e87c1034065d814ee2046e43562aef26911aaad4
29 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| c89e818dbf |
feat(asset-bridge): the transport, and the 357 wrong pictures it found
Asset Bridge phase 1 (docs/link/v8.md §16). Sidecar half: RunicGateway/link#41. Docs half: RunicGateway/docs#236. The transport for protocol 8, plus phase 0's validator promoted into the overlay and extended to animations — which is where the interesting part is. ## 357 of the 1,144 "decodable" bodies are wrong pictures, on a STOCK client Phase 0 measured the art path and left the animation half unbuilt. It has the same defect, and it is worse: `GetAnimation` decodes through `new MemoryStream(m_StreamBuffer, false)` — the whole shared buffer, not the `length` bytes just read into it — so a truncated or absent record does not even hit end-of-stream. It sails on into the previous animation's bytes. Measured directly, because no count could tell: | Decode body 320 (`lookup 22638982, length 0`) straight after… | Comes back | |---|---| | body 12, the dragon | the dragon, 176x167, identical hash | | body 34, the wolf | the wolf's dimensions, 35x34 | | body 400, the human male | the human, 27x63, identical hash | The catalogue is **787 bodies, not 1,144**. Importing the other 357 would have written duplicate creature portraits into the site showing whichever body the walk decoded before them. The record walk refused **0** real bodies on the stock client — the false-refusal measurement §4.5 says the boundary depends on. ## And four of the twelve player bodies, not six §5.2 listed the elf ghosts (607, 608) as decoding. Their index entry is `length 0`; what came back was the elf female at her exact dimensions, because 606 is what the walk decoded immediately before. Confirmed the same way — 607 after the dragon is the dragon. Phase 4's UOP decoder now covers eight ids rather than six. ## What is here - **`overlay/Scripts/Custom/Bridge/BridgeAssets.cs`** — the plane. Accepts on the Core thread, hands off to a dedicated asset worker, returns immediately. Three rules, all answering a specific failure: - **one slot**, second request answered `bridge.busy` (425). `Emit`'s queue is bounded in *lines*, so 10,000 queued 200 KB replies is 2 GB of shard memory; the bound that holds is flow control, on the side where the memory is. - **byte budgets** (`AssetBatchBytes`, 512 KiB) under the sidecar's new 1 MiB cap. The factor of two is load-bearing: a page always admits its first item, so it may overshoot by one, and the headroom is what makes that land on the wire. - **replies, never events** — no `reqId`, no answer. An uncorrelated frame is an event by definition, and §3.1 is why none of this may be one. - **`PageBuilder`** — one paging envelope (`more`/`cursor`/`cut`) for all five families that will page, defined before the first one needs it. `cut` matters: "short page" has three meanings and only `end` means finished. - **`assets.sources`** — stage 1 of the import gate, its first user. - **`BridgeAssetValidator.cs`** — promoted from `tools/`, plus `ResolveAnimation` (the never-sweep-file-types rule as code, with no loop and no fallback), `AnimationRecordSane` and the frame walk. - **`EXTRACTOR_VERSION`**, **`overlay.toml` protocol 7 → 8**, `AssetsEnabled`. ## Hashing had to come off the request path §6's gate is (size, mtime) first, hash only when those differ. The first call has nothing cached, so that still means hashing 1.06 GB — inside the sidecar's 10 s reply timeout it does not fit. So hashes are computed on their own thread (deliberately not the single-slot worker, which would answer every status poll `bridge.busy` for the whole pass) and the reply carries `hashing`/`complete`. Measured on the real rig: first call instant with `sha256: null`, second call **44 ms** with every hash present. ## Verified on the wire, not just compiled Real ServUO 57.4 + the real sidecar + the real client. `GET /assets/sources` → 200, `X-UOLink-Version: 8`, `imaging: {ok: true}`, and §4.6's diagnostic firing on a live client: `artDataFile: artlegacymul.uop`, with `art.mul` and `artidx.mul` both carrying `shadowedBy`. Live events kept flowing through the new capped reader with no warnings. Not exercised live: the disabled-plane 403 and the busy 425 (both unit-tested on the sidecar side; the shard halves are a config read and a lock). - [x] AI-assisted — Claude Code (Opus 5) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4 |
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| 6061fe39ce |
fix(bridge): a refusal is not an effect, so it does not spend the key (Phase 16a)
Protocol 7, amended in place. The at-most-once store had two cases and needed a third. A handler that THREW keeps its key and stores the failure — correct, because it may have applied half of itself, and that is the failure this file exists to prevent. A handler that RETURNED had its reply stored and replayed for ever. There was no case for a handler that ran to completion and deliberately REFUSED, and every refusal on this plane is a guard: a missing runId, an unknown item, a cap, a rate limit, a write that failed and left the value alone. Nothing happened — and remembering the refusal froze it as the key's answer, so a refusal that WAITING FIXES could never be retried past. `uo.world.save` is the case the acceptance walk found it with, and the module says in as many words what it expected: "429 is the shard's save rate limit, and it is the one refusal on this plane that waiting fixes … which is what makes a phase boundary retried rather than abandoned." It was not achievable. Six attempts over four minutes — three automatic, an operator retry, three more — every one answering the same frozen sentence, "the last save was 227 seconds ago". The number could not age because it was the first reply being replayed, and a step's idempotency key is one value for the life of the step, so the operator's retry control could not escape it either. So a refusal releases the key. The refusal is still emitted to the caller, which is what ends the attempt; it is simply not remembered as this key's answer. A refusal is recognised by its `kind` ending in `.error`, matched on the suffix so a handler family added later is covered without extending a list here. `bridge.error` is excluded deliberately — that is the reply this file writes when a handler threw, which is exactly the case whose key must be kept. Both completion paths are covered, including a deferred handler that refuses after its timer arms. The safety argument is that "nothing happened" holds for every `*.error` reply here — audited across BridgeWorld, BridgeOneShots, BridgeLeases and BridgeParticipation, where every refusal is a pre-mutation guard or follows a `Write` that failed. It is a property this file cannot verify, so it is written down as a rule handlers must keep: do not answer `*.error` after changing the world. Report a partial change in an `ok` reply, as the item grant does with `granted`/`missed` and the despawn with `removed`/`gone`/`refused`. Verified on a real shard: the same key 25 seconds apart now answers "the last save was 15 seconds ago" then "40 seconds ago" — a number that moves, with no `replayed` marker — while a SUCCESSFUL reply is still replayed unchanged, so the at-most-once guarantee is intact where it matters. `Status()` gains a `refused=` counter. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4 |
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| f6a86ff8c2 |
feat(bridge): what an event borrows, and the two one-shots (Phase 12b)
The shard half of protocol 7 part b. Two lease planes whose value lives on something already in the world, and two verbs that cannot be taken back. A LEASE HERE MUST BE PERSISTED, AND THE CONFIG PLANE'S MUST NOT 11b's fail-safe is stated plainly in its own header: a lease that never reaches disk means a shard restart is a FREE restore. That argument depends entirely on the leased value being memory-only too, and here it is not. A spawner is an Item and is in the world save; a seasonal entry is written to `Saves/Misc/SeasonalEvents.bin` by ServUO's own `EventSink.WorldSave`. So a restart does not put either back -- it puts the CHANGE back and throws away the deadline timer that was going to undo it, leaving the world at the leased value with nothing here remembering it is borrowed. So the Bridge gains its THIRD save file, `Saves/Bridge/Leases.bin`, written by the same `EventSink.WorldSave` that writes what it describes, with deadlines re-armed at load. A deadline that passed while the shard was down fires AT ONCE: the promise was "back at baseline by then", and extending it would silently turn a two-hour lease into however long the outage was. Config holds are still not written down -- the same argument, applied to planes where its premise is false. A TARGET IS A SERIAL OR A UniqueId, AND BOTH ARE NEEDED A serial is what `[props` shows a GM. An `XmlSpawner.UniqueId` is what the shard's own `Spawns/*.xml` carry -- and it is not a convenience: a dropdown built from serials is IMPOSSIBLE, because serials are assigned when the world is built and nothing off-shard knows them. A lease addressable only by serial could have no authoring list at all. `Spawner` and `XmlSpawner` share all four property names, which is a fact about this tree rather than a convenience: the spawn files load as XmlSpawners while `[add spawner` makes the native one. And it is `MaxCount`, not the `Amount` EVENTS_PLAN.md named -- there is no such property. `MinDelay`/`MaxDelay` are TimeSpans, so the wire carries seconds. The allowlist is checked against the object's OWN type, which is the sentence the whole plane rests on: a serial is a number a caller chooses, so that check is all that stands between `Spawner.MaxCount` and any item on the shard. Reflection is bounded three ways -- the pair must be in the catalog, the property must carry `CommandProperty` (so this can never reach further than `[set` could), and its CLR type must be one this file renders. THE SELF-CHECK, AND THE ONE FAILURE NO PROBE CAN CATCH §N10 in full: a config key is probed live (write, read back, restore) because there is exactly one of it. A property CANNOT be -- thousands of instances and no canonical one, so probing would mean writing to somebody's spawner at boot. What is verified instead is everything verifiable without touching the world. And `TreasuresOfTokuno` is excluded by name, because `IsActive()` reads its own `DropEra` rather than `Status`: the write succeeds, the value reads back, a compare-and-set restore passes, and the capability does nothing at all. That is N10's "capability that lies" in its purest form and the only way to find it is to read the source. §G also called this toggle "small and safe" -- it is safe, but `OnStatusChange()` generates or removes world content for six of the eight. THE ONE-SHOTS Who receives a grant is answered HERE. The website has the list too, but a module cannot read core's tables, so the alternative was a new core surface handing participants to a module. Not needed: 11b's participation ledger already holds them, keyed by the same serials. A run with no ledger is a 404; a run whose ledger is open and empty is a 200 with `granted: 0`, because an event nobody attended still happened. An undeliverable grant is DELETED rather than dropped -- `AddItem` failing on a full backpack would otherwise leave it at (0,0). A save stops the world, so it is rate-limited rather than capped, counting ServUO's own autosave as the last one. Refused, never queued: a queued save would land at a moment nobody chose. VERIFIED Compiles clean (0 warnings, 0 errors). Then a full walk on the real local ServUO 57.4 world against the release sidecar: - all six catalog keys survive the boot self-check; `current` is correctly absent on the targeted rows and filled when a target is named; - a spawner reads the same by UniqueId and by serial; - TWO RUNS ON TWO SPAWNERS BOTH SUCCEED while a second run on the SAME spawner is refused -- the whole reason for the targeted ref; - a GM edit behind the plane's back yields `lease.drifted` and the world is left at 55, not reverted; a clean release restores to baseline; - ToT refused with its own reason, a bad status refused, Fellowship toggled; - grant: no ledger 404, empty ledger 200 `granted: 0`, unknown item 400, over the stack bound 400; save 200 then 429 inside the interval; - BOTH HOLDS AND BOTH LEASED VALUES SURVIVE save + clean shutdown + restart, the deadlines re-arm, and a release across the restart still compare-and-sets; - with only a CONFIG lease held, `Leases.bin` is 8 bytes and names nothing; - refusals: targeted-with-no-target, untargeted-with-a-target, out of range, over 30 days, a target that is not there, and a `ChainChest` refused as a spawner; - 90 seconds becomes `00:01:30` and the baseline reads back as 18000; - a deleted target reads `unreadable` and releases `targetGone: true`. The test world was never saved after the deliberate deletion, so it is intact. Refs: docs/link/v7.md §11-§14, docs/website/EVENTS_PLAN.md Phase 12b Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4 |
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| 0182732d63 |
feat(bridge): the world verbs an event owns (protocol 7, Phase 12a)
Five verbs an author sees -- creatures, an enhanced "boss", an oracle NPC, a temporary gate, decoration -- and ONE command family underneath them, because every one of them ends in the same sentence: an object exists, and this run owns it. `world.spawn` / `world.despawn` / `world.owned` carry a `what` discriminator, and the per-verb differences are fields rather than kinds. The ownership registry is PERSISTED, and that is forced rather than chosen. A spawned creature is in the world save, so it survives the restart that proves a town-crier line gone -- which already rules out reconcile-by-boot-stamp. But the record of which run owns which serial has nowhere else to live: in memory it is lost in the restart the creatures survive, and only in the website's ledger it is not held here at all, so `world.despawn` would delete whatever serial it was handed and "never touches a creature it did not create" would have no mechanism behind it. So the Bridge gains its second persisted file beside `Participation.bin` -- written by the same world save as the objects it describes, so the two cannot get out of step. The oracle is ours rather than `XmlSpawner2.XmlDialog`'s, and that engine is the reason for both halves of the decision. Its `SpeechEntry` is the evidence the shape is right -- `Text` plus comma-separated `Keywords`, a keyword-less entry as the greeting, a proximity range, a conversation lock. It is also why not to build on it: `SpeechEntry` carries an `Action` string, XmlSpawner's command-scripting language, which would leave an arbitrary-command field one step from an event author. `Mobile.OnMovement` (delivered to every mobile in range -- the `HandlesOnMovement` filter applies only to Items) and `Mobile.HandlesOnSpeech`/`OnSpeech` are native virtuals and are all it needs. Every `Bridge.EventsMax*` REFUSES rather than clamps, on `LeaseMaxDurationSec`'s argument from 11b: the shard's bound exists for the case where the website is wrong. `Bridge.EventsEnabled` gates all of it -- spawning is the same consent 11b introduced that switch for, not a third one. Decoration carries an `itemId`, because `Static` accounts for 5031 of the tree's decoration placements under 1992 different graphics: for that class the graphic IS the identity. Never applied to a `BaseAddon`, whose own ItemID is not what a player sees. Containers are refused outright -- teardown would delete whatever a player had left inside. `tools/scaffolding` gains `worldgone <serial>`, which deletes an object behind the registry's back. It is the one outcome the rig cannot reach by asking the bridge -- every bridge verb that removes an object also drops its row -- and it is what a player's sword does every time they kill an event creature. Verified on a real ServUO 57.4 world (206k items, 42k mobiles) against the release sidecar: all five verbs place; every ceiling refuses; a container and an unknown type refuse; one run cannot despawn another's object; the registry and its objects both survive a save and a clean restart (`pruned: 0`); a creature deleted behind the registry's back comes back `gone` rather than `removed`; and a five-second gate is collected by the shard's own deadline with `world.expired` on the wire. Refs: docs/link/v7.md, docs/website/EVENTS_PLAN.md Phase 12a Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4 |
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| 63a7dc4374 |
feat(bridge): lease deadlines and the participation ledger (Phase 11b)
Protocol 6 amended in place. Two mechanisms behind one new default-off gate,
`Bridge.EventsEnabled` -- deliberately not `AdminWriteEnabled`, because enabling
the admin plane is consenting to staff moderation from a screen a human is
looking at, and this is consenting to the world being changed and watched on a
schedule, unattended.
BridgeLeases: a live config value held for a bounded time, with the deadline
honoured on the shard whether or not the website is heard from again, and a
compare-and-set restore that reports `drifted` rather than overwriting a GM's
deliberate change. Memory-only -- nothing calls Config.Save() -- so a restart is
a free restore.
BridgeParticipation: presence in a declared area plus kill credit inside it,
keyed by character serial, persisted in the world save. The Bridge's first
persisted state, because a run spans hours and an in-memory tally would regress
every attendee's score after one restart. Its snapshot is also the first handler
that DEFERS, which makes `bridge.busy` reachable for the first time.
And it immediately found a defect in 11a: BridgeIdempotency.Busy built its frame
with Begin("bridge.busy") and then appended a diagnostic `.Str("kind", ...)`, so
the object carried two `kind` fields and every JSON parser takes the last. The
sidecar answered 200 instead of 425. Renamed `busyKind`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| 7aa7bc8032 |
feat(bridge): protocol 6 — an idempotency key, and champ.boss.killed (Phase 11a)
A command carrying an `idempotencyKey` is now executed at most once: a repeat is answered with the original reply rather than re-run. That is the precondition every world verb in Phase 12 is waiting on, and it is what let `uo.broadcast` stop being un-retryable. The gate sits in BridgeBoot's inbound dispatch, not in each handler, so it covers every kind including ones a later protocol adds. A command with no key behaves exactly as it did before, which leaves the admin screens unchanged. Four rules, each a decision rather than an implementation detail: reserve on receipt (so a handler that defers is covered, answering `bridge.busy` to a repeat in flight); a key that has begun is never released, not even when the handler throws; a replay is stamped with the REPEAT's correlation id, because the sidecar's reqId is fresh per call and replaying the original would hang the retry; and the bound is loud, because an evicted key is the guarantee's one hole. `champ.boss.killed` rides along because a bump costs a release, a bundle and an operator update on every shard. It fires from EventSink.CreatureDeath, detected by type so a boss that popped and died inside one sweep is still reported, and it carries the damage table that exists at the death and nowhere else. overlay.toml protocol = 6, in this commit rather than a later one. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 1dd490b483 |
fix(bridge): make the market sweep notice a vendor running out of gold
`BridgeMarket.Signature()` diffs shop name, owner, map, coordinates and the item/price list -- the things a LISTING is made of. Protocol 5 added a `fees` block to the frame and the change detector never learned about it. So a vendor quietly running down its gold altered nothing the sweep compared, emitted no frame, and `uo.vendor.expiring` -- the notification whose entire subject is a vendor running out of gold -- could fire only by coincidence: when somebody happened to reprice an item on a shop that was already broke. Proved on the engagement Phase 11b live rig by setting a vendor's held gold to zero and watching no frame follow. The signature carries the DERIVED values, `exempt` and `periodsRemaining`, not the raw ones. An integer division moves only when the shard's own answer to "is this vendor in danger" moves; `HoldGold` changes on every sale and `NextPayTime` on every tick, and keying on either would re-emit a fat listing frame for a shop whose listings had not changed. Emit CADENCE, not frame shape: no field added, PROTOCOL_VERSION untouched, and `overlay.toml` unchanged. The general form is worth carrying forward -- a sweep-based kind has a change detector, and a field added to the frame but not to the detector ships correct and arrives never. Also adds `tools/scaffolding/BridgeRigDriver.cs`: the shard driven from outside the game over a polled command file. A walk asserts what happened BETWEEN two steps, so the steps have to be separated by the observer rather than by a hard-coded delay -- and ServUO's console takes a fixed verb set, so `[p5probe` cannot be typed at a headless shard at all. Never deployed; `deploy.ps1` copies only `overlay/`. The README gains the two ServUO facts the walk cost a rebuild each to learn: a condemned house cannot be refreshed, and only a clean shutdown emits. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| b818f6cf37 |
feat(bridge): protocol 5 — decay schedule, vendor fee state, and a login result
Three emitter changes and the overlay's protocol declaration, in one PR because
"The bridge is a contract": overlay.toml must be bumped in the same change as the
emitters or the next bundle silently fails to compose.
BridgeSweeps — house.decay gains ownerName and a nested `schedule`
{dynamicDecay, nextStage, decayPeriodSec, estimatedCollapse}.
estimatedCollapse is emitted only where ServUO can actually know it. Dynamic decay
(Core.ML) draws each stage's duration at RANDOM when the stage is entered, so
NextDecayStage is exact for the next transition and nothing beyond it is known —
collapse becomes exact only at IDOC, where the next transition IS the collapse.
Static decay is a pure function of LastRefreshed and DecayPeriod, so it is exact at
every stage. Emitting it anywhere else would publish a guess as a fact, and on the
website's side that becomes a dated promise in someone's mail.
BridgeMarket — vendor.listing gains ownerAcct and a nested `fees` block.
ownerAcct is the one that matters structurally: the frame has carried ownerName
since v3, but a character name joins to nothing — only the game account is the
website's link key. The fees block resolves PlayerVendor.PayTimer's dismissal rule
(pay > totalGold => Destroy) on the shard, because both halves of that comparison
differ between ServUO's two vendor systems and re-deriving them downstream would be
a second implementation of a rule that lives in core.
No daysRemaining: under the old vendor system a pay period is a UO day
(Clock.MinutesPerUODay, about two real hours), so the obvious name would be wrong
by a factor of twelve on exactly the shards least likely to notice. periodsRemaining
plus the interval, and dismissalAt as an instant. A commission vendor has no pay
timer at all and reports exempt with no schedule — "never dismissed" is not the same
as "dismissed in 400 days".
BridgeEvents — a new account.login.result kind.
EventSink.AccountLogin is a veto hook that fires BEFORE the auth decision, and
AccountLoginEventArgs constructs with Accepted = true, so the existing
account.login.attempt fires on successful logins too and cannot carry a verdict. A
security rule built on it would have mailed "someone tried to get into your account"
every time the player logged in.
The verdict is read one Core slice later via DelayCall(Zero). That needs no core
patch AND does not depend on handler subscription order, which ServUO does not define
and a shard's own scripts can change. reason is omitted on an accept, because
ALRReason's zero value is Invalid and would read as a failure reason. The address is
resolved inside the handler, since AccountLogin_ReplyRej disposes the NetState before
the deferred read runs. The password is never read, logged or emitted.
tools/scaffolding/BridgeProtocol5Probe.cs drives all three on a live shard, and the
README records the two traps it took to get there — both of which produce SILENCE
rather than an error, so each looks exactly like a broken emitter:
* An in-process login probe can never produce accepted:true. AccountHandler calls
acct.HasAccess(e.State) BEFORE it checks the password, and a null NetState fails
that. Only a real socket proves the accepted half — and it is the better test
anyway, since it also produces the real ip.
* Forcing a decay stage on a house that cannot decay emits nothing at all. Only
Condemned and ManualRefresh houses decay; an AutoRefresh one — and the owner's
NEWEST house is always AutoRefresh — has a DecayLevel getter that calls
ResetDynamicDecay() and reports Ageless, wiping the forced stage before the sweep
reads it.
Verified on the local rig against the release sidecar: a house walked
Fairly -> Greatly -> IDOC carried estimatedCollapse on the IDOC frame and only there;
every vendor's periodsRemaining matched funds/chargePerPeriod, including one at 0
whose dismissalAt equals its next tick; a real socket login gave
accepted:false reason:BadPass and then accepted:true. Compiles clean against ServUO
57.4 reference assemblies.
Docs: RunicGateway/docs link/v5.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| 8c6db9f0d5 |
feat(bridge): carry guild rank on roster members
Protocol 4 is still on `edge` and unreleased, so this amends it in place rather
than bumping: `PROTOCOL_VERSION` and `overlay.toml` both stay at 4. A bump is
only owed once a protocol has reached `main`.
Phase 1 shipped the roster member as the standard actor object, which carries no
guild rank. The consequence surfaced in Teams phase 2: the website could only
learn leadership from the board's single `leader` field, so `getTeamLeaders()`
could return exactly one member — while a UO guild routinely has several at rank
4, and TEAMS.md §2.5 treats multiple leaders as the normal case.
Roster members now carry `rank` (0-4, 4 being Leader per RankDefinition.Ranks)
plus `rankCliloc`, or `rankName` when a custom rank definition uses a literal
string instead of a cliloc. Only the raw rank goes on the wire: ServUO names the
five standard ranks with cliloc ids and ships no text for them, so this shard
cannot produce "Warlord" without a client-file table it does not have. The
website module has one, and resolving a game term is its job in any case.
`withGuildRank` is a parameter on `Actors()` rather than a change to the shared
actor writer. Rank is a property of a mobile's membership of THIS guild, not of
the mobile, and every other actor this bridge writes is a bystander, a killer or
a governor, where guild rank is meaningless. `WriteActor` is split into a
fields-only writer so both forms share one definition of an actor.
## The trap this found
**`PlayerMobile.GuildRank` returns `RankDefinition.Leader` for anyone at
GameMaster or above, whatever their actual rank.** It is a gameplay convenience
so staff can operate a guild stone, and it is emphatically not a claim about who
leads the guild -- but it is what the only public accessor returns, and the true
value sits in a private field. Emitting it verbatim would have published every
staff member in a guild as a guild leader on a public website.
Staff are therefore written with no rank fields at all. A staff account that
genuinely leads its guild shows as an unranked member, which is a visible gap
rather than a false claim -- the right way round, given the name on that roster
reaches a public page.
## Verification
This repo has no CI build, so compiling is not evidence. Run against the local
ServUO tree with a throwaway probe that synthesised a guild from real
PlayerMobiles across the rank ladder, with one account promoted to GameMaster.
The emitted frame:
tester rank 4 cliloc 1062959 (Leader)
Seed000A rank 4 cliloc 1062959 (Leader) <- two at once, the point of this
Seed000B rank 3 cliloc 1062960 (Warlord)
Seed000C rank 2 cliloc 1062961 (Emissary)
Seed001A rank 1 cliloc 1062962 (Member)
Seed001B no rank fields <- GameMaster, stored rank 0,
getter reported rank 4
The probe printed stored vs reported rank per member, so the getter's substitution
is recorded rather than inferred: `Seed001B storedRank=0 reportedRank=4
access=GameMaster`. The line parsed as valid JSON.
`dotnet build Scripts.csproj` clean, 0 warnings. Probe deleted, tree rebuilt, and
`deploy.ps1 -Verify` reports 0 changes against the overlay. The shard was killed
without a world save, so the synthetic guild did not persist (Guilds.bin still 0
bytes).
**The sidecar needs no change.** It treats roster members as opaque values and
never reads a field inside one -- `accumulate_roster` moves them and
`upsert_guild_roster` stores them, both by value. That is the forwarder design
paying off.
Refs docs/link/v4.md §2.3
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| cc4f58317e |
feat(bridge)!: guild rosters and per-member leaves, on protocol 4
Protocol 2 could say how many members a guild had, not who they were, and there is no EventSink for leaving a guild — so PROTOCOL_2.md §10.1 deferred the whole membership half. This closes it. The sweep now holds each guild's member serial **set** instead of folding it into the signature as a sum. That buys two things. A set comparison cannot collide, where a sum could: one member joining and another leaving between two passes offset each other and the guild looked unchanged. And a set can be *differenced*, which is what makes a per-member `guild.leave` possible without a core tap — departures are simply the prior set minus the current one. A changed set also re-emits `guild.roster`, the full member list. That is what lets the departure events stay advisory: a consumer building a "so-and-so left" feed wants them, but a consumer holding a membership table only needs the roster, so nothing downstream has to replay deltas to stay correct. On a guild's first sweep there is no prior set, so nothing is reported as leaving — an unknown roster becoming known is not 155 people leaving at once. A roster is the only fat frame this plugin emits — measured at roughly 69 bytes per member against a real 155-member guild — and the sidecar reads a line with no length bound. So members per frame are capped (default 500, about 35 KB), and a guild over the cap is split into frames carrying `seq`, `more` and `total`. Every realistic guild emits exactly one frame with `seq` 0 and `more` false, which is the same shape as if chunking did not exist. Verified against the real sidecar with the cap forced down to 50, which produced 50/50/50/5 across four frames. The reconnect baseline is spread rather than fired in one pass. `OnConnected` clears the diff caches, so every guild looks changed at once, and building hundreds of fat frames in a single Core-thread tick is exactly the stall this bridge exists to avoid. At most GuildRosterGuildsPerTick guilds emit a roster per sweep; a guild over budget keeps its old member set, so it still reads as changed next pass. The sweep re-arms itself after 2s while a baseline is draining, so catch-up takes seconds rather than one full sweep interval per batch. BridgeJson gained the array writer it never had — there was no way to express a list of objects at all. Every field helper emits a leading `,"name":`, so Actor is split into a bare-object writer that both the single and array forms use. overlay.toml protocol -> 4, in this commit rather than a later one: CI folds it into the release manifest and the installer refuses to pair an overlay and a sidecar that disagree, so a bump landing separately from the emitters would silently fail to compose into a bundle. Verified on a live ServUO shard against the real Rust sidecar (not a stub): 155 members seeded from real PlayerMobiles, four roster frames reassembled to 153 entries on the board after two members were removed, two guild.leave frames with the correct serials, and the departed serials absent from the re-emitted roster. Refs: docs/website/TEAMS.md Part 12 Phase 1 Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 48d57e6278 |
feat(bridge): publish the player-vendor market index as vendor.listing
Protocol 3.0 §8. Every player vendor's shop name, owner, location and priced inventory, so the website can offer the search the in-game Vendor Search gump offers — from outside the game, and honouring the same per-player opt-out. It cannot be an RPC. rpc.rs correlates a reply on the FIRST frame carrying a matching reqId, so a chunked reply sharing one reqId would deliver chunk 1 to the HTTP caller and leak chunks 2..N onto the broadcast feed; a whole-world snapshot would not fit in one frame inside the 10 s timeout either. So it is a diff sweep on the broadcast stream, one authoritative frame per vendor. The one genuinely new pattern here is an amortized round-robin: every other sweep walks its whole collection per tick, which is fine for tens of houses and is not fine for a world of shops whose inventories recurse into containers. MarketSweepBatch (25) vendors are inventoried per tick from a persistent cursor, so per-tick cost is bounded by the batch rather than by world size. VendorSearch.GetItemName is never called: it builds an ObjectPropertyList, serialises it and byte-parses the packet per item. The frame carries itemId, hue, amount, price, the plain item.Name field and item.LabelNumber; the website resolves names against its own cliloc table. (It would not work anyway — every current client ships its cliloc files compressed and ServUO's Ultima.StringList cannot read them, so the in-game gump has the same gap.) Measured on the live shard (27 vendors x 40 listings, 209k items / 43k mobiles): 15.4 ms for the first cold tick of 25 vendors, 3.4 ms for the next, 0.3 ms in steady state. `[bridge status` now reports lastMs/maxMs and a tick over 50 ms warns, naming the knob — the batch cap is a claim about that number and an operator tuning it was otherwise tuning blind. - location is ONE nested object, not flat map/x/y/region, so the website's single market.location visibility rule can hide a vendor's whereabouts on both the live frame and the stored read model. Flat keys would need five rules. - Owner is flat ownerSerial/ownerName, never BridgeJson.Actor, which would add acct and webId. Same argument points.board makes. - pv.VendorSearch is honoured, so a shop hidden in game is hidden on the site; the seen-set removal then emits vendor.listing.remove. - Container-priced items carry child:true, exactly as DoSearch reports them. - Over MarketMaxListings (250) the frame says truncated and carries the real total, so the site shows "250 of 3,104" rather than a partial shop as complete. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| ed8f568d94 |
feat(bridge): publish points/loyalty leaderboards as points.board
Protocol 3.0 §7 (docs/link/v3.md). ServUO carries ~25 separate point currencies
— Queen's Loyalty, Void Pool, Casino, Clean Up Britannia, the nine city
loyalties, the Doom/Khaldun/Kotl treasure systems — every one a standing players
build over months, and none of them visible outside an in-game gump until now.
BridgePoints.cs
- A diff sweep shaped like BridgeHousing: ServerStarted arms the timer, a
sidecar connect clears the diff state so a fresh sidecar gets every board,
and each pass emits only the systems whose top N or participant count moved.
One ~600 B frame per system rather than one 12 KB frame, matching
champ.update / guild.update. No points.remove — the system set is fixed at
startup by PointsSystem.Configure, the same argument city.update makes.
- Selection is a single bounded pass into a fixed N-element array kept sorted
by insertion, NOT OrderByDescending().Take(N). PlayerTable is a plain List
and ten of the ~25 systems have AutoAdd = true, so they hold a row for every
character ever created: the naive version is ~25 full sorts on the Core
thread, which BRIDGE_PLUGIN_PLAN.md §1 measured as the second thing in the
bridge capable of blowing a frame budget.
- Which systems publish defaults to the shard's OWN answer — ShowOnLoyaltyGump
— rather than a list here that would drift; Bridge.cfg PointsSystems=
overrides it, and an unrecognised name is logged rather than dropped.
- Entries are written inline as {serial, name}, never via BridgeJson.Actor. A
board is the widest-audience surface the bridge has, so acct/webId
deliberately do not cross the wire; the site resolves serial → user from its
own link mirror.
char.profile gains a points block, the titles precedent from PROTOCOL_2.md §10.3
- Never uses PointsSystem.GetEntry/GetPoints: both MUTATE THE WORLD, since
GetEntry(create: false) still calls AddEntry when the system has AutoAdd
(PointsSystem.cs:207). Using them would have appended up to ten rows to the
points save file every time anyone opened a character sheet. Hand-rolled
read-only scan instead.
- rank is off by default (PointsProfileRank). A points lookup stops at the
character's own row; a rank must count every row that beats them, in every
system, on every profile build.
Verified by running it, not by reading it: the whole Scripts tree (6,207 files)
compiles clean against real ServUO 57.4 assemblies, and a boot against the local
shard with a 43,011-mobile world emitted five live boards. That run caught a bug
no fake shard could — ServUO's uncapped idiom is MaxPoints = double.MaxValue,
and (long) on it is an UNCHECKED conversion yielding long.MinValue, so the first
sweep published "maxPoints": -9223372036854775808 for three of the five boards.
Cap()/Score() now normalise anything unrepresentable, and maxPoints: 0 is the
documented "uncapped" value — which on a real shard is the common case, not an
edge case. Re-verified after the fix: 0 for the uncapped systems, 15000 and
10000 for the two that genuinely cap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|||
| 3fb4b7dc9f |
feat(bridge): emit world.ruleset, the shard's published ruleset
Protocol 3.0 §5 (docs/link/v3.md). One frame describing how this shard is actually configured — expansion, which optional systems are on, skill/stat caps, account and house limits, champion scroll rules, the save/restart schedule — so the website's rules page cannot drift from the server. Modelled on BridgeBoot.EmitHello, not on the diff sweeps: the ruleset changes only when an operator edits a .cfg, so there is nothing to poll. It subscribes Connected_Core, so a sidecar that comes up second still learns the ruleset, and `[bridge reload` re-emits for an operator who just edited a file. The frame is built from an EXPLICIT ALLOWLIST of Config.Get calls. Config.Entries is never enumerated — that would sweep in every key on the server, secrets included — and Server.cfg, Staff.cfg, Email.cfg, DataPath.cfg, Bridge.cfg, Compiler.cfg, Reports.cfg and Client.cfg are named as excluded both here and in a code comment. The one connection detail published is Bridge.PublicConnectAddress, blank by default, which an operator sets deliberately for this purpose. `rev` is FNV-1a over the body so an unchanged reconnect is a site-side no-op. String.GetHashCode() is deliberately not used: it is seeded per process, so it would change on every restart and defeat the diff. Verified by compiling the full ServUO Scripts tree (6,205 files, net48, EJ) with this overlay substituted for the deployed Bridge copy — clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 0fd6b91f22 |
docs: move docs to RunicGateway/docs, repoint all references
Extracted docs/ (ADMIN_CONTROLS, INTEGRATION, PLAN, PROTOCOL_2, RESEARCH, SHARD_PREREQS) into the central RunicGateway/docs repo under link/, with full commit history preserved via git filter-repo. The source cites these design docs by section throughout, so every in-repo reference (C# + Rust comments, Bridge.cfg, and the READMEs) is repointed at the new docs-repo URL. README references are rendered as markdown links; a Documentation pointer section is added to the top-level README. Docs repo: https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs |
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| 5e0b42b948 |
feat(protocol2): Town Cryer news-gump integration (§16, Protocol 2.1)
Website news articles now land in the modern Town Cryer News gump
(TownCryerSystem.NewsEntries), separate from the scrolling-crier lines.
Overlay BridgeNews (new): news.add / news.remove insert/remove a
TownCryerNewsEntry directly in the public NewsEntries list (no stock edit),
tracking our own id->entry map so stock uo.com news is left intact. Title,
HTML body, image, and URL are all supported (the stock gumps already branch on
TextDefinition.Number, so string content renders). On add the article title is
also proclaimed via GlobalTownCrierEntryList (announce defaults on; set
announce:false to suppress). Config caps: NewsMaxTitleLength/BodyLength/
External, NewsAnnounceDurationSec.
Sidecar: POST /news (add/replace, id-correlated), DELETE /news/{id}; news table
stores each article as its news.add command; on shard server.hello the sidecar
replays the stored set with announce:false (the shard rebuilds NewsEntries each
boot and does not persist ours, so the website is the source of truth).
Docs: PROTOCOL_2 §16 (design + verified), INTEGRATION.md /news endpoints.
Verified live: sidecar cargo check clean; overlay compiles in the full ServUO
Scripts tree (0 errors); booted shard + sidecar and exercised add/replace/
remove/error paths and the reconnect replay end-to-end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| be442d36a0 |
feat(protocol2): titles in char.profile (Part B ph.4)
Overlay BridgeProfile: char.profile gains a titles block (selected index, fameKarma, skill, and the raw reward-title list) read from PlayerMobile's public title accessors. No new stream, no sidecar change — it rides the existing char.profile served by GET /char. Reward entries may be a cliloc number as a string or a literal; resolve numeric ones website-side like item names. Docs: INTEGRATION.md char.profile titles field; PROTOCOL_2 ph.4 built. Part B phase 5 (Factions/VvV) remains deferred by owner decision. Verified: overlay compiles in the full ServUO Scripts tree (0 errors, 0 warnings). Live run pending. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| a837edd5ee |
feat(protocol2): house registry board (Part B ph.3)
Overlay BridgeHousing (new): a diff sweep over BaseHouse.AllHouses -> house.update / house.remove (owner, region, location, decay level, co-owners, friends, placement price), complementing the existing house.decay transition feed. HousingSweepSeconds (300s); wired into [bridge reload|sweepnow|status. Stock ServUO has no "for sale" flag, so this is an owner->houses registry; price is the placement value, not a listing. Sidecar: houses board table with upsert/delete/all; main routes house.update/ remove into it; GET /houses served from the store. Docs: INTEGRATION.md house.* events + /houses endpoint; PROTOCOL_2 ph.3 built. Verified: sidecar cargo check clean; overlay compiles in the full ServUO Scripts tree (0 errors, 0 warnings). Live run pending. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 1244eb6c4f |
feat(protocol2): presence stream — online population + region transitions (Part B ph.2)
Overlay BridgePresence (new): - presence.online sweep over online PlayerMobiles: total plus per-facet and per-region counts, emitted only when the population changes. - region.enter real-time from EventSink.OnEnterRegion (player-filtered), the cheap location signal PLAN.md prefers over Movement. - PresenceSweepSeconds (30s); wired into [bridge reload|sweepnow|status. Sidecar: - GET /online serves the latest presence.online snapshot from the event store (survives restart); population time series via /history?kind=presence.online. Docs: INTEGRATION.md presence events + /online endpoint; PROTOCOL_2 ph.2 built. Verified: sidecar cargo check clean; overlay compiles in the full ServUO Scripts tree (0 errors, 0 warnings). Live run pending. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| dd39d524c6 |
feat(protocol2): guild and town-governor world-state streams (Part B ph.1)
Adds the first Part B streams from docs/PROTOCOL_2.md: guild rosters and
town governors ("mayors"), both outbound diff-board sweeps mirroring the
existing champ board.
Overlay:
- BridgeSocial (new): guild sweep+diff over BaseGuild.List -> guild.update /
guild.remove (full-state upsert; disband detected via Disbanded), plus a
real-time guild.join from EventSink.JoinGuild. (EventSink.CreateGuild is only
the load-time factory, so creation is derived sidecar-side from a first-seen
id, as champs do.)
- BridgeGovernance (new): city sweep over CityLoyaltySystem.Cities -> city.update
(governor / governor-elect / election phase), gated on CityLoyaltySystem.Enabled.
- BridgeJson.Actor: shared serial/name/acct/webId/player writer used by both.
- BridgeConfig: GuildSweepSeconds (60s), CitySweepSeconds (300s).
- BridgeBoot: both wired into [bridge reload|sweepnow|status.
Sidecar:
- store: guilds + governors board tables with upsert/delete/all.
- main: route guild.update/remove and city.update into the boards.
- web: GET /guilds, GET /governors served from the store (snapshot-companion
rule, so a fresh page or a restarted sidecar hydrates without the shard).
Docs: INTEGRATION.md event catalog (guild.*, city.update) + board endpoints;
PROTOCOL_2.md Part B phase 1 marked built.
Verified: sidecar cargo check clean; overlay compiles in the full ServUO
Scripts tree (0 errors, 0 warnings). Live end-to-end run still pending.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| 5816c29c67 |
feat(protocol2): website account provisioning & unlinking (Part A)
Adds the account-provisioning plane from docs/PROTOCOL_2.md Part A: the website can create game accounts and unlink them, gated by a shard-wide signup mode. The existing [link flow is unchanged. Overlay: - BridgeConfig: SignupMode (website|game|hybrid, default hybrid; unrecognized falls back to game), AccountCreateEnabled (mode-following default), RequireIpForCreate, name/password caps, and a boot warning when the core Accounts.AutoCreateAccounts setting contradicts the mode. - BridgeAccounts (new): account.create (mode gate, actor required, char-safety mirrored from AccountHandler, collision check, per-IP cap via CanCreate/ LogAccess with fail-closed missing/loopback IP, create + WebsiteUserId link, account.audit; password never logged or echoed) and account.unlink (Owner floor via BridgeAdmin.Protected, clears the tag). - BridgeAccountLink: in-game [unlink command, emits account.unlinked. - BridgeAdmin: Protected / ResolveTargetAccount promoted to public for reuse. Sidecar: - POST /accounts/create, DELETE /link/:account, respond_account status mapping (409 collision / 429 ip cap / 403 disabled|protected / 404 not-linked / 400). - store.record_unlink drops the mirrored link row. - PROTOCOL_VERSION -> 2 (outbound events additive; new endpoints need v2). Docs: INTEGRATION.md protocol bump, account.* events, endpoints, 409/429; PROTOCOL_2.md Part A marked built. Verified: sidecar cargo check clean; overlay compiles in the full ServUO Scripts tree (0 errors, 0 warnings). Live end-to-end run still pending. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 9c3a33148b |
feat(champ): stream champion-spawn state to the sidecar board
Champion spawns have no ServUO EventSink, so add a fourth polled stream
(BridgeChamps) modeled on BridgeSweeps: enumerate every spawn each tick,
fold to a small record, and emit champ.update only on change. No core
patch — every field used is public.
Covers all three families via a `category` field:
- champion: ChampionSpawn (type/level/kills/boss/cooldown ETA)
- mini: MiniChamp (type/level; auto-restarts, no kill counter)
- sea: BaseSeaChampion (a High Seas world-boss mobile, alive only
while summoned; removed via champ.remove when slain)
Status folds to active/cooldown/dormant. A (re)connection clears the diff
cache so the next sweep re-emits the full board, rebuilding a sidecar that
restarted on its own. Transient entries leave via champ.remove.
Sidecar: a `champs` current-state table (one row per serial) fed by
champ.update (upsert) and champ.remove (delete), exposed at GET /champs as
the live board. New ChampSweepSeconds config (default 10s), wired into
[bridge reload/sweepnow/status. Documented in docs/INTEGRATION.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0114TpmrNW4wNXsHq5CR72jQ
|
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| 3ef607ee44 |
feat(pages): help-page (support) queue — stream, snapshot, respond, close
Phase 2 of docs/ADMIN_CONTROLS.md: surface the in-game help-page queue to the
website.
- BridgePages.cs: the queue has no EventSink, so it is polled (PageSweepSeconds,
default 5s) and diffed, keyed by sender serial (one page per player) ->
page.new / page.updated / page.closed. Inbound pages.snapshot -> pages.list;
page.respond delivers a staff reply to the player (online: a gump now; offline:
queued for next login; shows as "Staff") and can close; page.close removes it.
- BridgeConfig/Bridge.cfg: PageSweepSeconds. BridgeBoot: reload re-arms the poll,
status reports it.
- sidecar/src/web.rs: GET /pages, POST /pages/{id}/respond, POST /pages/{id}/close.
- INTEGRATION.md: page events (§4) and endpoints (§6).
- tools/scaffolding/BridgePageProbe.cs: gated headless verification.
Verified live (probe-seeded tickets): snapshot returns the queue, the poll emits
page.new for both and page.closed on removal, respond -> 200, close removes the
page, unknown page -> 404.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0114TpmrNW4wNXsHq5CR72jQ
|
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| 5968007882 |
feat(admin): plugin write plane — admin.kick/ban/unban/broadcast
Phase 1 (plugin side) of docs/ADMIN_CONTROLS.md: a staff write plane so the website can moderate the live shard. - BridgeAdmin.cs: inbound admin.kick, admin.ban (timed + indefinite), admin.unban, admin.broadcast. Each requires an `actor`, refuses targets at or above AdminAccessFloor (default CoOwner — Owner-only shield), replies admin.ok/admin.error with the reqId echoed, and emits an admin.audit (origin=web) broadcast. Attribution is web:<actor> in the console log and the ban BanDealer tag. Kicking enumerates NetState.Instances so a character-select session is caught too. - BridgeConfig/Bridge.cfg: AdminWriteEnabled (default OFF — opt-in), AdminAccessFloor, broadcast/reason length caps, ban duration clamp. - tools/stub_sidecar_admin.ps1: live smoke-test harness; *.log gitignored. Verified: compiles clean against ServUO (0 err/warn); live run on the seeded shard confirms all four verbs, the audit stream, timed-ban fields, and the Owner-floor refusal, with no exceptions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0114TpmrNW4wNXsHq5CR72jQ |
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| e4b62ff5ce |
Phase 6: town-crier news (website -> game)
BridgeTownCrier handles inbound towncrier.add / towncrier.remove, pushing
website-published news into GlobalTownCrierEntryList so every town crier
announces it until it expires. Both run on the Core thread (required: AddEntry
mutates a shared list and the criers send packets). An id maps to the created
TownCrierEntry so a later remove can pull it, and re-adding an id replaces the
prior entry.
Caps are enforced before touching the shared list -- line count, line length,
active-entry count, duration -- as defense in depth on top of the loopback trust
boundary: a buggy or compromised sidecar still cannot flood the criers or pin a
message forever. Config: Bridge.TownCrierMax{Lines,LineLength,Active,DurationSec}.
Verified with a sending stub and a probe that logs the actual crier list. Replies
and game state agree: add n1 -> towncrier.ok and the entry appears with the exact
lines; add n2 (8 lines over the cap of 6) -> towncrier.error and never enters the
list; remove n1 -> towncrier.ok and the entry is gone; remove unknown ->
towncrier.error. Evidence in docs/PLAN.md §16.
Adds BridgeJson.GetStringList for JSON string arrays, tools/stub_sidecar_crier.ps1,
and tools/scaffolding/BridgeCrierProbe.cs. This closes the pure-plugin inbound
work; only the PlayerVendorSale core edit (Phase 7) remains on the ServUO side.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| feeb904bfe |
Phase 5: [link account linking
BridgeAccountLink ties a game account to a website account. [link mints a one-time, 5-minute code from an unambiguous alphabet (no O/0/I/1), holds it in a Core-thread dict keyed to the account, and emits link.request. The website relays the code back through the sidecar as link.confirm; the shard validates, writes the WebsiteUserId account tag, and replies link.ok. A bad or expired code gets link.error. The tag persists to accounts.xml in ServUO's standard <tags> format, read by LoadTags at boot, so a link survives restarts with no new persistence layer. mob.login now carries webId when the account is linked, so the sidecar can attribute a session to a site user without a lookup. Safeguards: one-time codes; only the newest code per account is valid; per-account 30s rate limit against code spam; a 1-minute purge bounds the code table; the websiteUserId is trusted only because the socket is loopback-only. The tag reaches memory on confirm but disk only on the next save — a hard crash between loses it, and the player just re-runs [link. Verified end to end with a smart stub that reads the emitted code and confirms it: link.request -> link.confirm -> link.ok, a bad code -> link.error, and the tag observed in accounts.xml after a save. Evidence in docs/PLAN.md §15. The [link command body is exposed as RequestLink(Mobile) so it can be driven in tests without a client. Adds tools/stub_sidecar_link.ps1 and tools/scaffolding/BridgeLinkProbe.cs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 7e48d60a8b |
Phase 4: character-profile request/response
BridgeProfile builds the read-models the website consumes; BridgeRequests
registers the inbound handlers. The sidecar asks, the shard answers on the Core
thread (inbound lines are marshaled through Timer.DelayCall before a handler
runs), so all of these read live world state safely.
- char.request: resolve by serial, or by account + slot, and reply with a full
profile (stats, all trained skills, worn equipment with flattened AOS mods,
resists). Works for offline characters since a logged-off mobile stays
resident until Delete.
- account.roster: light per-character summary, offline chars included.
- vendor.snapshot: every player vendor owned by an account, with held gold and
priced listings.
Each request may carry a reqId the reply echoes so the sidecar can correlate.
An unresolvable request gets a bridge.error reply rather than silence, so the
website can show a real failure instead of hanging.
Verified against the real world with a sending stub: all five requests answered,
both char lookup paths (account+slot and serial) returning the identical profile,
vendor.snapshot returning seed_000's two vendors and 80 listings, and the bad
account returning bridge.error. Two real-data findings noted in docs/PLAN.md §14:
a GM character can have skill base > cap (the website must not assume otherwise),
and the mod-flattening path still wants a genuinely kitted character to exercise
against real suffix gear.
Adds tools/stub_sidecar_request.ps1 (sends requests) and a hardened
tools/stub_sidecar.ps1 (survives reaping/rebind).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| 7ea7570e5a |
Phase 3: polled sweeps (vitals, house decay, economy)
BridgeSweeps runs three repeating Core-thread timers for the state that has no
EventSink. Cost measured in Phase 1 is why they can run on the main thread: a
full pass of all three is well under a millisecond at the seeded scale.
- Vitals: online players only. Small and volatile; the sidecar diffs snapshots.
Offline characters do not move, so they are served on demand as full profiles
instead, not swept.
- House decay: emits only on a level transition. A silent baseline on
ServerStarted records every house's current stage, so a restart does not
re-announce them. Payload carries from/to, coords, nested ban location,
region, sign name, owner serial+account, and built/refreshed timestamps, all
null-guarded.
- Economy supply: periodic sum of every account's currency as a snapshot. The
level; AccountGoldChange and the vendor events are the flow.
All three re-arm on `[bridge reload`; `[bridge sweepnow` runs one of each on
demand; `[bridge status` reports sweep counters. Sweeps skip emitting while the
sidecar is disconnected, since their state is perishable and re-emitted next
tick anyway (unlike events, which queue through an outage).
Verified on the seeded world with 8s intervals: baseline recorded 29 houses
silently, a probe bumped one Somewhat->Fairly, and the next sweep emitted exactly
one house.decay and none for the other 28. Economy emitted a supply snapshot per
interval. Vitals emitted nothing, correctly, since all seeded characters are
offline. Evidence in docs/PLAN.md §13.
Adds tools/scaffolding/BridgeSweepProbe.cs (never deployed) to force a decay
transition on demand.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| 261ae6bc5c |
Phase 2: cheap event streams
BridgeEvents subscribes the streams selected for tracking, economy, and cheat detection: Login/Logout/AccountLogin, AccountGoldChange, ValidVendorPurchase/ Sell, PlacePlayerVendor, SkillGain, FameChange, KarmaChange, QuestComplete, PlayerDeath, PlayerMurdered, OnKilledBy, FastWalk, OnPropertyChanged, Command, and Before/AfterWorldSave. Every handler runs on the Core thread inside the path that raised it, so each is wrapped to never throw, does only Emit (which enqueues and returns), and never mutates the args. Three of these are veto hooks and are read strictly: AccountLogin (Accepted/RejectReason, and a plaintext Password we never emit), FastWalk (Blocked), and the login decision path generally. Testing on the live shard found that SkillGain fires for NPCs, hard: the first boot emitted 115 skill.gain events in four seconds, all spawned creatures grinding Meditation, zero players. That is the general rule here — most "player" events also fire for NPCs — so SkillGain, FameChange, KarmaChange, and OnKilledBy all filter to players on the Core thread before the socket. Gold, fame, karma, and the save boundaries were fired through their real code paths and observed at the stub sidecar; gold.change round-trips the platinum->gold conversion and persists across restarts. Evidence in docs/PLAN.md §12. Adds tools/scaffolding/BridgeEventProbe.cs (never deployed) which triggers those events through real world mutations rather than synthetic Invoke calls. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Phase 1: loopback transport to the sidecar
BridgeLink owns a TcpClient to 127.0.0.1 and nothing else touches it. Emit() is
called from the Core thread; it enqueues onto a bounded drop-oldest queue and
returns. A link thread drains the queue and reconnects with backoff; a reader
thread parses inbound lines and marshals each to the Core thread via
Timer.DelayCall. An absent, slow, or wedged sidecar therefore cannot stall the
shard, which is the property the rest of the bridge depends on.
Outbound JSON is written by hand into a StringBuilder because it runs on the
Core thread for every event and the measured budget assumes that cost. Inbound
uses JavaScriptSerializer: commands arrive at human rates, so correctness beats
speed, and parsing happens off the Core thread anyway. That needs a
System.Web.Extensions reference.
server.hello is emitted per connection rather than once at ServerStarted. A
sidecar that restarts independently would otherwise never learn which shard it
is attached to. It carries a bootId, stable across reconnects and fresh on every
shard restart, so the sidecar can tell "I reconnected" from "the shard
restarted" and keep or discard its cache accordingly.
Two defects found by testing and fixed before commit:
- Backoff ceiling was 30s, so a sidecar restart cost up to half a minute of
buffering on a loopback socket. Now 5s.
- A stale reader could kill a fresh connection: reader.Join(1s) can time out,
and the old thread's finally block then set the shared _dead flag, possibly
tearing down the connection that had replaced it. Connections now carry an
epoch and a reader only marks dead the one it owned.
Acceptance evidence recorded in docs/PLAN.md §11: boots with no sidecar, buffers
through the outage and drains on connect, round-trips ping/pong on the Core
thread, survives unknown kinds and malformed JSON, and reconnects unattended.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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