feat(auth): trusted devices, recovery codes, and admin MFA management

Add opt-in "Trust this device" so a browser/app skips the TOTP step (never
the password) for 30 days, single-use bcrypt recovery codes as a 2FA-lockout
fallback, and admin trusted-device/MFA-reset management — backend, web UI,
OpenAPI spec, and tests.

- Schema: trusted_devices (sha256 token hash, looked up by unique index) and
  recovery_codes (bcrypt, single-use). Both additive/idempotent.
- Session service: trust-token mint/hash/resolve + cap helpers; new rg_trust
  httpOnly cookie (survives logout, revoked on untrust/password change/reset/
  TOTP disable). JWTs stay stateless — trust is a server-side row, not a claim.
- Web + mobile login accept a trusted-device token / recovery code; login/totp
  gains trustDevice + recoveryCode. Cap of 10/user with NO silent pruning — an
  over-cap trust returns 409/trustLimitReached and the client prompts to revoke.
- Self-service /auth/me/trusted-devices* + recovery-codes*; admin
  /admin/users/:id/trusted-devices* + /mfa/reset. All actions audit-logged.
- Client: "Trust this device" + recovery-code login options, one-time recovery
  code display, Trusted Devices + Recovery Codes account panels, a TOTP-styled
  revoke-to-continue cap modal, and admin per-user security controls.
- OpenAPI regenerated; 33 new server tests (all suites green).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

server/src/router/v1/admin/account.controller.js

@@ -6,8 +6,11 @@ const users = require('../../../model/users/users.model')
 const activity = require('../../../model/activity/activity.model')
 const userIdentities = require('../../../model/userIdentities/userIdentities.model')
 const mobileSessions = require('../../../model/mobileSessions/mobileSessions.model')
+const trustedDevices = require('../../../model/trustedDevices/trustedDevices.model')
+const recoveryCodes = require('../../../model/recoveryCodes/recoveryCodes.model')
 const sessionService = require('../../../auth/session.service')
-const { setAuthCookie } = require('../../../auth/token')
+const { establishTrust } = require('../auth/trustDevice.helper')
+const { setAuthCookie, setTrustCookie, clearTrustCookie } = require('../../../auth/token')
 const usernamePolicy = require('../../../auth/usernamePolicy')
 const loginProtection = require('../../../middleware/loginProtection')
 const botScore = require('../../../middleware/botScore')
@@ -108,6 +111,12 @@ async function changePassword(req, res) {
     if (session && session.createdAt) {
       await users.setSessionCutoff(req.user.id, new Date(session.createdAt - 1000))
     }
+    // A password change is a security event: drop every trusted device and every
+    // recovery code so a compromised-then-changed account can't be re-entered with
+    // a stale second-factor bypass. Clear this browser's trust cookie too.
+    await trustedDevices.revokeAllForUser(req.user.id)
+    await recoveryCodes.clearForUser(req.user.id)
+    clearTrustCookie(req, res)
     await activity.log({ req, action: 'account.password.change' })
     log.info('account password changed', { id: req.user.id })
     return res.json({ ok: true })
@@ -150,9 +159,14 @@ async function totpEnable(req, res) {
       return res.status(400).json({ message: 'That code is not valid. Try again.' })
     }
     await users.enableTotp(user.id)
+    // Issue the initial batch of single-use recovery codes, shown to the user ONCE
+    // right here (the only time they leave the server in the clear). Generation
+    // replaces any prior set, so re-enrolling always starts clean.
+    const codes = await recoveryCodes.generateForUser(user.id)
     await activity.log({ req, action: 'account.totp.enable' })
+    await activity.log({ req, action: 'account.recovery_codes.generate', detail: { count: codes.length } })
     log.info('totp enabled', { id: user.id, username: user.username })
-    return res.json({ totp_enabled: true })
+    return res.json({ totp_enabled: true, recoveryCodes: codes })
   } catch (err) {
     log.error('totpEnable', err)
     return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
@@ -171,6 +185,11 @@ async function totpDisable(req, res) {
       return res.status(400).json({ message: 'That code is not valid. Try again.' })
     }
     await users.disableTotp(user.id)
+    // With 2FA off, both the trusted-device bypass and recovery codes are moot and
+    // must not linger — drop them so re-enabling later starts from a clean slate.
+    await trustedDevices.revokeAllForUser(user.id)
+    await recoveryCodes.clearForUser(user.id)
+    clearTrustCookie(req, res)
     await activity.log({ req, action: 'account.totp.disable' })
     log.info('totp disabled', { id: user.id, username: user.username })
     return res.json({ totp_enabled: false })
@@ -246,6 +265,129 @@ async function revokeSession(req, res) {
   }
 }
 
+// ── Trusted devices (self-service) ─────────────────────────────────────────
+// Shape a trusted_devices row for the client (never the token hash).
+function toTrustedDevice(r) {
+  return {
+    id: r.id,
+    platform: r.platform,
+    deviceName: r.device_name || null,
+    userAgent: r.user_agent || null,
+    createdAt: r.created_at,
+    lastUsedAt: r.last_used_at || r.created_at,
+    expiresAt: r.expires_at,
+  }
+}
+
+// List the current user's active trusted devices (Trusted Devices screen).
+async function listTrustedDevices(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const rows = await trustedDevices.listActiveForUser(req.user.id)
+    return res.json(rows.map(toTrustedDevice))
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('listTrustedDevices', err)
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+// Trust the CURRENT device/browser from an authenticated session. This is the
+// "revoke one, then retry" completion after a cap-reached prompt, and a general
+// self-service way to trust the device you're on. Web receives the token as the
+// httpOnly rg_trust cookie; native (bearer) sessions get it in the JSON body.
+async function trustThisDevice(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const isMobile = (req.session?.authMethod || req.authMethod) === 'mobile'
+    const result = await establishTrust(req, req.user, {
+      platform: isMobile ? 'mobile' : 'web',
+      deviceName: req.body.deviceName || null,
+    })
+    if (!result.ok && result.capReached) {
+      return res.status(409).json({ error: 'trusted_device_limit', devices: result.devices.map(toTrustedDevice) })
+    }
+    if (!isMobile) {
+      setTrustCookie(req, res, result.trustToken)
+      return res.json({ trusted: true })
+    }
+    return res.json({ trusted: true, trustToken: result.trustToken })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('trustThisDevice', err)
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+// Revoke one of the current user's trusted devices by id (ownership-scoped).
+async function revokeTrustedDevice(req, res) {
+  const id = Number(req.params.id)
+  try {
+    const n = await trustedDevices.revokeByIdForUser(id, req.user.id)
+    if (n) {
+      await activity.log({ req, action: 'account.trusted_device.revoke', detail: { deviceId: id } })
+      log.info('trusted device revoked (self)', { id, userId: req.user.id })
+    }
+    return res.json({ revoked: n > 0 })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('revokeTrustedDevice', err)
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+// Revoke ALL of the current user's trusted devices ("untrust everywhere"), and
+// clear this browser's trust cookie.
+async function revokeAllTrustedDevices(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const n = await trustedDevices.revokeAllForUser(req.user.id)
+    clearTrustCookie(req, res)
+    await activity.log({ req, action: 'account.trusted_device.revoke_all', detail: { count: n } })
+    log.info('all trusted devices revoked (self)', { userId: req.user.id, count: n })
+    return res.json({ revoked: n })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('revokeAllTrustedDevices', err)
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+// ── Recovery codes (self-service) ──────────────────────────────────────────
+// Remaining (unused) code count — never the codes themselves.
+async function recoveryCodesStatus(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const remaining = await recoveryCodes.remainingForUser(req.user.id)
+    return res.json({ remaining })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('recoveryCodesStatus', err)
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+// Regenerate the recovery-code set, returning the new codes ONCE. Password
+// step-up: an account that has a password must supply and match currentPassword
+// (SSO-only accounts with no password may proceed while authenticated, mirroring
+// changePassword). Refuses when 2FA is off (codes only exist alongside TOTP).
+async function generateRecoveryCodes(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const raw = await users.getRawById(req.user.id)
+    if (!raw) return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Unauthorized' })
+    if (!raw.totp_enabled) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ message: 'Enable two-factor before generating recovery codes.' })
+    }
+    if (raw.password_hash) {
+      const ok = await users.validatePassword(raw, req.body.currentPassword || '')
+      if (!ok) {
+        loginProtection.recordFailure(req.ip)
+        botScore.recordLoginFailure(req.ip)
+        log.warn('generateRecoveryCodes wrong current password', { id: req.user.id, ip: req.ip })
+        return res.status(400).json({ message: 'Your current password is incorrect.' })
+      }
+    }
+    const codes = await recoveryCodes.generateForUser(req.user.id)
+    await activity.log({ req, action: 'account.recovery_codes.generate', detail: { count: codes.length } })
+    log.info('recovery codes regenerated', { id: req.user.id })
+    return res.json({ recoveryCodes: codes })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('generateRecoveryCodes', err)
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
 module.exports = {
   getAccount,
   changeUsername,
@@ -257,4 +399,10 @@ module.exports = {
   unlinkIdentity,
   listSessions,
   revokeSession,
+  listTrustedDevices,
+  trustThisDevice,
+  revokeTrustedDevice,
+  revokeAllTrustedDevices,
+  recoveryCodesStatus,
+  generateRecoveryCodes,
 }

server/src/router/v1/admin/admin.controller.js

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ const wiki = require('../../../model/wiki/wiki.model')
 const settings = require('../../../model/settings/settings.model')
 const users = require('../../../model/users/users.model')
 const activity = require('../../../model/activity/activity.model')
+const trustedDevices = require('../../../model/trustedDevices/trustedDevices.model')
+const recoveryCodes = require('../../../model/recoveryCodes/recoveryCodes.model')
 const announceJobs = require('../../../model/announceJobs/announceJobs.model')
 const newsGump = require('../../../utils/newsGump')
 const pushDispatch = require('../../../utils/pushDispatch')
@@ -651,6 +653,88 @@ async function deleteUser(req, res) {
   }
 }
 
+// ── Admin: a user's trusted devices & MFA (admin only) ─────────────────────
+// Staff-facing view/revocation of another user's trusted devices, plus an MFA
+// reset for a locked-out user. All actions are audit-logged with the acting admin
+// (via activity.log's req) and the target user id.
+function toAdminTrustedDevice(r) {
+  return {
+    id: r.id,
+    platform: r.platform,
+    deviceName: r.device_name || null,
+    userAgent: r.user_agent || null,
+    createdAt: r.created_at,
+    lastUsedAt: r.last_used_at || r.created_at,
+    expiresAt: r.expires_at,
+  }
+}
+
+async function listUserTrustedDevices(req, res) {
+  const id = Number(req.params.id)
+  try {
+    const target = await users.getById(id)
+    if (!target) return res.status(404).json({ message: 'Not found' })
+    const rows = await trustedDevices.listActiveForUser(id)
+    return res.json(rows.map(toAdminTrustedDevice))
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('listUserTrustedDevices', err)
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+async function revokeUserTrustedDevice(req, res) {
+  const id = Number(req.params.id)
+  const deviceId = Number(req.params.deviceId)
+  try {
+    const target = await users.getById(id)
+    if (!target) return res.status(404).json({ message: 'Not found' })
+    const n = await trustedDevices.revokeByIdForUser(deviceId, id)
+    if (n) {
+      await activity.log({ req, action: 'admin.trusted_device.revoke', detail: { userId: id, deviceId } })
+      log.info('admin revoked trusted device', { adminId: req.user.id, userId: id, deviceId })
+    }
+    return res.json({ revoked: n > 0 })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('revokeUserTrustedDevice', err)
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+async function revokeAllUserTrustedDevices(req, res) {
+  const id = Number(req.params.id)
+  try {
+    const target = await users.getById(id)
+    if (!target) return res.status(404).json({ message: 'Not found' })
+    const n = await trustedDevices.revokeAllForUser(id)
+    await activity.log({ req, action: 'admin.trusted_device.revoke_all', detail: { userId: id, count: n } })
+    log.info('admin revoked all trusted devices', { adminId: req.user.id, userId: id, count: n })
+    return res.json({ revoked: n })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('revokeAllUserTrustedDevices', err)
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+// Reset a locked-out user's MFA: turn TOTP off, drop every trusted device, and
+// clear their recovery codes. Lets an admin recover a user who lost their
+// authenticator; the user can then sign in with their password alone and re-enroll.
+async function resetUserMfa(req, res) {
+  const id = Number(req.params.id)
+  try {
+    const target = await users.getById(id)
+    if (!target) return res.status(404).json({ message: 'Not found' })
+    await users.disableTotp(id)
+    await trustedDevices.revokeAllForUser(id)
+    await recoveryCodes.clearForUser(id)
+    await activity.log({ req, action: 'admin.user.totp.reset', detail: { userId: id } })
+    log.info('admin reset user MFA', { adminId: req.user.id, userId: id })
+    return res.json({ ok: true })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('resetUserMfa', err)
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
 module.exports = {
   dashboard,
   setSiteMode,
@@ -685,4 +769,8 @@ module.exports = {
   createUser,
   updateUser,
   deleteUser,
+  listUserTrustedDevices,
+  revokeUserTrustedDevice,
+  revokeAllUserTrustedDevices,
+  resetUserMfa,
 }

server/src/router/v1/admin/admin.routes.js

@@ -1283,6 +1283,68 @@ adminRouter.delete(
   ctrl.deleteUser,
 )
 
+// ── A user's trusted devices & MFA (admin only) ───────────────────────
+adminRouter.get(
+  '/users/:id/trusted-devices',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Users']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'List a user’s trusted devices (admin only)'
+  // #swagger.description = 'Active (unrevoked, unexpired) trusted devices for the target user — the browsers/apps allowed to skip that user’s TOTP step. Never returns tokens.'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  // #swagger.parameters['id'] = { in: 'path', required: true, schema: { type: 'integer' }, description: 'User id.' }
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Trusted devices', content: { "application/json": { schema: { type: "array", items: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/TrustedDevice" } } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[403] = { description: 'Admin role required', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[404] = { description: 'Not found', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  param('id').isInt(),
+  validate,
+  ctrl.listUserTrustedDevices,
+)
+adminRouter.delete(
+  '/users/:id/trusted-devices',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Users']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Revoke all of a user’s trusted devices (admin only)'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  // #swagger.parameters['id'] = { in: 'path', required: true, schema: { type: 'integer' }, description: 'User id.' }
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Revoked count', content: { "application/json": { schema: { type: "object", properties: { revoked: { type: "integer" } } } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[403] = { description: 'Admin role required', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[404] = { description: 'Not found', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  param('id').isInt(),
+  validate,
+  ctrl.revokeAllUserTrustedDevices,
+)
+adminRouter.delete(
+  '/users/:id/trusted-devices/:deviceId',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Users']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Revoke one of a user’s trusted devices (admin only)'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  // #swagger.parameters['id'] = { in: 'path', required: true, schema: { type: 'integer' }, description: 'User id.' }
+  // #swagger.parameters['deviceId'] = { in: 'path', required: true, schema: { type: 'integer' }, description: 'Trusted-device id.' }
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Revoked (idempotent)', content: { "application/json": { schema: { type: "object", properties: { revoked: { type: "boolean" } } } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[403] = { description: 'Admin role required', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[404] = { description: 'Not found', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  param('id').isInt(),
+  param('deviceId').isInt({ min: 1 }),
+  validate,
+  ctrl.revokeUserTrustedDevice,
+)
+adminRouter.post(
+  '/users/:id/mfa/reset',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Users']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Reset a user’s MFA (admin only)'
+  // #swagger.description = 'Recovers a locked-out user: turns TOTP off, revokes every trusted device, and clears their recovery codes. The user can then sign in with their password alone and re-enroll.'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  // #swagger.parameters['id'] = { in: 'path', required: true, schema: { type: 'integer' }, description: 'User id.' }
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'MFA reset', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/OkFlag" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[403] = { description: 'Admin role required', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[404] = { description: 'Not found', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  param('id').isInt(),
+  validate,
+  ctrl.resetUserMfa,
+)
+
 // ── User → shard (uo-link) footprint (admin only) ─────────────────────
 // Backs the /admin/users/:id detail page: a user's linked game accounts and,
 // scoped to those accounts, their vendor sales / houses / online characters.