feat(auth): trusted devices, recovery codes, and admin MFA management
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Add opt-in "Trust this device" so a browser/app skips the TOTP step (never
the password) for 30 days, single-use bcrypt recovery codes as a 2FA-lockout
fallback, and admin trusted-device/MFA-reset management — backend, web UI,
OpenAPI spec, and tests.

- Schema: trusted_devices (sha256 token hash, looked up by unique index) and
  recovery_codes (bcrypt, single-use). Both additive/idempotent.
- Session service: trust-token mint/hash/resolve + cap helpers; new rg_trust
  httpOnly cookie (survives logout, revoked on untrust/password change/reset/
  TOTP disable). JWTs stay stateless — trust is a server-side row, not a claim.
- Web + mobile login accept a trusted-device token / recovery code; login/totp
  gains trustDevice + recoveryCode. Cap of 10/user with NO silent pruning — an
  over-cap trust returns 409/trustLimitReached and the client prompts to revoke.
- Self-service /auth/me/trusted-devices* + recovery-codes*; admin
  /admin/users/:id/trusted-devices* + /mfa/reset. All actions audit-logged.
- Client: "Trust this device" + recovery-code login options, one-time recovery
  code display, Trusted Devices + Recovery Codes account panels, a TOTP-styled
  revoke-to-continue cap modal, and admin per-user security controls.
- OpenAPI regenerated; 33 new server tests (all suites green).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-21 23:38:48 -05:00
parent 8d5bdc0d6e
commit 60ebacff2c
38 changed files with 3542 additions and 90 deletions

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const { query } = require('../../utils/db')
// SQL for the recovery_codes table. Each row is one bcrypt-hashed, single-use
// backup code. The raw codes are shown to the user exactly once at generation and
// never stored in the clear.
// Bulk-insert freshly generated code hashes for a user. `hashes` is an array of
// bcrypt strings. One multi-row INSERT keeps generation atomic-ish and cheap.
async function insertMany(userId, hashes) {
if (!hashes || hashes.length === 0) return 0
const values = hashes.map(() => '(?, ?)').join(', ')
const params = []
for (const h of hashes) params.push(userId, h)
const res = await query(
`INSERT INTO recovery_codes (user_id, code_hash) VALUES ${values}`,
params,
)
return Number(res.affectedRows || 0)
}
// All not-yet-used codes for a user (hashes included — this is the verify path,
// server-side only). Ordered by id so verification is deterministic.
async function listUnusedForUser(userId) {
return query(
'SELECT id, code_hash FROM recovery_codes WHERE user_id = ? AND used_at IS NULL ORDER BY id',
[userId],
)
}
// Count a user's remaining (unused) codes — for the status endpoint (never the
// codes themselves).
async function countUnusedForUser(userId) {
const rows = await query(
'SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM recovery_codes WHERE user_id = ? AND used_at IS NULL',
[userId],
)
return Number(rows[0]?.n || 0)
}
// Mark one code row used (single-use). Guarded on used_at IS NULL so a race can
// only consume it once. Returns rows changed.
async function markUsed(id) {
const res = await query(
'UPDATE recovery_codes SET used_at = NOW() WHERE id = ? AND used_at IS NULL',
[id],
)
return Number(res.affectedRows || 0)
}
// Delete every code for a user. Used both when regenerating (replace the set) and
// on TOTP disable / password change/reset. Returns rows removed.
async function deleteAllForUser(userId) {
const res = await query('DELETE FROM recovery_codes WHERE user_id = ?', [userId])
return Number(res.affectedRows || 0)
}
module.exports = {
insertMany,
listUnusedForUser,
countUnusedForUser,
markUsed,
deleteAllForUser,
}

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// Recovery (backup) code store. Logic layer over recoveryCodes.db, doing the
// bcrypt hashing itself — the same pattern as users.model hashing passwords (a
// recovery code is a human-typed, lower-entropy fallback credential, so bcrypt,
// not sha256; see docs/website/TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md §3). Codes are generated in
// batches, shown to the user once, and consumed single-use at login.
const crypto = require('crypto')
const bcrypt = require('bcryptjs')
const db = require('./recoveryCodes.db')
const SALT_ROUNDS = 10
const CODE_COUNT = Number(process.env.RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT) || 10
// 10 chars from a 32-symbol alphabet ≈ 50 bits of entropy per code. Crockford-ish
// base32 minus visually ambiguous glyphs (no I, L, O, U) to keep hand-entry clean.
const ALPHABET = '23456789ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ'
const CODE_LEN = 10
// Canonical form used for hashing + comparison: uppercase, alphanumerics only.
// Display adds a dash for readability; input is normalized back to this before
// bcrypt.compare so 'abcde-fghij', 'ABCDEFGHIJ', etc. all verify.
function normalize(code) {
return String(code || '').toUpperCase().replace(/[^0-9A-Z]/g, '')
}
// One random code in canonical form (no separator).
function generateCode() {
const bytes = crypto.randomBytes(CODE_LEN)
let out = ''
for (let i = 0; i < CODE_LEN; i++) out += ALPHABET[bytes[i] % ALPHABET.length]
return out
}
// Present a canonical code to the user with a mid-string dash (display only).
function formatForDisplay(code) {
const mid = Math.floor(code.length / 2)
return `${code.slice(0, mid)}-${code.slice(mid)}`
}
// Generate a fresh batch, REPLACING any existing codes for the user (regeneration
// invalidates the old set). Returns the plaintext codes for one-time display — the
// only time they exist outside the user's hands.
async function generateForUser(userId, count = CODE_COUNT) {
const plain = Array.from({ length: count }, generateCode)
const hashes = await Promise.all(plain.map((c) => bcrypt.hash(c, SALT_ROUNDS)))
await db.deleteAllForUser(userId)
await db.insertMany(userId, hashes)
return plain.map(formatForDisplay)
}
// Verify + consume a recovery code (single-use). Normalizes input, bcrypt-compares
// against the user's unused codes, and marks the first match used. Returns true iff
// a code was consumed. Timing is dominated by bcrypt regardless of match position.
async function consumeForUser(userId, rawCode) {
const candidate = normalize(rawCode)
if (!candidate) return false
const rows = await db.listUnusedForUser(userId)
for (const row of rows) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
if (await bcrypt.compare(candidate, row.code_hash)) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
const changed = await db.markUsed(row.id)
return changed > 0 // lost the race to consume this exact code → treat as fail
}
}
return false
}
// Remaining (unused) code count — for the status endpoint. Never returns codes.
async function remainingForUser(userId) {
return db.countUnusedForUser(userId)
}
// Clear every code for a user (TOTP disable / password change/reset).
async function clearForUser(userId) {
return db.deleteAllForUser(userId)
}
module.exports = {
CODE_COUNT,
normalize,
generateForUser,
consumeForUser,
remainingForUser,
clearForUser,
}