Auth is now impossible to turn off by accident. A blank auth_token is never
allowed even on loopback: config load generates a token, writes it back into
sidecar.toml (preserving the rest of the file), logs it, and continues -- so a
forgotten or cleared token self-heals into a working, authenticated setup instead
of silently disabling auth.
No auth token configured.
Generated new token: cb99...
Saved to sidecar.toml. Authentication is on.
Protocol versioning (PROTOCOL_VERSION = 1) lets the website and sidecar detect a
mismatch immediately when a message shape changes. Every response carries an
X-UOLink-Version header; /health and ws.hello include "protocol"; a request that
declares a different X-UOLink-Version is rejected 409 with both versions so the
mismatch is unambiguous. Bump the constant when a contract changes.
/health is now a real troubleshooting panel: status (ok/degraded), protocol,
plugin_connected (is the shard link up), database (SELECT 1), uptime, and
last_event (the timestamp of the last line from the shard). Unauthenticated so
monitoring can reach it.
Verified: a blank token generates + persists + enforces (401 without, 200 with);
X-UOLink-Version header on every response; 409 on a declared mismatch; /health
reports degraded/plugin_connected:false with no shard, then flips to ok/true and a
populated last_event once the shard connects.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
config.rs loads all runtime settings from an external sidecar.toml (path via
$UOLINK_CONFIG), with env-var overrides (UOLINK_WEB_TOKEN, UOLINK_WEB_BIND,
UOLINK_SHARD_BIND, UOLINK_DB_PATH). Nothing is compiled into the binary. On first
run the file is generated with a random 24-byte auth token, so the sidecar is
secured out of the box and the operator just copies the token to the website.
An axum middleware rejects any request to a non-/health route that does not
present the token, as Authorization: Bearer, X-Api-Key, or ?token= (the last so
browser WebSocket clients, which cannot set handshake headers, can authenticate).
The comparison is constant-time. An empty token disables auth and is only
tolerated on a loopback bind; binding to 0.0.0.0 with no token logs a warning.
Verified: /health open (200); /history 401 without a token, 401 with a wrong one,
200 with the right one via either Bearer or X-Api-Key; an authed shard query
falls through to 503 when no shard is connected; WS rejected (401) with a bad
?token= and upgraded (101) with the right one.
sidecar.toml is gitignored (holds the secret); sidecar.toml.example is committed
as the reference.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
