website/EVENTS_PLAN.md

@@ -1879,9 +1879,149 @@ core, docs, then the kit's re-pin and `runicgateway.com`.
 > a refusal releases its key, with the rule that pays for it written down — *do not answer `*.error`
 > after changing the world*.
 
+> **16b CUT OVER (2026-09-09/10) — six steps, and core before the module.** The protocol pair
+> (`link#40` + `servuo-plugins#26`) is ONE step, not two: `bundle.yml`'s Gate 1 reads the protocol
+> number out of both released artefacts and refuses a pair that disagrees, so whichever lands first
+> leaves a compose that cannot run. Then core (`website#199`), the module carrying its own re-pin
+> (`Module-uo#34`), the app (`Android-app#46`), the kit's re-pin (`Integration-kit#11`), and docs.
+>
+> **Core lands before the module**, which departs from the sentence above and matches what the
+> engagement cutover actually did: `Module-uo`'s `ci/core-ref.json` has to name a website `main` sha
+> carrying MODULE_API 1.10.0, and that sha does not exist until core has landed. Four decisions, all
+> as recommended (org lead, 2026-09-09): that order; the app merges with **no `v*` tag**, so no APK
+> was cut; the re-verify walks the whole delivery path; and **`edge` stays standing** in every repo
+> rather than being deleted as the module-system cutover deleted its own.
+>
+> Releases cut: sidecar **v2.2.0**, overlay **v1.2.0**, bundle **2026.09.10 (protocol 7)**. `website`
+> never releases. `MODULE_API_VERSION` and `EVENTS.md` are untouched by this leg — the cutover moves
+> no contract.
+>
+> **`Integration-kit#10` had been merged early**, on 2026-09-08, though it was written to be held —
+> so the kit's `main` was red on `checkCoreApi` for two days. That is what step 5 closes, and it is
+> the reason the re-pin is a repair rather than only a date.
+>
+> #### The outage, and what it did not break
+>
+> Gitea was unreachable for about ten minutes in the middle of the window (Cloudflare 1033/530) and
+> killed **both** release runs. `link`'s built every binary and wrote `SHA256SUMS`, then died pushing
+> the tag: `fatal: unable to access … The requested URL returned error: 530`. `servuo-plugins`' died
+> inside `Set up job` after 11m52s with no step ever executing — which is why that job's log route
+> answers 500 while its predecessor's serves fine: **there is no log blob, and that absence is
+> evidence.** No tag was pushed either time, so the orphaned-tag failure mode did not occur, and
+> re-running both by `workflow_dispatch` published them. The first to land left the pair mismatched
+> and compose run 102 failed exactly as the PRs predicted; the second dispatched it again and 103
+> composed. `link`'s `rust-gates` reds on three earlier PRs were `curl: (6) Could not resolve host:
+> sh.rustup.rs` inside the runner — infrastructure, not code, on all four counts.
+>
+> **A job's log IS readable on this instance, through the web route rather than the API:**
+> `/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs/<n>/jobs/<j>/logs` with an API token, served as `text/plain`; step
+> statuses come from the UI's own POST endpoint with a `_csrf` cookie. Every earlier phase diagnosed
+> CI by reproducing jobs locally, on the belief that logs were unreachable. They are not, and reading
+> one is what turned four red X's into four known causes in about ten minutes.
+>
+> #### A seventh defect, red on every events PR since Phase 10
+>
+> `website`'s `server-tests` job had been failing since `#192` — eight PRs, every one reporting
+> `# fail 1`, always **the same single test**, so nothing else was ever hiding behind it. The
+> workstream merged over it eight times.
+>
+> `events/announce.js` asked `Intl.DateTimeFormat('en-GB', { …, hour12: true })`, and **that is not
+> the same request as a 12-hour clock.** For a locale whose default cycle is h23 — `en-GB` is one —
+> Node 20 resolves `hour12: true` to **`h11`**, whose hours run 0–11, so midnight renders `0:00 am`;
+> Node 22 and later resolve it to `h12` and it renders `12:00 am`. **Same ICU (78.2) on both sides**,
+> so this is V8's ECMA-402 behaviour and not locale data — no amount of matching the runner's locale
+> would have found it.
+>
+> The image ships `node:20-alpine` and CI runs Node 20, while a dev machine is newer. So the mail
+> every real recipient got said **"0:00 am"** beside a schedule editor saying "12:00 AM" — one
+> instant, two spellings, the exact contradiction that option was added to prevent — and it rendered
+> correctly in front of everyone who reviewed it. Fixed to `hourCycle: 'h12'` (`website#200`), which
+> is the form `recurrence.js` had already adopted for the mirror-image case (`h23` **rather than**
+> `hour12: false`); `announce.js` was the last `hour12` in either repo.
+>
+> **The rule: `hour12` is a request about a locale's preference, `hourCycle` is a request about the
+> clock. Ask for the clock.** And the test now says so out loud, because it can only fail on Node 20:
+> a green run on a dev machine is not evidence, and CI is what holds that line.
+>
+> #### The re-verify, from artefacts an operator would download
+>
+> This is the leg 16a could not do — a locally built bundle cannot go through core's module installer,
+> which is https-only with a host allowlist.
+>
+> | | |
+> |---|---|
+> | installer | released `v0.1.1` binary, checksum matched against the release's own `SHA256SUMS` |
+> | bundle | resolved **2026.09.10, protocol 7**; both component checksums verified by the installer |
+> | overlay sync | a **first install** into a stock 57.4 tree — `add=30 change=1 unchanged=0` |
+> | script build | `0 Warning(s) 0 Error(s)` — the released overlay compiles on a stock tree, which no release had ever been asked to prove |
+> | shard boot | `[Bridge] enabled=True … adminWrite=True … events=True`, then `connected to 127.0.0.1:7788` |
+> | sidecar | `server.hello` for **208,568 items / 42,871 mobiles**; `x-uolink-version: 7` |
+> | event plane | `lease.list.ok` (config **and** targeted property leases), `item.catalog.ok` with its bounds, `GET /world/<run>` an empty list rather than a 404 |
+> | core | released `main` on a throwaway database, `capabilities: ["events"]` on `/public/version` |
+> | one event | published, run, **`completed` / `health: ok`**, results published |
+> | the page | `/site/events` reads *"Everything scheduled, live and recently finished"* and lists a run that finished two minutes earlier |
+>
+> The last row is 16a's calendar fix holding on `main`: before it, a run that had already started or
+> finished was absent and the page rendered `entries: []`.
+>
+> **A fresh `Bridge.cfg` still ships `EventsEnabled=false` and `AdminWriteEnabled=false`** — the
+> operator's real first-boot state, and the released config confirms it rather than a working tree's.
+>
+> One thing checked and deliberately **not** reported as a defect: a **cancelled** run appears on the
+> public calendar. It is meant to. The entry carries its own `status`, and the page renders a past
+> cancelled run as **"Did not happen"** — the honest label, not a silent omission.
+>
+> **The module's own install was walked too**, once step 3 cut `Module-uo` **v1.2.1**. The module
+> arrived the way an operator's would: `POST /admin/modules` naming the release's **manifest** (not
+> its tarball — core answers a tarball with *"the install manifest is larger than 262144 bytes"*,
+> which is the size guard doing its job), core fetched the artifact over https from the allowlisted
+> host, verified its `sha256`, and mounted it on the next boot with 12 event actions and 27 triggers.
+> Then `PUT /admin/uo-link/config` with the four values the installer printed answered
+> **`status: connected`, `pluginConnected: true`, `protocol: 7`** — released core, released module,
+> released sidecar, released overlay, all four talking.
+>
+> On that rig the two Phase 16a fixes were confirmed in the shipped artefacts rather than in a working
+> tree: the atlas **imported off a stock tree** (309 decor types, 6,455 points, 800 creatures, 558
+> landmarks, 387 regions, 25 champions — the import that used to die at 313), and a world verb ran and
+> **tore down for real** — three orcs spawned, ledger `reverted` ×3, `cleanup: complete`, and the shard
+> itself answering `world.owned → owned: [], pruned: 0`. That last check is the one 16a's no-op
+> teardown hid behind. The enablement gate and the cap behaved as specified on the way past: the dry
+> run refused the action before it was enabled, then priced it `uo.creatures 3 of 10`.
+>
+> **And the leg found two more defects, both in the released bundle and neither visible to any test**
+> (`Module-uo#35`).
+>
+> **The aggregator discarded the `UniqueId`, so no Phase 12b property lease was authorable at all.**
+> All 6,455 spawn points imported with `unique_id` NULL; `listSpawners` filters
+> `unique_id IS NOT NULL`, so `uo.options.spawners` — the only source those leases have — was an empty
+> dropdown with nothing to explain itself. Every part of the path was right except one line: the files
+> carry `<UniqueId>`, `parsePoints` returns it, the column exists, the insert passes it. `buildAtlas`
+> rebuilds each point from an explicit field list and the field was not on it. **`PARSER_VERSION = 4`'s
+> own note says a point keeps its `UniqueId` and names Phase 12b as the reason** — that bump exists to
+> re-read trees for this field, and the field was dropped one function later. The intent shipped as a
+> comment. Fixing it needs `PARSER_VERSION` 5 as well, because the tree's hashes have not changed —
+> only what is kept from them — so nothing would re-read an existing install.
+>
+> **A landmark option value named 23 places at once.** 558 landmarks, 320 distinct `facet/name`:
+> `Trammel/Entrance` is Blighted Grove, Covetous, Deceit, Despise, Destard and 18 more, and
+> `landmarkPoint` resolves with `.find()`. So 22 of the 23 were unreachable and an author who picked
+> "Entrance — Destard" got Blighted Grove, with a successful run and no warning. **The group was
+> already the disambiguator** — shown in the dropdown, left out of the value. Now `facet/group/name`,
+> distinct across all 558, with the two-part read kept as a fallback because a published version is
+> immutable and those stored values are the authored record. A three-part value whose group is gone
+> refuses rather than falling back: it asked for one place.
+>
+> Both are the same failure shape as 16a's blocking defect and worth naming as a class: **an option
+> source that answers empty, or answers with a value that does not identify one thing, disables a
+> feature silently.** Nothing errors, the form simply cannot express the thing — and a test that
+> checks the parser, or the query, or the column in isolation passes throughout. The atlas fixture had
+> no `<UniqueId>` in it at all until this phase, which is why a green suite said nothing for two.
+
 **Two documents that are cutover-window work by construction.**
 - **`runicgateway.com`** — `checkFacts` reads `main`, so any claim about events is unverifiable until
-  the cutover lands. Same 12a/12b split the engagement workstream needed.
+  the cutover lands. Same 12a/12b split the engagement workstream needed. **16b landed it**, so both
+  of these are now unblocked: `main` carries the engine, the module and the app, and the bundle triple
+  the site quotes is sidecar **v2.2.0** / overlay **v1.2.0** / bundle **2026.09.10**.
 - **`.profile`** — the org landing page is updated when the *shape* of the project changes, which a new
   subsystem is.