14 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
82872ffba7 Merge pull request 'feat(sidecar): protocol 8 — the asset plane (Asset Bridge cutover, 1 of 5)' (#44) from edge into main
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Reviewed-on: #44
Reviewed-by: Colby Whitlock <whitlocktech@gmail.com>
2026-09-14 23:09:12 +00:00
baa04e1a76 Merge pull request 'feat(sidecar): forward the asset manifest, the pixels and the body pass (Phase 3)' (#43) from feat/asset-bridge-p3 into edge
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PR Checks / rust-gates (pull_request) Successful in 1m52s
Reviewed-on: #43
2026-09-10 23:57:55 +00:00
143f424867 feat(sidecar): forward the asset manifest, the pixels and the body pass (Phase 3)
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PR Checks / rust-gates (pull_request) Successful in 2m24s
Three routes, forwarded verbatim like everything else on this link:

  GET  /assets/manifest?family=&cursor=
  POST /assets/fetch
  POST /assets/bodies

**The two POSTs are reads.** The method is the request body, not a side
effect -- a few hundred asset keys do not belong in a query string, and these
are the only reads on this link that take one. `assets_call` is `event_call`'s
shape with one difference that matters: it responds through `respond_assets`,
so `bridge.busy` is a 425 rather than an idempotency collision. On this plane
busy is the ORDINARY answer during an import, and a caller that read it as an
error would abandon a healthy transfer.

422 gains a second meaning here alongside "the shard cannot decode that file":
the mid-import guard. A manifest reply carries a `catalog` id the shard derives
from its own client files, and passing it back on a fetch makes the shard refuse
if those files moved in between -- without which an operator patching their
client halfway through an import gets one asset set stitched out of two, with no
error anywhere.

v8.md §16 listed phase 3 as servuo-plugins + module-uo. That was wrong: web.rs
routes every command explicitly and has no generic /assets/* forwarder, so this
repo is in the phase. The doc now says so.

64 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
2026-09-10 18:40:26 -05:00
60e6de55f3 Merge pull request 'feat(sidecar): forward the cliloc table, and stop reading refusals for meaning (Phase 2)' (#42) from feat/asset-bridge-p2 into edge
Reviewed-on: #42
2026-09-10 16:20:00 +00:00
b92393d224 feat(sidecar): forward the cliloc table, and stop reading refusals for meaning (Phase 2)
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`GET /cliloc` — the first protocol-8 family that carries content rather than a
manifest. The shard decompresses its own client's table and cuts it into pages;
this forwards them and keeps none of it, which matters more here than usual: the
payload is five megabytes of EA's strings out of the operator's own client, and
the one copy that should exist is the one the website imports.

Paging is the caller's, deliberately. `?cursor=` echoes back the previous reply's
cursor until one says `more: false`; a sidecar that helpfully assembled the pages
would be holding the whole table in memory to do it. `?lang=` selects the file
and defaults on the shard.

`asset_error_status` replaces phase 1's substring test. That test chose 403 or
400 by looking for the word "disabled" in an operator-facing sentence, so
rewording the message would silently turn a refusal into a bad request. The
overlay now sends a `code`: DISABLED 403, NOT_FOUND 404 (a client without the
file — an operator fact, not a bug), UNREADABLE 422 (a file it has and cannot
decode, where repeating the request cannot help), UNAVAILABLE 503, BAD_REQUEST
400. The substring check survives as a fallback, with a test, because an overlay
and a sidecar are deployed separately and a phase-1 shard must keep its 403.

No `PROTOCOL_VERSION` change: 8 already covers this family (v8.md §14).

Verified against a live shard: 12 pages, 67,496 rows, every page inside the
512 KiB budget (max 524,086 of 524,288) and well under the 1 MiB line cap, the
whole table in 1.4 s. Concurrent callers get 425 while one is served, which is
the flow control working rather than an error.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
2026-09-10 11:13:03 -05:00
6d83df0a2c Merge pull request 'feat(sidecar): protocol 8 — the asset plane, and a bound on what the shard can send' (#41) from feat/asset-bridge-p1 into edge
Reviewed-on: #41
2026-09-10 15:04:24 +00:00
a8f1804de9 feat(sidecar): protocol 8 — the asset plane, and a bound on what the shard can send
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Asset Bridge phase 1, sidecar half (docs/link/v8.md §3.3, §14).
Shard half: RunicGateway/servuo-plugins#28. Docs half: RunicGateway/docs#236.

Three things, one of which is not additive.

## The inbound line cap (§3.3) — the one that matters

`read_line` had **no bound at all**. That was survivable only because the shard had
never had a reason to send a large line. Protocol 8 gives it one deliberately, and an
unbounded read facing a component that now sends megabytes is a memory-exhaustion
shape we would be inventing ourselves.

`MAX_INBOUND_LINE_BYTES` is **1 MiB** — symmetric with the cap `BridgeLink.cs` has
always applied to its own inbound lines, so both directions of this link now read the
same. The shard's batch budget is 512 KiB, and the factor of two is load-bearing: a
page always admits its first item even when that item alone exceeds the budget (the
alternative is an oversized item skipped for the budget on every page forever), so the
wire needs room for one overshoot.

An over-long line is **discarded and the connection kept** — `BridgeLink.cs`'s own
disposition in the other direction. Tearing the link down would take the live event
feed with it over one malformed frame, and the lost reply just times out and is
re-requested; everything on this plane is idempotent.

**`LineReader` holds its state in a struct rather than in locals, and that is the
subtle part.** This is polled inside a `tokio::select!`, so the future is dropped
whenever a command wins the race. A `discarding` flag in a local would be lost with
it — and losing it turns the tail of an over-long line into a line of its own, silently.
There is a test for exactly that, and another for an over-long line whose terminator
lands in the very chunk that crosses the cap.

## `GET /assets/sources`

Stage 1 of the import gate, forwarded verbatim like everything else. `respond_assets`
maps `bridge.busy` → **425** and a disabled plane → **403**.

425 deserves a note: on this plane it is not an idempotency collision, it is flow
control, and it is the **ordinary** answer mid-import rather than a rare one. The shard
serves one asset request at a time because its outbound queue is bounded in lines, not
bytes. A caller treating it as an error would abandon a healthy transfer.

403 for the same reason the event plane's gate is a 403: `Bridge.AssetsEnabled` off is
an operator declining to let the website read their client files, not a malformed
request, and 400 would send an administrator hunting a bug in a correct call.

## `PROTOCOL_VERSION` 7 → 8

Paired with `servuo-plugins/overlay.toml` in the linked PR — the installer refuses to
compose a bundle whose halves disagree, so a split bump fails silently at the next
release.

## Also

`docs/link/INTEGRATION.md` still advertised `X-UOLink-Version: 6`; it was already two
versions stale before this change. Fixed in the docs PR.

61 tests pass, `cargo fmt --check` and `cargo clippy -- -D warnings` clean. Verified
against the real shard: `/health` reports protocol 8, `/assets/sources` returns 200 with
`X-UOLink-Version: 8`, and live events kept flowing through the new reader with no
warnings logged.

- [x] AI-assisted — Claude Code (Opus 5)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
2026-09-10 08:32:39 -05:00
6c8a247761 Merge pull request 'feat(sidecar): protocol 7 — the Event System's command plane (Phase 16b cutover, 1 of 6)' (#40) from edge into main
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Release sidecar / release (push) Failing after 8m39s
Reviewed-on: #40
Reviewed-by: Colby Whitlock <whitlocktech@gmail.com>
2026-09-09 19:54:28 +00:00
f39dfa4f84 Merge pull request 'feat(web): the borrowed planes and the one-shots on the wire (Phase 12b)' (#39) from feature/events-p12b-borrowed-and-oneshots into edge
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Reviewed-on: #39
2026-09-07 16:23:19 +00:00
d83bb1748c feat(web): the borrowed planes and the one-shots on the wire (Phase 12b)
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The sidecar half of protocol 7 part b. `PROTOCOL_VERSION` stays 7: 12b amends 7
in place rather than bumping again, which is tolerable for the single reason 6
and 7 already are and no other -- nothing is released from `edge`.

The lease family gains a `target` rather than a family of its own. A property
lease, a seasonal toggle and a config key are one protocol with three catalogs,
so there is one deadline, one compare-and-set, one grace window and one set of
counters instead of three of each.

`GET /lease?key=&target=` narrows to one row, and a targeted key needs it.
`Spawner.MaxCount` is one capability over thousands of spawners, so it has no
single `current` and the catalog walk cannot fill one in -- while the website's
`read()` needs exactly one value for exactly one target BEFORE it applies
anything. Naming both answers that.

The frame also always carries `holds`: every lease the shard is actually holding,
whatever key or target it is on. A catalog walk can enumerate the KEYS but never
the holds on a targeted one -- there is no list of spawners to walk -- so without
it a reconcile after an outage would have no way to ask "what are you still
holding?". `inForce()` reads that.

Three new routes. `GET /items` is the shard's own grant allowlist, so the
website's dropdown offers what this shard will actually build. `POST
/items/grant` names a RUN and never a recipient list: the shard has held the
run's participation ledger since protocol 6 part b, keyed by the same character
serials the website's `member_key` holds, so sending a list would put it on the
wire twice with a window in which the two disagree. `POST /world/save` starts a
save; what actually happened rides `world.save.before`/`after`, which have been
on the stream since protocol 2.

Two status mappings are the point of the diff rather than plumbing:

A run with no ledger open is a 404 and a run whose ledger is open and empty is a
200 with `granted: 0`. "You never told me to count" and "nobody came" are
different facts, and only the first is a mistake -- an event nobody attended
still happened, and answering it as a failure would have the module retry against
a ledger that will be just as empty next time.

A save refused for coming too soon is a 429, not the 400 every other refusal on
this plane is. It is the one refusal here that the same request gets past by
waiting, so 429 says exactly that and keeps it out of the module's
permanent-status set -- which is what makes a phase boundary retried rather than
abandoned.

`cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings` and `cargo test`
all clean: 51 passed (was 49). The two new tests pin those two mappings.

Also exercised end to end against the real local ServUO 57.4 world driving this
binary's REST -- including that `/world/save` is not eaten by `/world/:run_id`
next door. See servuo-plugins for the walk.

Refs: docs/link/v7.md §11-§13

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
2026-09-07 08:07:34 -05:00
5cdd80e694 Merge pull request 'feat(web): the world verbs on the wire (protocol 7, Phase 12a)' (#38) from feature/events-p12a-world-verbs into edge
Reviewed-on: #38
2026-09-07 06:58:22 +00:00
5d909ca0a3 feat(web): the world verbs on the wire (protocol 7, Phase 12a)
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`POST /world` places, `GET /world/:runId` says what a run still owns, and
`POST /world/:runId/despawn` gives it back. One route family for five
author-facing verbs, because each of them ends in "an object exists and this run
owns it" -- the differences between a boss's multipliers, an oracle's lines and
a gate's destination are fields on one command, not five commands.

`PROTOCOL_VERSION` -> 7. The overlay's `overlay.toml` is bumped in the same
window; 12b amends 7 in place rather than bumping again, so an overlay and a
sidecar both declaring 7 are interchangeable only within one side of that merge
-- tolerable for the same single reason 6 was, and no other: nothing is released
from `edge`.

`world.owned` is a GET, unlike `participation.snapshot`: it carries no
idempotency key and the shard answers it in one pass. A run the shard has no
rows for answers with an EMPTY hand rather than a 404, and the distinction is
load-bearing for reconcile -- "owns nothing" and "never heard of it" are the
same fact once the registry is the only record of ownership, and they stay the
same fact across a restart, because the registry is written by the same world
save as the objects it describes.

Two tests pin what the world verbs depend on from `respond_event`, rather than
trusting that its reason-sniffing keeps covering a kind it predates: a ceiling
refusal is a 400 (permanent -- retrying "you asked for 80 and this shard places
30" gets the same answer forever), the event gate being off is still a 403, and
an empty owned list is a 200.

Refs: docs/link/v7.md, docs/website/EVENTS_PLAN.md Phase 12a

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
2026-09-07 01:51:51 -05:00
d38a9e8a75 Merge pull request 'feat(sidecar): carry the event plane (Phase 11b)' (#37) from feature/events-p11b-leases-participation into edge
Reviewed-on: #37
2026-09-05 04:11:11 +00:00
93411966d7 feat(sidecar): carry the event plane (Phase 11b)
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Protocol 6 amended in place, so PROTOCOL_VERSION is unchanged. Six routes and a
fourth responder; no store migration and no new machinery.

`event_call` is `admin_call` without the required `actor`: an event verb's author
is a RUN, which the body carries as `runId`, and demanding a human name for
something no human is doing would have the runner inventing one.

`respond_event` exists for two mappings the generic responder gets wrong. A
drifted lease is a 200 -- the shard was asked to compare and set, it compared,
and it declined to overwrite somebody's deliberate change, which is the mechanism
working -- and deliberately not the 409 the version gate owns, for the same
reason 425 is not. And the event plane being switched off is a 403 rather than a
reason-sniffed 400: it is an operator's deliberate refusal, and a 400 would send
an administrator hunting a bug in a step that is written correctly.

`participation.snapshot` is a POST for a read, because it carries the caller's
idempotency key and the shard may refuse it as a repeat in flight.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 19:31:31 -05:00
3 changed files with 1227 additions and 20 deletions

View File

@@ -91,7 +91,40 @@ use tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter;
/// the dumb-forwarder property again.
///
/// **No store migration.** Nothing gains a column; the new kind is persisted whole like every other.
pub const PROTOCOL_VERSION: u32 = 6;
///
/// # Protocol 8 — the Asset Bridge (docs/link/v8.md)
///
/// The shard starts sending the operator's own **client assets** over this link: the cliloc string
/// table, creature and item art, player models. The point is that an operator stops having to run
/// a GUI converter on a desktop to make their site render a bestiary, and the shard is the only
/// host that already has the client files — a ServUO server cannot boot without them.
///
/// Phase 1 is the transport, and the sidecar's share of it is three things:
///
/// * **A new command family, `assets.*`, forwarded verbatim** like every other. The first of them
/// is `assets.sources` — stage 1 of the import gate: what the client files currently are, and
/// what version of the shard's extractor would read them. No pixels cross on this call.
/// * **An inbound line cap** — [`shard::MAX_INBOUND_LINE_BYTES`]. This is the one change that is
/// not additive. `read_line` had no bound at all, which was survivable while the shard had no
/// reason to send a large line; protocol 8 gives it one deliberately, and an unbounded read
/// facing a component that now sends megabytes is a memory-exhaustion shape we would be
/// inventing ourselves.
/// * **Nothing else.** Assets ride the request/reply path, so `rpc::try_route` consumes them
/// before `app.rs` can persist them to the store and fan them out to every WebSocket
/// subscriber — which is what keeps a 512 KiB reply from being written to SQLite and broadcast
/// to every connected client. The dumb-forwarder property is doing real work here: the sidecar
/// does not know what an asset is, and must not learn.
///
/// Phase 2 adds the first family that actually carries content: **`cliloc.table`**, served at
/// `GET /cliloc`. It pages — the shard cuts at a byte budget and the caller echoes a cursor back —
/// and the sidecar forwards it without keeping any of it, which matters more here than usual: the
/// payload is five megabytes of EA's strings out of the operator's own client, and the one copy of
/// it that should exist is the one the website imports. That phase also gave `assets.error` a
/// `code`, so the status a refusal maps to stops depending on the wording of a human-facing
/// sentence (see [`web::asset_error_status`]).
///
/// **No store migration**, again: nothing on this plane is an event, so nothing is persisted.
pub const PROTOCOL_VERSION: u32 = 8;
// Not `#[tokio::main]`: on Windows the SCM dispatcher takes over this thread and starts the runtime
// itself, on its own thread, once the service actually begins. The runtime is built by whichever

View File

@@ -7,15 +7,130 @@
//! Framing is newline-delimited JSON, bidirectional: the shard sends events, we send commands. We
//! accept one shard connection at a time and re-accept when it drops (the shard reconnects on its
//! own, with a bounded backoff).
//!
//! Inbound lines are **capped** (see [`MAX_INBOUND_LINE_BYTES`]). Until protocol 8 they were not:
//! `read_line` will buffer a line of any length, which was survivable only because the shard had
//! never had a reason to send a large one. The Asset Bridge gives it one, so the gap had to close
//! before it became a memory-exhaustion shape we invented ourselves.
use std::sync::Arc;
use serde_json::Value;
use tokio::io::{AsyncBufReadExt, AsyncWriteExt, BufReader};
use tokio::io::{AsyncBufRead, AsyncBufReadExt, AsyncWriteExt, BufReader};
use tokio::net::TcpListener;
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, Mutex};
use tracing::{info, warn};
/// The longest line the sidecar will accept from the shard, in bytes.
///
/// Set above the largest legal batch rather than at it: the shard cuts a batch when the next item
/// would take it past `Bridge.AssetBatchBytes` (512 KiB), and always admits the first item of a
/// page even when that item alone is bigger than the budget — so one page can legitimately
/// overshoot by one item. Doubling the budget to get this cap is what makes that overshoot safe
/// instead of a dropped reply.
///
/// Over-long lines are **discarded, not buffered**, and the connection stays up. That is the same
/// disposition `BridgeLink.cs` has always had for its own 1 MiB inbound cap in the other
/// direction, and it is the right one here: a single malformed frame is not a reason to tear down
/// a link that live events are flowing over. The dropped reply simply times out and is
/// re-requested, which is safe because everything on the asset plane is idempotent.
pub const MAX_INBOUND_LINE_BYTES: usize = 1024 * 1024;
/// What one read off the shard socket produced.
#[derive(Debug)]
enum Line {
/// A complete line, within the cap.
Complete(String),
/// A line that ran past the cap. Carries how many bytes were thrown away, for the log.
TooLong(usize),
/// The shard closed the connection.
Eof,
}
/// A cancel-safe, capped, newline-delimited reader.
///
/// Every piece of state that must survive a partial read lives here rather than in a local,
/// because this is polled inside a `tokio::select!`: the loop below drops the future whenever a
/// command wins the race, and a `discarding` flag or a half-filled buffer held in a local would be
/// lost with it. Losing the buffer corrupts the *next* line; losing `discarding` turns the tail of
/// an over-long line into a line of its own. Both are silent.
///
/// The only await point is `fill_buf`, and nothing is consumed until after it returns, so a
/// cancellation between the two can lose at most the wakeup.
#[derive(Default)]
struct LineReader {
buf: Vec<u8>,
discarding: bool,
discarded: usize,
}
impl LineReader {
async fn next<R: AsyncBufRead + Unpin>(&mut self, reader: &mut R) -> std::io::Result<Line> {
loop {
let consumed;
let outcome;
{
let available = reader.fill_buf().await?;
if available.is_empty() {
return Ok(Line::Eof);
}
match available.iter().position(|&b| b == b'\n') {
Some(at) => {
consumed = at + 1;
if self.discarding {
// The tail of a line we already gave up on. Swallow it, terminator
// included, and report the size once.
self.discarded += at;
let total = self.discarded;
self.discarding = false;
self.discarded = 0;
outcome = Some(Line::TooLong(total));
} else if self.buf.len() + at > MAX_INBOUND_LINE_BYTES {
// The cap is reached only now, on the chunk that also holds the
// terminator — so there is nothing left to discard.
let total = self.buf.len() + at;
self.buf.clear();
outcome = Some(Line::TooLong(total));
} else {
self.buf.extend_from_slice(&available[..at]);
let line = String::from_utf8_lossy(&self.buf).into_owned();
self.buf.clear();
outcome = Some(Line::Complete(line));
}
}
None => {
consumed = available.len();
if self.discarding {
self.discarded += consumed;
} else if self.buf.len() + consumed > MAX_INBOUND_LINE_BYTES {
// Refuse rather than buffer: this is the whole point of the cap.
// Everything up to the next newline is now dropped on the floor.
self.discarded = self.buf.len() + consumed;
self.buf.clear();
self.discarding = true;
} else {
self.buf.extend_from_slice(available);
}
outcome = None;
}
}
}
reader.consume(consumed);
if let Some(line) = outcome {
return Ok(line);
}
}
}
}
/// An event line received from the shard, parsed. `kind` is lifted out for routing.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ShardEvent {
@@ -112,16 +227,25 @@ async fn handle_connection(
handle.set(Some(cmd_tx)).await;
let mut reader = BufReader::new(read_half);
let mut line = String::new();
let mut lines = LineReader::default();
loop {
tokio::select! {
// Inbound: a line from the shard.
result = reader.read_line(&mut line) => {
let n = result?;
if n == 0 {
return Ok(()); // clean EOF: shard closed
result = lines.next(&mut reader) => {
match result? {
Line::Eof => return Ok(()), // clean EOF: shard closed
Line::TooLong(bytes) => {
// Deliberately not a disconnect. See MAX_INBOUND_LINE_BYTES: a reply lost
// this way times out on the caller's side and is re-requested, and tearing
// the link down would take the live event feed with it.
warn!(
bytes,
cap = MAX_INBOUND_LINE_BYTES,
"inbound line over the cap; discarded"
);
}
Line::Complete(line) => {
let trimmed = line.trim_end();
if !trimmed.is_empty() {
match serde_json::from_str::<Value>(trimmed) {
@@ -136,7 +260,8 @@ async fn handle_connection(
Err(e) => warn!(error = %e, line = %trimmed, "unparseable event"),
}
}
line.clear();
}
}
}
// Outbound: a command to write to the shard.
cmd = cmd_rx.recv() => {
@@ -152,3 +277,108 @@ async fn handle_connection(
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// Drives `LineReader` over a byte slice, returning every outcome up to EOF.
async fn read_all(input: &[u8]) -> Vec<Line> {
let mut reader = BufReader::with_capacity(64, input);
let mut lines = LineReader::default();
let mut out = Vec::new();
loop {
match lines.next(&mut reader).await.unwrap() {
Line::Eof => break,
other => out.push(other),
}
}
out
}
fn complete(lines: &[Line]) -> Vec<&str> {
lines
.iter()
.filter_map(|l| match l {
Line::Complete(s) => Some(s.as_str()),
_ => None,
})
.collect()
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn splits_on_newlines() {
let lines = read_all(b"{\"a\":1}\n{\"b\":2}\n").await;
assert_eq!(complete(&lines), vec!["{\"a\":1}", "{\"b\":2}"]);
}
/// The reader's buffer is 64 bytes here, so every one of these lines spans several
/// `fill_buf` chunks. Reassembly across chunks is the thing `read_line` did for us.
#[tokio::test]
async fn reassembles_across_chunks() {
let long = "x".repeat(500);
let input = format!("{}\n{}\n", long, long);
let lines = read_all(input.as_bytes()).await;
assert_eq!(complete(&lines), vec![long.as_str(), long.as_str()]);
}
/// The cap itself. The over-long line must be reported and thrown away, and — the part that
/// actually matters — the line *after* it must still arrive intact. A reader that lost its
/// `discarding` flag would emit the tail of the oversized line as a line of its own.
#[tokio::test]
async fn refuses_an_over_long_line_and_recovers() {
let mut input = Vec::new();
input.extend_from_slice(&b"a".repeat(MAX_INBOUND_LINE_BYTES + 10));
input.push(b'\n');
input.extend_from_slice(b"{\"kind\":\"pong\"}\n");
let lines = read_all(&input).await;
assert_eq!(lines.len(), 2);
assert!(
matches!(lines[0], Line::TooLong(n) if n >= MAX_INBOUND_LINE_BYTES),
"expected TooLong, got {:?}",
lines[0]
);
assert_eq!(complete(&lines), vec!["{\"kind\":\"pong\"}"]);
}
/// A line of exactly the cap is legal; one byte more is not. Checking both sides is what says
/// the comparison is `>` rather than `>=`, which would silently cost a byte of the budget.
#[tokio::test]
async fn the_cap_is_inclusive() {
let at_cap = "b".repeat(MAX_INBOUND_LINE_BYTES);
let lines = read_all(format!("{}\n", at_cap).as_bytes()).await;
assert_eq!(complete(&lines).len(), 1);
let over = "b".repeat(MAX_INBOUND_LINE_BYTES + 1);
let lines = read_all(format!("{}\n", over).as_bytes()).await;
assert!(complete(&lines).is_empty());
assert!(matches!(lines[0], Line::TooLong(_)));
}
/// An over-long line whose terminator lands in the very chunk that crosses the cap: the
/// reader must not leave itself in `discarding` and eat the next line as well.
#[tokio::test]
async fn over_long_line_terminating_in_the_crossing_chunk() {
let mut input = Vec::new();
input.extend_from_slice(&b"c".repeat(MAX_INBOUND_LINE_BYTES + 1));
input.extend_from_slice(b"\n{\"kind\":\"pong\"}\n");
let lines = read_all(&input).await;
assert!(matches!(lines[0], Line::TooLong(_)));
assert_eq!(complete(&lines), vec!["{\"kind\":\"pong\"}"]);
}
/// A partial line at EOF is dropped rather than delivered half-parsed. The shard reconnects
/// and re-sends; half a JSON object is not something to hand to the event fan-out.
#[tokio::test]
async fn trailing_partial_line_at_eof_is_dropped() {
let lines = read_all(b"{\"a\":1}\n{\"b\":").await;
assert_eq!(complete(&lines), vec!["{\"a\":1}"]);
}
}

View File

@@ -72,6 +72,41 @@ pub async fn serve(addr: &str, state: AppState) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
.route("/admin/ban", post(admin_ban))
.route("/admin/unban", post(admin_unban))
.route("/admin/broadcast", post(admin_broadcast))
// The event plane (protocol 6, EVENTS_PLAN.md Phase 11b). Leases are a live config value
// the website holds for a bounded time; the shard restores baseline when the deadline
// passes whether or not anyone asks it to. GET lists the whole catalog with current values,
// which is the one read both `read()` and `inForce()` on the website's side are served by.
.route("/lease", get(lease_list).post(lease_apply))
.route("/lease/release", post(lease_release))
// The run-scoped participation ledger. `snapshot` is a POST despite being a read: it
// carries the caller's `idempotencyKey`, and on a well-attended run the shard walks its
// members across ticks rather than in one inbound call -- so a repeat arriving mid-walk is
// answered `bridge.busy`, and a read that can be refused as a repeat is not a GET.
.route("/participation", post(participation_open))
.route(
"/participation/:run_id/snapshot",
post(participation_snapshot),
)
.route("/participation/:run_id/close", post(participation_close))
// The world verbs (protocol 7, EVENTS_PLAN.md Phase 12a). Five things an event author
// can place -- creatures, an enhanced "boss", an oracle NPC, a temporary gate,
// decoration -- and ONE command family, because each of them ends in "an object exists
// and this run owns it". POST places, GET says what the run still owns, POST .../despawn
// gives it back. Ownership is held on the shard, so despawn cannot be pointed at a serial
// the run did not create.
.route("/world", post(world_spawn))
.route("/world/:run_id", get(world_owned))
.route("/world/:run_id/despawn", post(world_despawn))
// The one-shots (protocol 7 part b, EVENTS_PLAN.md Phase 12b). Neither owned nor
// borrowed: an item put into somebody's hands, and a world save. Both are `done is
// done`, which is why they are not in the world family -- there is nothing to give
// back and no ledger row core would come back for.
//
// `GET /items` is the shard's own grant allowlist, so the website's dropdown offers
// what this shard will actually build rather than what a module guessed.
.route("/items", get(item_catalog))
.route("/items/grant", post(item_grant))
.route("/world/save", post(world_save))
// Help-page (support) queue: snapshot the open queue, respond to / close a page.
.route("/pages", get(pages_list))
.route("/pages/:id/respond", post(page_respond))
@@ -100,6 +135,28 @@ pub async fn serve(addr: &str, state: AppState) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
// readability trap nobody wins. The only PAGED read the sidecar serves — a whole-world
// market does not fit in one response.
.route("/market", get(market))
// The Asset Bridge (Protocol 8). Stage 1 of the two-stage import gate: what the shard's
// UO client files currently are. RPC, never store-backed — unlike the boards above there
// is nothing here worth serving stale, because the only question this answers is "have
// the files on that host changed since the last import", and a cached answer to that is
// worse than no answer.
.route("/assets/sources", get(assets_sources))
// Stage 2 (phase 3): what the shard could serve, hashed but without the pixels, so the
// website can ask only for what changed. Paged.
.route("/assets/manifest", get(assets_manifest))
// The pixels, for an explicit list of keys. POST rather than GET because the list is the
// request -- a few hundred keys do not belong in a query string, and this is the one place
// on this link where a read takes a body.
.route("/assets/fetch", post(assets_fetch))
// Slug -> body id. The one asset-plane call the shard answers ON ITS CORE THREAD, because
// it resolves a class name by constructing the creature and reading its body; the sidecar
// neither knows nor cares, which is the point of forwarding verbatim.
.route("/assets/bodies", post(assets_bodies))
// The cliloc table (Protocol 8, phase 2): UO's id -> display-string map, read out of the
// shard's own client and paged. RPC for the same reason as the source gate, and one more:
// it is five megabytes of somebody else's copyrighted strings, which this process has no
// business holding a copy of. It forwards them and forgets them.
.route("/cliloc", get(cliloc_table))
.route_layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(state.clone(), gate));
let app = Router::new()
@@ -337,6 +394,70 @@ fn respond_admin(result: Result<Value, RpcError>) -> (StatusCode, Json<Value>) {
}
}
/// Like `respond`, but for the event plane: leases and the participation ledger.
///
/// Two mappings are the point of it existing rather than reusing `respond`.
///
/// **`lease.drifted` is a 200.** The shard was asked to compare and set, it compared, and it
/// refused to overwrite somebody's deliberate change -- that is the mechanism working, not a
/// failure, and `cleanup.js` on the website treats `drifted` as a distinct successful outcome
/// rather than an error. It is also why this is not a 409: 409 is the protocol-version gate's, and
/// a version mismatch and a drifted lease want opposite dispositions from a caller. The same
/// argument protocol 6 made for `bridge.busy` being a 425.
///
/// **The event plane being switched off is a 403**, not the 400 the generic responder's
/// reason-sniffing would produce. `Bridge.EventsEnabled` is an operator's deliberate refusal to let
/// the website change the world on a schedule, and telling the website it sent a bad request would
/// send an administrator hunting a bug in a step that is written correctly.
fn respond_event(result: Result<Value, RpcError>) -> (StatusCode, Json<Value>) {
match result {
Ok(value) => {
let kind = value.get("kind").and_then(|k| k.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if kind == BUSY_KIND {
(BUSY_STATUS, Json(value))
} else if kind.ends_with(".error") {
let reason = value
.get("reason")
.and_then(|r| r.as_str())
.unwrap_or("request rejected");
let code = if reason.contains("disabled") {
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN
} else if reason.contains("no lease is offered")
|| reason.contains("not counting")
// Phase 12b. A grant against a run this shard has never been told to count
// is the same shape as an unknown lease key: the caller named something that
// does not exist here, which is a 404 and never a retry. It is deliberately
// NOT the same as a run whose ledger is open and empty -- that is a 200 with
// `granted: 0`, because "nobody came" is a result rather than a mistake.
|| reason.contains("no participation ledger")
{
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND
} else if reason.contains("saves at most every") {
// A save refused because one just happened is the shard's rate limit, and it
// is TRANSIENT in a way nothing else on this plane is: the same request will
// succeed once the interval passes. 429 says exactly that, and keeps it out of
// the module's permanent-status set so a phase boundary is retried rather than
// abandoned.
StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS
} else {
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
};
(code, Json(value))
} else {
(StatusCode::OK, Json(value))
}
}
Err(RpcError::NoShard) => (
StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
Json(json!({"error": "shard not connected"})),
),
Err(RpcError::Timeout) => (
StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT,
Json(json!({"error": "shard did not reply in time"})),
),
}
}
/// Like `respond`, but for the account-provisioning plane. Maps an `account.error` reply to a
/// status by its reason: a name clash is a 409, the per-IP cap is a 429, a disabled/protected/
/// refused action is a 403, an unknown target or "not linked" is a 404, anything else a 400.
@@ -536,6 +657,241 @@ async fn admin_broadcast(State(st): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<Value>) ->
admin_call(&st, "admin.broadcast", body).await
}
// ---- event plane handlers (protocol 6, Phase 11b) ----
/// Forwards an event-plane command to the shard, correlated on a fresh reqId.
///
/// Deliberately NOT `admin_call`: that one requires an `actor`, because every verb behind it is a
/// staff member pressing a button and the shard's audit trail has to name them. An event verb's
/// author is a RUN, which the body already carries as `runId` -- and demanding an actor here would
/// have the runner inventing a human name for something no human is doing.
///
/// Everything else about it is the same, and the `idempotencyKey` passthrough matters for the same
/// reason it does there: the key is one of the body's remaining fields, and a refactor that
/// narrowed this to a known field list would silently make every retried lease a possible duplicate.
async fn event_call(st: &AppState, kind: &str, body: Value) -> (StatusCode, Json<Value>) {
let mut obj = match body {
Value::Object(m) => m,
Value::Null => serde_json::Map::new(),
_ => {
return (
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
Json(json!({"error": "body must be a JSON object"})),
)
}
};
let req_id = st.rpc.next_req_id();
obj.insert("kind".to_string(), json!(kind));
obj.insert("reqId".to_string(), json!(req_id));
respond_event(st.rpc.call(&st.shard, Value::Object(obj), &req_id).await)
}
/// Every lease this shard offers, with what each is worth right now and what is holding it.
///
/// One read answers both questions the website asks about a lease: `read()` wants the current value
/// before it applies anything, and `inForce()` wants to know whether the shard still has a record
/// of the hold. Splitting them would be two round trips for one key.
///
/// **`held` means "the shard still has a record of this lease", not "the value is still
/// overridden".** A lease whose deadline has already fired stays listed, with `expired: true`,
/// until teardown collects its verdict -- otherwise a reconcile in that window would report it gone
/// and the website would write off a correctly-working backstop as an orphaned resource.
/// **`?key=` and `?target=` narrow it to one row, and a targeted key needs them** (protocol 7 part
/// b). `Spawner.MaxCount` is one capability over thousands of spawners, so it has no single
/// "current" and the catalog walk cannot fill one in -- while the website's `read()` needs exactly
/// one value for exactly one target before it applies anything. Naming both answers that.
///
/// The frame also carries `holds`: every lease this shard is actually holding, whatever key or
/// target it is on. A catalog walk can enumerate the KEYS but never the holds on a targeted one --
/// there is no list of spawners to walk -- so without it a reconcile after an outage would have no
/// way to ask "what are you still holding?".
async fn lease_list(State(st): State<AppState>, Query(q): Query<LeaseQuery>) -> impl IntoResponse {
let mut body = serde_json::Map::new();
if let Some(key) = q.key {
body.insert("key".to_string(), json!(key));
}
if let Some(target) = q.target {
body.insert("target".to_string(), json!(target));
}
let arg = if body.is_empty() {
Value::Null
} else {
Value::Object(body)
};
event_call(&st, "lease.list", arg).await
}
/// Narrowing for `GET /lease`. Both optional: absent means the whole catalog, as before.
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct LeaseQuery {
key: Option<String>,
target: Option<String>,
}
/// Body: {"key":"...","value":"...","holdMs":<ms>,"untilMs":<opt>,"runId":<opt>,"idempotencyKey":<opt>}.
///
/// **`holdMs` is authoritative and `untilMs` is carried for display.** An absolute deadline computed
/// on the website and honoured on the shard is a deadline measured against two clocks, and a shard
/// running ten minutes fast would restore a ten-minute lease the moment it took it. A duration is
/// immune to that; the absolute time is still worth sending so a console can say when the hold ends.
///
/// Values cross as TEXT whatever the lease's declared type, because JSON would otherwise decide for
/// us: `1200` and `1200.0` are one number to a parser and two strings to a compare-and-set.
async fn lease_apply(State(st): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<Value>) -> impl IntoResponse {
event_call(&st, "lease.apply", body).await
}
/// Body: {"key":"...","expected":"...","baseline":"...","idempotencyKey":<opt>}.
///
/// `expected` is what the event applied and `baseline` is what to put back, both out of the
/// website's ledger rather than the shard's memory -- so a release still works after a reconnect,
/// and a shard that has forgotten the lease entirely (a restart, which reverts every lease anyway)
/// can answer honestly instead of refusing.
///
/// A mismatch comes back `lease.drifted` with a **200**: see `respond_event`.
async fn lease_release(State(st): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<Value>) -> impl IntoResponse {
event_call(&st, "lease.release", body).await
}
/// Body: {"runId":"...","map":"Felucca","x":N,"y":N,"radius":N,"holdMs":<opt>}.
///
/// Declares where a run happens and starts counting who is there. The area is a map, a point and a
/// radius rather than a region name, because protocol 6's own live walk established that the most
/// specific region containing an event is routinely anonymous.
async fn participation_open(
State(st): State<AppState>,
Json(body): Json<Value>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
event_call(&st, "participation.open", body).await
}
/// Body: {"idempotencyKey":<opt>}. Answers the run's tally, best-effort resolved to accounts.
///
/// A POST for a read, and the reason is worth keeping: on a well-attended run the shard walks its
/// members in chunks across Core ticks rather than handing the whole resolve to one inbound call,
/// so the handler completes after its call returned and a repeat arriving in between is answered
/// `bridge.busy`. A read that can legitimately be refused as a repeat in flight is not a GET.
async fn participation_snapshot(
State(st): State<AppState>,
Path(run_id): Path<String>,
Json(body): Json<Value>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let mut obj = match body {
Value::Object(m) => m,
_ => serde_json::Map::new(),
};
obj.insert("runId".to_string(), json!(run_id));
event_call(&st, "participation.snapshot", Value::Object(obj)).await
}
/// Body: {"idempotencyKey":<opt>}. Stops counting; the tally stays readable through the shard's
/// grace window, because closing an event and collecting its results are two steps and either can
/// be retried.
async fn participation_close(
State(st): State<AppState>,
Path(run_id): Path<String>,
Json(body): Json<Value>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let mut obj = match body {
Value::Object(m) => m,
_ => serde_json::Map::new(),
};
obj.insert("runId".to_string(), json!(run_id));
event_call(&st, "participation.close", Value::Object(obj)).await
}
/// Body: {"runId":"...","what":"creature|boss|npc|gate|decor","map":"...","x":N,"y":N,...}.
///
/// One route for five author-facing verbs. The `what` discriminator is a wire detail: the
/// differences between them -- a boss's multipliers, an oracle's lines, a gate's destination and
/// `holdMs` -- are fields on one command rather than five commands, so there is one ledger shape,
/// one teardown path and one reconcile instead of five near-identical ones in three repos.
///
/// The shard registers every serial it places against the run and PERSISTS that registry beside
/// the world save, which is what makes `world_despawn` below safe: a spawned creature survives a
/// restart, so an in-memory registry would leave the website holding serials the shard would not
/// vouch for.
async fn world_spawn(State(st): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<Value>) -> impl IntoResponse {
event_call(&st, "world.spawn", body).await
}
/// What the run still owns, and the answer the website's `reconcile()` is built on.
///
/// A GET, unlike `participation_snapshot`: it carries no idempotency key and the shard answers it
/// in one pass, pruning rows whose object the world has already lost as it walks. Anything not
/// listed is gone -- which is the shape core wants, because it takes a row out of its ledger only
/// on an explicit reply and this is that reply.
async fn world_owned(State(st): State<AppState>, Path(run_id): Path<String>) -> impl IntoResponse {
event_call(&st, "world.owned", json!({ "runId": run_id })).await
}
/// Body: {"serials":[...]} -- or no serials at all, which means everything the run owns and is the
/// call teardown actually makes.
///
/// Three answers, and the split is why the shard keeps a registry at all. `removed` was found and
/// deleted; `gone` was owned but already absent, which is what happens when a player kills an event
/// creature and is a SUCCESS; `refused` was never this run's to delete, and is the only answer here
/// that means somebody asked for something they should not have.
async fn world_despawn(
State(st): State<AppState>,
Path(run_id): Path<String>,
Json(body): Json<Value>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let mut obj = match body {
Value::Object(m) => m,
_ => serde_json::Map::new(),
};
obj.insert("runId".to_string(), json!(run_id));
event_call(&st, "world.despawn", Value::Object(obj)).await
}
// ---- the one-shots (protocol 7 part b) ----
/// What this shard is willing to grant, and the bounds it will grant within.
///
/// A read, so the website's option source offers what this shard will actually build. The module
/// holds the same list, which is two copies of a short allowlist on purpose and exactly how the
/// lease bounds are already carried: the module's copy is what makes a bad value a refusal on a
/// form, and this one is what is true when the website is wrong.
async fn item_catalog(State(st): State<AppState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
event_call(&st, "item.catalog", Value::Null).await
}
/// Body: {"runId":"...","item":"gold","amount":N,"hue":<opt>,"name":<opt>,"where":<opt>,"idempotencyKey":<opt>}.
///
/// **The recipients are not in the body, and that is the design.** The shard already holds the
/// run's participation ledger (protocol 6 part b), keyed by the same character serials the
/// website's `member_key` holds, so the grant names a run and the shard resolves who was there.
/// Sending a list would mean the same list crossing the wire twice with a window in which the two
/// disagree -- and it would have needed a core surface handing a module core's own participants.
///
/// A run with no ledger open is a 404, not an empty success: "nobody came" and "you never told me
/// to count" are different facts, and only the first is a result a run should record.
///
/// **Retryable, and protocol 6 is why.** `EVENTS.md` §G called a grant un-retryable because a lost
/// acknowledgement and a grant that never applied looked the same -- exactly the argument that made
/// `uo.broadcast` answer `retry: false` in Phase 9. An `idempotencyKey` closes that: a repeat is
/// answered by the original reply, so a retried grant cannot be one winner receiving two.
async fn item_grant(State(st): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<Value>) -> impl IntoResponse {
event_call(&st, "item.grant", body).await
}
/// Body: {"idempotencyKey":<opt>}. Starts a world save, useful as a phase boundary.
///
/// The reply says the save was STARTED and nothing more. What actually happened rides
/// `world.save.before` / `world.save.after`, which have been on the event stream since protocol 2 --
/// so this route asserts nothing it cannot know, and a caller that needs the completion watches the
/// stream it is already connected to.
///
/// **A save too soon after the last one is refused, not queued**, and the shard counts ServUO's own
/// autosave as the last one. A save stops the world; a queued one would land at a moment nobody
/// chose, in the middle of whatever the next step is doing.
async fn world_save(State(st): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<Value>) -> impl IntoResponse {
event_call(&st, "world.save", body).await
}
// ---- help-page queue handlers ----
/// The open help-page queue, correlated on reqId. Returns a pages.list.
@@ -962,6 +1318,243 @@ async fn market(State(st): State<AppState>, Query(q): Query<PageQuery>) -> impl
}
}
// ---- the Asset Bridge (Protocol 8) ----
/// Stage 1 of the import gate: the shard's UO client files as they are right now — size, mtime and
/// content hash — plus the version of the extractor that would read them, and whether this host
/// can render an image at all.
///
/// The website diffs this against what it last imported and, in the overwhelmingly common case
/// that nothing changed, stops. That is the whole reason stage 1 exists separately from the asset
/// manifest: the normal case is a restart that changed nothing, and it has to cost nothing.
///
/// Forwarded verbatim, like everything else on this link. The sidecar does not know what a cliloc
/// or an anim file is, does not cache this, and has no opinion about what the website does with
/// the answer — the same dumb-forwarder property that keeps access control on the website where it
/// belongs.
async fn assets_sources(State(st): State<AppState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
let req_id = st.rpc.next_req_id();
let cmd = json!({"kind": "assets.sources", "reqId": req_id});
respond_assets(st.rpc.call(&st.shard, cmd, &req_id).await)
}
/// Maps an asset-plane reply to a status.
///
/// Two of these matter more than the rest and neither is the generic responder's answer:
///
/// **`bridge.busy` is a 425**, as everywhere else. On this plane it is not an idempotency
/// collision, it is flow control: the shard serves one asset request at a time on purpose, because
/// its outbound queue is bounded in *lines* and a queue of large replies is how the shard runs out
/// of memory. So it means "come back", it is entirely expected during an import, and a caller that
/// treated it as an error would abandon a perfectly healthy transfer.
///
/// **The plane being switched off is a 403.** `Bridge.AssetsEnabled` is an operator declining to
/// let the website read their client files off this host — a deliberate refusal, not a malformed
/// request — and answering 400 would send an administrator hunting a bug in a call that is written
/// correctly. Same argument the event plane's gate made in protocol 7.
fn respond_assets(result: Result<Value, RpcError>) -> (StatusCode, Json<Value>) {
match result {
Ok(value) => {
let kind = value.get("kind").and_then(|k| k.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if kind == BUSY_KIND {
(BUSY_STATUS, Json(value))
} else if kind == "assets.error" {
(asset_error_status(&value), Json(value))
} else {
(StatusCode::OK, Json(value))
}
}
Err(RpcError::NoShard) => (
StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
Json(json!({"error": "shard not connected"})),
),
Err(RpcError::Timeout) => (
StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT,
Json(json!({"error": "shard did not reply in time"})),
),
}
}
/// The status behind one `assets.error`.
///
/// Phase 2 gave the frame a `code`, and the reason is worth stating: phase 1 decided between 403
/// and 400 by looking for the word "disabled" **in the operator-facing sentence**. That works
/// until someone improves the wording, at which point a refusal quietly becomes a bad request and
/// an administrator goes hunting for a bug in a correctly-written call. The sentence is for a
/// human; the code is for this function.
///
/// The substring check survives as a fallback because an overlay is deployed independently of the
/// sidecar: a phase-1 shard paired with a phase-2 sidecar still sends the codeless frame, and it
/// must keep getting its 403.
fn asset_error_status(value: &Value) -> StatusCode {
match value.get("code").and_then(|c| c.as_str()) {
Some("DISABLED") => return StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
// The shard has no such file. Not the caller's mistake and not a broken shard -- a client
// that does not carry what was asked for, which the website reports to its operator.
Some("NOT_FOUND") => return StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
// It has the file and cannot decode it: truncated, hand-edited, or not what it claims to
// be. 422 rather than 400, because the request was fine and repeating it will not help.
Some("UNREADABLE") => return StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
// The shard cannot do this right now (it could not start its asset worker, say). Same
// status as "no shard connected", because it means the same thing to a caller: come back.
Some("UNAVAILABLE") => return StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
Some("BAD_REQUEST") => return StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
_ => {}
}
let reason = value
.get("reason")
.and_then(|r| r.as_str())
.unwrap_or("request rejected");
if reason.contains("disabled") {
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN
} else {
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
}
}
/// The cliloc table, as the shard's own client holds it (docs/link/v8.md §9).
///
/// Until protocol 8 this table reached the website by hand: the operator installed UOFiddler,
/// built a converter against its `Ultima.dll`, ran it over their client's compressed `Cliloc.enu`
/// and copied the result to the web host. The shard could not help, because ServUO's bundled
/// `Ultima.StringList` cannot read a modern client's file either. Phase 2 put the decompressor in
/// the overlay, so the shard reads its own client and the operator installs nothing.
///
/// **Paged, and the caller drives the paging** -- `?cursor=` echoes back whatever the previous
/// reply's `cursor` was, until a reply says `more: false`. The pages are cut by byte budget on the
/// shard (512 KiB against the 1 MiB inbound line cap), so a stock English table arrives in about
/// eleven of them. The sidecar keeps none of it: it has no opinion about what a cliloc is, and a
/// cached copy of five megabytes of EA's strings is exactly what this process should not hold.
///
/// `?lang=` selects the file; it defaults to `enu` on the shard and the shard refuses anything its
/// `Ultima.Files` cannot resolve, which is a 404 rather than a 400.
async fn cliloc_table(
State(st): State<AppState>,
Query(q): Query<ClilocQuery>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let req_id = st.rpc.next_req_id();
let mut cmd = json!({"kind": "cliloc.table", "reqId": req_id});
if let Some(lang) = q.lang.as_deref().filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
cmd["lang"] = json!(lang);
}
if let Some(cursor) = q.cursor.as_deref().filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
cmd["cursor"] = json!(cursor);
}
respond_assets(st.rpc.call(&st.shard, cmd, &req_id).await)
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct ClilocQuery {
lang: Option<String>,
cursor: Option<String>,
}
/// Stage 2 of the import gate (docs/link/v8.md §6, phase 3): every asset the shard could serve,
/// with a hash and a size and **no pixels**.
///
/// That separation is the whole difference between an Update and a re-download. The website holds
/// the hashes from last time, diffs this against them and asks `/assets/fetch` only for the keys
/// that moved — which, on the normal restart-that-changed-nothing, is none of them.
///
/// **Paged, and the caller drives the paging**, same envelope as `/cliloc`: echo the previous
/// reply's `cursor` until one says `more: false`, and read `cut` to learn *why* a page was the
/// last — only `end` means the manifest is complete. This family pages on the shard's wall clock
/// rather than on bytes, because its rows are tiny and building them means decoding hundreds of
/// sprites, so expect several pages of a few hundred rows each.
///
/// `?family=` selects which asset family; phase 3 serves `body` and the shard refuses anything
/// else by name rather than substituting a default.
async fn assets_manifest(
State(st): State<AppState>,
Query(q): Query<ManifestQuery>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let req_id = st.rpc.next_req_id();
let mut cmd = json!({"kind": "assets.manifest", "reqId": req_id});
if let Some(family) = q.family.as_deref().filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
cmd["family"] = json!(family);
}
if let Some(cursor) = q.cursor.as_deref().filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
cmd["cursor"] = json!(cursor);
}
respond_assets(st.rpc.call(&st.shard, cmd, &req_id).await)
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct ManifestQuery {
family: Option<String>,
cursor: Option<String>,
}
/// The bytes, for keys the caller names: `{"keys":[…],"catalog":<opt>,"cursor":<opt>}`.
///
/// Each row carries the sprite as base64 PNG. The shard encodes it, and that is deliberate rather
/// than incidental: `System.Drawing` is already in its *decode* path (docs/link/v8.md §4.2), so
/// PNG costs it no new dependency, while asking the website to encode would put an image encoder
/// in Node and make the manifest's hash cover bytes nobody ever stores.
///
/// **`catalog` is the mid-import guard.** A manifest reply carries a `catalog` id derived from the
/// client files themselves; passing it back here makes the shard refuse (422) if those files moved
/// in between. Without it an operator who patched their client halfway through an import would get
/// one asset set stitched out of two, with no error anywhere.
///
/// A key the shard cannot serve comes back as a **row** with a `status`, not as a failed request —
/// a body this client has no art for is the expected answer for two thirds of the player bodies,
/// and failing the whole page over one would make an import impossible on a stock client.
async fn assets_fetch(State(st): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<Value>) -> impl IntoResponse {
assets_call(&st, "assets.fetch", body).await
}
/// Slug → body id: `{"types":["GiantSpider", …]}` (docs/link/v8.md §8, phase 3).
///
/// The spawn atlas knows a creature by the class name in `Spawns/*.xml`; the client knows it by a
/// body id; nothing in the ServUO tree declares the mapping as data. Only code running *inside*
/// ServUO can answer it — construct the type, read `Body.BodyID`, delete it — which is why this is
/// a request kind of its own rather than a step inside asset extraction: it runs on the shard's
/// Core thread, while every decode on this plane runs off it.
///
/// **The shard caps the batch and refuses rather than truncates** a longer list, because every
/// name in it costs a real constructor between two ticks of the world. Chunk the list; a 400 here
/// names the cap.
async fn assets_bodies(State(st): State<AppState>, Json(body): Json<Value>) -> impl IntoResponse {
assets_call(&st, "assets.bodies", body).await
}
/// `event_call`'s shape for the asset plane: take the caller's object verbatim, stamp `kind` and
/// `reqId` on it, and map the reply through `respond_assets` rather than `respond_event`.
///
/// The two differ in exactly one way that matters, and it is the reason this is not `event_call`
/// with a different string: `bridge.busy` is a **425** here, and it is the ordinary answer during
/// an import rather than a rare collision. The shard serves one asset request at a time on purpose,
/// so a caller that read busy as an error would abandon a healthy transfer.
async fn assets_call(st: &AppState, kind: &str, body: Value) -> (StatusCode, Json<Value>) {
let mut obj = match body {
Value::Object(m) => m,
Value::Null => serde_json::Map::new(),
_ => {
return (
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
Json(json!({"error": "body must be a JSON object"})),
)
}
};
let req_id = st.rpc.next_req_id();
obj.insert("kind".to_string(), json!(kind));
obj.insert("reqId".to_string(), json!(req_id));
respond_assets(st.rpc.call(&st.shard, Value::Object(obj), &req_id).await)
}
// ---- websocket ----
async fn ws_upgrade(ws: WebSocketUpgrade, State(state): State<AppState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
@@ -1031,6 +1624,357 @@ mod tests {
respond_account(reply("bridge.busy")).0,
StatusCode::TOO_EARLY
);
assert_eq!(respond_event(reply("bridge.busy")).0, StatusCode::TOO_EARLY);
// Protocol 8. On the asset plane `bridge.busy` is not a keyed retry colliding with itself
// -- it is flow control, and it is the ORDINARY answer during an import rather than a rare
// one. The shard serves one asset request at a time because its outbound queue is bounded
// in lines, not bytes, so a queue of large replies is how it runs out of memory. A
// responder that answered 200 here would tell the website an import step succeeded and
// returned nothing.
assert_eq!(
respond_assets(reply("bridge.busy")).0,
StatusCode::TOO_EARLY
);
}
/// The asset plane's own gate, and it is a refusal rather than a mistake: an operator who has
/// not enabled `Bridge.AssetsEnabled` has declined to let the website read their UO client
/// files off the shard host. 403, for the same reason the event plane's switch is a 403.
#[test]
fn assets_disabled_is_a_403() {
let value = json!({
"kind": "assets.error",
"reqId": "r-9",
"reason": "asset extraction is disabled on this shard"
});
assert_eq!(respond_assets(Ok(value)).0, StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
}
/// Anything else the shard refuses on this plane is the caller's mistake.
#[test]
fn other_asset_errors_are_400() {
let value = json!({
"kind": "assets.error",
"reason": "assets.sources requires a reqId"
});
assert_eq!(respond_assets(Ok(value)).0, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
}
/// Phase 2's codes, each of which says something a 400 does not. `NOT_FOUND` is a client that
/// does not carry the file (an operator fact, not a bug); `UNREADABLE` is a file that is there
/// and cannot be decoded, where repeating the request cannot help; `UNAVAILABLE` is the shard
/// declining for now.
#[test]
fn an_asset_error_code_picks_the_status() {
let with = |code: &str| {
respond_assets(Ok(json!({
"kind": "assets.error",
"reqId": "r-1",
"code": code,
"reason": ""
})))
.0
};
assert_eq!(with("DISABLED"), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert_eq!(with("NOT_FOUND"), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
assert_eq!(with("UNREADABLE"), StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY);
assert_eq!(with("UNAVAILABLE"), StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
assert_eq!(with("BAD_REQUEST"), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
// An unknown code is not a reason to invent a status.
assert_eq!(with("SOMETHING_NEW"), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
}
/// The overlay and the sidecar ship separately and an operator can run a phase-1 shard against
/// a phase-2 sidecar, so the codeless refusal must keep its 403. This is the whole reason the
/// substring check survives rather than being deleted with the code it preceded.
#[test]
fn a_codeless_disabled_refusal_is_still_a_403() {
let value = json!({
"kind": "assets.error",
"reqId": "r-9",
"reason": "asset extraction is disabled on this shard"
});
assert_eq!(respond_assets(Ok(value)).0, StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
}
/// One page of the cliloc table. The assertion that matters is the envelope: `more` and
/// `cursor` reach the caller untouched, because the sidecar does not page this — the shard
/// cuts the pages and the website drives them, and a sidecar that "helpfully" assembled them
/// would be holding the whole table in memory to do it.
#[test]
fn a_cliloc_page_is_a_200_and_keeps_its_cursor() {
let value = json!({
"kind": "cliloc.table.ok",
"reqId": "r-2",
"lang": "enu",
"extractorVersion": 1,
"total": 67496,
"rows": [{"n": 1023721, "f": 0, "t": "quarter staff"}],
"more": true,
"cursor": "n:1023721",
"cut": "budget"
});
let (status, body) = respond_assets(Ok(value));
assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK);
assert_eq!(body.0.get("more").and_then(|v| v.as_bool()), Some(true));
assert_eq!(
body.0.get("cursor").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
Some("n:1023721")
);
assert_eq!(body.0.get("total").and_then(|v| v.as_i64()), Some(67496));
}
/// A source manifest comes back whole. Worth asserting because `respond_assets` sniffs `kind`
/// and a family whose success kind ends in `.ok` sits one character away from the `.error`
/// suffix the generic responder matches on -- which is exactly why this plane has its own
/// responder and matches `assets.error` exactly rather than by suffix.
#[test]
fn a_source_manifest_is_a_200() {
let value = json!({
"kind": "assets.sources.ok",
"reqId": "r-9",
"extractorVersion": 1,
"imaging": {"ok": true},
"files": [],
"more": false,
"cut": "end"
});
let (status, body) = respond_assets(Ok(value));
assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK);
assert_eq!(
body.0.get("extractorVersion").and_then(|v| v.as_i64()),
Some(1)
);
}
/// A shard that is not connected is a 503 and a shard that did not answer in time is a 504,
/// and the asset plane needs the second one to stay distinct more than any other plane does:
/// hashing a 195 MB anim.mul is the one thing on this link that can genuinely outlast the
/// 10 s reply timeout, and the website's response to that is to poll again rather than to
/// declare the shard down.
#[test]
fn asset_transport_failures_keep_their_own_statuses() {
assert_eq!(
respond_assets(Err(RpcError::NoShard)).0,
StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
);
assert_eq!(
respond_assets(Err(RpcError::Timeout)).0,
StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT
);
}
/// The event plane is the FIRST place `bridge.busy` is reachable on a live shard rather than
/// only in a unit test: `participation.snapshot` walks a well-attended run's members across
/// Core ticks, so it completes after its inbound call returned and a repeat can genuinely land
/// mid-flight. 11a built the door and had nothing to walk through it.
#[test]
fn a_drifted_lease_is_a_200_not_a_409() {
let value =
json!({"kind": "lease.drifted", "key": "PlayerCaps.SkillCap", "current": "1300"});
let (status, body) = respond_event(Ok(value));
// The shard was asked to compare and set, it compared, and it declined to overwrite
// somebody's deliberate change. That is the mechanism working; the website records
// `drifted` as a distinct successful outcome rather than an error.
assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK);
assert_eq!(body.0.get("current").and_then(|v| v.as_str()), Some("1300"));
// And explicitly not the version gate's status, for the reason 425 is not either: a
// mismatched deployment and a moved value want opposite dispositions from a caller.
assert_ne!(status, StatusCode::CONFLICT);
}
/// The event plane being switched off is an operator's refusal, not a malformed request. A 400
/// would send an administrator hunting a bug in a step that is written correctly.
#[test]
fn the_event_gate_being_off_is_a_403() {
assert_eq!(
respond_event(Ok(json!({
"kind": "lease.error",
"reason": "the event plane is disabled on this shard (Bridge.EventsEnabled)"
})))
.0,
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN
);
assert_eq!(
respond_event(Ok(json!({
"kind": "participation.error",
"reason": "the event plane is disabled on this shard (Bridge.EventsEnabled)"
})))
.0,
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN
);
}
/// Protocol 7's world verbs go through the same responder, and this pins the two mappings
/// they depend on rather than trusting that the reason-sniffing above keeps covering a kind
/// it was written before.
///
/// A CEILING refusal is a 400 on purpose. It is permanent -- retrying "you asked for 80
/// creatures and this shard places 30" gets the same answer forever -- and it is the module's
/// `PERMANENT_STATUSES` that has to see it as such, so classifying it as anything retryable
/// would put a run in a loop against a limit that will never move.
#[test]
fn a_world_refusal_is_a_400_and_the_gate_is_still_a_403() {
assert_eq!(
respond_event(Ok(json!({
"kind": "world.error",
"action": "spawn",
"reason": "this shard places 1 to 30 of 'creature' at a time, and 80 was asked for"
})))
.0,
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
);
assert_eq!(
respond_event(Ok(json!({
"kind": "world.error",
"action": "spawn",
"reason": "the event plane is disabled on this shard (Bridge.EventsEnabled)"
})))
.0,
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN
);
}
/// A run the shard has no registry rows for answers with an EMPTY hand, not a 404, and the
/// distinction is load-bearing for reconcile.
///
/// "This run owns nothing" and "I have never heard of this run" are the same fact once the
/// registry is the only record of ownership, and they stay the same fact across a restart:
/// the registry is written by `EventSink.WorldSave`, so it and the objects it describes are
/// saved and lost together. A 404 here would make the website treat a run that legitimately
/// owns nothing as a shard it could not reach.
#[test]
fn a_run_owning_nothing_is_an_empty_list_not_a_404() {
let (status, body) = respond_event(Ok(json!({
"kind": "world.owned.ok",
"runId": "77",
"owned": [],
"pruned": 0
})));
assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK);
assert_eq!(
body.0
.get("owned")
.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
.map(|a| a.len()),
Some(0)
);
}
/// An unknown lease key and an unknown run are not-founds; anything else the shard refuses is a
/// bad request. The catalog is short and a typo in a step is the likely cause of both.
#[test]
fn unknown_lease_and_run_are_404s() {
assert_eq!(
respond_event(Ok(json!({
"kind": "lease.error",
"reason": "no lease is offered for key 'Loot.MaxProps'"
})))
.0,
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND
);
assert_eq!(
respond_event(Ok(json!({
"kind": "participation.error",
"reason": "this shard is not counting run '42'"
})))
.0,
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND
);
assert_eq!(
respond_event(Ok(json!({
"kind": "lease.error",
"reason": "a lease needs a positive holdMs"
})))
.0,
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
);
}
/// A run this shard was never told to count is a 404; a run that WAS counted and had no
/// attendees is a 200. Protocol 7 part b.
#[test]
fn an_uncounted_run_is_a_404_and_an_empty_one_is_not() {
assert_eq!(
respond_event(Ok(json!({
"kind": "oneshot.error",
"reason": "run 42 has no participation ledger open on this shard"
})))
.0,
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND
);
// The distinction the 404 exists to preserve. "Nobody came" is a RESULT -- an event
// nobody attended still happened -- and answering it as a failure would have the module
// retry a grant against a ledger that will be just as empty next time.
assert_eq!(
respond_event(Ok(json!({
"kind": "item.grant.ok",
"runId": "42",
"granted": 0,
"missed": []
})))
.0,
StatusCode::OK
);
}
/// The save rate limit is the one refusal on this plane that the same request will get past
/// by waiting, so it is a 429 rather than the 400 every other refusal is.
#[test]
fn a_save_refused_for_coming_too_soon_is_a_429() {
assert_eq!(
respond_event(Ok(json!({
"kind": "oneshot.error",
"reason": "this shard saves at most every 300 seconds, and the last save was 12 seconds ago"
})))
.0,
StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS
);
// And an ordinary refusal on the same plane is still a 400, so the 429 is not swallowing
// the class it sits beside: a grant this shard does not offer will never succeed, however
// long the caller waits.
assert_eq!(
respond_event(Ok(json!({
"kind": "oneshot.error",
"reason": "this shard does not grant 'castle'"
})))
.0,
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST
);
// The event gate being off stays a 403 on this plane too -- it is an operator's deliberate
// refusal, not a bad request.
assert_eq!(
respond_event(Ok(json!({
"kind": "oneshot.error",
"reason": "the event plane is disabled on this shard (Bridge.EventsEnabled)"
})))
.0,
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN
);
}
/// A lease taken, a tally answered: an ordinary success carries straight through.
#[test]
fn event_successes_are_200s() {
assert_eq!(respond_event(reply("lease.ok")).0, StatusCode::OK);
assert_eq!(respond_event(reply("lease.list.ok")).0, StatusCode::OK);
assert_eq!(respond_event(reply("participation.ok")).0, StatusCode::OK);
assert_eq!(
respond_event(reply("participation.snapshot.ok")).0,
StatusCode::OK
);
}
/// 425 must not collide with the protocol-version gate's 409: a mismatch is a deployment fault