feat(auth): trusted devices, recovery codes, and admin MFA management

Add opt-in "Trust this device" so a browser/app skips the TOTP step (never
the password) for 30 days, single-use bcrypt recovery codes as a 2FA-lockout
fallback, and admin trusted-device/MFA-reset management — backend, web UI,
OpenAPI spec, and tests.

- Schema: trusted_devices (sha256 token hash, looked up by unique index) and
  recovery_codes (bcrypt, single-use). Both additive/idempotent.
- Session service: trust-token mint/hash/resolve + cap helpers; new rg_trust
  httpOnly cookie (survives logout, revoked on untrust/password change/reset/
  TOTP disable). JWTs stay stateless — trust is a server-side row, not a claim.
- Web + mobile login accept a trusted-device token / recovery code; login/totp
  gains trustDevice + recoveryCode. Cap of 10/user with NO silent pruning — an
  over-cap trust returns 409/trustLimitReached and the client prompts to revoke.
- Self-service /auth/me/trusted-devices* + recovery-codes*; admin
  /admin/users/:id/trusted-devices* + /mfa/reset. All actions audit-logged.
- Client: "Trust this device" + recovery-code login options, one-time recovery
  code display, Trusted Devices + Recovery Codes account panels, a TOTP-styled
  revoke-to-continue cap modal, and admin per-user security controls.
- OpenAPI regenerated; 33 new server tests (all suites green).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

server/src/router/v1/auth/auth.routes.js

@@ -94,16 +94,21 @@ authRouter.post(
 authRouter.post(
   '/login/totp',
   // #swagger.tags = ['Auth']
-  // #swagger.summary = 'Complete login with a TOTP code'
-  // #swagger.description = 'Second step for 2FA accounts. Exchange the challenge from /login plus the current authenticator code for a session cookie.'
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Complete login with a TOTP or recovery code'
+  // #swagger.description = 'Second step for 2FA accounts. Exchange the challenge from /login plus either the current authenticator code OR a single-use recovery code for a session cookie. Set trustDevice to remember this browser and skip TOTP on future logins (30 days); if the trusted-device limit is reached the session is still issued and the response carries { trustLimitReached, devices } so the user can revoke one first.'
   /* #swagger.requestBody = { required: true, content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/TotpLoginRequest" } } } } */
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Session issued', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/LoginResponse" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Session issued (optionally with a trusted-device-limit prompt)', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/LoginResponse" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[400] = { description: 'Validation error', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/ValidationError" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Invalid code or expired challenge', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[429] = { description: 'Too many attempts (rate limited / backoff)', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   ...loginGuards,
   body('challenge').isString().notEmpty(),
-  body('code').isString().trim().isLength({ min: 6, max: 8 }),
+  // Either a TOTP code or a recovery code satisfies the second factor; the
+  // controller rejects the request when neither verifies.
+  body('code').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().trim().isLength({ min: 6, max: 8 }),
+  body('recoveryCode').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().trim().isLength({ min: 8, max: 32 }),
+  body('trustDevice').optional().isBoolean(),
+  body('deviceName').optional({ values: 'falsy' }).isString().trim().isLength({ max: 100 }),
   validate,
   loginTotp,
 )