1 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
cbaa18ea0b docs(android): release.yml is a conventional-commit auto-release engine
Update M6 docs to reflect release.yml mirroring link/'s engine (auto version +
changelog + tag + signed APK + Gitea release on merge to main), not a v* tag
trigger. Note REGISTRY_USER/REGISTRY_TOKEN + the main-push requirement, and the
derived monotonic versionCode. §9 status, §9 M6/M7 milestones, §12.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 04:25:05 -05:00
2 changed files with 33 additions and 282 deletions

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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Android App — Plan
Status: **M0M7 landed; M7 (push notifications) both parts done — Part 1 backend (website#78) and Part 2 app (Android-app#15) plus a small `push.ntfyUrl` settings addition (website#79). Remaining: set the shard's `NTFY_*` deploy config so push lights up, and cut the v1 tag.** This document is the
Status: **M0M6 landed; the functional build, design pass, and release mechanics are complete (the auto-release engine cuts a tagged, signed APK on merge to `main`; M7 push notifications next).** This document is the
design contract for the `RunicGateway/Android-app` repo. It was written before implementation so the
API changes it depends on could be landed in `website/` and `docs/` first. The authoritative API
reference is the committed OpenAPI spec at `website/server/swagger/swagger-output.json` (regenerated
@@ -128,193 +128,22 @@ probe refuses a backend whose API version this build can't speak (a future `v2`)
signed release) with keep-rules for the kotlinx.serialization serializers, the wire DTOs, and the
Retrofit interfaces; a release `signingConfig` that reads keystore material from a **gitignored**
`keystore.properties` or env vars (absent → unsigned; the keystore is never committed); and
`versionName`/`versionCode` overridable via `-P` so a release tag + CI run number drive them (§10).
**CI `release.yml`** — on a `v*` tag, builds a **signed** APK (keystore decoded from a base64 Gitea
secret) and attaches it + `SHA256SUMS` to a Gitea release; `workflow_dispatch` is a signing dry run.
`versionName` is the committed source of truth (bumped by the release engine); `versionCode` is derived
from it (`major*10000+minor*100+patch`, monotonic); both stay `-P`-overridable for local builds (§10).
**CI `release.yml`** — mirrors `link/`'s language-agnostic release engine, adapted for Android: on every
push to `main` it derives the next version from conventional-commit subjects since the last `v*` tag
(`feat!`/BREAKING → major, `feat` → minor, `fix`/`perf` → patch; nothing releasable → no release),
generates a grouped changelog, bumps `build.gradle.kts`, builds the **signed** APK (keystore decoded from
a base64 Gitea secret), then commits the bump `[skip ci]`, tags `vX.Y.Z`, and creates the Gitea release
with notes + APK + `SHA256SUMS`. Uses `REGISTRY_USER`/`REGISTRY_TOKEN` (as `link/` does) to push the bump
and create the release, so `main` must allow that account to push.
HTTPS-only in release (M1), no token logging (logging is debug-gated, M3), and the Settings → Server
hard reset (M3) were already in place. Biometric app-lock is **descoped from v1** (see the note below).
**The functional build (M0M4), design pass (M5), and release mechanics (M6) are complete. Cutting
the first `v*` release tag (once the signing secrets are set + the on-device QA pass is done) and M7
push notifications are what remain.**
### M7 plan — push notifications (in progress)
M7 spans three repos, so it ships in **two parts**; the backend contract lands first because the app
is a pure consumer of it (§8/§11).
**Part 1 — `website/` backend + `docs/` — ✅ LANDED** (2026-07-20, `RunicGateway/website#78` merged
+ docs#20). Additive, v1-only (new tables/routes/compose
service; no existing response shape changes). Decision: **no ntfy publish token** — publishes go over
the internal compose network to unguessable per-device topics carrying **content-free tickles**
(`{ stream, ref }`); the publisher honors an optional `NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN` if ever set but requires
none (keeps §11's zero-interaction promise).
- **Two event sources, one publisher.** The fan-out is a small transport-agnostic
`utils/pushDispatch.js` that both producers call: `utils/shardIngest.js` (`ingest()`, beside the
existing `broadcast(event)`) for shard-derived streams, and the admin create-post path for the
`news.post` stream (§11 lists news posts as a public stream, but they originate in the website, not
the shard feed).
- **Stream catalog** (`config/notificationStreams.js`): public/opt-in — `news.post`,
`server.status`, `idoc.warning`, `champ.start`, `governor.election`; personal/owner-keyed
(require a linked game account) — `vendor.sale`, `house.idoc`, `account.login`. `mapShardEvent()`
maps event kinds → streams, drawing public streams **only** from the SSE `PUBLIC_KINDS` allowlist;
sensitive kinds are never fanned out publicly. Personal events are delivered only to the owning
user's devices, resolved via `shardLinks.getByAccount` (same ownership source as `/player/shard/*`).
- **Tables:** `push_devices` (per-device endpoint) and `notification_subscriptions` (per-user opted-in
streams), FK → `users` ON DELETE CASCADE, mirroring `mobile_refresh_tokens`.
- **Routes** under the role-agnostic self surface (never `/admin`): `POST|GET /auth/me/devices`,
`DELETE /auth/me/devices/:id`, `GET /auth/me/notifications/streams` (catalog),
`GET|PUT /auth/me/notifications/subscriptions`. All bearer/cookie auth; Swagger regenerated.
- **SSRF guard (important):** a device `endpoint` is a client-supplied URL the backend POSTs to, so
registration and every publish validate it is HTTPS and its origin is in the shard's ntfy
allow-set (`NTFY_BASE_URL` / `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`), rejecting loopback/private hosts.
- **ntfy** added to `website/docker-compose.yml` as a pinned upstream image with a committed
declarative `./ntfy/server.yml` and named volume, **no published host port** (reached via the
reverse proxy; internal-only for the publisher), anonymous read-write to unguessable topics (no
per-user accounts — safe because tickles are content-free).
**Part 2 — the Android app — ✅ LANDED** (2026-07-20, `RunicGateway/Android-app#15` + a small
`RunicGateway/website#79` settings addition + this docs PR). Built exactly to the plan below, with
two recorded implementation decisions:
- **Direct-ntfy embedded distributor, no UnifiedPush library (deviation from §2's "UnifiedPush
connector" wording — the plan's stated likely path, work item 1).** The app talks straight to ntfy
over its own topic rather than pulling in `org.unifiedpush.android:connector` + an external
distributor: a foreground `PushService` holds an OkHttp-SSE connection to `<ntfy>/<topic>/sse`
(reusing the M2 `ShardStreamClient` reconnect pattern) on a **bare** client, `PushManager`
orchestrates topic mint / device register / start-stop keyed to the session, and `PushNotifier`
posts a per-stream notification whose tap deep-links via `MainActivity` intent extras. No new Gradle
dependency; a `PushResult`/transport seam keeps the future FCM Play flavor cheap. Reasons: the
UnifiedPush distributor model assumes a *separate* app (exactly what the user vetoed), we already own
the SSE machinery, and this keeps the APK Google-free and dependency-light. New code lives in
`core/push/` + `ui/notifications/` + a `NotificationsApi`/`NotificationsRepository`; no existing
screen's data flow changed.
- **One small additive backend field was required after all (`push.ntfyUrl`).** The embedded
distributor must know the shard's client-facing ntfy URL to build its topic endpoint, and Part 1
never surfaced it (the `NTFY_*` vars are server-only). So `/public/settings` now carries
`push: { ntfyUrl }` (from `NTFY_PUBLIC_URL` / first `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`; never the internal
`NTFY_BASE_URL`), null when unconfigured → the app shows push as unavailable for that shard. This is
the "no backend work in Part 2" caveat corrected: it is additive, non-sensitive, and forward-compatible
(an older backend omitting it just decodes to null). **Deploy dependency stands:** push only delivers
once the shard sets `NTFY_PUBLIC_URL`/`NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` (§13).
Verified green: `:app:testDebugUnitTest` (18 new JVM tests — notifications DTO decode, ntfy tickle
parse incl. malformed, topic/URL building, stream→route map + personal gating) + `:app:lintDebug` +
`:app:assembleDebug`; backend 250 tests (+3 for `push.ntfyUrl`) and `npm run swagger` clean. The
foreground-service tradeoff (§11) and the POST_NOTIFICATIONS runtime permission are implemented as
planned; an on-device delivery pass against a live ntfy is the one open QA item.
**Part 2 (original plan) — the Android app.** UnifiedPush receiver + device registration
against the merged Part-1 contract, a Notifications settings screen, and notification-tap deep-links.
The app is architected for push from M0 (§11), so this is **additive** — a new feature slice
(`core/push` + `ui/notifications` + a `DevicesApi`/`NotificationsApi` pair) that touches no existing
screen's data flow. Everything the app calls already exists and is merged; there is **no backend
work** in Part 2.
The Part-1 contract the app codes against (verified against the merged `website` source):
- `POST /auth/me/devices` `{ transport?: 'unifiedpush'|'fcm', endpoint, platform? }``201 PushDevice`
`{ id, transport, endpoint, platform, createdAt, lastSeenAt }`. Idempotent per `(user, endpoint)`
(upsert). `endpoint` **must** be HTTPS on the shard's ntfy allow-set — a private/loopback or
off-allowlist origin is rejected `400` (the SSRF guard). Bearer-auth, so registration only happens
while signed in.
- `GET /auth/me/devices``PushDevice[]`; `DELETE /auth/me/devices/:id``{ ok: true }` (`404` if not
the caller's).
- `GET /auth/me/notifications/streams` → `{ streams: [{ id, label, description, personal,
requiresLinkedAccount }] }` — the eight-stream catalog (`news.post`, `server.status`,
`idoc.warning`, `champ.start`, `governor.election`; personal `vendor.sale`, `house.idoc`,
`account.login`). Render from this, don't hardcode.
- `GET /auth/me/notifications/subscriptions` → `{ streams: [id…] }`; `PUT` the same shape (full
replace; unknown ids dropped server-side; the stored set is echoed back).
- **The wire tickle** the device receives is the content-free `{ "stream": "<id>", "ref": "<opaque>" }`
JSON body (`utils/pushDispatch.js`). `ref` is a serial / city / timestamp hint — **never** content.
Work items:
1. **Transport — the app is its own distributor; no second app (DECIDED).** The Runic Gateway app
**embeds its own UnifiedPush distributor**. The self-hosted **ntfy is only the relay server**, never
a user-installed app — the user installs *one* APK and it receives its own notifications, with no
external distributor (no ntfy app, no NextPush) and no Google Play Services. Concretely, the embedded
distributor holds a **persistent connection to the shard's ntfy** in a **foreground service**,
reusing the OkHttp reconnect/backoff pattern already built for `core/net/ShardStreamClient` (M2): it
subscribes to the app's own random, unguessable ntfy **topic** (over `wss://<ntfy-host>/<topic>/ws`
or the `/json` stream) and forwards each received `{stream,ref}` tickle to the app's receiver. The
**endpoint the app registers** with the backend (work item 5) is that topic's public URL
(`https://<ntfy-host>/<topic>`) — exactly the client-supplied `endpoint` the merged `POST
/auth/me/devices` contract expects and the URL the backend POSTs tickles to. Keep the transport
behind a small `PushTransport` seam so the **future Play/FCM build flavor** (§11, §M8) can swap the
embedded-ntfy distributor for FCM without touching registration, subscriptions, or notification code.
(Implementation detail to confirm: whether a maintained Google-free embedded UnifiedPush-distributor
library fits, or — more likely — a thin in-app distributor written directly over ntfy's subscribe API
reusing `ShardStreamClient`. Either way the distributor lives **inside this app**; the UnifiedPush
*receiver* abstraction is retained only to keep the FCM-flavor seam clean.)
- **Tradeoff, accepted:** instant background delivery requires a persistent foreground service with
an ongoing (low-importance) notification and its battery cost — this is exactly how ntfy's own app
does instant delivery, and it is the price of Google-free self-delivery. A future "battery saver"
option could fall back to periodic polling, but v1 ships the always-connected foreground service.
2. **Deps + manifest.** Add the UnifiedPush connector + the embedded-distributor transport (per #1) to
the version catalog; declare `POST_NOTIFICATIONS` (API 33+ runtime permission) **and
`FOREGROUND_SERVICE` + `FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC`** (API 34+, for the persistent ntfy
connection); register the receiver and the foreground service in `AndroidManifest.xml`; define the
notification channels (id/name externalized, §2) — one for real notifications plus a low-importance
channel for the ongoing foreground-service notification — and reuse the "RG" notification icon
**already staged in M6**.
3. **`core/push` — embedded distributor + receiver.** The **distributor** component is a foreground
service that owns the ntfy connection (per #1): it (re)creates the app's topic, subscribes over
OkHttp with reconnect/backoff cloned from `ShardStreamClient`, and forwards each frame to the
receiver. The **receiver** parses the `{ stream, ref }` tickle (`kotlinx.serialization`; an
unknown/garbled body is dropped, not crashed — §7 discipline) and posts a notification (work item 7).
Endpoint (re)registration against the backend fires on first subscribe / topic (re)creation
(work item 5); a transient ntfy drop is just a reconnect, not a re-register.
4. **`DevicesApi` + `NotificationsApi` (Retrofit) + DTOs.** Hand-authored, spec-aligned (as recorded
for M1): `RegisterDeviceRequestDto`, `PushDeviceDto`, `NotificationStreamDto`,
`NotificationStreamsDto`, `NotificationSubscriptionsDto`. Both go through the existing bearer/refresh
stack (`AuthInterceptor` + `TokenAuthenticator`) and return the typed `ApiResult` (§7). A
`NotificationsRepository` owns register/list/delete-device and get/put streams+subscriptions.
5. **Endpoint ↔ backend lifecycle (mirror the M3 token teardown).** Persist the app's ntfy topic, its
endpoint URL, and the returned device `id` in prefs (DataStore; the topic/endpoint isn't a secret —
its security rests on being unguessable + the content-free tickle, §11). Start the embedded
distributor and `POST /auth/me/devices` **only when the user has ≥1 subscription and is signed in**.
On **logout / dead-refresh sign-out / Settings→Server switch**, `DELETE /auth/me/devices/:id`, **stop
the foreground service**, and drop the topic — wire this into `SessionManager` beside the existing
token-clear so a signed-out device stops receiving (§4.3, §11 "unregister on logout / token
revocation"). On a **server (base-URL) switch**, mint a fresh topic against the new shard's ntfy (the
old endpoint's origin won't be on the new host's allow-set). Re-assert the endpoint + restart the
service on app start when signed-in + subscribed. A `400` on register (endpoint origin off the
shard's `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`) surfaces a clear "your shard's push relay isn't reachable" state, not
a crash.
6. **Notifications settings screen (`ui/notifications`).** Lists the catalog from
`GET …/streams` with a per-stream toggle bound to `GET/PUT …/subscriptions`; a **personal** stream
(`requiresLinkedAccount`) is greyed with a "link a game account" hint until the user has a linked
account — reuse the linked-accounts signal already fetched for M4's player surface
(`PlayerShardRepository`), not a fresh source of truth. Toggling to a non-empty set triggers the
register flow (#5) and requests `POST_NOTIFICATIONS`; emptying the set unregisters. Each mutation
folds its `ApiResult` into a section-scoped, localized banner (§7 parity with M4).
7. **Deep-links (resolves the §13 open item).** Tapping a notification opens the app to the stream's
home: `news.post`→News, `server.status`/`champ.start`/`idoc.warning`/`governor.election`→Shard,
`vendor.sale`→Vendors, `house.idoc`→My Houses, `account.login`→My Account. Routed through the
existing `ui/navigation/Routes.kt`; a signed-out/deep-link-to-player tap lands on the `PlayerGate`
(M4) rather than erroring. **v1 shows a generic per-stream notification** (localized catalog
`label`) and deep-links — it does **not** pull `ref` content first; the content-free design means
nothing needs decrypting to render the tap, and the target screen fetches fresh over the
authenticated API on open. (Pulling `ref` for a richer inline notification is a possible later
enhancement, not v1.)
8. **Menu.** Add a **Notifications** entry to the signed-in group in `ui/navigation/Menu.kt` (near My
Account), visible once signed in.
9. **Permission UX.** Request `POST_NOTIFICATIONS` at the moment the user first enables a stream (API
33+); on denial, keep the toggle off and show how to enable it in system settings — never nag on
launch.
10. **Tests (JVM, `testDebugUnitTest`).** DTO decode (device/stream/subscription), `{ stream, ref }`
tickle parse (incl. a malformed body → dropped), the stream→deep-link map, the "personal greyed
until linked" gate, and the register/unregister lifecycle over a fake `SessionManager` + repository
(parity with M3's session tests).
**Cross-repo dependency to confirm before/at implementation** (a Part-1 §13 open item): the shard's
finalized **ntfy reverse-proxy hostname** must be in `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`, because the distributor
hands the app an endpoint on *that* origin and the backend rejects a register whose origin isn't
allow-listed. This is deployment config, not code, but Part 2 can't be end-to-end tested until it's
pinned. No `website`/`link`/`servuo-plugins` code change is expected in Part 2.
Ships as `RunicGateway/Android-app#15`; bumps `versionCode`/`versionName` for a post-v1 release
(§10). Like M1M4 it records itself in the §9 build-progress block on landing.
**The functional build (M0M4), design pass (M5), and release mechanics (M6) are complete. The first
signed release now cuts automatically on the next release-worthy merge to `main` — once the signing +
`REGISTRY_*` secrets are set, `main` allows the CI account to push, and the on-device QA pass is done.
M7 push notifications are what remain.**
**Prerequisite progress (§8):** all v1 prerequisites are **done** (2026-07-19) — ✅ password reset
(item 2; website#75 + docs#8), ✅ role-agnostic `/auth/me/*` self surface (item 1; website#76 + docs#10),
@@ -628,12 +457,6 @@ maintenance cost. Reserve v2 for a real breaking re-shape if one ever arises.
3. **Push notifications** — see §11. Additive v1 endpoints under `/auth/me/devices*` and
`/auth/me/notifications*`, plus a **self-hosted `ntfy` service added to `website/docker-compose.yml`**
with fully declarative, zero-interaction config. Not required for the first release (M7, not M1M6).
✅ **Backend + docs LANDED (2026-07-20, RunicGateway/website#78 merged (+ docs#20)).** The
contract Part 1 is built: the two tables, the stream catalog + `PUBLIC_KINDS`-gated event mapping,
the content-free-tickle fan-out (`utils/pushDispatch`, SSRF-guarded endpoints, owner-keyed personal
streams), the six `/auth/me/*` routes (Swagger regenerated), and the declarative `ntfy` compose
service (247 server tests green). The app (Part 2, §9 M7) consumes this next — see the "M7 plan"
block for the detailed Part 2 plan.
4. **Version/health surfacing.**
✅ **DONE (2026-07-19, RunicGateway/website#77 (+ this docs PR)).** A dependency-free
`config/version.js` (`{ service:'runic-gateway', api:'v1', server:<pkg> }`) is surfaced on
@@ -690,18 +513,13 @@ push, and Play (M6M8) follow the designed app.
7. **M6 — Polish & release mechanics**: settings (server switch = hard reset, done M3),
version-mismatch guard, release build hardening (HTTPS-only, no token logging, R8 minify + resource
shrink, release signing). No offline cache in v1 (§7). **Ships v1 as a signed APK attached to a Gitea
release** via `release.yml` on a `v*` tag (see §10). Biometric app-lock **descoped** (below).
release** via `release.yml`'s conventional-commit engine on merge to `main` (see §10, §12).
Biometric app-lock **descoped** (below).
**Landed** 2026-07-20 (`RunicGateway/Android-app#11`).
8. **M7 — Push notifications** (post-v1): add the self-hosted `ntfy` service to
`website/docker-compose.yml` (declarative, zero-interaction config), UnifiedPush integration in the
app, device registration, the subscriptions UI, and the content-free-tickle backend fan-out (see
§11). The app is built with room for this from M0 but it does not gate the first release.
✅ **Both parts landed** 2026-07-20 — Part 1 backend (`RunicGateway/website#78` merged + docs#20),
Part 2 app (`RunicGateway/Android-app#15`) + a small `push.ntfyUrl` settings addition
(`RunicGateway/website#79`). The app embeds its own ntfy distributor (a foreground-service SSE
connection, no second app, no Google Play Services, no UnifiedPush library); see the "M7 plan"
Part 2 block for the recorded transport + backend-field decisions. Push delivers once the shard sets
its `NTFY_*` deploy config (§13).
9. **M8 — Google Play**: Play Console listing, signing/upload key, and (optionally) an FCM build flavor
— after the direct-APK release is stable.
@@ -726,10 +544,6 @@ first release. Users **opt in per stream**: nothing is pushed unless subscribed.
- **Primary: UnifiedPush, delivered by a self-hosted `ntfy` service added to the website's
`docker-compose.yml`.** FOSS, no Google Play Services dependency, works for the sideloaded APK on any
device, and keeps delivery under the org's own infrastructure — consistent with the self-hosted ethos.
- **The app embeds its own distributor — no second app (decided; see M7 Part 2 work item 1).** ntfy is
purely the relay *server*; the Runic Gateway app receives notifications itself via an in-app embedded
UnifiedPush distributor (a foreground-service persistent connection to the shard's ntfy). The user
installs one APK — never a separate distributor app — and no Google Play Services is involved.
- **FCM stays optional and Play-only.** If/when a Play build wants it, add FCM as a **build flavor**;
the direct-APK flavor stays Google-free. The backend fan-out is **transport-agnostic** and dispatches
to whatever endpoint a device registered, so adding FCM later touches no core logic.
@@ -801,11 +615,16 @@ repos use), on a bare `ubuntu:latest` container.
frequent: run the job under a prebuilt Android-SDK `container:` image so nothing installs per-run.)
- **PR gate** (`.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml`, on PR → `main`): `./gradlew lint test assembleDebug`.
Debug builds are auto-signed, so the gate needs no secrets. Mirrors `website/`'s pre-merge gate.
- **Release** (`.gitea/workflows/release.yml`, M6+): build a **signed release APK** and attach it to a
Gitea release (mirrors `link/`'s release job). The **keystore is a base64 Gitea Actions secret**
decoded in CI; store/key passwords are secrets. The keystore never lives in the repo. Keep the
signing identity stable from the first release (Play later requires consistency).
- Semantic `versionName` + monotonic `versionCode`; tag releases.
- **Release** (`.gitea/workflows/release.yml`, M6): mirrors `link/`'s release engine — on every push to
`main` it computes the next version from conventional commits since the last `v*` tag, generates a
changelog, bumps `build.gradle.kts`, builds a **signed release APK**, commits the bump `[skip ci]`,
tags `vX.Y.Z`, and creates the Gitea release with the notes + APK + `SHA256SUMS`. The **keystore is a
base64 Gitea Actions secret** decoded in CI (`ANDROID_KEYSTORE_BASE64`); store/key passwords + alias
are secrets too. The keystore never lives in the repo. `REGISTRY_USER`/`REGISTRY_TOKEN`
(`write:repository`) push the bump + create the release, so `main` must allow that account to push.
Keep the signing identity stable from the first release (Play later requires consistency).
- Semantic `versionName` (bumped by the engine) + derived monotonic `versionCode`
(`major*10000+minor*100+patch`); the engine tags each release.
## 13. Open questions (revisit as we go)
@@ -814,8 +633,7 @@ password+TOTP only, with registration/invite/reset/SSO **handled by the website*
reset built on backend + web first**, before app work (§8); minSdk 29, compile/target 35 (§2); no
telemetry in v1 (§2); strings externalized from day one, English-only bundled (§2); **text-only** game
data in v1, pretty paperdoll is future (§6.3); **no offline cache in v1** (§7); push via self-hosted
ntfy / UnifiedPush (§11) with the **distributor embedded in the app — no second app to install**
(M7 Part 2 work item 1); **biometric app-lock descoped from v1** (tokens already encrypted at rest, so
ntfy / UnifiedPush (§11); **biometric app-lock descoped from v1** (tokens already encrypted at rest, so
it is a UX convenience, not a v1 requirement — deferred at M3, descoped at M6; revisit only if requested).
**Still open:**
@@ -824,14 +642,9 @@ it is a UX convenience, not a v1 requirement — deferred at M3, descoped at M6;
the fixed launcher name (baked at build even though in-app branding is per-shard — one APK, any shard).
Since SSO/invite/reset are website-handled, the app mostly *opens* website URLs rather than needing its
own verified app links — confirm whether any deep-link-back is wanted at all for v1.
- ntfy: exact upstream image + pinned tag (Part-1 landed the compose service — confirm the tag), and
its reverse-proxy hostname/path. The hostname must land in `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` before M7 Part 2 is
end-to-end testable (the app registers an endpoint on that origin; the SSRF guard rejects others). No
backend publish token — **decided** (the content-free-tickle design does not require one; optional
`NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN` is honored if ever set).
- FCM flavor: build it for the Play release or ship Play on UnifiedPush too? Decide at M8. (The M7
Part 2 `PushTransport` seam keeps this swap cheap.)
- Deep-link / share targets for wiki pages and posts (share/open-in-app). *Notification-tap* deep-links
are **resolved** for M7 Part 2 (stream→screen map, work item 7).
- ntfy: exact upstream image + pinned tag, its reverse-proxy hostname/path, and whether to add a
backend publish token (optional hardening — the content-free-tickle design does not require one).
- FCM flavor: build it for the Play release or ship Play on UnifiedPush too? Decide at M8.
- Deep-link / share targets for wiki pages, posts, and notification taps.
- iOS: none planned (this is the Android-only choice); revisit only if cross-platform is later
required (would change §2 — and push, which would then favor a cross-platform transport).

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@@ -156,28 +156,6 @@ Seeded keys: `site_mode` (default `maintenance`), `site_mode_changed_at`,
Same "store only the hash of an opaque token" pattern as `user_invites` / `mobile_refresh_tokens`.
A DB read never yields a usable reset link. See §4 `/auth/password/*`.
### push_devices — opt-in push endpoints (M7)
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | owner |
| transport | ENUM('unifiedpush','fcm') DEFAULT 'unifiedpush' | UnifiedPush for the sideloaded APK; FCM reserved for a later Play flavor |
| endpoint | VARCHAR(512) NOT NULL | the distributor URL the app's ntfy topic was handed (or an FCM token). Unguessable but **not a secret** — stored in the clear (unlike refresh tokens), because pushes are content-free tickles |
| platform | VARCHAR(40) NULL | free-form label, e.g. `android` |
| created_at / last_seen_at | DATETIME | |
`UNIQUE(user_id, endpoint)` — re-registering the same endpoint is an idempotent upsert.
### notification_subscriptions — which streams a user opted into (M7)
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | |
| stream_id | VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL | an id from the catalog (`config/notificationStreams.js`), validated on write |
| created_at | DATETIME | |
`PRIMARY KEY(user_id, stream_id)`. Subscriptions are per-user (applied to every device); a PUT
replaces the whole set. Nothing is pushed unless the user subscribed.
---
## 4. API contract
@@ -199,10 +177,6 @@ accepts `Authorization: Bearer` for API testing).
| PATCH | `/me/account/password` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited) | `{newPassword, currentPassword?}` | change/set own password (current required unless the account has none); revokes other sessions, keeps the caller's |
| POST | `/me/account/totp/setup` · `…/enable` · `…/disable` | cookie / bearer | `{code}` on enable/disable | self 2FA enrollment (disable needs a valid current code, not a password) |
| GET | `/me/account/identities` · DELETE `…/:provider` | cookie / bearer | — | list / unlink own SSO identities |
| POST | `/me/devices` | cookie / bearer | `{endpoint, transport?, platform?}` | register a push endpoint; **rejects a disallowed endpoint 400** (SSRF guard). Idempotent per (user, endpoint) |
| GET | `/me/devices` · DELETE `…/:id` | cookie / bearer | — | list / unregister own push devices |
| GET | `/me/notifications/streams` | cookie / bearer | — | the subscribable catalog (`personal`/`requiresLinkedAccount` flags) |
| GET · PUT | `/me/notifications/subscriptions` | cookie / bearer | `{streams:[id]}` on PUT | get / replace own opted-in streams (unknown ids dropped) |
**Role-agnostic self-service (`/auth/me/*`).** The canonical "me" surface for **every** authenticated
role. It reuses the exact `account.controller` handlers as `/player/account/*` and `/admin/account/*`
@@ -218,30 +192,10 @@ reset link points at the web front end (`/account/reset/:token`); the Android ap
rather than shipping its own reset screen (docs/android/PLAN.md §4.2). First admin is bootstrapped
by `seed.js` from env (see §6); further staff are created under `/admin/users` or via email invites.
**Push notifications (M7, opt-in).** The app subscribes per stream (`/auth/me/notifications/*`) and
registers device endpoints (`/auth/me/devices`); nothing is pushed unless subscribed. Delivery is a
**content-free tickle**`{ stream, ref }`, no sensitive data — POSTed to each subscribed device's
self-hosted **ntfy** endpoint (`utils/pushDispatch`); the app wakes and pulls the real, ownership-
checked content over the authenticated API. Two producers fan out through the one publisher: the shard
ingest dispatcher (`utils/shardIngest`, beside the SSE broadcast) for shard-derived streams, and the
create/publish-post path for `news.post`. The stream catalog + event→stream mapping is
`config/notificationStreams.js`. Security invariants:
- **Same public/admin split as the SSE feed.** Public streams are drawn *only* from the SSE
`PUBLIC_KINDS` allowlist; a sensitive kind (audit/cheat/IP/login-attempt) can never produce a public
push.
- **Personal streams are owner-keyed.** `vendor.sale` / `house.idoc` / `account.login` are delivered
only to the *owning* user's devices, resolved via `shardLinks` (the same ownership check as
`/player/shard/*`).
- **SSRF guard.** A device `endpoint` is a client-supplied URL the server POSTs to, so registration and
every publish validate it is HTTPS, non-private/loopback, and (when configured) on the shard's ntfy
allow-set (`NTFY_BASE_URL` / `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`).
- ntfy is treated as an **untrusted relay** — no per-user accounts, unguessable topics; an optional
`NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN` hardens backend→ntfy publishes but is not required. See docs/android/PLAN.md §11.
### /public (public.routes.js → public.controller.js) — all GET, no auth
| Method | Path | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| GET | `/settings` | whitelisted public keys, derived `registration`/`gameAccountSignup` flags, the per-shard **`brand`** block (name, `accent` color, logo/hero/favicon) a client themes itself from — one image runs as any shard, asset fields may be site-relative paths (resolve against the base URL) — and a **`push`** block `{ ntfyUrl }` (M7): the client-facing ntfy relay URL the app's embedded distributor registers its device topic against, from `NTFY_PUBLIC_URL` / first `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` (never the internal `NTFY_BASE_URL`); `null` when push isn't configured for the shard. |
| GET | `/settings` | whitelisted public keys, derived `registration`/`gameAccountSignup` flags, and the per-shard **`brand`** block (name, `accent` color, logo/hero/favicon) a client themes itself from — one image runs as any shard. Asset fields may be site-relative paths (resolve against the base URL). |
| GET | `/status` | status message + current mode, **plus a `version` block** (`{ service:'runic-gateway', api, server }`) so a client first-run probe recognizes the backend and can run a version-mismatch guard |
| GET | `/version` | lightweight, **DB-free** backend identity/version (`{ service, api, server }`) — the canonical target for the version guard and a cheap liveness check |
| GET | `/posts/:category` | published only; `category` ∈ news\|five-on-friday\|newsletter\|screenshots |
@@ -350,13 +304,7 @@ subsystem (`[server]`, `[http]`, `[db]`, `[auth]`, `[admin]`, `[ratelimit]`, …
- `app`: builds the Dockerfile (installs client+server, builds Vite, serves via Express),
`env_file: .env`, `DB_HOST=db`, `depends_on: db (healthy)`, volume `uploads:/app/uploads`,
`ports: "3000:3000"`**binds 0.0.0.0** (no `127.0.0.1:` prefix) so Pangolin reaches it.
- `ntfy` (M7): pinned upstream `binwiederhier/ntfy` image, declarative config only
(`./ntfy/server.yml` mounted `:ro` + `NTFY_BASE_URL`), volume `ntfydata:/var/lib/ntfy`, **no
published host port** — devices reach it via the reverse proxy; the backend publisher reaches it
over the private compose network. Anonymous read-write to unguessable topics (no accounts to
provision) — safe because pushes are content-free tickles. Bringing the stack up provisions a
working push relay with **zero interactive setup**.
- Volumes: `dbdata`, `uploads`, `ntfydata`.
- Volumes: `dbdata`, `uploads`.
Express listens on `0.0.0.0:${PORT||3000}`. Pangolin terminates TLS and proxies to `app`.
@@ -378,16 +326,6 @@ ADMIN_USERNAME=
ADMIN_PASSWORD=
# Email: configured in Admin → Settings → Email (Gmail OAuth2), not via env
CLIENT_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5173
# Push (M7): the ntfy relay URL — also the backend's SSRF allow-set for device
# endpoints. NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS / NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN are optional.
NTFY_BASE_URL=https://ntfy.example.com
# The client-facing ntfy URL surfaced to the app via /public/settings.push.ntfyUrl
# (the app registers its topic endpoint here). Defaults to the first
# NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS entry; set explicitly when the public URL differs from the
# internal NTFY_BASE_URL. Without it (and without NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS) the app
# shows push as unavailable for the shard.
NTFY_PUBLIC_URL=https://ntfy.example.com
NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://ntfy.example.com
```
`.gitignore`: `node_modules/`, `.env`, `_reference/`, `client/dist/`, `uploads/`.