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Adds the Rust crate at the repo root and implements `install` end to end for the overlay half of a deployment: resolve the published bundle, find and validate the ServUO root, refuse to deploy under a running shard, sync the plugin overlay, and record what was deployed in install.json. `doctor`, `update` and `uninstall` parse and answer with the phase they arrive in rather than "unrecognized command", and the run states plainly that the uo-link sidecar (Phase 2) and the patch tier (Phase 3) were not installed — `--patches` in particular reports REQUESTED BUT NOT APPLIED, since a quiet completion would be read as a patched shard. Landing on `edge` rather than `main`: release.yml publishes a binary on every push to main, and an installer that deploys the overlay but cannot install the sidecar is not something to hand an operator. pr-checks.yml now gates PRs into edge on the same rules, so the branch the work happens on is not the ungated one. Notable decisions, all documented in docs/installer/PLAN.md §5 Phase 1: - The code lives in a library called `rgdeploy` with a thin binary that keeps the published name. Windows' UAC installer detection refuses to launch an unsigned executable whose file name contains "install" (os error 740), and Cargo names test harnesses after their target — so a target under that name makes `cargo test` unrunnable on Windows. - The running-shard check matches processes by path, not by process name: on Linux a live shard is `mono`/`dotnet` with ServUO.exe as an argument, and a name match would report "not running" for a shard that is running. - install.json records a state (`deployed` / `kept-operator-modified`), not the run's verb, so an unchanged re-run produces an identical record and writes nothing. - The Bridge.cfg keep rule compares against the hash the installer last deployed, not the last hash it saw — otherwise a kept file is overwritten on the very next run. - Downloads are verified against the bundle's SHA256 while being written, then every extracted file is re-hashed against the release's own manifest.json, whose protocol and version are cross-checked against the bundle. Verified against a real ServUO 57.4 tree and end to end into a scratch tree: 24 files deployed, an unchanged re-run that writes nothing, an edited Bridge.cfg kept across repeated runs while code files are overwritten, bundle pinning, and a refusal with a shard running out of the tree. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>