Two defects the acceptance walk found in shipped code, both invisible to the suites that were green on either side of them. **The spawn atlas cannot import on a stock ServUO tree.** `spawnAtlasSource.js` dedupes decoration types with a case-SENSITIVE `Map`, but `shard_decor_types.type` is a PRIMARY KEY under MariaDB's default `..._ai_ci` collation, which folds case. Stock 57.4's own `Data/Decoration/` names four types under two spellings each (CheckerBoard/Checkerboard, ChessBoard/Chessboard, MetalChest/Metalchest, SpinningWheelEastAddon/SpinningwheelEastAddon), and in every pair exactly one is a real class. The second row raised `1062 Duplicate entry` and took the WHOLE import transaction down. The blast radius is not decoration: with no atlas, EVERY option source answers empty and no Phase 12 world verb can be authored at all. The shard end already knew — `BridgeWorld.cs` resolves a decor type with `FindTypeByName(name, ignoreCase: true)` and its comment says the atlas and the decoration files disagree about casing. Folding here is the two ends agreeing. **Teardown of every world verb was a no-op that reported success.** `revertOwned` forwarded core's `idempotencyKey` as the despawn's OWN key — and core's key is the step's, the one `placeOwned` spawned under. `BridgeIdempotency` keys on the key alone, so the despawn was taken for a repeat and answered with the SPAWN's stored reply; `OnDespawn` never ran. Core read `ok` with no `refused` and marked every row `reverted` while the shard still held every object. Measured on the rig: ledger `world | reverted | 21`, shard `world.owned` 21 alive with `pruned: 0`, and the identical despawn re-sent with a fresh key removed all 21. It affected all five world verbs, so an invasion's creatures, boss, oracle, gate and decoration stayed in the world for ever while the console reported a clean teardown. `MODULE_API.md` says what that key is for and it is not this: it identifies a dispatch core never learned the outcome of, so the module can ask about it. No key is needed on a despawn — a repeat answers `gone`, which both ends already treat as success — and dropping it also makes the documented empty-`resources` case work, since no serials means "everything this run owns". The parameter is removed from `despawnWorld`'s signature rather than left optional. Both fixes are verified end to end against a real ServUO + sidecar + website rig: the import now yields 309 decor types (was failing at 313 with 4 collisions), 6,455 spawn points, 800 creatures, 558 landmarks; and a full four-phase run's teardown left the shard owning 0 objects. Each new test was confirmed to FAIL without its fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
428 lines
21 KiB
JavaScript
428 lines
21 KiB
JavaScript
// ── uo-link sidecar REST client ────────────────────────────────────────────
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//
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// Server-side HTTP client for the uo-link sidecar (the bridge to the ServUO
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// shard). Same shape as botInternalClient: never throws — every call returns
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// { ok, data, status, error } so an admin poll or a public page never 500s just
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// because the sidecar/shard is down or restarting.
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//
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// The base URL + shared-secret token come from the DB-backed uoLinkConfig
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// (admin-managed, encrypted at rest) — NOT env vars, and the token is NEVER sent
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// to the browser. Every request carries `Authorization: Bearer <token>` and
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// `X-UOLink-Version: <protocol>` so a protocol mismatch is caught (409) rather
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// than mis-parsed. Config is cached for a few seconds to avoid decrypting the
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// token on every call.
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//
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// ── Protocol 6: `idempotencyKey` on a write ────────────────────────────────
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//
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// The three write helpers the event engine drives take an optional
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// `idempotencyKey`, which the sidecar passes to the shard verbatim. The shard
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// executes a key at most once and answers a repeat with the ORIGINAL reply, which
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// is what makes retrying a world write safe — before it, a lost acknowledgement
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// and a command that never applied were the same event seen from here.
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//
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// **A key is a function of the caller's unit of work, never of the attempt.** The
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// event runner derives it from `sha256(runId|stepId)`, so every retry of one step
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// carries the same key and a different step never collides with it. Passing a
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// fresh value per call would satisfy the type and defeat the entire mechanism.
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//
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// **The DELETEs deliberately take no key.** Their idempotency is inherent — the
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// second removal of a town-crier entry or a news article is a no-op the shard is
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// already happy to perform — and the sidecar builds those commands from the path
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// rather than from a body, so carrying one would be a protocol change bought for
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// a guarantee that already holds.
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//
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// A caller that sends no key gets exactly the pre-protocol-6 behaviour, which is
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// what leaves the admin screens (which send none, being driven by a human who can
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// see whether the thing happened) unchanged.
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//
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// One new status can now come back from a keyed write: **425**, the sidecar's
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// mapping of `bridge.busy` — a command under this key is still in flight on the
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// shard. It is transient and retryable, and `shardAnnounce.classify` already
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// treats it so by falling through to its retry case.
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const uoLinkConfig = require('../model/uoLinkConfig/uoLinkConfig.model')
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const log = require('../core').logger('uo-link-client')
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// The sidecar waits up to 10s on the shard before answering 504, so this sits
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// just above it — every call answers rather than being abandoned mid-flight.
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//
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// **Exported because the event actions are declared against it** (EVENTS_PLAN.md
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// Phase 9). An action's `budgetMs` must exceed this or core's dispatch deadline
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// fires first and classifies the step `retry` without asking the module, which
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// for a broadcast means announcing twice. `config/uoEventActions.js` states that
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// relationship and its test asserts it, and both need the number to come from
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// here rather than from a copy that can drift.
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const TIMEOUT_MS = 12000
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const CONFIG_TTL_MS = 5000
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let cachedConfig = null
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let cachedAt = 0
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// Read (and briefly cache) the connection config incl. decrypted token.
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async function resolveConfig() {
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const now = Date.now()
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if (cachedConfig && now - cachedAt < CONFIG_TTL_MS) return cachedConfig
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cachedConfig = await uoLinkConfig.getWithToken()
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cachedAt = now
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return cachedConfig
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}
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// Drop the cache after a save so the next call picks up new URL/token immediately.
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function invalidateConfig() {
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cachedConfig = null
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cachedAt = 0
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}
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// Core request. Returns { ok, data, status, error }. `ok` is true only on a 2xx
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// with a parseable JSON body. Non-2xx responses still return their status + body
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// so callers can distinguish 503 (shard restarting — transient) from 404.
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async function call(path, { method = 'GET', body } = {}) {
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const controller = new AbortController()
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const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), TIMEOUT_MS)
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// resolveConfig() decrypts the stored auth token, and decryption THROWS when the
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// ciphertext can't be authenticated — SECRET_ENC_KEY was rotated, or a DB dump was
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// restored into an environment keyed differently. It must stay INSIDE the try: out
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// here it escaped `call()` entirely and 500'd every live-shard route (admin and
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// player character/roster/vendor lookups, GET /admin/uo-link/config) instead of
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// degrading to "shard unavailable". This module never throws — see the header.
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let configResolved = false
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try {
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const config = await resolveConfig()
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configResolved = true
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if (!config || !config.baseUrl) {
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return { ok: false, status: 0, error: 'uo-link is not configured' }
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}
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const headers = {
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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'X-UOLink-Version': String(config.protocol || 3),
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}
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if (config.token) headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${config.token}`
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const res = await fetch(`${config.baseUrl}${path}`, {
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method,
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headers,
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body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,
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signal: controller.signal,
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})
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let data = null
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try {
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data = await res.json()
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} catch {
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// Non-JSON (or empty) body — leave data null; status still reported.
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}
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if (!res.ok) {
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if (res.status === 401) log.warn('uo-link rejected auth token (401)', { path })
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if (res.status === 409) log.error('uo-link protocol mismatch (409)', { path, body: data })
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return { ok: false, status: res.status, data, error: `sidecar responded ${res.status}` }
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}
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return { ok: true, status: res.status, data }
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} catch (err) {
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// A failure before the config resolved is a misconfiguration, not a flaky
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// sidecar: log it loudly (and distinctly) so "the shard looks offline" doesn't
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// silently mean "the token can no longer be decrypted".
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if (!configResolved) {
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log.error('uo-link config unreadable — is SECRET_ENC_KEY the key the stored token was encrypted with?', {
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path,
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message: err.message,
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})
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return { ok: false, status: 0, error: 'uo-link config unreadable' }
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}
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log.warn('uo-link call failed', { path, message: err.message })
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return { ok: false, status: 0, error: err.message }
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} finally {
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clearTimeout(timeout)
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}
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}
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// ── Read queries ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Liveness (no auth required by the sidecar, but we send it anyway).
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const health = () => call('/health')
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const getCharBySerial = (serial) => call(`/char/serial/${encodeURIComponent(serial)}`)
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const getCharBySlot = (account, slot) =>
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call(`/char/${encodeURIComponent(account)}/${encodeURIComponent(slot)}`)
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const getRoster = (account) => call(`/roster/${encodeURIComponent(account)}`)
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const getVendors = (account) => call(`/vendors/${encodeURIComponent(account)}`)
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// History / economy series — used for WS-reconnect backfill and public feeds.
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function getHistory({ kind, limit = 100 } = {}) {
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const params = new URLSearchParams()
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if (kind) params.set('kind', kind)
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if (limit) params.set('limit', String(limit))
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const qs = params.toString()
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const suffix = qs ? `?${qs}` : ''
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return call(`/history${suffix}`)
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}
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const getEconomy = (limit = 100) => call(`/economy?limit=${encodeURIComponent(limit)}`)
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// Live board / queue projections — snapshotted on WS (re)connect and served from
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// our own store thereafter.
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const getChamps = () => call('/champs')
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const getPages = () => call('/pages')
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// Protocol 2.0 board projections — same snapshot-on-connect pattern.
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const getGuilds = () => call('/guilds')
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const getGovernors = () => call('/governors')
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const getHouses = () => call('/houses')
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const getPresence = () => call('/online') // aggregate population (count + byFacet/byRegion)
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// Protocol 3.0: the shard's published ruleset. Object-shaped, not a board — the
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// sidecar answers `{ ruleset: null }` until the shard has published one.
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const getRuleset = () => call('/ruleset')
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// Protocol 3.0: points/loyalty leaderboards. `/points` is board-shaped (an array
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// under `boards`); the per-system read 404s for a system the shard never published.
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const getPoints = () => call('/points')
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const getPointsBoard = (system) => call(`/points/${encodeURIComponent(system)}`)
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// Protocol 3.0: the player-vendor market index. The one PAGED sidecar read — a
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// whole-world market does not fit in a response — so it answers with
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// `{ vendors, total, limit, offset }` and the caller walks it (see uoLinkSocket).
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const getMarket = ({ limit = 200, offset = 0 } = {}) =>
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call(`/market?limit=${encodeURIComponent(limit)}&offset=${encodeURIComponent(offset)}`)
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// ── Commands ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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const confirmLink = (code, websiteUserId) =>
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call('/link/confirm', { method: 'POST', body: { code, websiteUserId: String(websiteUserId) } })
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const linkLookup = (account) => call(`/link/${encodeURIComponent(account)}`)
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// Account provisioning (Protocol 2.0). createAccount provisions a game account and
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// auto-links it to the website user in one step; `ip` is the END USER's browser IP
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// (read from the request), which the shard needs for its per-IP account cap — the
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// sidecar only sees our server. The password is hashed on the shard and never
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// appears in any reply/event/log. unlinkAccount severs a game account's tie from
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// the site side. `actor` is the staff/website id, recorded in the shard audit.
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const createAccount = ({ actor, account, password, websiteUserId, ip }) =>
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call('/accounts/create', {
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method: 'POST',
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body: { actor, account, password, websiteUserId: websiteUserId == null ? undefined : String(websiteUserId), ip },
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})
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const unlinkAccount = ({ actor, account }) =>
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call(`/link/${encodeURIComponent(account)}`, { method: 'DELETE', body: { actor } })
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const postTownCrier = ({ id, lines, durationSec, idempotencyKey }) =>
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call('/towncrier', { method: 'POST', body: { id, lines, durationSec, idempotencyKey } })
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const deleteTownCrier = (id) => call(`/towncrier/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, { method: 'DELETE' })
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// Town Cryer News gump (Protocol 2.1). A full article (title/HTML body/image/URL)
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// in the in-game News window; re-posting the same id REPLACES it. `announce`
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// (default true on the sidecar) controls whether the criers proclaim the title.
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const postNews = ({ id, title, body, image, url, announce, idempotencyKey }) =>
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call('/news', {
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method: 'POST',
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body: { id: String(id), title, body, image, url, announce, idempotencyKey },
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})
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const deleteNews = (id) => call(`/news/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, { method: 'DELETE' })
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// ── Staff write plane (§6) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Every call carries `actor` — the website username of the staff member — set by
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// the controller from the session, NEVER from the browser. The shard records it
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// for attribution and echoes an admin.audit event back over the WS feed.
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const adminKick = ({ actor, account, serial }) =>
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call('/admin/kick', { method: 'POST', body: { actor, account, serial } })
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const adminBan = ({ actor, account, serial, durationSec, reason }) =>
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call('/admin/ban', { method: 'POST', body: { actor, account, serial, durationSec, reason } })
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const adminUnban = ({ actor, account }) =>
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call('/admin/unban', { method: 'POST', body: { actor, account } })
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const adminBroadcast = ({ actor, text, hue, idempotencyKey }) =>
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call('/admin/broadcast', { method: 'POST', body: { actor, text, hue, idempotencyKey } })
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// ── The event plane (protocol 6, EVENTS_PLAN.md Phase 11b) ─────────────────
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//
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// Leases and the run-scoped participation ledger. Both are gated on the shard by
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// `Bridge.EventsEnabled`, which is deliberately NOT the admin plane's switch: an
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// operator consenting to staff moderation from a screen has not thereby consented
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// to the website changing their world on a schedule at four in the morning. A
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// shard with the plane off answers 403, and the actions turn that into a refusal
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// an author can read rather than a retry.
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// Every lease this shard offers, with what each is worth right now and what is
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// holding it. One read serves both questions core asks — `read()` wants the
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// current value, `inForce()` wants to know whether the shard still has a record
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// of the hold — so a lease costs one round trip, not two.
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// **A targeted lease must name its target here** (protocol 7 part b). A key like
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// `Spawner.MaxCount` is one capability over thousands of spawners, so it has no
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// single `current` and the catalog walk cannot fill one in — while `read()` needs
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// exactly one value for exactly one target before it applies anything. Naming both
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// narrows the frame to that row and fills it.
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//
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// The frame also carries `holds`: every hold this shard has, whatever key or
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// target. A catalog walk enumerates the KEYS but can never enumerate the holds on
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// a targeted one — there is no list of spawners to walk — so `inForce()` reads
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// that rather than the row's `held` flag.
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const getLeases = ({ key, target } = {}) => {
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const params = new URLSearchParams()
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if (key) params.set('key', key)
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if (target) params.set('target', target)
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const query = params.toString()
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return call(query ? `/lease?${query}` : '/lease')
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}
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// `holdMs` is authoritative and `untilMs` is display only. An absolute deadline
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// computed here and honoured there is a deadline measured against two clocks, and
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// a shard running ten minutes fast would restore a ten-minute lease the moment it
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// took it. Values cross as TEXT whatever the lease's declared type: `1200` and
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// `1200.0` are one number to a JSON parser and two strings to a compare-and-set.
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const applyLease = ({ key, target, value, holdMs, untilMs, runId, idempotencyKey }) =>
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call('/lease', {
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method: 'POST',
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body: { key, target, value: String(value), holdMs, untilMs, runId, idempotencyKey },
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})
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// `expected` is what this run applied and `baseline` is what to put back, both out
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// of core's ledger rather than the shard's memory — so a release still works after
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// a reconnect, and a shard that has forgotten the lease entirely (a restart, which
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// reverts every config lease by design) answers honestly instead of refusing.
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const releaseLease = ({ key, target, expected, baseline, idempotencyKey }) =>
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call('/lease/release', {
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method: 'POST',
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body: {
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key,
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target,
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expected: expected == null ? undefined : String(expected),
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baseline: baseline == null ? undefined : String(baseline),
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idempotencyKey,
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},
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})
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// The participation ledger. The area is a map, a point and a radius rather than a
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// region name, because protocol 6's own walk established that the most specific
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// region containing an event is routinely anonymous.
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const openParticipation = ({ runId, map, x, y, radius, holdMs, idempotencyKey }) =>
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call('/participation', {
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method: 'POST',
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body: { runId: String(runId), map, x, y, radius, holdMs, idempotencyKey },
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})
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// A POST for a read, and the reason is the phase's headline: on a well-attended
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// run the shard walks its members across Core ticks rather than in one inbound
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// call, so a repeat arriving mid-walk is answered `bridge.busy` (425). A read that
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// can legitimately be refused as a repeat in flight is not a GET.
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const snapshotParticipation = ({ runId, idempotencyKey }) =>
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call(`/participation/${encodeURIComponent(runId)}/snapshot`, {
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method: 'POST',
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body: { idempotencyKey },
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})
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const closeParticipation = ({ runId, idempotencyKey }) =>
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call(`/participation/${encodeURIComponent(runId)}/close`, {
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method: 'POST',
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body: { idempotencyKey },
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})
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// ── The world verbs (protocol 7) ───────────────────────────────
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//
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// One endpoint for five author-facing verbs. `what` is the discriminator, and the
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// per-verb fields ride alongside it: `type`/`name`/`hue`/`spread` for creatures and
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// decoration, the three multipliers for a boss, `greeting`/`lines` for an oracle,
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// `target`/`holdMs` for a gate.
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//
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// The shard registers every serial it places against the run and persists that
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// registry, which is what makes `despawnWorld` below safe to point at a list of
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// serials: it can only delete what the run actually owns.
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const spawnWorld = (body) => call('/world', { method: 'POST', body })
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// What the run still owns. A GET, unlike the participation snapshot: it carries no
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// idempotency key and the shard answers it in one pass. An unknown run answers with an
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// empty hand rather than a 404 — "owns nothing" and "never heard of it" are the same
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// fact once the registry is the only record, and they stay the same fact across a
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// restart, because the registry is written by the same world save as the objects it
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// describes.
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const ownedWorld = ({ runId }) => call(`/world/${encodeURIComponent(runId)}`)
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// Give back what the run owns. No `serials` means everything, which is the call
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// teardown makes. The reply splits three ways: `removed` was deleted, `gone` was
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// already absent (a player killed it — an ordinary success), and `refused` was never
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// this run's to delete.
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//
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// **It takes no idempotency key, and the parameter is gone rather than optional.**
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// It used to accept one, and `revertOwned` passed the step's — the key the SPAWN
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// went out under. The shard's at-most-once store is keyed on the key alone, so the
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// despawn was answered with the spawn's stored reply and nothing was ever deleted.
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// A repeat despawn needs no key: the second pass answers `gone`, which both ends
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// already treat as a success. Removed from the signature so it cannot be handed
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// one again by accident.
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const despawnWorld = ({ runId, serials }) =>
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call(`/world/${encodeURIComponent(runId)}/despawn`, {
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method: 'POST',
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body: { serials },
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})
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// ── Help-page (support) queue commands (§6) ────────────────────────────────
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const respondPage = (pageId, { message, close }) =>
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call(`/pages/${encodeURIComponent(pageId)}/respond`, { method: 'POST', body: { message, close } })
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const closePage = (pageId) => call(`/pages/${encodeURIComponent(pageId)}/close`, { method: 'POST' })
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|
|
|
// ── The one-shots (protocol 7 part b, EVENTS_PLAN.md Phase 12b) ────────────
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|
//
|
|
// Neither owned nor borrowed: done is done. Both are gated on the shard by the
|
|
// same `Bridge.EventsEnabled` as the rest of the plane.
|
|
|
|
// What this shard will actually build, with the bounds it will build within. The
|
|
// module holds the same allowlist for its dropdown, so the form still works with
|
|
// the shard down; this is what is true when that copy is wrong.
|
|
const getGrantCatalog = () => call('/items')
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|
|
|
// **The recipients are not sent.** The shard has held this run's participation
|
|
// ledger since it opened, keyed by the same character serials core stores as
|
|
// `member_key`, so the grant names a run and the shard resolves who was there.
|
|
// Sending a list would put the same list on the wire twice with a window in which
|
|
// the two disagree — and would have needed a core surface handing a module core's
|
|
// own participants.
|
|
const grantItem = ({ runId, item, amount, hue, name, where, idempotencyKey }) =>
|
|
call('/items/grant', {
|
|
method: 'POST',
|
|
body: { runId: String(runId), item, amount, hue, name, where, idempotencyKey },
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Starts a save. What actually happened rides `world.save.before`/`after` on the
|
|
// event stream, which have been there since protocol 2 — so this asserts only that
|
|
// the save was started, and a caller that needs the completion watches the feed it
|
|
// is already connected to.
|
|
const saveWorld = ({ idempotencyKey } = {}) =>
|
|
call('/world/save', { method: 'POST', body: { idempotencyKey } })
|
|
|
|
module.exports = {
|
|
TIMEOUT_MS,
|
|
invalidateConfig,
|
|
health,
|
|
getCharBySerial,
|
|
getCharBySlot,
|
|
getRoster,
|
|
getVendors,
|
|
getHistory,
|
|
getEconomy,
|
|
getChamps,
|
|
getPages,
|
|
getGuilds,
|
|
getGovernors,
|
|
getHouses,
|
|
getPresence,
|
|
getRuleset,
|
|
getPoints,
|
|
getPointsBoard,
|
|
getMarket,
|
|
confirmLink,
|
|
linkLookup,
|
|
createAccount,
|
|
unlinkAccount,
|
|
postTownCrier,
|
|
deleteTownCrier,
|
|
postNews,
|
|
deleteNews,
|
|
getLeases,
|
|
applyLease,
|
|
releaseLease,
|
|
openParticipation,
|
|
snapshotParticipation,
|
|
closeParticipation,
|
|
spawnWorld,
|
|
ownedWorld,
|
|
despawnWorld,
|
|
getGrantCatalog,
|
|
grantItem,
|
|
saveWorld,
|
|
adminKick,
|
|
adminBan,
|
|
adminUnban,
|
|
adminBroadcast,
|
|
respondPage,
|
|
closePage,
|
|
}
|