Record that the whole /player/* router sits behind requireAuth only (not
requireRole('player')): staff are a superset of players, every handler is
self-scoped to the caller, and staff reach the identical handlers under
/admin/shard/*. This is why a staff account with linked characters gets
its "My characters" and personal notification streams on the mobile
client. Matches the code change in RunicGateway/website.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md (the approved design/implementation plan) and fold
the feature into BACKEND_DESIGN §3 (trusted_devices + recovery_codes schema),
§4 (login/totp trust+recovery, /auth/me/trusted-devices*, recovery-codes*,
admin trusted-device + /mfa/reset routes), and §6 (trusted-device security
model + audit actions). Note the app-side trust/recovery flow in android PLAN §4.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the vague "helmet with a CSP suited to the SPA" line with the actual
policy now implemented in server/src/app.js: per-directive sources and the
rationale for each non-'self' allowance (Google Fonts, inline React styles,
external/embedded images, same-origin REST+SSE), why upgrade-insecure-requests
is omitted, the scoped looser CSP for the /api/docs Swagger UI route, and the
X-Powered-By handling across the public and internal listeners.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Promote APP_LINKS.md from a deferred design note into an implementation spec
matching the website `feat/mobile-app-links` and android `feat/app-links`
branches: the server-side `/.well-known/assetlinks.json` route + `mobile_app_links_enabled`
toggle + additive redirect-allowlist entry, and the app-side `autoVerify`
intent-filter driven by a build-time `appLinkHost` (a single multi-tenant APK
cannot autoVerify open-ended shard domains, so App Links are a white-label /
first-party build opt-in; the custom scheme stays the permanent fallback).
Update PLAN.md §9 (M9 follow-up) and the §14 open item, and the redirect-URI
allowlist section of website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Record the plan before coding: native Android "Sign in with Google/Discord"
via a Mobile SSO Authorization Bridge that extends the existing /auth/sso/*
redirect flow and terminates in the existing mobile bearer tokens.
- BACKEND_DESIGN.md: mobile_auth_sessions / mobile_auth_codes schema, the
/auth/mobile/sso/{start,exchange} contract, the two PKCE layers, state/CSRF,
exact-match redirect-URI allowlist, TOTP parity, and the documented
revocation-latency window.
- android/PLAN.md: promote §4.2's "possible later enhancement" to milestone M9
(backend-first, mirroring M7); status note.
- android/APP_LINKS.md: new architecture note on the per-shard assetlinks.json
/ pairing multi-tenancy question (App Links deferred; custom scheme only now).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Flip M7 Part 2 to landed (Android-app#15) and record the two implementation
decisions: the direct-ntfy embedded distributor (no UnifiedPush library — the
plan's stated likely path; foreground-service SSE, no second app, no Google
Play Services), and the small additive push.ntfyUrl settings field the app
needs to discover the relay (website#79). Document push.ntfyUrl +
NTFY_PUBLIC_URL in BACKEND_DESIGN.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- BACKEND_DESIGN.md: push_devices + notification_subscriptions tables (§3), the
/auth/me/devices* + /auth/me/notifications/* API rows (§4), a push-notification
design + security section (content-free tickles, PUBLIC_KINDS split, owner-keyed
personal streams, SSRF endpoint guard, untrusted-relay model), and the ntfy
compose service in the deploy section (§8).
- PLAN.md: flip M7 Part 1 (backend + docs) to in-review — status line, §8 item 3,
§9 M7.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Counterpart to RunicGateway/website#77.
- BACKEND_DESIGN.md: /public table now documents the new GET /public/version
(DB-free identity/version), the version block on /public/status, and the brand
block on /public/settings (per-shard theming: name/accent/logo/hero/favicon).
- android/PLAN.md: mark §8 item 4 (version/health) and item 6 (branding) DONE and
update the prerequisite-progress summary — all v1 prerequisites are now done;
only push notifications (item 3) remains and is post-v1 (M7). App M0–M4 unblocked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Counterpart to RunicGateway/website#76 (role-agnostic /auth/me/* self surface).
- BACKEND_DESIGN.md: add the /auth/me/account* rows to the /auth API contract and
a note that the surface reuses account.controller behind requireAuth (any role),
so a client manages its own account without touching /admin.
- android/PLAN.md: mark §8 item 1 (role-agnostic self-service) DONE and update the
prerequisite-progress summary; version/health (item 4) and branding (item 6)
remain open, push (item 3) is post-v1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Add /auth/password/forgot and /auth/password/reset/:token to the API
contract and the password_resets table to the schema section, matching the
website change (RunicGateway/website feat/password-reset). Notes the
no-enumeration behaviour, single-use hashed-token model, and that the Android
app hands off to the web reset page (PLAN.md §4.2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Retire env-var SMTP basic-auth and send the contact form through Gmail over
OAuth2 (SMTP XOAUTH2), configured in Admin -> Settings -> Email via an in-app
"Connect Gmail" consent flow. Reuses the existing google SSO OAuth client; the
captured refresh token is stored AES-GCM-encrypted (write-only over the API,
never returned), mirroring the auth-provider and Discord-bot secret patterns.
- schema: new email_config singleton table (mirrors bot_config)
- model: emailConfig.{db,model} with encrypted refresh token + getSafe/getWithSecret
- mailer: nodemailer OAuth2 transport (client id/secret from the google provider
row), contact recipient = contact_email setting, mailto: fallback preserved,
plus sendTest()
- routes/controller: /admin/email config, connect start+callback (ssoState CSRF
+ PKCE), test, disconnect
- client: EmailDelivery section on the Settings page + api methods; Settings copy
now spells out that contact_email is the delivery recipient
- docs/env: drop SMTP_*/CONTACT_TO from env examples; update README/BACKEND_DESIGN
- tests: emailConfig.model + mailer suites (8 new; full suite 142 pass)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XKeCQEJZr1AFJN4Bgcmvh3
