docs(ci): use the actual case-sensitive SonarQube project keys

link and Android-app reuse the pre-existing capitalised keys (Runic-Gateway-link, Runic-Gateway-Android-app); the server rejects case-variant duplicates. Note the case-sensitivity gotcha. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 23:21:04 -05:00
22 changed files with 37 additions and 785 deletions
--- a/android/PLAN.md
+++ b/android/PLAN.md
@@ -169,12 +169,9 @@ none (keeps §11's zero-interaction promise).
  registration and every publish validate it is HTTPS and its origin is in the shard's ntfy
  allow-set (`NTFY_BASE_URL` / `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`), rejecting loopback/private hosts.
 - **ntfy** added to `website/docker-compose.yml` as a pinned upstream image with a committed
-  declarative `./ntfy/server.yml` and named volume, **published on a host port** (`NTFY_HOST_PORT`,
+  declarative `./ntfy/server.yml` and named volume, **no published host port** (reached via the
-  default `2586` → container `:80`) so the public reverse proxy — which runs *outside* the compose
+  reverse proxy; internal-only for the publisher), anonymous read-write to unguessable topics (no
-  network — can forward the notification subdomain to it, anonymous read-write to unguessable topics
+  per-user accounts — safe because tickles are content-free).
  (no per-user accounts — safe because tickles are content-free). Both the app (SSE subscribe) and the
  backend (POSTing tickles to registered device endpoints) reach ntfy on that public origin, so all
  ntfy traffic transits the proxy — there is no separate internal publish port.
 **Part 2 — the Android app — ✅ LANDED** (2026-07-20, `RunicGateway/Android-app#15` + a small
 `RunicGateway/website#79` settings addition + this docs PR). Built exactly to the plan below, with
@@ -422,29 +419,21 @@ console. It is a **read + self-service** app, not an operator tool.
 - **Access-level menu**: one shared navigation that reveals items based on the signed-in user's role.
 - **Opt-in push notifications** (post-v1; architected for from the start): per-stream subscriptions the
  user chooses — nothing is pushed unless subscribed. See §11.
 - **Staff operations subset** (post-v1, **M10** — decided 2026-07-21): a *defined* slice of the admin
  surface, native, for `admin`/`moderator` staff. In scope: **moderation actions** (kick / ban / unban /
  broadcast), the **support (help-page) queue** (reply / close / resolve), the **dashboard summary +
  site-mode** toggle, and **content management** (news posts — list / create / edit / publish / delete —
  plus wiki category & tag management). These consume the existing `/api/v1/admin/**` routes (which
  already accept bearer auth and re-check role every request); no backend routes are added. See §6.4 + §10.
 ### Explicitly OUT of scope (never in the app, for any role)
-The exclusions are now a *narrow* list (M10 brought the operational admin subset in-scope, above). The
+- The **hero editor** and any CMS authoring/block editing.
-app still never ships:
+- The **admin / auth-management console** — user management, invites issuance, SSO provider config,
- The **hero editor** and CMS **block/page authoring** (the visual page builder). *(News-post and
+  moderation console, email config, bot-activity/ban console. (Players still *log in*; what's
-  wiki category/tag management ARE in scope; the excluded piece is the CMS block editor / hero builder.)*
+  excluded is the management surface, not authentication itself.)
- **Discord bot** configuration (and anything under the unpublished `/internal/**` port — it returns the
+- The **Discord bot** management (and anything under the unpublished `/internal/**` port — it
-  decrypted bot token and must never be reachable from a client).
+  returns the decrypted bot token and must never be reachable from a client).
- **uo-link / sidecar administration** — the shard sidecar base-URL/token config (`uoLinkConfig`). (The
+- **Shard / uo-link administration** — sidecar base-URL/token config (`uoLinkConfig`), shard ops,
-  app performs *shard operations* like kick/ban/broadcast against the live shard, but never configures
+  the staff shard-user console. (The app shows *public* shard widgets and a player's *own* game
-  the sidecar connection itself.)
+  data; it does not manage the sidecar.)
 - **OAuth / SSO provider setup** — creating/editing identity providers and their client secrets.
-> The app calls `/api/v1/public/**`, `/api/v1/auth/**` (incl. the role-agnostic self surface
+> The excluded surfaces all live under `/api/v1/admin/**` and `/api/v1/internal/**`. The app only
-> `/auth/me/*`, §6.4), `/api/v1/player/**`, and — for staff, M10 — the **defined `/api/v1/admin/**`
+> ever calls `/api/v1/public/**`, `/api/v1/auth/**` (incl. the new role-agnostic self surface
-> operations listed above. It never touches `/api/v1/internal/**`, nor the four excluded admin surfaces
+> `/auth/me/*`, §6.4), and `/api/v1/player/**` — it never references `/admin`.
 > (hero/CMS block editor, Discord-bot config, uo-link config, OAuth-provider setup).
 ---
@@ -502,13 +491,7 @@ compiled in.
  `/public/settings` for branding: name/colors/logo). Only on a successful, well-formed response is
  the URL persisted to DataStore and the app allowed to initialize its main UI.
  - Accept `https://host[/base]`; normalize/trim; require HTTPS in release builds (allow HTTP only in
-    debug for local dev against `127.0.0.1:3000`). This app-layer rule (`ServerUrl`,
+    debug for local dev against `127.0.0.1:3000`).
    `allowInsecureHttp = BuildConfig.DEBUG`) is backed at the platform socket layer by an explicit
    **network security config** (`res/xml/network_security_config.xml`, wired via
    `application android:networkSecurityConfig`): the main/release config permits **no** cleartext,
    and a debug-only override (`app/src/debug/res/xml/`) re-permits cleartext to loopback
    (`127.0.0.1`/`localhost`) only. Being explicit also stops a merged library manifest from
    re-enabling cleartext and clears the `usesCleartextTraffic`-implicitly-enabled scanner finding.
  - Failure states: unreachable, non-2xx, not-a-Runic-Gateway-site (missing expected `/public/status`
    shape), TLS error — each gets a clear retry message. Nothing else in the app runs until this
    succeeds.
@@ -546,39 +529,6 @@ Uses the existing **mobile bearer** surface, no backend changes:
  `401` from a bearer call, with a mutex so concurrent 401s trigger only one refresh.
 - `POST /auth/mobile/logout` `{ refreshToken?, all? }` (requires bearer) — revoke this session or all
  sessions. Called on user logout and on "sign out everywhere."
 #### 4.1.1 Trusted devices & recovery codes — **implemented** (app PR `feature/trusted-devices-mfa`)
 The backend trusted-device + recovery-code feature (canonical ref: `../website/TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md`)
 is additive on the mobile surface. As built:
 - **Login extras:** `POST /auth/mobile/login` accepts `recoveryCode` (a single-use alternative to
  `code`), `trustDevice: true`, `device_name`, and an `X-Trust-Token` header. On the `401 { totpRequired }`
  screen the app offers a "use a recovery code instead" toggle and a **"Trust this device"** checkbox.
  When `trustDevice` is accepted, the response carries `trustToken` → stored in a **dedicated
  EncryptedSharedPreferences file** (`runic_trust`, AES-256-GCM; never plain prefs/logs) **scoped to the
  username** it was minted for, and replayed as `X-Trust-Token` on that account's future logins to skip
  the TOTP prompt.
 - **Login-time cap:** a `{ trustLimitReached, devices }` response means login **succeeded** but the
  device was not remembered (session is already issued on native, unlike the web cookie step). Rather
  than a blocking login-time modal, this is surfaced + resolved on the **Trusted Devices** account
  screen, whose `POST /auth/me/trusted-devices` gives the exact revoke-one-then-retry flow. (Deliberate
  deviation from the earlier "prompt at login" sketch — the mobile login is past the point a modal would
  gate.)
 - **Self-service (account screens):** a **Security** section on the account screen links to two
  dedicated screens. **Trusted Devices** — `GET /auth/me/trusted-devices` (list), `DELETE …/:id`
  (revoke one), `DELETE …/trusted-devices` (untrust all), and `POST /auth/me/trusted-devices` to trust
  the current device (stores the returned `{ trustToken }`). **Recovery Codes** — enabling TOTP returns
  the one-time `recoveryCodes` (shown once on the account screen with copy/share); `GET
  …/recovery-codes/status` for the remaining count; `POST …/recovery-codes/generate` (password step-up)
  to regenerate, shown once.
 - **Invalidation — trust token deliberately survives logout.** The trust token is the native analogue
  of the web `rg_trust` cookie, which per the canonical design *survives logout so the next login skips
  2FA*. On mobile the token is only ever consulted at a **fresh** login — i.e. exactly after a logout or
  a dead-refresh sign-out — so clearing it there would make the feature a no-op. It is therefore kept in
  its own store, **untouched by session teardown** (`SessionManager.onSignedOut`), and cleared only on a
  **Settings → Server switch** (bound to the old host), an **untrust-all**, or server-side revocation
  (password change/reset, TOTP disable — which makes any surviving token inert; the next login just
  prompts for the code). This supersedes the earlier handoff note that said to clear it on logout.
 ### 4.2 Website-handled flows: registration, invite, forgot-password, SSO
 These are **not** rebuilt in the app. The app links out to the website's own pages/API and the user
 completes them in a Custom Tab, then returns and signs in natively (§4.1):
@@ -679,18 +629,11 @@ Guidelines:
 Player self-service is under `/player/account/*` (gated to `role='player'`) and staff use the *same*
 handlers under `/admin/account/*`. Rather than have the app branch by role (and touch `/admin`), we
 **add a role-agnostic self surface under `/auth/**`** — the canonical "me" endpoints for every role.
-The app calls these regardless of role. This is an **additive v1**
+The app calls these regardless of role, and never references `/admin`. This is an **additive v1**
 change (see §8): the existing `/player/account/*` and `/admin/account/*` routes stay for web
 back-compat; `/auth/me/*` reuses the same `account.controller` handlers behind `requireAuth` (any
 authenticated role), so there's no logic duplication.
 > **M10 update (2026-07-21):** *self-service* stays role-agnostic under `/auth/me/*` as above. Separately,
 > the **operational** admin subset (§1, §10 — moderation, support queue, dashboard/site-mode, content)
 > *does* call `/api/v1/admin/**` directly, gated to staff by a new `STAFF`/`ADMIN` menu access level.
 > The earlier "the app never references `/admin`" rule is superseded for these defined staff operations
 > only; `validateSession` accepts the mobile bearer on those routes and `requireRole` re-checks every
 > request, so a demoted user loses the surface immediately (the app treats any `403` as authoritative).
 ---
 ## 7. Degradation & offline
@@ -859,25 +802,6 @@ push, and Play (M6–M8) follow the designed app.
      generic build stays custom-scheme; white-label/first-party builds bake one host). The custom
      scheme remains the permanent fallback on every build. Full spec + rollout in
      [`APP_LINKS.md`](./APP_LINKS.md).
 11. **M10 — Native SSO fixes + staff operations** (post-v1; decided 2026-07-21). Two threads found
    during on-device QA:
    - **SSO discovery + reachability fixes (app-only, done):** the native login screen only rendered
      provider buttons when `GET /auth/providers` was non-empty and otherwise fell back to the desktop
      website login (which can't deep-link a mobile session back → it hung). `AuthRepository.ssoProviders()`
      now returns `Available` / `None` / `Unavailable` (retry once); the login screen shows native
      buttons / a loading hint / a retry, and the website-login fallback is removed. The pending PKCE
      `{state,verifier}` is persisted (encrypted `PendingSsoStore`) so the exchange survives Custom-Tab
      process death. The nav drawer is now `verticalScroll`-wrapped so a signed-in session's longer menu
      (which includes **Notifications**) can't clip on short screens. Dev testing uses a **stub OAuth IdP**
      (`website/scripts/dev/`), since dev configures no real provider. Verified end-to-end on an emulator.
    - **Staff operations (§1, §6.4):** a new `STAFF`/`ADMIN` menu access level reveals a staff section
      for `admin`/`moderator`, with native screens over the existing `/api/v1/admin/**`: **moderation**
      (`POST /admin/shard/{kick,ban,unban,broadcast}`), **support queue** (`GET /admin/shard/pages`,
      `POST /admin/shard/pages/:id/{respond,close}`), **dashboard + site-mode** (`GET /admin/dashboard`,
      `PUT /admin/site-mode`), and **content** (news posts under `/admin/posts*`, wiki categories/tags
      under `/admin/wiki/*`). No backend routes added (they already accept bearer + re-check role);
      shard-write actions degrade gracefully when the sidecar is offline. Excluded: hero/CMS block
      editor, Discord-bot config, uo-link config, OAuth-provider setup.
 ---
@@ -914,11 +838,8 @@ first release. Users **opt in per stream**: nothing is pushed unless subscribed.
  path/tag at implementation.
 - **All config is declarative** — a committed `ntfy` config file and/or `NTFY_*` env vars baked into
  compose. No `docker exec`, no interactive `ntfy user add`, no post-deploy manual steps. Bringing the
-  stack up provisions a working push relay. Reachable via the existing reverse proxy on its own
+  stack up provisions a working push relay. Reachable to devices via the existing reverse proxy on its
-  hostname/path — the container publishes `:80` on a host port (`NTFY_HOST_PORT`, default `2586`)
+  own hostname/path; internal-only for the backend publisher.
  because the proxy runs *outside* the compose network and can only reach a service through a
  published host port (the same reason `app` publishes `3000`). Both devices and the backend publisher
  reach ntfy on that public origin.
 - **No per-user ntfy accounts to administer.** The security model (below) removes the need for ntfy ACL
  provisioning, which is exactly what keeps setup interaction-free. ntfy topics are the random,
  unguessable endpoints UnifiedPush hands out; the backend treats ntfy as an **untrusted relay**.
@@ -1008,10 +929,8 @@ it is a UX convenience, not a v1 requirement — deferred at M3, descoped at M6;
  See [`APP_LINKS.md`](./APP_LINKS.md).
 - ntfy: exact upstream image + pinned tag (Part-1 landed the compose service — confirm the tag), and
  its reverse-proxy hostname/path. The hostname must land in `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` before M7 Part 2 is
-  end-to-end testable (the app registers an endpoint on that origin; the SSRF guard rejects others). The
+  end-to-end testable (the app registers an endpoint on that origin; the SSRF guard rejects others). No
-  reverse proxy forwards that hostname to the ntfy container's published host port (`NTFY_HOST_PORT`,
+  backend publish token — **decided** (the content-free-tickle design does not require one; optional
  default `2586`) — the container publishes `:80` because the proxy runs outside the compose network.
  No backend publish token — **decided** (the content-free-tickle design does not require one; optional
  `NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN` is honored if ever set).
 - FCM flavor: build it for the Play release or ship Play on UnifiedPush too? Decide at M8. (The M7
  Part 2 `PushTransport` seam keeps this swap cheap.)
--- a/android/screenshots/01-login-2fa-trust-device.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/01-login-2fa-trust-device.png
--- a/android/screenshots/02-account-security-section.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/02-account-security-section.png
--- a/android/screenshots/03-trusted-devices.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/03-trusted-devices.png
--- a/android/screenshots/04-recovery-codes-show-once.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/04-recovery-codes-show-once.png
--- a/android/screenshots/05-recovery-code-login.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/05-recovery-code-login.png
--- a/android/screenshots/README.md
+++ b/android/screenshots/README.md
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
 # Android app — trusted devices & recovery codes (live smoke test)
 Screenshots from a live end-to-end smoke test of the trusted-device + MFA feature on
 the Android client (app PR `RunicGateway/Android-app#23`), captured against the local
 Node server (`127.0.0.1:3000`) and a `uomysticmoon` MariaDB, on an API 36 emulator.
 See `../PLAN.md §4.1.1` for the design and `../../website/TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md` for
 the canonical contract.
 | # | Screenshot | Shows |
 |---|---|---|
 | 1 | [`01-login-2fa-trust-device.png`](01-login-2fa-trust-device.png) | The `401 { totpRequired }` login step: the **authentication code** field, the **"Use a recovery code instead"** toggle, and the **"Trust this device (skip codes for 30 days)"** checkbox (ticked). |
 | 2 | [`02-account-security-section.png`](02-account-security-section.png) | The new **Security** section on the account screen linking to Trusted devices and Recovery codes. |
 | 3 | [`03-trusted-devices.png`](03-trusted-devices.png) | The **Trusted Devices** screen listing this device (`Google sdk_gphone64_x86_64` — the `device_name` sent at login) with revoke / trust-this-device / untrust-all. |
 | 4 | [`04-recovery-codes-show-once.png`](04-recovery-codes-show-once.png) | The **Recovery Codes** screen after a password-stepped regenerate: the one-time batch shown once with copy / share, and the updated remaining count. |
 | 5 | [`05-recovery-code-login.png`](05-recovery-code-login.png) | Signing in with a **single-use recovery code** instead of the authenticator code. |
 ## Verified flows (all passed)
 1. **2FA login + "Trust this device"** → `200`, trust token stored; server logged `device trusted`.
 2. **Trust survives logout** — after signing out, a **password-only** sign-in skipped the
   TOTP step entirely (server: a clean `200` with **no** preceding `401 totpRequired`).
   This is the headline behaviour: the trust token is *only* consulted at a fresh login,
   so it must outlive logout (see PLAN §4.1.1).
 3. **Trusted Devices** — list, and the device's `last_used` stamp advancing after the
   trust-skip login.
 4. **Untrust all** — cleared the server rows **and** the local token; the next
   password-only sign-in correctly required the TOTP step again (server: `401`).
 5. **Recovery codes** — generate (password step-up, shown once) and a successful
   **recovery-code login** (server: `mobile login via recovery code` → `200`).
 ## Full step-by-step walkthrough
 The five images above are the curated highlights. These `walkthrough-*` frames are the
 rest of the same smoke-test session, in flow order, for a complete record. (Pure
 automation-artifact frames — soft-keyboard popups, mid-transition spinners, and
 duplicate Home landings — are omitted; the raws that the highlights above supersede are
 not repeated here.)
 | # | Screenshot | Shows |
 |---|---|---|
 | 1 | [`walkthrough-01-home-connected.png`](walkthrough-01-home-connected.png) | Home with the shard **Online** (already connected to the local server), signed out. |
 | 2 | [`walkthrough-02-drawer-signed-out.png`](walkthrough-02-drawer-signed-out.png) | Navigation drawer while signed out — **Sign in** entry. |
 | 3 | [`walkthrough-03-login-screen.png`](walkthrough-03-login-screen.png) | The native login screen (no SSO providers configured in dev). |
 | 4 | [`walkthrough-04-login-2fa-step.png`](walkthrough-04-login-2fa-step.png) | The `401 { totpRequired }` step with the fields empty — the **"Use a recovery code instead"** toggle and **"Trust this device"** checkbox before entry (companion to highlight #1, which shows them filled). |
 | 5 | [`walkthrough-05-drawer-signed-in.png`](walkthrough-05-drawer-signed-in.png) | Drawer once signed in — **My account**, Notifications, player groups, **Sign out**. |
 | 6 | [`walkthrough-06-account-overview.png`](walkthrough-06-account-overview.png) | Top of the account screen: identity, username/password, **two-factor ENABLED**. |
 | 7 | [`walkthrough-07-recovery-codes-before-generate.png`](walkthrough-07-recovery-codes-before-generate.png) | Recovery Codes screen before generating — **0 codes remaining** + the password-step-up form. |
 | 8 | [`walkthrough-08-trusted-devices-empty-after-untrust.png`](walkthrough-08-trusted-devices-empty-after-untrust.png) | Trusted Devices after **Untrust all** — "All devices untrusted." and the empty state. |
 | 9 | [`walkthrough-09-login-2fa-required-after-untrust.png`](walkthrough-09-login-2fa-required-after-untrust.png) | The next sign-in **re-prompting for the TOTP step** — proof that untrust-all cleared the local trust token. |
--- a/android/screenshots/walkthrough-01-home-connected.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/walkthrough-01-home-connected.png
--- a/android/screenshots/walkthrough-02-drawer-signed-out.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/walkthrough-02-drawer-signed-out.png
--- a/android/screenshots/walkthrough-03-login-screen.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/walkthrough-03-login-screen.png
--- a/android/screenshots/walkthrough-04-login-2fa-step.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/walkthrough-04-login-2fa-step.png
--- a/android/screenshots/walkthrough-05-drawer-signed-in.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/walkthrough-05-drawer-signed-in.png
--- a/android/screenshots/walkthrough-06-account-overview.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/walkthrough-06-account-overview.png
--- a/android/screenshots/walkthrough-07-recovery-codes-before-generate.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/walkthrough-07-recovery-codes-before-generate.png
--- a/android/screenshots/walkthrough-08-trusted-devices-empty-after-untrust.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/walkthrough-08-trusted-devices-empty-after-untrust.png
--- a/android/screenshots/walkthrough-09-login-2fa-required-after-untrust.png
+++ b/android/screenshots/walkthrough-09-login-2fa-required-after-untrust.png
--- a/ci/SONARQUBE.md
+++ b/ci/SONARQUBE.md
@@ -16,8 +16,13 @@ feeds the dashboard.
 | Repo | Project key | Sources analysed | Language |
 |---|---|---|---|
 | `website` | `runic-gateway-website` | `server/src`, `client/src`, `bot/src` | JS/TS |
-| `link` | `runic-gateway-link` | `sidecar/src` | Rust |
+| `link` | `Runic-Gateway-link` | `sidecar/src` | Rust |
-| `Android-app` | `runic-gateway-android-app` | `app/src/main` | Kotlin |
+| `Android-app` | `Runic-Gateway-Android-app` | `app/src/main` | Kotlin |
 > Project keys are **case-sensitive** and must match what already exists on the
 > server — SonarQube refuses to create a key that differs only in case from an
 > existing one. `link` and `Android-app` reuse the pre-existing capitalised keys
 > above; `website` predates this note with its lower-case key.
 ## How it's wired
--- a/website/ARCHITECTURE.md
+++ b/website/ARCHITECTURE.md
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
 # Website — Architecture
 How the pieces of `RunicGateway/website` fit together. The React SPA and the native mobile app
 talk to one Express backend (`router → controller → model → db`), which persists to MariaDB and
 bridges to the live game world **only** through the **uo-link** sidecar. The ServUO shard itself is
 never internet-facing — it dials out to the sidecar over loopback, and only the sidecar is exposed.
 This is the canonical copy of the diagram; the same diagram is embedded in the website's
 [`README.md`](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/website/src/branch/main/README.md#architecture).
 See [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) for the full API / schema / security contract, and
 [`docs/link/`](../link/) for the wire protocol between the sidecar and the shard.
 ```mermaid
 flowchart TB
    %% ---------- Clients ----------
    subgraph clients["Clients"]
        browser["Browser<br/>React + Vite SPA<br/>(public · wiki · admin)"]
        mobile["Native mobile app<br/>(bearer tokens)"]
    end
    idp["SSO providers<br/>Google · Discord · custom OIDC"]
    discord["Discord"]
    %% ---------- Website (one repo) ----------
    subgraph website["website/ &nbsp;— Node app (one repo)"]
        direction TB
        subgraph backend["server/ — Express backend"]
            direction TB
            mw["Middleware<br/>helmet · siteMode · noindex<br/>rateLimit · loginProtection · botScore · validate"]
            router["Router /api/v1<br/>auth (web · mobile · sso) · public · admin"]
            ctrl["Controllers"]
            auth["Session layer (auth/)<br/>sessionService · JWT/cookie · bearer · SSO+PKCE"]
            model["Models (.model + .db)<br/>raw parameterized SQL — no ORM"]
            sse["SSE fan-out<br/>public stream (allowlist) · admin stream (sensitive)"]
            subgraph shardutil["Shard integration (utils/)"]
                ingest["shardIngest.js<br/>WS ingest dispatcher"]
                restcli["uoLinkClient.js<br/>REST client (never throws)"]
            end
            secret["secretBox.js<br/>AES-256-GCM secrets at rest"]
        end
        bot["bot/<br/>Discord bot"]
    end
    db[("MariaDB<br/>users · posts · wiki · settings · activity<br/>mobileSessions · authProviders · userIdentities<br/>uoLinkConfig · shard_online/economy/houses/events")]
    %% ---------- Shard side ----------
    subgraph shardside["Game shard (never internet-facing)"]
        direction TB
        sidecar["uo-link sidecar<br/>(Rust) — the only bridge exposed"]
        servuo["ServUO shard<br/>(C# plugin)"]
    end
    %% ---------- Edges ----------
    browser <-->|"same-origin JSON + SSE (cookie)"| mw
    mobile -->|"REST (bearer access/refresh)"| mw
    browser -.->|"OAuth redirect + PKCE"| idp
    auth -.->|"token exchange"| idp
    mw --> router --> ctrl
    ctrl --> auth
    ctrl --> model
    ctrl --> restcli
    ctrl --> sse
    auth --> model
    model <--> db
    auth -. reads/writes secrets .-> secret
    restcli -. reads config/token .-> secret
    ingest --> model
    ingest --> sse
    sse -->|"live events"| browser
    bot -->|"messages"| discord
    bot <--> db
    restcli -->|"REST: /char /roster /economy /history · /link/confirm · /towncrier"| sidecar
    sidecar -->|"WebSocket live event feed (bearer + X-UOLink-Version)"| ingest
    servuo -->|"loopback TCP 127.0.0.1:7788<br/>newline-delimited JSON (shard dials out)"| sidecar
    %% ---------- Styling ----------
    classDef ext fill:#2d2233,stroke:#7a5c94,color:#e8dff0;
    classDef store fill:#1f2d2a,stroke:#4c8c7d,color:#dff0ea;
    classDef bridge fill:#2d2620,stroke:#94764c,color:#f0e6d8;
    class idp,discord ext;
    class db store;
    class sidecar,servuo bridge;
 ```
 ## Notes on the diagram
 - **One backend, layered.** Every request flows `middleware → router → controller → model → db`.
  Web browsers authenticate with an httpOnly JWT cookie; the native app uses short-lived bearer
  access tokens plus rotated, hashed, revocable refresh tokens; SSO (Google/Discord/OIDC) is
  link-only and PKCE-guarded. All three surfaces resolve to the *same* session model via the session
  layer, and admin routes are re-validated against the DB on every request.
 - **The shard is never reachable.** The ServUO shard *dials out* over loopback TCP `127.0.0.1:7788`
  (newline-delimited JSON) to the uo-link sidecar; only the sidecar is exposed, and only the backend
  talks to it. Every backend→sidecar call carries `Authorization: Bearer <token>` and an
  `X-UOLink-Version` header (a protocol mismatch fails fast with `409`). The REST client
  (`uoLinkClient.js`) never throws — every call returns `{ ok, data, status }` — so the site degrades
  gracefully when the shard is down.
 - **Two ways in from the sidecar.** Live game events arrive over an outbound **WebSocket** and are
  routed by the `shardIngest.js` dispatcher (state-changing kinds update `shard_*` tables, notable
  kinds append to `shard_events`, high-frequency kinds only update state). Point-in-time reads and
  commands go over **REST** through `uoLinkClient.js`.
 - **Sensitive events stay private.** Ingested events fan out to browsers over two **SSE** channels —
  a public allowlist stream and an admin-only stream that additionally carries staff audit, cheat
  detection, and login-attempt events. The allowlist split is a security boundary; sensitive kinds
  can never leak onto the public channel.
 - **Secrets at rest.** OAuth client secrets, the uo-link token, and the Gmail refresh token are
  AES-256-GCM encrypted via `secretBox.js` (keyed by `SECRET_ENC_KEY`). The uo-link token is
  write-only in the API — never returned to any client.
--- a/website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md
+++ b/website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md
@@ -223,28 +223,6 @@ list/revoke surface: `device_name VARCHAR(100) NULL` (a friendly label) and `las
 NULL` (bumped on each refresh). Existing rows get them via the schema's ALTER section; the token model
 is otherwise unchanged.
 ### trusted_devices  — MFA "Trust this device"
 Lets a browser/app **skip the TOTP step** at login (never the password) for 30 days. Pattern-identical
 to `mobile_refresh_tokens`: the opaque trust token lives client-side (the `rg_trust` httpOnly cookie on
 web, `X-Trust-Token` / EncryptedSharedPreferences on native) and only its **sha256** hash is stored
 (`token_hash CHAR(64) UNIQUE`) — sha256, not bcrypt, because a 256-bit random token is looked up **by
 its hash** via the unique index (a per-row salt would break that). Columns mirror the mobile table
 (`platform`, `device_name`, `device_hash`, `user_agent`, `created_at`, `last_used_at`, `expires_at`,
 `revoked_at`). Capped at 10 rows/user **in application code — no silent pruning** (an over-cap trust is
 refused so the client can prompt the user to revoke one first). Consulted only at the login/password
 step, never at token refresh, and revoked wholesale on untrust / password change / password reset /
 TOTP disable. See `docs/website/TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md`.
 ### recovery_codes  — single-use MFA backup codes
 Generated at TOTP enrollment (10 at a time, shown to the user **once**) so a user who loses their
 authenticator can complete login without an admin reset. `code_hash VARCHAR(72)` is a **bcrypt** hash
 (not sha256): a recovery code is a human-typed, lower-entropy fallback credential — the closest
 analogue to a password — and there is no hash-lookup constraint (verification fetches the user's ≤10
 unused rows and `bcrypt.compare`s each, like password verification). `used_at` is the single-use
 marker. Cleared wholesale on TOTP disable / password change / password reset.
 ---
 ## 4. API contract
@@ -255,9 +233,8 @@ accepts `Authorization: Bearer` for API testing).
 ### /auth  (auth.routes.js → auth.controller.js)
 | Method | Path | Auth | Body | Purpose |
 |---|---|---|---|---|
-| POST | `/login` | — (rate-limited) | `{username,password}` | verify, set cookie, log `auth.login`, update `last_login_at`. If the account has TOTP **and this browser is a trusted device** (a valid `rg_trust` cookie bound to the user), the TOTP step is **skipped** and a session is issued directly (logs `auth.login.trusted_device`). Otherwise a 2FA account returns `{totpRequired, challenge}`. |
+| POST | `/login` | — (rate-limited) | `{username,password}` | verify, set cookie, log `auth.login`, update `last_login_at` |
-| POST | `/login/totp` | — (rate-limited) | `{challenge, code? \| recoveryCode?, trustDevice?, deviceName?}` | complete 2FA with a TOTP **or** single-use recovery code. `trustDevice` sets the `rg_trust` cookie so future logins skip TOTP; at the device cap the session is still issued and the body carries `{trustLimitReached, devices}`. |
+| POST | `/logout` | cookie | — | clear cookie |
 | POST | `/logout` | cookie | — | clear cookie (the `rg_trust` trust cookie deliberately **survives** logout) |
 | GET | `/me` | cookie / bearer | — | current user (no hash) or 401 — client bootstraps auth state |
 | POST | `/password/forgot` | — (rate-limited) | `{email}` | email a single-use, ~1h reset link to **every active account** on the address; **always** returns the same generic 200 (no account enumeration). Email is non-unique, so several accounts may each get a link naming their username. Logs `account.password.reset.request`. |
 | GET | `/password/reset/:token` | — | — | validate a link → `{username}` for the form, else 404 (never distinguishes expired/used/never-existed) |
@@ -265,13 +242,8 @@ accepts `Authorization: Bearer` for API testing).
 | GET | `/me/account` | cookie / bearer | — | full self account (`id, username, role, email, status, totp_enabled, has_password`) |
 | PATCH | `/me/account/username` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited) | `{username}` | change own username; re-issues the caller's session |
 | PATCH | `/me/account/password` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited) | `{newPassword, currentPassword?}` | change/set own password (current required unless the account has none); revokes other sessions, keeps the caller's |
-| POST | `/me/account/totp/setup` · `…/enable` · `…/disable` | cookie / bearer | `{code}` on enable/disable | self 2FA enrollment (disable needs a valid current code, not a password). **enable** returns the one-time `recoveryCodes`; **disable** clears the user's trusted devices + recovery codes |
+| POST | `/me/account/totp/setup` · `…/enable` · `…/disable` | cookie / bearer | `{code}` on enable/disable | self 2FA enrollment (disable needs a valid current code, not a password) |
 | GET | `/me/account/identities` · DELETE `…/:provider` | cookie / bearer | — | list / unlink own SSO identities |
 | GET | `/me/trusted-devices` | cookie / bearer | — | list own active trusted devices (never tokens) |
 | POST | `/me/trusted-devices` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited) | `{deviceName?}` | trust the current device; web gets an httpOnly `rg_trust` cookie, native gets `{trustToken}`. **409 `{error:'trusted_device_limit', devices}`** at the cap |
 | DELETE | `/me/trusted-devices` · `…/:id` | cookie / bearer | — | untrust all / one (ownership-scoped) |
 | GET | `/me/account/recovery-codes/status` | cookie / bearer | — | remaining unused code count (never the codes) |
 | POST | `/me/account/recovery-codes/generate` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited, **password step-up**) | `{currentPassword?}` | regenerate the one-time recovery codes (returned once); refused when 2FA is off |
 | POST | `/me/devices` | cookie / bearer | `{endpoint, transport?, platform?}` | register a push endpoint; **rejects a disallowed endpoint 400** (SSRF guard). Idempotent per (user, endpoint) |
 | GET | `/me/devices` · DELETE `…/:id` | cookie / bearer | — | list / unregister own push devices |
 | GET | `/me/notifications/streams` | cookie / bearer | — | the subscribable catalog (`personal`/`requiresLinkedAccount` flags) |
@@ -284,16 +256,6 @@ lets a client (the Android app) manage its own account through one surface witho
 `/admin` (docs/android/PLAN.md §6.4). The older `/player/account/*` + `/admin/account/*` routes stay
 for web back-compat.
 **The `/player/*` group is self-service, not player-only.** Staff are a **superset** of players — every
 player ability plus their staff tools on top — so the whole `/player/*` router (game-account linking,
 character/vendor/house reads, credential changes, appeals) sits behind `requireAuth` **only**, never
 `requireRole('player')`. Every handler is self-scoped to the caller by `req.user.id`, so an admin/editor/
 moderator using it sees only their **own** linked accounts and characters (with the pre-existing
 `isAdmin` bypass still letting a genuine admin read *any* character). Staff also reach the identical
 self-scoped handlers under `/admin/shard/*` (same controller) for the web admin surface; the two are
 interchangeable. This is why a staff account with linked game characters gets its "My characters" and
 personal notification streams on the mobile client — the group no longer 403s a non-`player` role.
 **Password reset.** Uses the same audited pattern as `user_invites`: an opaque 32-byte token
 whose **sha256 hash only** is stored in `password_resets`, single-use and short-lived (~1h). It
 also serves SSO-only accounts (null `password_hash`) as their "set an initial password" path. The
@@ -413,9 +375,6 @@ Public content GETs pass through the **siteMode** gate (§5).
 | GET | `/settings` · PUT `/settings` | read all / update `{key:value,...}` |
 | GET | `/activity?limit=&offset=` | paginated activity log |
 | GET | `/users` · POST `/users` · PUT `/users/:id` · DELETE `/users/:id` | user mgmt (can't delete self / last admin; password hashed on write) |
 | GET | `/users/:id/trusted-devices` | list a user's active trusted devices (never tokens) |
 | DELETE | `/users/:id/trusted-devices` · `…/:deviceId` | revoke all / one of a user's trusted devices (logs `admin.trusted_device.revoke[_all]`) |
 | POST | `/users/:id/mfa/reset` | recover a locked-out user: disable TOTP + revoke all trusted devices + clear recovery codes (logs `admin.user.totp.reset`) |
 Every admin write logs to `activity_log`.
@@ -446,8 +405,7 @@ who"; `activity_log` provides the history feed.
 ## 6. Auth & security
 - **JWT** signed with `JWT_SECRET`, `expiresIn=JWT_EXPIRES_IN` (default `1d`); payload `{id,username,role}`.
- **Cookie**: `httpOnly`, `sameSite=Lax`, `path=/`, and **`secure` decided per-request** (`COOKIE_SECURE=auto` → `secure: req.secure`).
+- **Cookie**: `httpOnly`, `sameSite=Lax`, `path=/`, and **`secure` decided per-request** (`COOKIE_SECURE=auto` → `secure: req.secure`). This is the key to dual access: the cookie is `Secure` when reached through Pangolin (HTTPS, `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`) but **not** `Secure` when reached directly over the LAN IP on plain HTTP — so login works in both. `COOKIE_SECURE=true|false` can force it. Requires `trust proxy` (below). `localhost:5173` (Vite) and `localhost:3000` are same-site, so the cookie flows in dev too.
 - **Trusted-device MFA.** A second, separate httpOnly cookie (`rg_trust`, default 30d) — opaque, sha256-hashed server-side in `trusted_devices` — lets a browser/app **skip the TOTP step** (never the password) on future logins. It is a server-side, per-row-revocable record (never a JWT claim), so the stateless session JWT is unchanged and trust stays revocable. It only ever gates the **second factor**; it deliberately outlives logout, and is cleared on untrust / password change / password reset / TOTP disable. **Recovery codes** (bcrypt, single-use) are the 2FA-lockout fallback. All admin trusted-device/MFA actions and the self actions (`auth.login.trusted_device`, `account.trusted_device.*`, `account.recovery_code*`, `admin.trusted_device.*`, `admin.user.totp.reset`) are audit-logged. See `docs/website/TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md`. This is the key to dual access: the cookie is `Secure` when reached through Pangolin (HTTPS, `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`) but **not** `Secure` when reached directly over the LAN IP on plain HTTP — so login works in both. `COOKIE_SECURE=true|false` can force it. Requires `trust proxy` (below). `localhost:5173` (Vite) and `localhost:3000` are same-site, so the cookie flows in dev too.
 - **bcrypt** hashing (cost 10+); plaintext passwords never stored, logged, or returned.
 - **Rate limiting** (`express-rate-limit`) on `/auth/login` and `/public/contact`.
 - **Validation** (`express-validator`) on all writes; centralized error handler.
@@ -511,13 +469,11 @@ subsystem (`[server]`, `[http]`, `[db]`, `[auth]`, `[admin]`, `[ratelimit]`, …
  `env_file: .env`, `DB_HOST=db`, `depends_on: db (healthy)`, volume `uploads:/app/uploads`,
  `ports: "3000:3000"` — **binds 0.0.0.0** (no `127.0.0.1:` prefix) so Pangolin reaches it.
 - `ntfy` (M7): pinned upstream `binwiederhier/ntfy` image, declarative config only
-  (`./ntfy/server.yml` mounted `:ro` + `NTFY_BASE_URL`), volume `ntfydata:/var/lib/ntfy`,
+  (`./ntfy/server.yml` mounted `:ro` + `NTFY_BASE_URL`), volume `ntfydata:/var/lib/ntfy`, **no
-  **publishes `:80` on a host port** (`${NTFY_HOST_PORT:-2586}:80`, binds 0.0.0.0) so Pangolin — which
+  published host port** — devices reach it via the reverse proxy; the backend publisher reaches it
-  runs outside the compose network — can forward the notification subdomain to it, the same reason
+  over the private compose network. Anonymous read-write to unguessable topics (no accounts to
-  `app` publishes `3000`. Both devices (SSE subscribe) and the backend publisher (POSTing tickles to
+  provision) — safe because pushes are content-free tickles. Bringing the stack up provisions a
-  registered device endpoints) reach ntfy on that public origin. Anonymous read-write to unguessable
+  working push relay with **zero interactive setup**.
  topics (no accounts to provision) — safe because pushes are content-free tickles. Bringing the stack
  up provisions a working push relay with **zero interactive setup**.
 - Volumes: `dbdata`, `uploads`, `ntfydata`.
 Express listens on `0.0.0.0:${PORT||3000}`. Pangolin terminates TLS and proxies to `app`.
@@ -550,9 +506,6 @@ NTFY_BASE_URL=https://ntfy.example.com
 # shows push as unavailable for the shard.
 NTFY_PUBLIC_URL=https://ntfy.example.com
 NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://ntfy.example.com
 # Host port the ntfy container publishes :80 on (default 2586); the reverse proxy
 # forwards the notification subdomain to host:NTFY_HOST_PORT. Change on a conflict.
 NTFY_HOST_PORT=2586
 ```
 `.gitignore`: `node_modules/`, `.env`, `_reference/`, `client/dist/`, `uploads/`.
--- a/website/TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md
+++ b/website/TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md
@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
 # Trusted Devices & MFA Improvements — Design & Implementation Plan
 > Reference plan for the trusted-device + MFA hardening work. Approved 2026-07-21.
 > This document is the contract the implementation builds against; keep it in sync
 > with `BACKEND_DESIGN.md` (§3 schema, §4 API, §6 security) as code lands.
 ## 1. Goal & scope
 Reduce 2FA friction without weakening the second-factor boundary, and close the
 2FA-lockout gap. Four deliverables:
 1. **Trusted devices** — an opt-in "Trust this device" that lets a browser or the
   Android app **skip the TOTP step** (never the password) on future logins for a
   fixed window.
 2. **Recovery / backup codes** — single-use codes generated at 2FA enrollment so a
   user who loses their authenticator can self-recover instead of needing an admin
   reset.
 3. **Admin-managed revocation** — staff can view and revoke a user's trusted
   devices and reset their MFA, with full audit logging (**backend endpoints _and_
   admin front-end screens**).
 4. **Step-up (password) for sensitive operations** — reusing the existing
   `currentPassword`-verification pattern; disabling TOTP keeps its stronger
   current-TOTP-code requirement.
 Touches `website/` (server + client), `docs/`, and `android-app/` (plan only in
 this pass). **No** `link/` or `servuo-plugins/` change — no wire-protocol impact.
 ### Approved decisions
 | Decision | Value |
 |---|---|
 | Trust duration | **30 days** (matches mobile refresh-token lifetime) |
 | Roles eligible | **All roles** (no staff carve-out) |
 | Opt-in model | **Explicit "Trust this device" checkbox, default off** |
 | Recovery codes | **10 codes**, shown **once**, single-use |
 | Trusted-device cap | **10 per user, no silent pruning** (see §5) |
 | Trust-token hashing | **sha256** |
 | Recovery-code hashing | **bcrypt** (cost 10) |
 ## 2. Current state (starting point)
 - **One session service** (`server/src/auth/session.service.js`) backs web (JWT
  `httpOnly` cookie, 1d) and mobile (15m access JWT + 30d opaque refresh token).
  `requireAuth` accepts either via `token.extractToken()`.
 - **TOTP** is opt-in per user (`users.totp_secret` / `totp_enabled`), demanded on
  **every** login. Web uses a staged 5-min `stage:'totp'` challenge; mobile uses a
  single-request `401 { totpRequired }`. **No recovery codes** exist today.
 - **Device tracking exists only on mobile** (`mobile_refresh_tokens` rows with
  `device_name` / `device_hash` / `user_agent` / `last_used_at`). Web JWTs are
  stateless with no per-session row.
 - **Revocation is mature:** `revoked_sessions` (jti denylist) + `tokens_valid_after`
  (per-user cutoff) for web; per-token rows + `revokeAllForUser` for mobile.
 - **No trusted-device or step-up concept exists anywhere.**
 ## 3. Hashing rationale
 The repo already splits hashing by secret entropy, and this plan follows it:
 - **sha256** — every high-entropy machine-generated opaque token
  (`mobile_refresh_tokens`, `mobile_auth_codes`, `user_invites`, `password_resets`,
  SSO PKCE). **Trusted-device tokens use sha256:** they are 256-bit random values
  (nothing to brute-force) looked up **by a `token_hash UNIQUE` index**, which
  requires a deterministic hash — bcrypt's per-row salt would break the lookup and
  truncates input at 72 bytes.
 - **bcrypt (`bcryptjs`, cost 10)** — the repo uses it only for **passwords**, the
  one human-chosen low-entropy secret. **Recovery codes use bcrypt:** they are a
  human-typed, lower-entropy fallback credential that grants a login (the closest
  analogue to a password), and there is no hash-lookup constraint — we fetch the
  identified user's ≤10 code rows and `bcrypt.compare` each, exactly like password
  verification.
 ## 4. Database (additive, idempotent — matches `schema.sql` style)
 ### `trusted_devices`
 Pattern-identical to `mobile_refresh_tokens`; stores only the token hash.
 | Column | Type | Notes |
 |---|---|---|
 | id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
 | user_id | INT NOT NULL | FK → users, `ON DELETE CASCADE` |
 | token_hash | CHAR(64) NOT NULL UNIQUE | sha256 hex of the opaque trust token |
 | platform | ENUM('web','mobile') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'web' | |
 | device_name | VARCHAR(100) NULL | friendly label |
 | device_hash | VARCHAR(32) NULL | best-effort UA+IP, **display only** |
 | user_agent | VARCHAR(255) NULL | |
 | created_at | DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | |
 | last_used_at | DATETIME NULL | stamped when trust is honored at login |
 | expires_at | DATETIME NOT NULL | created_at + 30d |
 | revoked_at | DATETIME NULL | |
 Indices: `idx_td_user (user_id)`, `idx_td_expires (expires_at)`.
 ### `recovery_codes`
 | Column | Type | Notes |
 |---|---|---|
 | id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
 | user_id | INT NOT NULL | FK → users, `ON DELETE CASCADE` |
 | code_hash | VARCHAR(72) NOT NULL | **bcrypt** hash of one code |
 | used_at | DATETIME NULL | single-use marker |
 | created_at | DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | |
 Index: `idx_rc_user (user_id)`.
 No new `users` column: password change/reset and TOTP-disable **bulk-revoke**
 `trusted_devices` rows and **delete** `recovery_codes` (consistent with
 `revokeAllForUser`), so no "trust epoch" column is needed.
 ## 5. Trusted-device cap — no silent pruning
 Cap = **10**. A shared `assertUnderTrustCap(userId)` guards both entry points (the
 login/TOTP trust path and the authenticated "trust this device" path). On the 11th
 attempt the backend **refuses to create the row** and returns
 `409 { error: 'trusted_device_limit', devices: [...] }`. Login itself still
 succeeds — only the trust marker is withheld. The web client then renders a modal
 **in the same visual pattern as the TOTP entry flow** that:
 1. shows the existing trusted devices,
 2. requires revoking ≥1 before continuing,
 3. completes via `POST /auth/me/trusted-devices` (trust current device), and
 4. offers **Cancel**, which returns without creating any trust entry.
 ## 6. API additions
 ### Auth (login paths)
 - `POST /auth/login` — after password verify, if a valid unrevoked `rg_trust`
  cookie matches a live `trusted_devices` row for this user → **skip TOTP**, issue
  the session, log `auth.login.trusted_device`, stamp `last_used_at`. Otherwise
  unchanged (`{ totpRequired, challenge }`).
 - `POST /auth/login/totp` — gains optional `trustDevice` + `deviceName`, and
  accepts a **recovery code** as an alternative to the TOTP code (single-use). On
  success with `trustDevice`, mint the opaque trust token, set the `rg_trust`
  cookie, insert the row (subject to the cap → `409` signal).
 - `POST /auth/mobile/login` — gains `trustDevice` / `recoveryCode`; returns a
  `trustToken` the app stores in EncryptedSharedPreferences and replays on a later
  login to skip TOTP. Same cap behavior.
 ### Self-service (`/auth/me/*`, `requireAuth`, any role)
 - `GET /auth/me/trusted-devices` — list active trusted devices (never tokens).
 - `POST /auth/me/trusted-devices` — trust the current browser/device (cap-checked).
 - `DELETE /auth/me/trusted-devices/:id` — revoke one (ownership-scoped).
 - `DELETE /auth/me/trusted-devices` — revoke all ("untrust everywhere").
 - `POST /auth/me/account/recovery-codes/generate` — **password step-up required**;
  returns the codes **once**.
 - `GET /auth/me/account/recovery-codes/status` — remaining count only.
 ### Admin (`requireRole('admin')`)
 - `GET /admin/users/:id/trusted-devices` — list a user's trusted devices.
 - `DELETE /admin/users/:id/trusted-devices/:deviceId` — revoke one.
 - `DELETE /admin/users/:id/trusted-devices` — revoke all.
 - MFA reset control (revoke trust + disable TOTP + clear recovery codes).
 ## 7. Cookie / refresh / JWT interaction
 - New **`rg_trust`** cookie: `httpOnly`, `sameSite=Lax`, `secure` per-request
  (reuse `cookieSecure`), `path=/`, `maxAge` 30d, opaque 256-bit base64url,
  sha256-hashed server-side. **Separate from the session cookie and deliberately
  survives logout** (so the next login skips 2FA); only untrust / password-change /
  TOTP-disable revoke it.
 - **JWTs stay stateless and unchanged** — trust is a server-side cookie+row, never
  a JWT claim, so it remains revocable.
 - **Refresh flow untouched** — trust is consulted only at the login/password step,
  never at token refresh; the two stores stay independent.
 ## 8. Security & invalidation
 - Trust **only ever gates the second factor**; password is always required.
 - Recovery-code entry reuses the login brute-force stack (backoff + bot scoring +
  rate limits); recovery codes are single-use.
 - **Password change/reset and TOTP-disable clear trust and recovery codes.**
 - **Audit logging** via existing `activity.log` / `activity_log`:
  `auth.login.trusted_device`, `account.trusted_device.add` / `.revoke` /
  `.revoke_all`, `account.recovery_codes.generate`, `account.recovery_code.consume`,
  and admin `admin.trusted_device.revoke` / `.revoke_all`, `admin.user.totp.reset`
  — each with actor, target user, and device id in `detail`.
 ## 9. Backwards compatibility
 Fully additive. With no `rg_trust` cookie the behavior is exactly today's (TOTP
 every login). Recovery codes exist only for users who generate them. No existing
 session or login flow changes shape. New tables via `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`
 and columns via `ALTER TABLE … ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`.
 ## 10. Implementation roadmap
 1. **Schema + models** — `trusted_devices` (sha256, cap-checked) + `recovery_codes`
   (bcrypt); `.db.js` / `.model.js` pairs mirroring `mobileSessions`.
 2. **Session service** — trust-token mint/sha256/verify + recovery-code
   generate/bcrypt-verify/consume helpers (pure, DB-free); shared
   `assertUnderTrustCap()`.
 3. **Web login** — trust-cookie skip in `/auth/login`; `trustDevice` / recovery
   handling + cap `409` in `/auth/login/totp`; set/clear `rg_trust`.
 4. **Mobile login** — `trustDevice` / `trustToken` / `recoveryCode`, same cap.
 5. **Self-service + admin backend** — `/auth/me/trusted-devices*` + recovery-code
   endpoints; `/admin/users/:id/trusted-devices*` + MFA reset (all admin-gated).
 6. **Invalidation wiring** — password change/reset & TOTP-disable revoke trust +
   delete recovery codes.
 7. **Web client UI** — "Trust this device" checkbox; cap-reached TOTP-styled modal
   (revoke-to-continue / cancel); user Trusted Devices + Recovery Codes screens.
 8. **Admin front-end UI** — admin Trusted Devices management & revocation screens
   (per-user list, revoke one / revoke all, MFA reset), wired to step 5.
 9. **Android** — record the app-side trust/recovery flow in
   `docs/android/PLAN.md`; app implementation sequenced after the backend lands.
 10. **OpenAPI + docs** — `#swagger.*` on every new/modified route + regenerate
    `server/swagger/swagger-output.json`; update `BACKEND_DESIGN.md` §3/§4/§6.
 11. **Automated tests** — trusted-device login skip (valid / missing / expired /
    revoked), token mint+hash, recovery-code single-use consume + wrong-code
    backoff, cap `409` behavior, revocation (self + admin), invalidation on
    password-change / TOTP-disable, and permission checks (admin routes reject
    non-admins; self routes ownership-scoped); web client pure-logic tests; Android
    JVM DTO/repository tests.
--- a/website/test-plan.md
+++ b/website/test-plan.md
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
 # Runic Gateway Website — Test Plan (Discord bot)
 > Companion to [website-README.md](website-README.md) (overview) and
 > [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) (server API/schema/security contract).
 > Establishes the test plan for the **`bot/` workspace** (the Discord bot), the
 > last of the three `website` npm workspaces without a suite. The server and
 > client suites already exist (website PR #86); this doc closes the bot gap and
 > records the shared conventions so all three stay consistent.
 ## 1. Goal & philosophy
 Cover **meaningful bot behavior** — the moderation/filter decisions a future
 change could silently break — not a coverage number. The bot's value is in *what
 it decides to delete, warn, mute, or let through*; a good test reads "given this
 message + config, what action does the bot take?", never "did this function call
 that function?".
 The whole `website` repo tests on **Node's built-in runner (`node --test`)** with
 **zero external test dependencies** — no jest, no vitest, no jsdom. Unit tests
 run without a database or a live Discord gateway: the DB pool is pointed at a dead
 port and every collaborator (`db.query`, a model, a Discord `message`/`client`) is
 replaced with an in-memory fake. This mirrors the server suite exactly (the bot is
 CommonJS, like the server — `require`/`module.exports` — so the same patterns
 apply verbatim).
 ## 2. Current state
 | Workspace | Runner | Status |
 |---|---|---|
 | `server/` | `node --test` | **Exists** — models, controllers, auth/session, shard ingest. |
 | `client/` | `node --test` (pure-logic ESM) | **Exists** (PR #86) — `lib/`, `api/`, `data/`. |
 | `bot/` | — | **This plan** — no runner or tests yet. |
 The 46% SonarQube aggregate is dragged down by the bot (and the client's
 un-unit-testable React components) reading as 0% covered. Standing up the bot
 suite lifts the real number and, more importantly, locks the filter/moderation
 rules.
 ## 3. Harness
 Add a test script to `bot/package.json` (mirrors server/client):
 ```json
 "scripts": { "test": "node --test" }
 ```
 Conventions, identical to `server/test/`:
 - **No DB.** Set `process.env.DB_HOST = '127.0.0.1'` / `DB_PORT = '59999'` at the
  top of any test whose module transitively `require`s `../db`, so the pool is
  built against a dead port and a stray query fails fast instead of hanging.
  Models are exercised by monkeypatching `db.query` (or the model method the unit
  under test calls) with an in-memory fake; restore it in `afterEach`.
 - **No Discord.** The `discord.js` `Client`, `Message`, `GuildMember`, and
  `Interaction` objects are hand-rolled fakes carrying only the fields the unit
  reads (e.g. `message.mentions.users.size`, `message.member.roles.cache`,
  `message.client.fetchInvite`). Never construct a real client or open a gateway
  connection.
 - **Tests live in `bot/test/*.test.js`.** One file per module under test.
 ## 4. Units to cover
 Ordered high-value first. Each row names the module, the behavior worth locking,
 and the seam a test drives it through.
 ### 4.1 Pure logic (no mocks beyond inputs)
 | Module | Behaviors to lock | Notes |
 |---|---|---|
 | `filter/normalize.js` | leetspeak folding (`b4d`→`bad`, `@ss`→`ass`), 3+-repeat collapse (`sooooo`→`so`), case-fold; `matches()` is word-boundary anchored (so `bad` does not fire inside `badminton`); `findMatch()` returns the first `{word, severity}` row or `null`; the *documented gaps* stay gaps (spaced-out `b a d` is **not** caught). | The core obfuscation-resistance contract. Pin the gaps too, so a future tightening is a deliberate, test-visible change. |
 | `utils/duration.js` | `"30s"/"10m"/"2h"/"1d"` → correct ms; whitespace tolerated; garbage/empty/unknown-unit → `null`; `MAX_TIMEOUT_MS` is 28 days (the Discord cap callers clamp to). | Feeds `/mute` and temp-role expiry — a wrong parse mutes for the wrong span. |
 | `filter/spamFilter.js` | `isRateLimited` trips on the 6th message inside the 5 s window and is per-`guild:user`; it has a **side effect** (records the timestamp) so it must be called once; `isMassMention` counts users **+** roles against the threshold; `isMassEmoji` counts custom `<:name:id>` and unicode pictographs. | Drive time with a stubbed `Date.now` (or accept the real clock and use tight windows). The module-load `setInterval(...).unref()` sweep must not keep the runner alive — `.unref()` already handles this; assert no leak by letting the suite exit. |
 ### 4.2 Logic with a single mocked collaborator
 | Module | Behaviors to lock | Seam / mock |
 |---|---|---|
 | `filter/inviteFilter.js` | returns the **code** (not a bool) of the first *foreign* invite; an invite resolving to the current guild is allowed; an invite that **fails to resolve** (expired/invalid) is treated as foreign (fail-closed); no invite in the message → `null`. | Fake `message.client.fetchInvite(code)` — resolve with `{ guild: { id } }` for local/foreign, or throw for unresolvable. Set `message.guildId` + `message.content`. |
 | `site/siteApiClient.js` | never throws on a network/timeout/HTTP failure — always returns the `{ ok, ... }` shape so a command never breaks when the site is down: `{ ok: true, data }` on success, `{ ok: false, error }` on failure, and the distinct `{ ok: false, maintenance: true, message }` for the site's 503 maintenance response. (Public read client — **no** shared secret; the keyed channel is `botInternalClient.js`.) | Stub `global.fetch` (resolve various statuses/bodies, reject/timeout via `AbortController`). Same non-throwing contract the server's `uoLinkClient` follows. |
 | `internal/requireInternalKey.js` | `401` on a missing/wrong key; `next()` on the configured key; **fail-closed** when `BOT_INTERNAL_KEY` is empty (never matches); timing-safe compare (equal-length + `crypto.timingSafeEqual`, no early-exit length leak). | Call the middleware with a fake `req` (`req.get('X-Internal-Key')`) + `res`/`next` spies; mirrors `server/test/requireInternalKey.test.js`. |
 ### 4.3 The filter pipeline (orchestration)
 `discord/messageFilter.js` is the highest-value integration seam — it composes
 all of §4.1–4.2. Lock the **decision order and the actions**, with every
 collaborator faked:
 - **Bypass wins first:** an allow-listed channel, or a member holding an
  allow-listed role, short-circuits the whole pipeline (`isBypassed`) — no
  delete, no hit recorded.
 - **Order:** invite link → banned word → spam (rate-limit → mass-mention →
  mass-emoji). `detectSpam` must evaluate `isRateLimited` **first and exactly
  once** (it has the timestamp side effect).
 - **Actions:** invite/spam always delete + warn (no severity tiers); a
  word-filter hit applies the action for its severity; filter-triggered mutes use
  the fixed `FILTER_MUTE_SECONDS` (600 s).
 - **Best-effort recording never breaks moderation:** `recordFilterHit` /
  `recordSpamHit` throwing must be swallowed — the delete/warn still happens.
 Mocks: `filterCache` (in-memory `allowChannels`/`allowRoles` Sets + words), a fake
 `message` (content, author, member roles, `delete()`, `guildId`), and spies on
 `warnings`/`filterHits`/`spamHits`/`modLog` to assert what was called.
 ### 4.4 Models (`bot/model/*.js`)
 Thin `db.query` wrappers (e.g. `warnings.js`, `filterWords.js`, `filterHits.js`,
 `spamHits.js`, `memberEvents.js`, `guildConfig.js`, `scheduledMessages.js`,
 `tempRoles.js`). Cover only those with **shaping/branching logic** (a query that
 maps rows, applies an "active/not-expired" predicate, or upserts) by asserting the
 **SQL params** passed to a fake `db.query` and the shape returned. Skip pure
 one-line inserts with no logic — testing those only proves the mock.
 ## 5. Explicitly out of scope
 - **`discord.js` internals / the live gateway** — not ours to test; never open a
  real connection.
 - **Thin command wrappers** (`discord/commands/*.command.js`) that only validate
  args and call a Discord API + a model — cover their *logic* (arg parsing,
  duration clamping) if any, but not the Discord round-trip.
 - **`node-cron` scheduling itself** — test the job's callback logic, not that cron
  fires.
 ## 6. CI & coverage wiring
 Mirror what PR #86 did for the client:
 - **`.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml`** — add a `bot-tests` job (or a
  `Run bot tests` step) that runs `npm test --prefix bot`, gating PRs into `main`.
 - **`.gitea/workflows/sonarqube.yml`** — generate a bot LCOV from the repo root so
  `SF:` paths resolve to `bot/src/...`:
  ```
  node --test --experimental-test-coverage \
    --test-reporter=lcov --test-reporter-destination=bot/coverage/lcov.info \
    bot/test/*.test.js
  ```
 - **`sonar-project.properties`** — add `bot/test` to `sonar.tests`, the glob to
  `sonar.test.inclusions`, `bot/coverage/lcov.info` to
  `sonar.javascript.lcov.reportPaths`, and `bot/coverage/**` to `sonar.exclusions`.
  (`bot/src` is already in `sonar.sources`.)
 Bot units need no `npm ci` to run when they import only relative files + Node
 built-ins; a test that stubs `global.fetch` or fakes `db` needs no `discord.js`
 either. Keep the pool pointed at a dead port so the run is hermetic.
 ## 7. Suggested phasing
 1. **Harness + pure logic** — `test` script, then `normalize`, `duration`,
   `spamFilter`. Fast, zero mocks, immediate value.
 2. **Single-collaborator units** — `inviteFilter`, `siteApiClient`,
   `requireInternalKey`.
 3. **Pipeline** — `messageFilter` decision order + actions (the payoff test).
 4. **Models with logic**, then the **CI/Sonar wiring** so it all counts.
--- a/website/website-README.md
+++ b/website/website-README.md
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ The design reference is [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) (API contract, sc
 ## Contents
 - [Architecture](#architecture)
 - [Tech stack](#tech-stack)
 - [Project structure](#project-structure)
 - [Prerequisites](#prerequisites)
@@ -38,103 +37,6 @@ The design reference is [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) (API contract, sc
 ---
 ## Architecture
 How the pieces fit together — the React SPA and native app talk to one Express backend
 (`router → controller → model → db`), which persists to MariaDB and bridges to the live
 game world only through the **uo-link** sidecar. The shard itself is never internet-facing.
 See [ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md) for the fuller write-up.
 ```mermaid
 flowchart TB
    %% ---------- Clients ----------
    subgraph clients["Clients"]
        browser["Browser<br/>React + Vite SPA<br/>(public · wiki · admin)"]
        mobile["Native mobile app<br/>(bearer tokens)"]
    end
    idp["SSO providers<br/>Google · Discord · custom OIDC"]
    discord["Discord"]
    %% ---------- Website (one repo) ----------
    subgraph website["website/ &nbsp;— Node app (one repo)"]
        direction TB
        subgraph backend["server/ — Express backend"]
            direction TB
            mw["Middleware<br/>helmet · siteMode · noindex<br/>rateLimit · loginProtection · botScore · validate"]
            router["Router /api/v1<br/>auth (web · mobile · sso) · public · admin"]
            ctrl["Controllers"]
            auth["Session layer (auth/)<br/>sessionService · JWT/cookie · bearer · SSO+PKCE"]
            model["Models (.model + .db)<br/>raw parameterized SQL — no ORM"]
            sse["SSE fan-out<br/>public stream (allowlist) · admin stream (sensitive)"]
            subgraph shardutil["Shard integration (utils/)"]
                ingest["shardIngest.js<br/>WS ingest dispatcher"]
                restcli["uoLinkClient.js<br/>REST client (never throws)"]
            end
            secret["secretBox.js<br/>AES-256-GCM secrets at rest"]
        end
        bot["bot/<br/>Discord bot"]
    end
    db[("MariaDB<br/>users · posts · wiki · settings · activity<br/>mobileSessions · authProviders · userIdentities<br/>uoLinkConfig · shard_online/economy/houses/events")]
    %% ---------- Shard side ----------
    subgraph shardside["Game shard (never internet-facing)"]
        direction TB
        sidecar["uo-link sidecar<br/>(Rust) — the only bridge exposed"]
        servuo["ServUO shard<br/>(C# plugin)"]
    end
    %% ---------- Edges ----------
    browser <-->|"same-origin JSON + SSE (cookie)"| mw
    mobile -->|"REST (bearer access/refresh)"| mw
    browser -.->|"OAuth redirect + PKCE"| idp
    auth -.->|"token exchange"| idp
    mw --> router --> ctrl
    ctrl --> auth
    ctrl --> model
    ctrl --> restcli
    ctrl --> sse
    auth --> model
    model <--> db
    auth -. reads/writes secrets .-> secret
    restcli -. reads config/token .-> secret
    ingest --> model
    ingest --> sse
    sse -->|"live events"| browser
    bot -->|"messages"| discord
    bot <--> db
    restcli -->|"REST: /char /roster /economy /history · /link/confirm · /towncrier"| sidecar
    sidecar -->|"WebSocket live event feed (bearer + X-UOLink-Version)"| ingest
    servuo -->|"loopback TCP 127.0.0.1:7788<br/>newline-delimited JSON (shard dials out)"| sidecar
    %% ---------- Styling ----------
    classDef ext fill:#2d2233,stroke:#7a5c94,color:#e8dff0;
    classDef store fill:#1f2d2a,stroke:#4c8c7d,color:#dff0ea;
    classDef bridge fill:#2d2620,stroke:#94764c,color:#f0e6d8;
    class idp,discord ext;
    class db store;
    class sidecar,servuo bridge;
 ```
 - **One backend, layered.** Every request flows `middleware → router → controller → model → db`.
  Web browsers authenticate with an httpOnly JWT cookie; the native app uses short-lived bearer
  access tokens plus rotated refresh tokens; SSO (Google/Discord/OIDC) is link-only and PKCE-guarded.
  All three surfaces produce the *same* session via the session layer.
 - **The shard is never reachable.** The ServUO shard *dials out* over loopback TCP to the uo-link
  sidecar; only the sidecar is exposed, and only the backend talks to it. The REST client
  (`uoLinkClient.js`) never throws, so the site degrades gracefully when the shard is down.
 - **Sensitive events stay private.** Ingested game events fan out to browsers over two SSE channels —
  a public allowlist stream and an admin-only stream that adds staff audit / cheat / login events.
 ---
 ## Tech stack
 | Layer | Tech |