docs: M7 push-notification backend contract + plan #20
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# Android App — Plan
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Status: **M0–M6 landed; the functional build, design pass, and release mechanics are complete (cut the v1 tag, then M7 push notifications).** This document is the
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Status: **M0–M6 landed; M7 (push notifications) Part 1 — backend + docs — in review (website#78). Remaining: cut the v1 tag, then M7 Part 2 (the app's UnifiedPush integration).** This document is the
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design contract for the `RunicGateway/Android-app` repo. It was written before implementation so the
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API changes it depends on could be landed in `website/` and `docs/` first. The authoritative API
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reference is the committed OpenAPI spec at `website/server/swagger/swagger-output.json` (regenerated
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@@ -138,6 +138,46 @@ hard reset (M3) were already in place. Biometric app-lock is **descoped from v1*
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the first `v*` release tag (once the signing secrets are set + the on-device QA pass is done) and M7
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push notifications are what remain.**
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### M7 plan — push notifications (in progress)
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M7 spans three repos, so it ships in **two parts**; the backend contract lands first because the app
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is a pure consumer of it (§8/§11).
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**Part 1 — `website/` backend + `docs/` (this pass).** Additive, v1-only (new tables/routes/compose
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service; no existing response shape changes). Decision: **no ntfy publish token** — publishes go over
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the internal compose network to unguessable per-device topics carrying **content-free tickles**
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(`{ stream, ref }`); the publisher honors an optional `NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN` if ever set but requires
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none (keeps §11's zero-interaction promise).
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- **Two event sources, one publisher.** The fan-out is a small transport-agnostic
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`utils/pushDispatch.js` that both producers call: `utils/shardIngest.js` (`ingest()`, beside the
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existing `broadcast(event)`) for shard-derived streams, and the admin create-post path for the
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`news.post` stream (§11 lists news posts as a public stream, but they originate in the website, not
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the shard feed).
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- **Stream catalog** (`config/notificationStreams.js`): public/opt-in — `news.post`,
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`server.status`, `idoc.warning`, `champ.start`, `governor.election`; personal/owner-keyed
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(require a linked game account) — `vendor.sale`, `house.idoc`, `account.login`. `mapShardEvent()`
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maps event kinds → streams, drawing public streams **only** from the SSE `PUBLIC_KINDS` allowlist;
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sensitive kinds are never fanned out publicly. Personal events are delivered only to the owning
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user's devices, resolved via `shardLinks.getByAccount` (same ownership source as `/player/shard/*`).
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- **Tables:** `push_devices` (per-device endpoint) and `notification_subscriptions` (per-user opted-in
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streams), FK → `users` ON DELETE CASCADE, mirroring `mobile_refresh_tokens`.
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- **Routes** under the role-agnostic self surface (never `/admin`): `POST|GET /auth/me/devices`,
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`DELETE /auth/me/devices/:id`, `GET /auth/me/notifications/streams` (catalog),
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`GET|PUT /auth/me/notifications/subscriptions`. All bearer/cookie auth; Swagger regenerated.
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- **SSRF guard (important):** a device `endpoint` is a client-supplied URL the backend POSTs to, so
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registration and every publish validate it is HTTPS and its origin is in the shard's ntfy
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allow-set (`NTFY_BASE_URL` / `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`), rejecting loopback/private hosts.
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- **ntfy** added to `website/docker-compose.yml` as a pinned upstream image with a committed
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declarative `./ntfy/server.yml` and named volume, **no published host port** (reached via the
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reverse proxy; internal-only for the publisher), anonymous read-write to unguessable topics (no
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per-user accounts — safe because tickles are content-free).
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**Part 2 — the Android app (next pass).** UnifiedPush distributor integration, device registration
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against `POST /auth/me/devices`, the Notifications settings screen (per-stream toggles; personal
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streams greyed until a game account is linked), notification-tap deep-links, and the notification
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channel/icon. Built against the Part-1 contract; the app is architected for push from M0 (§11) so it
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adds no data-flow change to the existing screens.
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**Prerequisite progress (§8):** all v1 prerequisites are **done** (2026-07-19) — ✅ password reset
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(item 2; website#75 + docs#8), ✅ role-agnostic `/auth/me/*` self surface (item 1; website#76 + docs#10),
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✅ version/health surfacing (item 4) and ✅ branding for mobile (item 6). **Push notifications (item 3)
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@@ -450,6 +490,11 @@ maintenance cost. Reserve v2 for a real breaking re-shape if one ever arises.
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3. **Push notifications** — see §11. Additive v1 endpoints under `/auth/me/devices*` and
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`/auth/me/notifications*`, plus a **self-hosted `ntfy` service added to `website/docker-compose.yml`**
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with fully declarative, zero-interaction config. Not required for the first release (M7, not M1–M6).
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🚧 **Backend + docs IN REVIEW (2026-07-20, RunicGateway/website#78 (+ this docs PR)).** The
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contract Part 1 is built: the two tables, the stream catalog + `PUBLIC_KINDS`-gated event mapping,
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the content-free-tickle fan-out (`utils/pushDispatch`, SSRF-guarded endpoints, owner-keyed personal
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streams), the six `/auth/me/*` routes (Swagger regenerated), and the declarative `ntfy` compose
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service. Full server suite green. The app (Part 2, §9 M7) consumes this next.
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4. **Version/health surfacing.**
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✅ **DONE (2026-07-19, RunicGateway/website#77 (+ this docs PR)).** A dependency-free
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`config/version.js` (`{ service:'runic-gateway', api:'v1', server:<pkg> }`) is surfaced on
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@@ -512,6 +557,9 @@ push, and Play (M6–M8) follow the designed app.
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`website/docker-compose.yml` (declarative, zero-interaction config), UnifiedPush integration in the
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app, device registration, the subscriptions UI, and the content-free-tickle backend fan-out (see
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§11). The app is built with room for this from M0 but it does not gate the first release.
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🚧 **Part 1 (backend + docs) in review** 2026-07-20 (`RunicGateway/website#78` + this docs PR) — see
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the "M7 plan" build-progress block above and §8 item 3. **Part 2 (the app: UnifiedPush, device
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registration, subscriptions UI, notification handling) is next.**
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9. **M8 — Google Play**: Play Console listing, signing/upload key, and (optionally) an FCM build flavor
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— after the direct-APK release is stable.
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@@ -156,6 +156,28 @@ Seeded keys: `site_mode` (default `maintenance`), `site_mode_changed_at`,
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Same "store only the hash of an opaque token" pattern as `user_invites` / `mobile_refresh_tokens`.
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A DB read never yields a usable reset link. See §4 `/auth/password/*`.
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### push_devices — opt-in push endpoints (M7)
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| col | type | notes |
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|---|---|---|
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| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
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| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | owner |
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| transport | ENUM('unifiedpush','fcm') DEFAULT 'unifiedpush' | UnifiedPush for the sideloaded APK; FCM reserved for a later Play flavor |
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| endpoint | VARCHAR(512) NOT NULL | the distributor URL the app's ntfy topic was handed (or an FCM token). Unguessable but **not a secret** — stored in the clear (unlike refresh tokens), because pushes are content-free tickles |
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| platform | VARCHAR(40) NULL | free-form label, e.g. `android` |
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| created_at / last_seen_at | DATETIME | |
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`UNIQUE(user_id, endpoint)` — re-registering the same endpoint is an idempotent upsert.
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### notification_subscriptions — which streams a user opted into (M7)
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| col | type | notes |
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|---|---|---|
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| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | |
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| stream_id | VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL | an id from the catalog (`config/notificationStreams.js`), validated on write |
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| created_at | DATETIME | |
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`PRIMARY KEY(user_id, stream_id)`. Subscriptions are per-user (applied to every device); a PUT
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replaces the whole set. Nothing is pushed unless the user subscribed.
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---
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## 4. API contract
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@@ -177,6 +199,10 @@ accepts `Authorization: Bearer` for API testing).
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| PATCH | `/me/account/password` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited) | `{newPassword, currentPassword?}` | change/set own password (current required unless the account has none); revokes other sessions, keeps the caller's |
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| POST | `/me/account/totp/setup` · `…/enable` · `…/disable` | cookie / bearer | `{code}` on enable/disable | self 2FA enrollment (disable needs a valid current code, not a password) |
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| GET | `/me/account/identities` · DELETE `…/:provider` | cookie / bearer | — | list / unlink own SSO identities |
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| POST | `/me/devices` | cookie / bearer | `{endpoint, transport?, platform?}` | register a push endpoint; **rejects a disallowed endpoint 400** (SSRF guard). Idempotent per (user, endpoint) |
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| GET | `/me/devices` · DELETE `…/:id` | cookie / bearer | — | list / unregister own push devices |
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| GET | `/me/notifications/streams` | cookie / bearer | — | the subscribable catalog (`personal`/`requiresLinkedAccount` flags) |
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| GET · PUT | `/me/notifications/subscriptions` | cookie / bearer | `{streams:[id]}` on PUT | get / replace own opted-in streams (unknown ids dropped) |
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**Role-agnostic self-service (`/auth/me/*`).** The canonical "me" surface for **every** authenticated
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role. It reuses the exact `account.controller` handlers as `/player/account/*` and `/admin/account/*`
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@@ -192,6 +218,26 @@ reset link points at the web front end (`/account/reset/:token`); the Android ap
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rather than shipping its own reset screen (docs/android/PLAN.md §4.2). First admin is bootstrapped
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by `seed.js` from env (see §6); further staff are created under `/admin/users` or via email invites.
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**Push notifications (M7, opt-in).** The app subscribes per stream (`/auth/me/notifications/*`) and
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registers device endpoints (`/auth/me/devices`); nothing is pushed unless subscribed. Delivery is a
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**content-free tickle** — `{ stream, ref }`, no sensitive data — POSTed to each subscribed device's
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self-hosted **ntfy** endpoint (`utils/pushDispatch`); the app wakes and pulls the real, ownership-
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checked content over the authenticated API. Two producers fan out through the one publisher: the shard
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ingest dispatcher (`utils/shardIngest`, beside the SSE broadcast) for shard-derived streams, and the
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create/publish-post path for `news.post`. The stream catalog + event→stream mapping is
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`config/notificationStreams.js`. Security invariants:
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- **Same public/admin split as the SSE feed.** Public streams are drawn *only* from the SSE
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`PUBLIC_KINDS` allowlist; a sensitive kind (audit/cheat/IP/login-attempt) can never produce a public
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push.
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- **Personal streams are owner-keyed.** `vendor.sale` / `house.idoc` / `account.login` are delivered
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only to the *owning* user's devices, resolved via `shardLinks` (the same ownership check as
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`/player/shard/*`).
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- **SSRF guard.** A device `endpoint` is a client-supplied URL the server POSTs to, so registration and
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every publish validate it is HTTPS, non-private/loopback, and (when configured) on the shard's ntfy
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allow-set (`NTFY_BASE_URL` / `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`).
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- ntfy is treated as an **untrusted relay** — no per-user accounts, unguessable topics; an optional
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`NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN` hardens backend→ntfy publishes but is not required. See docs/android/PLAN.md §11.
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### /public (public.routes.js → public.controller.js) — all GET, no auth
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| Method | Path | Notes |
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@@ -304,7 +350,13 @@ subsystem (`[server]`, `[http]`, `[db]`, `[auth]`, `[admin]`, `[ratelimit]`, …
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- `app`: builds the Dockerfile (installs client+server, builds Vite, serves via Express),
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`env_file: .env`, `DB_HOST=db`, `depends_on: db (healthy)`, volume `uploads:/app/uploads`,
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`ports: "3000:3000"` — **binds 0.0.0.0** (no `127.0.0.1:` prefix) so Pangolin reaches it.
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- Volumes: `dbdata`, `uploads`.
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- `ntfy` (M7): pinned upstream `binwiederhier/ntfy` image, declarative config only
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(`./ntfy/server.yml` mounted `:ro` + `NTFY_BASE_URL`), volume `ntfydata:/var/lib/ntfy`, **no
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published host port** — devices reach it via the reverse proxy; the backend publisher reaches it
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over the private compose network. Anonymous read-write to unguessable topics (no accounts to
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provision) — safe because pushes are content-free tickles. Bringing the stack up provisions a
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working push relay with **zero interactive setup**.
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- Volumes: `dbdata`, `uploads`, `ntfydata`.
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Express listens on `0.0.0.0:${PORT||3000}`. Pangolin terminates TLS and proxies to `app`.
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@@ -326,6 +378,9 @@ ADMIN_USERNAME=
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ADMIN_PASSWORD=
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# Email: configured in Admin → Settings → Email (Gmail OAuth2), not via env
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CLIENT_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5173
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# Push (M7): the ntfy relay URL — also the backend's SSRF allow-set for device
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# endpoints. NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS / NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN are optional.
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NTFY_BASE_URL=https://ntfy.example.com
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```
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`.gitignore`: `node_modules/`, `.env`, `_reference/`, `client/dist/`, `uploads/`.
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