feat: stage 0, an empty RunicNPC that releases through CI

The repository RunicNPC is built in (docs/runicnpc/PLAN.md §9, stage 0):

- plugin/RunicNPC.cs: `// Requires: Kits` (D217), `[Info]` with the 0.0.0
  placeholder the release stamps, `RunicNpc_ApiVersion()` (API 1), and
  `rnpc.status`, which reports the version and which hooks have fired. It
  spawns nothing.
- plugin.toml: the API version, the framework floors it was loaded on
  (Oxide 2.0.7726, Carbon 2.0.259) and requires_plugins = ["Kits"].
- scripts/checkPlugin.js, adapted from Rust-Plugins': every hook listed and
  void unless written down; chat-command signatures; every RunicNpc_ call
  reachable by Call (the HumanNPC trap, PLAN.md §1.2); ApiVersion,
  `// Requires:` and [Info] agreeing with plugin.toml. 23 self-tests, including
  the real plugin and a CRLF checkout.
- PR Checks on PRs into main and edge; the release workflow on main, with
  Rust-Plugins' release engine unchanged and an adapter that ships
  runicnpc-<ver>.tar.gz (runicnpc/RunicNPC.cs + manifest.json) and SHA256SUMS.
  No bundle dispatch until stage 4.
- tools/: the rig panel scripts, with the panel and server ids moved into a
  git-ignored tools/rigs.json. `con.js` became `console.js`: CON is a reserved
  device name on Windows, and git there cannot open the file.
- README, CONTRIBUTING (edge-based flow, AI disclosure, borrow-not-copy),
  SECURITY, the code of conduct, issue and PR templates.

`feat:` so the cutover to main cuts the first release, 0.1.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E14m6SuuY6i1vASFeGDBeY

SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# Security Policy
+
+Thank you for helping keep Runic Gateway and its users safe.
+
+## Reporting a vulnerability
+
+**Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public issues, pull
+requests, or the wiki.** A public report tips off attackers before a fix is
+available.
+
+Instead, report privately by email to:
+
+**whitlocktech@gmail.com**
+
+Please include as much of the following as you can:
+
+- The repository and component affected.
+- The type of issue (e.g. authentication bypass, injection, secret exposure,
+  remote code execution, denial of service).
+- Step-by-step instructions to reproduce, and a proof-of-concept if you have one.
+- The impact — what an attacker could do with it.
+- Any suggested remediation.
+
+You will receive an acknowledgement of your report, typically within a few days.
+We will keep you informed as we investigate and work toward a fix, and we are
+happy to credit you in the release notes once the issue is resolved (let us know
+if you would prefer to remain anonymous).
+
+## Scope
+
+Runic Gateway is a self-hosted platform made up of several components:
+
+| Component | Repo | Network exposure |
+|---|---|---|
+| Website (site + admin + API) | `RunicGateway/website` | Internet-facing (behind a reverse proxy) |
+| rust-link sidecar | `RunicGateway/Rust-Link` | The only network-facing part of the game bridge |
+| Oxide bridge plugin | `RunicGateway/Rust-Plugins` | Loopback only — dials the sidecar on `127.0.0.1` |
+| RunicNPC | `RunicGateway/runicnpc-rust` | None — an in-process plugin; talks to no network, and reaches the site only through the bridge |
+| Documentation | `RunicGateway/docs` | Content only |
+
+Because instances are self-hosted, the security of any given deployment also
+depends on how it is configured and operated — strong secrets (`JWT_SECRET`,
+`SECRET_ENC_KEY`, database and admin passwords), a correctly configured reverse
+proxy and `TRUST_PROXY`, and keeping the shard itself unreachable from the
+internet (only the sidecar should be exposed). See each repo's README for the
+security model.
+
+## Supported versions
+
+This project is developed continuously and does not maintain long-term release
+branches. Security fixes land on `main`; please run a recent build.