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link/sidecar
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feat(web): the borrowed planes and the one-shots on the wire (Phase 12b)
The sidecar half of protocol 7 part b. `PROTOCOL_VERSION` stays 7: 12b amends 7
in place rather than bumping again, which is tolerable for the single reason 6
and 7 already are and no other -- nothing is released from `edge`.

The lease family gains a `target` rather than a family of its own. A property
lease, a seasonal toggle and a config key are one protocol with three catalogs,
so there is one deadline, one compare-and-set, one grace window and one set of
counters instead of three of each.

`GET /lease?key=&target=` narrows to one row, and a targeted key needs it.
`Spawner.MaxCount` is one capability over thousands of spawners, so it has no
single `current` and the catalog walk cannot fill one in -- while the website's
`read()` needs exactly one value for exactly one target BEFORE it applies
anything. Naming both answers that.

The frame also always carries `holds`: every lease the shard is actually holding,
whatever key or target it is on. A catalog walk can enumerate the KEYS but never
the holds on a targeted one -- there is no list of spawners to walk -- so without
it a reconcile after an outage would have no way to ask "what are you still
holding?". `inForce()` reads that.

Three new routes. `GET /items` is the shard's own grant allowlist, so the
website's dropdown offers what this shard will actually build. `POST
/items/grant` names a RUN and never a recipient list: the shard has held the
run's participation ledger since protocol 6 part b, keyed by the same character
serials the website's `member_key` holds, so sending a list would put it on the
wire twice with a window in which the two disagree. `POST /world/save` starts a
save; what actually happened rides `world.save.before`/`after`, which have been
on the stream since protocol 2.

Two status mappings are the point of the diff rather than plumbing:

A run with no ledger open is a 404 and a run whose ledger is open and empty is a
200 with `granted: 0`. "You never told me to count" and "nobody came" are
different facts, and only the first is a mistake -- an event nobody attended
still happened, and answering it as a failure would have the module retry against
a ledger that will be just as empty next time.

A save refused for coming too soon is a 429, not the 400 every other refusal on
this plane is. It is the one refusal here that the same request gets past by
waiting, so 429 says exactly that and keeps it out of the module's
permanent-status set -- which is what makes a phase boundary retried rather than
abandoned.

`cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings` and `cargo test`
all clean: 51 passed (was 49). The two new tests pin those two mappings.

Also exercised end to end against the real local ServUO 57.4 world driving this
binary's REST -- including that `/world/save` is not eaten by `/world/:run_id`
next door. See servuo-plugins for the walk.

Refs: docs/link/v7.md §11-§13

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
2026-09-07 08:07:34 -05:00
..

uo-link sidecar

The Rust half of the bridge. It terminates the loopback link to the ServUO shard and (as it grows) exposes WebSocket + REST to the website.

website ──WS (live feed) / REST (queries)──►  sidecar  ──loopback TCP 127.0.0.1:7788──►  shard
                                              (this)      newline-JSON, bidirectional

The sidecar is the TCP listener; the shard dials out to it. That is what keeps the game unreachable from the website — the game exposes no port of its own. See PLAN.md §2.

Run

cargo run                 # info logging
RUST_LOG=debug cargo run  # see every event, incl. pong heartbeats

On first run it writes sidecar.toml with a generated auth token and logs the path. Binds the shard listener (127.0.0.1:7788) and the web server (127.0.0.1:8080) from that file, then waits for the shard to connect.

Command line

Four flags. Everything else is configuration, and configuration lives in the file.

uo-link-sidecar [--print-config] [--config <PATH>] [-V|--version] [-h|--help]
Flag What
--print-config Resolve the configuration, print it as JSON on stdout, exit.
--config <PATH> Path to sidecar.toml. Outranks $UOLINK_CONFIG; default ./sidecar.toml.
-V, --version uo-link-sidecar <ver> (protocol <n>).
-h, --help Usage.

An unrecognized argument is an error (exit 2), not something to ignore — a typo'd flag would otherwise start a sidecar that is not the one you asked for.

--print-config

The non-interactive way to read the sidecar's own settings back, so an installer or a diagnostic never has to scrape the startup log or parse TOML:

$ uo-link-sidecar --print-config --config /etc/runicgateway/sidecar.toml
{
  "component": "uo-link-sidecar",
  "config_created": false,
  "config_path": "/etc/runicgateway/sidecar.toml",
  "protocol": 3,
  "shard": { "bind": "127.0.0.1:7788" },
  "store": { "path": "/var/lib/runicgateway/uo-link.db" },
  "token_generated": false,
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "web": {
    "auth_required": true,
    "auth_token": "c0f04ace66a937edff407d9dc25d5d8a967b0300e3306f11",
    "bind": "127.0.0.1:8080",
    "ws_path": "/ws"
  }
}
  • It contains the auth token in clear text. That is the point — those values go straight into Admin → Shard — but it means the output is a secret: don't pipe it into a log or a CI artifact.
  • It performs first-run setup, exactly as a normal start would: a missing config file is written and a blank token is generated and saved. So --print-config on a fresh host provisions the sidecar and tells you its token in one step. config_created and token_generated report whether this run did either, which is how a re-run distinguishes "read an existing install" from "provisioned a new one".
  • Paths are the resolved absolute ones, not what the file literally says.
  • Nothing else is written to stdout — the log subscriber is not started in this mode, so the JSON is the entire output.

Configuration & auth

All runtime settings live in sidecar.toml (path overridable with --config or $UOLINK_CONFIG) — nothing is compiled into the binary. See sidecar.toml.example. Environment variables override the file: UOLINK_SHARD_BIND, UOLINK_WEB_BIND, UOLINK_WEB_TOKEN, UOLINK_DB_PATH.

Where the data goes

A relative [store].path resolves against the directory holding sidecar.toml, not the process's working directory. Under cargo run those are the same thing, so nothing changes for development; for an installed service they are emphatically not. A unit that pins UOLINK_CONFIG=/etc/runicgateway/sidecar.toml and leaves the default uo-link.db gets /etc/runicgateway/uo-link.db — beside its config, deterministically — instead of a database wherever the service manager happened to set CWD (%SystemRoot%\System32, or a silently redirected VirtualStore copy under C:\Program Files\).

Absolute paths are used as written, and the parent directory is created if it does not exist, so a service can name /var/lib/runicgateway/uo-link.db on a host where nothing has created that directory yet. Paths are handed to SQLite as filesystem paths rather than being formatted into a sqlite:// URL, so a %, #, ? or space in the path means what it looks like.

The website authenticates to the sidecar with a shared token, presented as:

  • REST — Authorization: Bearer <token> or X-Api-Key: <token>
  • WebSocket — ?token=<token> in the connect URL (browsers can't set headers on a WS handshake)

/health is the only unauthenticated route. The token is compared in constant time.

Authentication is always on. If auth_token is blank (fresh install, or someone cleared it), the sidecar generates one, writes it back to sidecar.toml, logs it, and continues:

No auth token configured.
Generated new token: cb998929b2201e44914dcf077bbf115583bfbe80dcf93073
Saved to sidecar.toml. Authentication is on.

So you can never accidentally run without auth. Rotate by editing the token and restarting. sidecar.toml is gitignored because it holds the secret.

Protocol version

The wire protocol has a version (PROTOCOL_VERSION, currently 3), so the website and sidecar detect a mismatch immediately instead of failing in strange ways when a message shape changes.

  • Every response carries an X-UOLink-Version: 3 header.
  • /health and the WebSocket ws.hello include "protocol": 3.
  • If a request sends X-UOLink-Version and it disagrees with the sidecar, the request is rejected 409 Conflict with {sidecar_protocol, client_protocol} so the mismatch is obvious.

Bump PROTOCOL_VERSION in main.rs whenever an event or endpoint's shape changes.

Health

GET /health (unauthenticated) returns an at-a-glance status for troubleshooting:

{
  "status": "ok",              // "ok" when plugin connected and DB reachable, else "degraded"
  "protocol": 3,
  "plugin_connected": true,    // is the shard link up?
  "database": "ok",
  "uptime": "3d 12h",
  "last_event": "2026-07-10T22:08:27Z"   // last line received from the shard, null if none
}

Status

Piece State
Shard link (shard.rs) done — accepts the shard, reads events, sends commands, re-accepts on disconnect. Verified against the live shard: received server.hello, round-tripped a pingpong, and reconnected after a sidecar restart.
WebSocket feed (web.rs) done/ws fans every shard event out to connected clients via a broadcast. Verified: a WS client received ws.hello then live pong events relayed from the shard. Live-only, no replay.
REST queries (rpc.rs + web.rs) done — synchronous queries and commands, correlated to shard replies by id. Verified end-to-end against the live shard, success and error paths.
SQLite persistence (store.rs) done — every live event persisted; history/economy served from the DB; profiles cached with shard-down fallback; link map. Verified: data survived a sidecar restart, and a cached profile served at 200 with the shard killed.

The sidecar is feature-complete. All four pieces work end-to-end against the live shard.

The web server binds per sidecar.toml (default 127.0.0.1:8080). All routes except /health require the auth token (see Configuration & auth above).

Routes

Method Path Shard command Reply
GET /health ok
GET /ws live event feed (WebSocket)
GET /char/{account}/{slot} char.request char.profile
GET /char/serial/{serial} char.request char.profile
GET /roster/{account} account.roster account.roster
GET /vendors/{account} vendor.snapshot vendor.snapshot
POST /link/confirm {code, websiteUserId} link.confirm link.ok / link.error
POST /towncrier {id, lines, durationSec} towncrier.add towncrier.ok / towncrier.error
DELETE /towncrier/{id} towncrier.remove towncrier.ok / towncrier.error
GET /link/{account} — (reads store) {account, websiteUserId} or 404
GET /history?kind=&limit= — (reads store) {events: [...]} newest first
GET /economy?limit= — (reads store) {series: [...]} supply snapshots

A shard *.error reply maps to HTTP 404 (unknown/not-found) or 400 (bad request). No shard connected → 503; no reply within 10 s → 504. GET /char/serial/{serial} falls back to the cached profile when the shard is unreachable, so an already-viewed character still renders during an outage.

Design

  • shard.rsserve() binds the listener and accepts shard connections in a loop. Each connection splits into read/write halves: the read half parses newline-JSON into ShardEvent { kind, value } and forwards them; the write half drains an mpsc of command lines. ShardHandle::send posts a command to whichever shard is currently connected, and drops with a warning if none is — a website query during a shard outage should fail fast and retry, not queue behind a reconnect. Live events that must survive an outage are buffered by the shard, not here.
  • web.rs — the website-facing HTTP surface (axum). AppState holds the broadcast::Sender<String>; each /ws client subscribes and forwards every event as a text frame. A client that lags past the broadcast buffer is warned and kept live (it just misses events) rather than stalling the others. This side may be exposed beyond loopback — it is the gatekeeper, so add auth when you do.
  • rpc.rs — request/reply correlation over the one shard socket. A REST call registers a pending entry under a correlation id, sends the command, and awaits the reply (10 s timeout). The event loop routes any incoming line whose id is pending back to the waiter; everything else flows on as a live event. Recognizes three correlation fields, matching what the plugin echoes: reqId (queries), code (link), id (town-crier).
  • store.rs — SQLite (sqlx). Three tables: events (the full live stream, append-only), links (account ↔ website user, mirrored from link.ok), profiles (last-known character sheet, cached from char.profile). History and economy read here instead of the shard; pong is dropped as ephemeral chatter. The DB file is [store].path (default uo-link.db beside the config), gitignored.
  • config.rs — resolves the config file, applies the environment overrides, guarantees an auth token, anchors relative paths, and renders the --print-config document.
  • cli.rs — the four flags above. Hand-rolled; no argument-parsing dependency.
  • main.rs — wires it together: the shard event loop first tries to route each line as an RPC reply; if it isn't one, the line is a live event — logged, persisted, and broadcast to WS.

Wire protocol

Every line is one JSON object with t (epoch ms) and kind. The shard→sidecar events and sidecar→shard commands are catalogued in PLAN.md (§5 data catalog, §7 protocol) and were all validated end-to-end while building the plugin. Notable inbound commands the sidecar will issue: char.request, account.roster, vendor.snapshot, link.confirm, towncrier.add/remove, ping.