feat(auth): honor and establish trusted devices on the SSO login paths
"Trust this device" did nothing for anyone who signs in with Google or Discord.
sso.controller went straight from needsTotp(user) to staging a pending-TOTP
challenge and never consulted resolveTrustedDevice, so an SSO user was asked for
a code on EVERY sign-in no matter how many times they had ticked the box — and
POST /auth/sso/totp accepted only `code`, so that step could not establish a
trust either. The password paths (web + native) were unaffected and already
worked; this closes the gap for SSO, on the website AND in the Android app.
Server:
- finishLogin and finishMobileLogin now run the same trusted-device check as
auth.controller.login, via one shared helper: honor a trust that belongs to
THIS user, stamp last_used_at, log auth.login.trusted_device. A store error
falls through to the challenge — fail closed to asking for the code.
- POST /auth/sso/totp gains optional trustDevice + deviceName, sets the rg_trust
cookie, and mirrors the password path's { trustLimitReached, devices } response
at the cap (the sign-in still completes). Recovery codes stay password-only.
Android coverage, without leaking a secret into a URL:
- The app opens SSO in a Custom Tab, which shares the system browser's cookie
jar, so the rg_trust cookie set on that TOTP form is presented back on the next
app sign-in. That alone makes native SSO skip the code. Passing the app's token
into the start URL was rejected — it would put a 256-bit secret in query
strings, Referer headers and access logs.
- To also cover the app's NATIVE password login, ticking the box sets
mobile_auth_sessions.trust_device (a boolean; never the token), and
/auth/mobile/sso/exchange mints a platform:'mobile' trust and returns
{ trustToken }. Minting there keeps the raw token on an authenticated
app→server call, out of the deep link and out of the bridge row. Best-effort:
at the cap the response just omits it rather than failing a good sign-in.
Client: the trust checkbox is no longer hidden on the SSO second step, on both
the admin and player login screens. On the mobile bridge the deep-link redirect
takes priority over the cap prompt — the sign-in succeeded and the link is
single-use, so stalling there would strand the app.
Tests: 8 new cases in server/test/ssoTrustedDevice.test.js (verified to fail
against the pre-fix controller). Full suites green — server 445, client 43 —
and routes.manifest.json is a zero-line diff: no URL moved, only +2 handlers on
/auth/sso/totp in routes.guards.json for the two new validators. Swagger
regenerated. Verified live against the running server and real MariaDB: the TOTP
step issues rg_trust and persists the row, a subsequent SSO callback carrying it
skips the code, and an invalid trust is still challenged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -71,8 +71,10 @@ export const api = {
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resetPassword: (token, password) =>
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req(`/auth/password/reset/${encodeURIComponent(token)}`, { method: 'POST', body: { password } }),
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// Second factor for an SSO login (challenge is held in an httpOnly cookie set by
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// the callback, so only the code is sent). Returns { user, returnTo }.
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ssoLoginTotp: (code) => req('/auth/sso/totp', { method: 'POST', body: { code } }),
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// the callback, so only the code is sent). `extra` carries the trustDevice/
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// deviceName opt-in, same as the password path. Returns { user, returnTo } — plus
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// { trustLimitReached, devices } when trust was asked for but the cap is reached.
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ssoLoginTotp: (code, extra = {}) => req('/auth/sso/totp', { method: 'POST', body: { code, ...extra } }),
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logout: () => req('/auth/logout', { method: 'POST' }),
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// Public SSO provider discovery — drives the login-page provider buttons.
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authProviders: () => req('/auth/providers'),
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@@ -49,9 +49,11 @@ export function AuthProvider({ children }) {
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}, [])
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// Step 2 for SSO logins whose account has 2FA on. The pending challenge lives in
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// an httpOnly cookie, so only the code is sent. Returns { user, returnTo }.
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const ssoLoginTotp = useCallback(async (code) => {
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const data = await api.ssoLoginTotp(code)
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// an httpOnly cookie, so only the code is sent. `extra` carries the trustDevice/
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// deviceName opt-in. Returns the full payload ({ user, returnTo,
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// trustLimitReached?, devices? }) so the caller can handle the device-cap prompt.
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const ssoLoginTotp = useCallback(async (code, extra) => {
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const data = await api.ssoLoginTotp(code, extra)
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setUser(data.user)
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return data
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}, [])
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@@ -123,8 +123,16 @@ export default function AdminLogin() {
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setBusy(true)
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try {
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if (ssoTotp) {
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const { returnTo } = await ssoLoginTotp(code)
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navigate(returnTo || '/admin', { replace: true })
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// Trust works on the SSO second factor exactly as it does on the password
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// one — the IdP already proved the first factor.
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const data = await ssoLoginTotp(code.trim(), { trustDevice })
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const to = data.returnTo || '/admin'
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if (data.trustLimitReached) {
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setTrustLimit({ devices: data.devices || [], dest: to })
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setBusy(false)
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return
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}
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navigate(to, { replace: true })
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} else {
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const entered = code.trim()
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const data = await loginTotp(challenge, useRecovery ? '' : entered, {
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@@ -251,12 +259,14 @@ export default function AdminLogin() {
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{useRecovery ? 'Enter one of your saved single-use recovery codes.' : 'Enter the code from your authenticator app.'}
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</span>
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</label>
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{!ssoTotp && (
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<label className="sans" style={{ display: 'flex', alignItems: 'center', gap: 8, marginBottom: 12, color: 'var(--muted)', fontSize: '0.84rem' }}>
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<input type="checkbox" checked={trustDevice} onChange={(e) => setTrustDevice(e.target.checked)} />
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Trust this device for 30 days (skip the code next time)
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</label>
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)}
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{/* Offered on the SSO second factor too — the trust is on the device,
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not on how the first factor was proved. */}
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<label className="sans" style={{ display: 'flex', alignItems: 'center', gap: 8, marginBottom: 12, color: 'var(--muted)', fontSize: '0.84rem' }}>
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<input type="checkbox" checked={trustDevice} onChange={(e) => setTrustDevice(e.target.checked)} />
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Trust this device for 30 days (skip the code next time)
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</label>
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{/* Recovery codes remain password-login only: the SSO second step
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verifies an authenticator code against the staged challenge. */}
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{!ssoTotp && (
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<button
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type="button"
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@@ -108,15 +108,28 @@ export default function PlayerLogin() {
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setBusy(true)
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try {
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if (ssoTotp) {
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const { returnTo, redirect } = await ssoLoginTotp(code)
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// Trust works on the SSO second factor too. On the mobile bridge this page
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// is running inside the app's Custom Tab, so the cookie set here is what
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// lets the next app sign-in skip the code.
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const data = await ssoLoginTotp(code.trim(), { trustDevice })
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// Native SSO bridge (M9): a mobile 2FA completion returns an absolute
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// deep link (e.g. runicgateway://…) to hand the app its one-time code.
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// React Router can't navigate a custom scheme, so leave the SPA for it.
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if (redirect) {
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window.location.href = redirect
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// This wins over the trust-cap prompt: the sign-in itself succeeded and the
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// deep link is single-use, so stalling here to manage devices would strand
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// the app. An over-cap user simply isn't trusted and can prune the list
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// from Account → Trusted Devices.
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if (data.redirect) {
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window.location.href = data.redirect
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return
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}
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navigate(returnTo || '/account', { replace: true })
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const to = data.returnTo || '/account'
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if (data.trustLimitReached) {
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setTrustLimit({ devices: data.devices || [], dest: to })
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setBusy(false)
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return
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}
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navigate(to, { replace: true })
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} else {
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const entered = code.trim()
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const data = await loginTotp(challenge, useRecovery ? '' : entered, {
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@@ -206,14 +219,15 @@ export default function PlayerLogin() {
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{useRecovery ? 'Enter one of your saved single-use recovery codes.' : 'Enter the code from your authenticator app.'}
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</span>
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</label>
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{/* Trust-this-device only applies to real authenticator/recovery login,
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not the SSO 2FA bounce (which has no trust cookie flow here). */}
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{!ssoTotp && (
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<label className="sans" style={{ display: 'flex', alignItems: 'center', gap: 8, marginBottom: 12, color: 'var(--muted)', fontSize: '0.84rem' }}>
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<input type="checkbox" checked={trustDevice} onChange={(e) => setTrustDevice(e.target.checked)} />
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Trust this device for 30 days (skip the code next time)
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</label>
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)}
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{/* Offered on the SSO second factor too — the trust is on the device,
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not on how the first factor was proved. Inside the app's Custom Tab
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this is also what trusts the device for future native sign-ins. */}
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<label className="sans" style={{ display: 'flex', alignItems: 'center', gap: 8, marginBottom: 12, color: 'var(--muted)', fontSize: '0.84rem' }}>
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<input type="checkbox" checked={trustDevice} onChange={(e) => setTrustDevice(e.target.checked)} />
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Trust this device for 30 days (skip the code next time)
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</label>
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{/* Recovery codes remain password-login only: the SSO second step
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verifies an authenticator code against the staged challenge. */}
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{!ssoTotp && (
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<button
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type="button"
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