenty spawns starting.
A FIRST sighting is never a transition.
* Thresholds. conditions.js compares a declared variable against a LITERAL, so
"within 24 hours of dismissal" is not expressible; and vendor.listing is a
sweep frame re-emitted on any price change, so per-frame would flood. The
crossing is tracked here and `hoursRemaining` is declared so an operator can
still narrow with `is at most`.
* The members audience. "The members of THIS guild" differs every firing, so
it travels on the envelope as recipientUserIds (Phase 6 decision 2).
**The fan-out runs BEFORE the state write, and that ordering is load-bearing.**
account.unlinked drops the shard_account_links row that names the one person who
needs to be told; house.remove drops the house whose stored ownerAcct is the only
place a collapsed house's owner appears; guild.leave/remove need the roster and
board mirrors to name who left. Resolving afterwards finds nobody, every time.
Four rows of 8.6 deliberately do not ship, each with its reason recorded in
docs (docs#194): uo.market.item_listed (a saved search, no per-user query store),
uo.guild.joined (core's team.member.joined already fires for it -- a UO guild IS
a Team and this module is the provider), uo.link.requested (no addressable
recipient by construction, ~5-minute TTL), and uo.points.rank_changed's personal
half (top[] names a serial, links are keyed by account).
coreApi -> ^1.8.0: the module now calls registerEventTriggers and declares
`ceiling: 'admin'`, so a 1.7.0 core would refuse the ceiling and a 1.6.0 one
would not have the method at all.
39 new tests; 509/509 pass. check:imports, check:bundle and check:swagger clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| 6a276a7ec3 |
feat(shard): ingest protocol 5 — decay schedule, vendor fees, login result
The website half of the protocol-5 bump. Engagement Phase 10.
Schema — twelve columns and two indexes.
shard_houses gains next_stage, estimated_collapse, decay_period_sec and
dynamic_decay. estimated_collapse is nullable and stays null far more often than
not, deliberately: under dynamic decay ServUO draws each stage at random on entry,
so collapse is knowable only at IDOC. A null means "not knowable", never "not yet
read".
shard_vendors gains owner_acct plus seven fee columns and an index on dismissal_at.
owner_acct is the structural one — the table has carried owner_name since protocol
3, but a character name joins to nothing, and only the game account reaches
shard_account_links. Until now a vendor row named an owner the site could not
resolve to a person. dismissal_at + owner_acct are what let Phase 11's
uo.vendor.expiring find "vendors about to be dismissed" and turn each into a
person, without scanning every shop.
Ingest.
Both new field groups arrive NESTED and are flattened into columns on the way in,
then re-nested on the way out — the same trick shardMarket already uses for
`location`. That is not stylistic: the visibility projection matches literal JSON
keys, so the stored read model and the live wire frame have to spell a group
identically or one admin rule covers only one of the two paths. It also means a
field added inside a group later inherits the group's gate instead of defaulting to
visible; there is a test that adds an imaginary future fee field and asserts exactly
that.
Two write-back asymmetries, both load-bearing:
* ownerName is written ONLY when the frame carries one. house.update also writes
that column, from a different sweep, and a pre-v5 overlay's house.decay carries
no ownerName at all — coalescing to null would let every decay transition erase
a name the registry had already resolved.
* The schedule and fee columns are written UNCONDITIONALLY, including as nulls. A
schedule is a claim about the future and goes stale on its own: roll a shard
back to a pre-v5 overlay, or let a house leave IDOC, and the right stored value
is nothing. A dismissal date nobody is maintaining is worse than none.
dismissalAt is taken from the shard rather than recomputed. The shard resolved it
against ServUO's two vendor systems, whose charge, funds and pay interval all
differ; re-deriving it here would be a second implementation of PlayerVendor's own
rule.
Visibility — three classifications, each chosen rather than inherited.
* house.decay's `schedule` defaults to `anonymous`. The countdown IS the public
IDOC page's content and a house at IDOC is already announced in game. Listed
anyway so a shard that considers a precise collapse time an unfair advantage can
raise it — and one nested rule takes the whole schedule with it.
* vendor.listing's `fees` defaults to `admin`, the only default in the market
feature that does not reproduce prior behaviour, because there is no prior
behaviour to reproduce. Shop name, owner and location are already visible to any
player through the in-game Vendor Search gump, which is the argument for
publishing them. Held gold, daily charge and dismissal date are visible to the
OWNER only, on that vendor's own gump. Publishing them anonymously would be a
new disclosure and a targeting aid — which shops are about to be abandoned, and
how much coin is in each.
* account.login.result is admin-only BY OMISSION. KIND_FEATURE is the map of kinds
an admin may widen, and there is no rung below admin that an IP plus an auth
verdict belongs on. The omission is the decision, and a test says so by name.
owner_acct needs no rule: rule 1 locks it by suffix. And the new columns are in no
REST read model's column list — they exist for Phase 11's server-side trigger and
reach no client at all.
The pin, and the protocol-4 bug seen from the other side.
Both declaration sites go to 5 (the model constant and schema.sql's CREATE default),
plus the one-shot migration, guarded `protocol < 5` so an install that missed an
earlier step is carried the whole way.
The schema test used to assert `DEFAULT 4` at each site. That is exactly how
protocol 4 shipped with the emitters moved and one site left behind: every site
agreed with itself and the test passed. It now reads DEFAULT_PROTOCOL from the
model, so the assertion is "the declarations AGREE", and the one-shot migration
test is written once against the current version instead of being hand-copied per
bump.
470 tests pass, 16 new. Verified end to end on the live rig against a real ServUO
and the release sidecar.
Docs: RunicGateway/docs link/v5.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|||
| 7f7d4578ce |
fix(uo-link): pin protocol 4, the version this build actually speaks
The protocol-4 cutover moved `link`'s PROTOCOL_VERSION, the overlay's `overlay.toml` and this module's ingest — `guild.roster` and `guild.leave` landed with the Teams cutover — but left both of this module's pin sites at 3. A fresh install therefore came up speaking 3 to a protocol-4 sidecar, and a sidecar answers a stale client with `409 protocol version mismatch` rather than mis-parsing it. The failure is total and silent: every REST read fails, the WS closes on ws.hello, and the operator sees an empty marketplace, an empty guild board and no shard status, with the cause only in the server log. It cleared only when an admin edited the number by hand in Admin → Shard. Found while standing up a demo deployment for the marketing site's screenshots. - `DEFAULT_PROTOCOL` → 4 (the constant used before an admin has saved anything) - the `uo_link_config.protocol` column default → 4, at both declaration sites - a protocol-4 one-shot mirroring the protocol-3 one, guarded by its own marker so an operator who deliberately pins an older sidecar stays pinned, and written `protocol < 4` so an install that never took the protocol-3 migration is carried the whole way rather than one step - three regression tests: the column default, the marker ordering, and the `< 4` predicate Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
|||
| 3c179e3338 |
fix(release): ship server/commands, and check that the bundle is complete
v1.0.0 installed and then died on every boot:
module "uo" failed to load — {"stage":"register","reason":"Cannot find
module './commands/guild.command'"}
`server/commands/` arrived with the Teams cutover (
|
|||
| 466842c6f2 |
fix(guilds): do not offer linking where linking cannot reach
Found on the live rig, with the shard's guild feature gated to staff: the refusal still read "link your account — this shard shows guild information to linked players". Signing in reaches `logged_in` and linking a game account reaches `player`; `staff` and `admin` are roles an operator grants, and no amount of linking earns them. Inviting someone to do something that changes nothing is worse than plainly saying no. Also drops the host name from the list embed's title. `ctx.site` carries a base URL and no brand name, so naming the deployment there could only ever mean printing its hostname into a title on the shard's own Discord server. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 2d1d91e372 |
feat(guilds): /guild, the module's own chat command
The first command through `api.registerSlashCommands` (MODULE_API 1.6.0, TEAMS.md §7.1). The definition and the handler both live here; the bot pulls the definition and runs no line of this module. `/guild` and not `/team`, deliberately. Core does not own the word for a Team — that is what deleted its Team pages in phase 3 — so it does not publish the noun in a channel either. Core ships the dispatcher and zero commands. The audience rungs are re-resolved in the handler rather than assumed: a shard that gates guilds to staff does not become public because the question arrived over Discord. The provider's own staleness guard is honoured too, so a stale board answers "not connected" instead of reporting what it still holds, and `resolveUserId` is exported rather than copied so "linked" means here what it means on the roster. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| c57310c505 |
feat(guilds): a third place on the guild page, and where that page lives
Two lines only core cannot supply for itself.
`uo.guild.header` is a third declared slot, at the top of the page, for core's
per-Team notification control. A third rather than a corner of the feed because a
slot holds one component and the first fill wins: the control is an action ON this
page and the other two are content IN it, and separate slots are what let this
module say so.
`pageUrlTemplate` tells core where a guild page actually is. Teams are a contract
primitive with no core surface — core owns the tables and the access rules, this
module owns the word "guild" and therefore the page — which leaves core unable to
write a link to one. A notification email that cannot take you to the thread it is
about is most of the way to useless. Core substitutes `{externalId}` and does
nothing else with it; a template naming its own host is refused at registration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|||
| dda0e32dd3 |
feat(guilds): a guild detail page, and the slot core puts the feed in
The module's half of the org lead's correction: Teams is the contract, guilds are the presentation, and the presentation is this module's. Adds `/uo/guilds/:id` — the detail view the board never had — with the roster from this module's OWN board, which is the same data it answers core's Team provider from. Reading core's projection of our own answer back would be a round trip through a staler copy of it. The page declares `uo.guild.detail` and core fills it with the Team activity feed. That is the one part of this page core cannot hand over: only core can resolve whether the viewer is inside the Team, and the public/members split on that feed is a security boundary. The guild is named in OUR terms — core maps its own Team from the module id and the external id — so this module never holds core's row id or slug. `TeamOverviewStrip` is deleted with the core Team page it filled. `team.member.row` is not declared here either: the useful thing to put in a roster row is a link to the character behind it, and nothing core could supply identifies one. `GET /public/shard/guilds/:id` backs the page, gated and projected through the same `guilds` feature as the board — so an operator who raises that audience raises this too, and the locked acct/webId fields never survive below admin. A roster is where those appear in bulk, which makes this the endpoint where getting the projection wrong would matter most. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| d4aa5ade12 |
feat(teams): project rosters by audience rung, and add to the Team page
The module's half of TEAMS.md phase 3. `projectRoster` is the optional fourth provider method and the only one core calls on a request path. Core holds the roster and owns its public shape; the question that is this module's is who is allowed to look, because the audience rungs and their configuration live here. The answer is all-or-nothing, which is the honest translation rather than a shortcut: a rung is a property of the FEATURE, and there is no configuration in which some members of a guild are public and others are not. The refusal semantics INVERT here, and the tests say so. For the other three methods a refusal means "change nothing" and an empty array would be destructive. Core fails CLOSED on this one, so the dangerous answer is the opposite — returning every key because the config could not be read would publish a roster an operator gated to staff. Every path that cannot reach a confident answer refuses, including the catch. The anonymous case is answered directly rather than by handing `viewerLevel` a synthetic request. Given one with no `req.user` it falls through to `auth.getUserFromRequest`, which expects real cookies and throws on a fake — and that throw would have become a refusal, so every anonymous visitor would have been served an empty roster on a shard whose guilds are public. Caught by the tests, not by reading. `team.overview` gets a live population reading beside core's stored one. Core's number comes from the last roster sync and is coarse by construction; this is the `presence.online` feed this module already holds. It is explicitly not a per-Team presence figure — the shard publishes a global aggregate and no per-guild breakdown exists on the wire, so claiming one would be inventing a number — and it renders nothing at all when it has nothing true to say. `team.member.row` is left unfilled. The useful thing to put there is a link to the character behind a row, and the props core can supply do not identify one: the member key and the site account id are withheld from every public roster. An empty cell beats a guess. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 99d1ca25a7 |
feat(teams): ingest guild rank, and report every leader rather than one
The module half of the Protocol 4 rank amendment (servuo-plugins, same wire
version -- Protocol 4 is unreleased on `edge`, so it is amended rather than
bumped).
`shard_guild_members` gains `rank`, `rank_cliloc` and `rank_name`. The provider
then answers the question it previously could not: `getTeamLeaders()` returns
EVERY member at rank 4, not just the board's single `leader_serial`. That
limitation was the whole reason the wire grew a per-member rank -- TEAMS.md §2.5
treats multiple leaders as the normal case and core has always supported them.
The board's `leader_serial` is folded in as a floor rather than replaced. It
comes from a different frame, so on a shard whose roster has not been re-emitted
since the amendment it is the only leadership signal there is, and moving to
ranks must not lose it.
## NULL rank is a real state, and it is load-bearing
The shard withholds the rank for a staff account, because ServUO's
`PlayerMobile.GuildRank` reports Leader for anyone at GameMaster or above
whatever their actual rank. Every layer here preserves that:
- the ingest stores NULL rather than defaulting to 0, which would be a
demotion this code invented;
- `leader` requires an integer rank >= 4, so absence is never leadership;
- the leaders query compares on `rank`, and NULL is excluded by the comparison.
Reading a missing rank as either 0 or "leader" would republish the exact lie the
shard went out of its way not to send.
## Rank labels
Three sources, in order: a custom rank's literal string, then the operator's
cliloc table, then the five standard names. The last exists because the cliloc
table is populated only if someone ran the client-file extraction, and a roster
on a shard that has not should still read "Warlord" rather than nothing. A
failing lookup falls back rather than failing the roster -- a label is decoration,
and losing it must not lose the data.
`rank` is backticked everywhere it is written, like `int` on shard_online: it is
reserved in MySQL 8 and merely a keyword in MariaDB, so it parses bare here and
must not be relied on to.
The schema fragment carries ALTERs as well as the CREATE. No production install
has this table -- it is new in an unreleased protocol -- but `edge` deployments do,
from the roster work that landed before the amendment, and CREATE TABLE IF NOT
EXISTS adds a table and never a column. Same gap the sidecar's own store hit when
`guilds.members` was added.
## Verification
The unit tests stub the db layer, so the round trip was proved separately: the
VERBATIM roster frame captured from the live ServUO run was fed through the real
ingest into MariaDB and then read back through the provider.
stored: 0x1F5 rank=4 0x1F6 rank=3 0x1F7 rank=2 0x1F8 rank=1
0x1F9 rank=NULL (the GameMaster) 0x2E0 rank=4
provider: leaders = [0x1F5, 0x2E0] <- two, which the board alone cannot express
labels = Leader / Warlord / Emissary / Member, with no cliloc table
0x1F9 = not a leader, no label
9/9 checks. Suite 413 -> 421 tests, all passing.
Refs docs/link/v4.md §2.3, docs/website/TEAMS.md §2.5
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|||
| c6929c6bae |
fix(teams): take query from the core facade, not a core.db that does not exist
The Team provider's db layer built its query helper as `core.db.query(...)`. The
facade has no `db` member -- every other *.db.js in this module destructures
`query` from it directly -- so every call threw `Cannot read properties of
undefined (reading 'query')`.
The failure mode is the bad part. That throw is caught by the provider's own
error handling and turned into `{ ok: false, reason: 'roster unreadable: …' }`,
which is a perfectly valid refusal -- so core would have accepted it, held the
projection it had, and reported staleness. A provider that answers correctly and
never returns data, forever, with nothing in any log louder than a warning.
Invisible to the unit tests because they stub every db function, so the helper
was never called. Found by running a real roster frame through the ingest and
then asking the provider what it saw, against the real database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|||
| 268449f2a6 |
feat(teams): answer core's Team provider from the guild board
A UO guild is a Team. This registers module-uo as the authoritative source of
them (MODULE_API 1.6.0, docs/website/TEAMS.md §2.3) and answers the three
questions core asks, from the board and the roster Protocol 4 put there.
`externalId` is the persistent ServUO `Guild.Id`, which survives a rename -- so
core sees "an id whose name changed" and applies its rename rule rather than an
unrelated new guild appearing beside the old one. That mapping is this module's
to make: only the game knows what identity survives what.
The most important code here is the refusal guard, and it is deliberately
conservative. Core's contract is that module unavailability becomes staleness and
never emptiness, and this module is the only thing that can honour it -- an empty
array from here reads as an authoritative "there are none", and core archives
Teams and departs members from an authoritative answer. Three states refuse: no
uo-link configured, the integration disabled, and the socket not connected.
**The third is the one worth arguing about.** The board is durable and survives an
outage, so serving it while disconnected looks harmless. It is not: core cannot
tell a board five minutes stale from one five days stale, and a complete answer
licenses destruction. There is a test named for that.
A fourth refusal has no equivalent anywhere else: a guild whose roster has not
arrived. Protocol 4's roster comes on its own frames, separately from the
`guild.update` that creates the board row, so there is a real window where a
155-member guild has zero roster rows. The board's own `members` count is the only
thing that distinguishes "the roster is late" from "this guild is empty", and it
is checked -- with the count in the refusal message, because it is the evidence.
The other side is tested too: when the board says zero, an empty roster is the
truth and withholding it would freeze a disbanding guild's membership forever.
Two limitations, both honest and both in the code as comments:
- **`rankLabel` is null.** The wire's roster member is the standard actor object
(`serial`, `name`, `player`, `acct?`, `webId?`) and carries no guild rank.
Inventing a label from the leader flag would be core displaying something this
module made up.
- **One leader, not several.** TEAMS.md §2.5 expects multiple leaders from
`GuildRank.Rank >= 4` and core supports them, but Protocol 4 does not put rank
on the wire, so the only leadership visible here is the board's single
`leader_serial`. Raising it to the full set is a protocol change, not
something this module can fix.
`online` comes from `shard_online` rather than the roster, which carries no
per-member presence and only a board-level count -- the same source the public
"who's online" surface already uses. `userId` prefers the roster's own `web_id`
(what the shard asserted at roster time) and falls back to the `shard_account_links`
join for a member whose row predates their link; resolving it here rather than in
core is the contract, since core reading `shard_account_links` would be core
naming a module's table.
`coreApi` stays `^1.3.0` -- 1.6.0 satisfies it, which is what makes the bump minor.
18 provider tests plus two on the entry point: that all three methods are
registered, and that registration performs no query. The second matters because
register() runs while core's app.js is still being required with the pool pointed
at a dead port, which both routeManifest.js and swagger.js depend on.
`fakeApi` gained `registerTeamProvider` with the same `once` rule core applies --
one provider per deployment, so a second registration has to fail here too rather
than passing a shape core rejects at load.
411 -> 413 tests, all passing.
Refs docs/website/TEAMS.md §2.3, Part 12 phase 2
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|||
| 2fa4d87a40 |
feat(shard): ingest guild rosters and departures (protocol 4)
Protocol 2 gave the guild board a member *count* and nothing else, so the Guilds page could say a guild had 155 members but never who they were, and findGuildForActor deliberately answered only for leaders because membership for rank-and-file was not in the feed at all. Protocol 4 puts it there. `shard_guild_members` holds one row per member per guild, keyed on (guild_id, serial). `guild.roster` replaces a guild's rows; `guild.leave` removes one. A guild.remove now clears the membership too, so a disbanded guild does not leave orphaned rows behind. The chunking needs explaining. A roster over the shard's per-frame cap arrives as several frames carrying seq/more/total. The sidecar reassembles them for its own GET /guilds board, but the live WebSocket feed and the /history backfill both carry the individual frames — so this ingest sees them unreassembled. It copes without buffering, because a table expresses what the sidecar's single JSON column could not: the frame carrying seq 0 clears the guild first, and every frame then upserts its own rows. Upsert rather than insert because the /history backfill replays stored frames on every reconnect, and a redelivery has to be a no-op rather than a duplicate-key error. The cost is a sub-second window during a multi-frame update where the table holds part of a roster; buffering to close it would duplicate the sidecar's reassembly for a projection that is already only as fresh as a 60s sweep. On visibility: both kinds are mapped to the existing `guilds` feature. Without that mapping rule 2 fails an unmapped kind closed to admin-only, which would have quietly kept rosters off the public page forever. Mapping them is safe because a roster is the first frame carrying locked fields inside an ARRAY of actors rather than one nested actor, and the projection walker already recurses into arrays and matches acct/webId by suffix — so a member's account name is stripped below admin by exactly the rule that already strips guild.leader.acct. There is a test for that specifically, because the difference is a public page listing character names versus one publishing 150 account names. `acct`/`web_id` are still stored, since that is what lets a linked member be matched to a site user; they are just never projected below admin. guild.leave is appended to the event log, as the departure counterpart to guild.join and for the same reason — it is what a "so-and-so left" feed reads. guild.roster stays out: it is board state like guild.update, and it is the one fat frame on the wire, so logging it would put a full membership snapshot into shard_events on every membership change. The PUBLIC_KINDS guard test caught the addition, which is what it is for; its expected set now carries a v4 group alongside the v3 one. Refs: docs/website/TEAMS.md Part 12 Phase 1 Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
|||
| 044211fd41 |
fix(docs): repair the escaped apostrophes, and document this module's env vars
Nineteen `#swagger` descriptions carried a `\'` inside a single-quoted string. That is correct JavaScript and wrong here: swagger-autogen does not evaluate the annotation as JS, so the backslash survives into the spec and Swagger UI renders "the shard\'s published ruleset" to a reader. Replaced with a typographic apostrophe, which the same files already use elsewhere. Found by opening /api/docs in a browser against a real core with this module installed — the fragment was valid JSON, the paths were right, every test passed, and it was still wrong on screen. Nothing that reads the artifact can see this; only reading the rendered page can. Also documents the four environment variables this module reads (UOLINK_BASE_URL / _WS_URL / _PROTOCOL, TOWNCRIER_DURATION_SEC). Core's .env.example is dropping them in the paired website PR: they were never core's, and a half-copy in two repos goes stale silently. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 5cdcf0fbb6 |
feat(release): ship an OpenAPI fragment, a frozen manifest and a bundle (phase 3, slice 5)
The three artifacts that make this module installable and checkable, closing
phase 3's extraction. Nothing about what the module serves changes: the same 72
URLs, the same behaviour.
**The OpenAPI fragment (MODULE_API.md §2.8, §6.1a) was never built, on either
side.** The 417 `#swagger` annotations came across in slice 1 and went nowhere,
and core's /api/docs.json merged nothing — so every route this module serves was
in no spec at all, which is core's standing rule ("never ship a route that isn't
in the spec") being broken by the extraction rather than by a route.
`server/scripts/swaggerFragment.js` generates it. The prefixes are DERIVED: the
script runs the module's own `register()` against a recording api and asks
`require.cache` which file each router came from, so a mount prefix exists in one
place — `server/index.js` — and not in a table beside it. The 31 schemas moved
here from core's swagger.js, namespaced `Uo…` because core wins every key
collision in the merge; `Error` and `ValidationError` stay referenced by core's
names, since they resolve in the merged document.
**The frozen route manifest (§5.3)** is derived too, and by subtraction: CI
clones core at the ref pinned in ci/core-ref.json, generates its manifest without
this module and then with it, and the difference is what this module serves. That
buys the half of §5.3 that matters most for free — a module that shadowed or
displaced one of core's routes shows up as a REMOVAL, not merely as an addition
elsewhere. The same job checks the fragment against ground truth: every route
must have an operation and every operation must be a route.
**The release workflow** publishes `module-uo-<version>.tar.gz` plus a manifest
carrying its sha256. The version is declared in module.json rather than computed
from commit subjects, and the workflow never writes to a branch — it tags and
publishes — so `main` needs no push exception. The bundle is assembled from an
include list, because an exclude list ships whatever it forgot.
Four annotation defects, inherited from core and never visible until something
generated a spec from these files: two `requestBody` literals a brace short (the
route documented with an empty body), and two descriptions whose inner quoting
swagger-autogen cannot survive — it re-quotes `"` and a backtick to `'` before
evaluating, so either inside a single-quoted description ends the string early
and the annotation is dropped. It reports each one and then prints Success in
green, so the generator now captures its diagnostics and makes them fatal.
Also fixed while writing it: passing one shared `doc` to swagger-autogen six
times. It renders components.schemas from an EXAMPLE object and writes the result
back into what it was handed, so each pass re-wrapped the last and the fragment
came out at 484 MB.
- 409 server tests (+21), 40 client tests unchanged
- swagger-fragment.json: 69 paths covering all 72 routes
- routes.manifest.json: 72 routes; core's own surface unchanged, 0 removals
- verified end to end by assembling the bundle exactly as CI will, unpacking it
into a real core and regenerating the manifest
Refs: docs/website/MODULE_SYSTEM.md §2.7.1, MODULE_API.md §2.8, §5.3, §6.1a
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|||
| f7bb3d912e |
fix(db): own the two settings seeds, and repair the protocol-3 one-shot
Core seeded `game_account_signup` and `uo_link_protocol_3_migrated`, two keys that name a game concept. That made core's schema declare a module's settings, which is the structural half of what Phase 3 removes (MODULE_SYSTEM.md §2.7.1, slice 4). Both INSERTs move here. The keys are deliberately unchanged: they are live rows on every existing install and renaming one silently resets an operator's choice to the default. The marker is not just a tidy-up. It and the `UPDATE uo_link_config SET protocol = 3` it makes one-shot were adjacent in core's schema.sql until slice 1 moved the UPDATE here and left the INSERT behind — and the two files do not run together: core's schema is replayed in full before any module fragment. So the marker existed before the UPDATE ever read it, the NOT EXISTS guard was false on every boot of an upgraded install, and the migration could never fire. An install carrying a protocol-2 row would have stayed pinned at 2 against a v3 sidecar, 409ing every REST call — the exact failure the migration prevents. Latent rather than live: it bites only an install that first boots a post-slice-1 build while already holding a uo_link_config row, and `edge` has not cut over. `schemaFragment.test.js` asserts the order, plus the fragment rules core validates at load time (leading-verb allowlist, IF NOT EXISTS, grandfathered table prefixes) — restated here for the same reason manifest.test.js restates the manifest rules. Its statement splitter is a character walk, because a comment in this file contains quotes. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 493cf296ab |
fix(server): own game-account signup, and repair the gate slice 1 broke
`POST /player/shard/account` and its staff twin have answered 500 for every caller since slice 1: the ported controller called `settings.isGameAccountSignupEnabled()`, which is a member of core's settings model and not of `ctx.settings` — three functions, deliberately. The call was `undefined(...)`, the TypeError landed in the catch, and no test reached the branch. The gate now lives on the side that uses it (`utils/gameSignup.js`), which is also where the policy belongs: the setting's own help text names Bridge.cfg and says the shard's SignupMode must agree, and core cannot own a sentence about a UO shard. The admin field moves to this module's Shard page and the derived flag onto `/public/shard/features`, beside the visibility flags the same callers already read. The setting KEY is unchanged. Renaming `game_account_signup` would silently reset every configured instance to `disabled` on upgrade, with players reporting broken signup as the only clue — the same grandfathering as `spawn_atlas_servuo_path` and the seven stream ids. Both regression tests were shown to fail against the bug before it was fixed. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 28f4b9afe2 |
feat(client): the whole client half (phase 3, slice 3)
The 35 files behind twelve public pages, seven admin views, two player views and three core-page extensions, ported onto `window.__rg`. Every one of them imports exactly the seven kit members plus `lib/format.js`, which is the finding §2.7.1 predicted and this confirms. `client/src/core.js` is the port mechanism, and unlike the server's it is a plain read: `window.__rg` is published before any module chunk evaluates, so there is no gap to defer around and a ported component keeps its ordinary import shape. `client/src/api.js` rebuilds the UO namespaces over the request primitive — same URLs, because §1.2 freezes the API surface. SPA paths changed and API paths did not. `/site/shard` is `/uo/shard`, and the admin paths lost their now-redundant `shard-` prefixes (`/admin/uo/ops`), a clean break being the only moment that is free. `shim/rg.js` becomes the single reader of the global, so the "core did not publish its dependencies" message is reachable from whichever module the bundler happens to touch first rather than from whichever one is imported first — a guarantee that used to last until someone sorted the imports. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 6b99d7e220 |
test(server): port core's UO suite onto the ctx harness
22 test files moved from core, plus the two that were split out of files core keeps. 351 tests pass. One change runs through every moved test, and it is the boundary rather than a chore: core internals can no longer be stubbed by requiring them, because there are none to require. `../utils/db` and `../model/settings` do not exist here. What a test controls instead is the ctx core would have handed over, installed once by test/_setup.js -- which is a better seam anyway, since it is exactly the surface the contract promises and nothing wider. The ctx _setup installs is deliberately unfrozen. Core freezes what it hands a module and entry.test.js still asserts against a frozen one; but a test that needs settings.get to return a path has to be able to say so. Two tests changed SHAPE, and that is the boundary too. fromShardEvent used to assert through publish() into pushDevices and a captured fetch -- which endpoints were hit, how many requests went out. None of that is this module's any more: publish is ctx.push.publish, and the device registry and the relay are behind it. Reaching for them from here would be reaching past ctx. What remains is what the module owns and is the part worth guarding: a game account resolves to a website user, a personal target that resolves to nobody is dropped rather than published, and a sensitive kind never reaches publish at all. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 740a677f92 |
feat(server): register the routes, the slot, the leg and the boot hooks
The entry point becomes real: five mount prefixes, the admin.users.detail extension slot, the shard push catalog, the town-crier announce leg and both lifecycle hooks. module.json declares all of it and the loader checks the declaration against what register() actually registers, in both directions. The URLs are byte-identical to the ones core served before the extraction. That is the whole point of moving the code and not the paths: the shipped Android app calls POST /api/v1/admin/shard/kick and the Discord bot reads /api/v1/public/shard/*, and neither knows a module answers now. Require order is load-bearing and the requires are inside register() because of it. Every ported file reaches core through ./core, whose members resolve ctx when called -- but a router does `const express = core.express` at ITS file scope, which runs the moment it is required. Hoisting these to the top of the file breaks the module with an error about ctx being missing, from a file that never mentions it. boot.js takes the eight UO call sites out of core's server.js. One behavioural change, deliberate: uoLinkSocket.start() and the sidecar health probe used to run AFTER the listener bound and now run before it, because onBoot does. start() returns as soon as the reconnecting client is armed, but the probe is a real HTTP call, so it is fired and NOT awaited -- an unreachable sidecar must not hold the site closed. Reporting that the bridge is down is diagnostics; being up is not a precondition for serving a page. router/rateLimits.js builds the market limiter through ctx.middleware.rateLimit, core's factory. The policy is the module's -- only the module knows what its endpoints cost -- and the plumbing is core's, so there is one express-rate-limit in the process and one place a breach is logged. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| fe3251a543 |
feat(server): port the UO models, utils and schema fragment
The data half of the extraction: 8 model directories, 13 utils, the shard
stream catalog and the 27-table schema fragment with its purge.
server/core.js is what makes the port a one-line import change per file rather
than a signature change per function. Ported code requires its dependencies at
file scope -- `const { query } = require('../../core')` -- which runs before
register() has been called and before any ctx exists. So every member is a
stable function that resolves ctx when CALLED, and nothing may be destructured
off ctx at init either, because core is free to hand over a getter.
Two helpers are vendored rather than taken from ctx, and the line between them
is the point. utils/excerpt.js is core's deriveExcerpt -- nine lines of pure
text handling. Core's sanitiser next to it was NOT copied: a second copy of a
security control diverges silently the moment either is fixed. announceLinks.js
vendors legError and articleUrl the same way, but baseUrl could not be: core's
reads APP_BASE_URL, and §2.7 forbids a module reading core's environment, so it
comes off ctx.site.baseUrl.
The schema fragment is core's 27 shard_*/uo_link_* statements, verbs CREATE,
ALTER and UPDATE only, every CREATE TABLE guarded. Two of its tables carry a
foreign key INTO users, which is allowed and is why the replay order matters --
core's schema is in place before this runs. The reverse never occurs and must
not: it would make core unable to boot without a module installed.
One real port bug caught by the integration run, not by tests: the atlas art
map resolved `../../../db/data`, which pointed at core's tree when this file
lived there and points outside server/ now. A path that happens to resolve is
exactly what survives a green suite, because the absent-file branch returns {}
and looks like the normal case.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| 47809854ef |
fix(module): ask Node whether a specifier is a builtin
The first CI run failed on `node:test`, in every test file, reported as the module boundary being broken. It was not: `builtinModules` omits `test` on Node 20 (CI) and includes it on Node 24 (local), so a list rebuilt from it disagrees with itself across versions. Use `isBuiltin`, which is Node's own answer, and treat the `node:` prefix as sufficient on its own -- a prefixed specifier can never resolve to a package, whatever the running version enumerates. Test covers both forms. Also corrects this file's header: the client half's guard is no longer `external` (it never worked), it is the Vite build's resolution-time check plus checkExternals.js on the built chunk. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 5d7668d5ea |
feat(module): the bundle skeleton (phase 3, slice 0)
The first real module. It registers nothing, deliberately: what slice 0 proves
is the delivery path itself, end to end, before a single UO file moves into it.
Server half: module.json, an entry point that takes (ctx, api) and registers
nothing, a test suite built on a fake ctx, and scripts/checkImports.js -- the
MODULE_API.md §5.1 boundary check. Client half: the Vite library build, four
shims re-exporting react / react-dom/client / react-router-dom / jsx-runtime
from window.__rg, an entry that verifies each is identity-equal to core's copy,
and scripts/checkExternals.js. 29 server tests, 9 client tests, both new.
Verified against a real core: the module loads, mounts its zero routes, runs to
`started`, and is published by /api/v1/public/modules. Its chunk serves from
the entry's directory with `Cache-Control: no-cache` while the module's server
source, module.json and package.json all 404. In Chrome, under the enforced
`script-src 'self'`, the chunk evaluates and reports all four shared
dependencies OK, with zero CSP reports and no console errors.
Three findings, each of which had produced a green build that was wrong.
MODULE_API.md §3.6 shows `external` alongside the aliases and they do not
compose. Rollup asks `external` BEFORE Vite's alias resolver runs, so a
specifier in both is marked external and never aliased -- the chunk then ships
bare `import "react"`, which no browser can resolve without an import map, and
CSP forbids one. Built cleanly and emitted exactly that; checkExternals caught
it. So: alias only, `external` empty, and vite.config.js grows a resolution-time
guard that fails the build if a shared dependency resolves into node_modules.
That guard was wrong twice before it worked. Written against Rollup's `load`
hook it never ran -- `load` is first-wins and an earlier plugin had already
claimed the module -- so a deliberately-broken alias produced a 24 kB chunk with
react-router welded in, and a green build. And its forbidden-package list was
derived from the alias list "so the two cannot disagree", which meant deleting
an alias also deleted the guard against what that alias prevented. It states the
contract now, and a test asserts the aliases stay inside it.
checkImports failed on its own documentation the first time it ran: the comment
naming require("../../etc/passwd") as an example of what to catch, and index.js
explaining why the module must never require("express"). A boundary check that
cannot survive being described is one people stop writing comments around. It
strips comments and template literals with a character walk rather than a
regexp, because a URL in a string contains a comment opener and a comment
contains quotes -- and it has its own test suite, since a check never shown to
fail is a check nobody knows the state of.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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