Isolate internal bot-config route from the public listener (#33)
The GET /internal/bot-config route returns the DECRYPTED Discord bot token and was mounted on the same Express app / port 3000 that Pangolin proxies publicly. Its only guard was the BOT_INTERNAL_KEY shared secret, and .env.example shipped a placeholder default — so a forwarded path or a weak/unrotated key would expose the plaintext token to the internet. Move server<->bot internal traffic onto its own listener and fail fast on a weak key: - Add server/src/internalApp.js: a standalone Express app mounting requireInternalKey + /internal (and a no-secret /health), mirroring the bot's unpublished port-4100 pattern. - server.js starts a second listener on INTERNAL_PORT (default 3001), closed on graceful shutdown. - Remove the /internal mount from the public v1.router; the public app now 404s /api/v1/internal/bot-config even with a valid key. - Fail fast: new utils/botInternalKey.js rejects an empty, placeholder, or <16-char BOT_INTERNAL_KEY — fatal in production (exit 1), warning in dev. - docker-compose: bot SITE_INTERNAL_URL -> app:3001/internal/bot-config; document that INTERNAL_PORT stays unpublished. - .env.example (root/server/bot): document INTERNAL_PORT, the fail-fast behavior, and a defense-in-depth Pangolin deny rule for /api/v1/internal. Tests: add requireInternalKey.test.js and botInternalKey.test.js (node --test: 93 pass). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
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15
.env.example
15
.env.example
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
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# App
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NODE_ENV=production
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PORT=3000
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# Separate, UNPUBLISHED port for server<->bot internal traffic (the decrypted
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# bot-token route). Must match the port in the bot's SITE_INTERNAL_URL
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# (docker-compose.yml) and must NEVER be published/proxied. See issue #33.
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INTERNAL_PORT=3001
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UPLOAD_DIR=/app/uploads
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# Logging — written to BOTH the console and a log file.
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LOG_LEVEL=info # console verbosity: error | warn | info | debug
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@@ -64,7 +68,14 @@ CLIENT_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5173
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# service). BOT_INTERNAL_KEY MUST be byte-for-byte identical to the same
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# variable in bot/.env.example — it is the only auth on both sides' /internal/*
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# routes, so a mismatch silently breaks every server<->bot call with 401s.
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# The Discord bot TOKEN itself is not an env var — it's entered in the admin
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# panel (Discord Bot page) and stored encrypted in the DB (see bot_config table).
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# It also guards the server's /internal/bot-config route, which returns the
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# DECRYPTED Discord token; with NODE_ENV=production the app REFUSES TO START if
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# this is left blank, at this placeholder, or shorter than 16 chars. Generate a
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# long random string. The Discord bot TOKEN itself is not an env var — it's
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# entered in the admin panel (Discord Bot page) and stored encrypted in the DB.
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#
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# Defense in depth: even with a strong key, configure Pangolin/your reverse
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# proxy to DENY /api/v1/internal (and never forward INTERNAL_PORT). The route no
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# longer rides the public listener, but an explicit deny rule is belt-and-braces.
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BOT_INTERNAL_URL=http://bot:4100
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BOT_INTERNAL_KEY=change-me-to-a-long-random-string
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