feat(security): soak the tightened CSP on report-only, with a same-origin sink

Phase 1 of docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md. The tightened policy ships on
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only alongside the unchanged enforced one for a
release; a follow-up PR flips it after the soak comes back clean.

The plan expected a two-directive delta. It is one. `form-action 'self'` was
described as absent because it is not in the directives object in app.js — but
the middleware runs with `useDefaults: true` and helmet's defaults already
supply it, so the header served in production has carried it all along. Caught
by capturing the live header from the running app instead of reading the config.
It is now written out explicitly in config/csp.js regardless: a security
directive should not depend on a third-party library's default surviving its
next major version. The enforced header's contents do not change at all, and a
test pins it verbatim.

So the whole behavioural delta is `frame-ancestors 'self'` -> `'none'`. That is
still the directive most worth soaking: a frame-ancestors report is generated by
the browser of whoever framed the site, which is the only way to find out that
something legitimately embeds us before an enforcing policy breaks it.

The policies move to config/csp.js, with the report-only one derived by spread
from the enforced one so the two cannot drift and the object reads as a diff.

`report-to` needs somewhere to point, so this adds POST /api/csp-report --
same-origin on purpose, since reports describe attacks against this site and
should not go to a third-party collector. It is mounted outside /api/v1 next to
/api/health: the browser learns the path from the policy header, never from a
client build, so it is not versioned client contract.

It is necessarily unauthenticated -- browsers send reports with no session, and
gating it would silence exactly the anonymous visitors worth hearing about -- so
it is bounded on every axis:

  * both wire formats, since report-uri (Firefox/Safari) sends hyphenated keys
    in application/csp-report and report-to (Chrome) sends camelCase envelopes
    in application/reports+json; handling one silently drops half the browsers,
  * report-to also needs the Reporting-Endpoints response header or it is inert,
  * 16 KB body cap, per-IP rate limit, fixed field allowlist, every logged field
    truncated (script-sample is attacker-influenced and can carry a whole inline
    script),
  * always 204, even for malformed input: a 4xx would reach the global error
    handler, which logs the offending body -- turning an open endpoint into a
    log-flood primitive.

Nothing is persisted; reports go to the `csp` log tag.

routes.manifest.json moves 199 -> 200, which is the freeze from PR 0 working as
designed: the one new URL is visible as a reviewed +1 rather than slipping
through. Swagger regenerated to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

server/src/router/cspReport.controller.js

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+// ── POST /api/csp-report — Content-Security-Policy violation sink ─────────────
+//
+// The target policy ships on Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only for one release
+// before it is enforced (docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md § Phase 1). That soak is only
+// worth anything if the reports land somewhere a human reads, so `report-to` /
+// `report-uri` point here (see config/csp.js) and this writes them to the `csp` log
+// tag. It is deliberately same-origin: reports describe attacks against this site
+// and must not be handed to a third-party collector.
+//
+// This is an unauthenticated public POST — browsers send reports with no session and
+// no CSRF token, and gating it would silence exactly the anonymous visitors whose
+// pages we most want to hear about. So treat every field as hostile:
+//   • the body is parsed under a small cap (browsers send a few KB),
+//   • the rate limiter blunts a flood, since each accepted report writes a log line,
+//   • every logged field is truncated, and only a fixed allowlist of fields is read.
+// Nothing is echoed back and nothing is persisted to the database.
+//
+// Retiring this: when the tightened policy flips to enforced and the report-only
+// twin is removed, this endpoint goes with it — unless a `report-to` group is kept
+// on the enforced policy, which is a reasonable thing to want.
+
+const express = require('express')
+
+const log = require('../utils/logger')('csp')
+
+// Browsers send a few KB at most. A cap this low means a junk POST is rejected by
+// the parser before any of this code runs.
+const BODY_LIMIT = '16kb'
+
+// Keep log lines bounded: `script-sample` in particular is attacker-influenced and
+// can carry a whole inline script.
+const MAX_FIELD = 200
+const clip = (value) => {
+  if (value == null) return undefined
+  const s = String(value)
+  return s.length > MAX_FIELD ? `${s.slice(0, MAX_FIELD)}…` : s
+}
+
+/**
+ * Normalize the two wire formats into one shape.
+ *
+ * `report-uri` (Firefox, Safari) POSTs `application/csp-report` with a single
+ * `{ "csp-report": { … } }` object and hyphenated keys. `report-to` (Chrome) POSTs
+ * `application/reports+json` with an *array* of envelopes whose `body` uses camelCase
+ * keys. Reading only one of them would silently drop half the browsers.
+ */
+function normalize(body) {
+  if (Array.isArray(body)) {
+    return body
+      .filter((entry) => entry && entry.type === 'csp-violation' && entry.body)
+      .map((entry) => ({
+        documentUrl: entry.body.documentURL || entry.url,
+        directive: entry.body.effectiveDirective,
+        blockedUrl: entry.body.blockedURL,
+        disposition: entry.body.disposition,
+        sample: entry.body.sample,
+      }))
+  }
+  if (body && typeof body === 'object' && body['csp-report']) {
+    const r = body['csp-report']
+    return [
+      {
+        documentUrl: r['document-uri'],
+        directive: r['effective-directive'] || r['violated-directive'],
+        blockedUrl: r['blocked-uri'],
+        disposition: r.disposition,
+        sample: r['script-sample'],
+      },
+    ]
+  }
+  return []
+}
+
+// POST /api/csp-report
+function receive(req, res) {
+  /* #swagger.tags = ['Health']
+     #swagger.summary = 'Content-Security-Policy violation report sink'
+     #swagger.description = 'Receives CSP violation reports from browsers (both the `report-uri` `application/csp-report` format and the Reporting API `application/reports+json` format). Unauthenticated by necessity — browsers send reports with no session. Reports are logged, never stored or echoed. Always answers 204.'
+     #swagger.security = []
+     #swagger.responses[204] = { description: 'Report accepted (or ignored). No content.' }
+     #swagger.responses[429] = { description: 'Too many reports from this address.' }
+  */
+
+  // 204 regardless of what arrived. A browser cannot act on an error here, and a
+  // non-2xx would only make it retry or log noise in the user's console.
+  for (const v of normalize(req.body)) {
+    if (!v.directive) continue
+    log.warn('csp violation', {
+      // 'report' = the report-only policy fired (expected during the soak);
+      // 'enforce' = the live policy actually blocked something.
+      disposition: clip(v.disposition) || 'report',
+      directive: clip(v.directive),
+      blocked: clip(v.blockedUrl),
+      document: clip(v.documentUrl),
+      sample: clip(v.sample),
+      ip: req.ip,
+    })
+  }
+  res.status(204).end()
+}
+
+/**
+ * The full middleware chain for the endpoint. Both content types get their own
+ * parser because express.json() only matches `application/json` by default, and a
+ * report that arrives unparsed is a report silently discarded.
+ */
+const parsers = [
+  express.json({ limit: BODY_LIMIT, type: 'application/csp-report' }),
+  express.json({ limit: BODY_LIMIT, type: 'application/reports+json' }),
+  express.json({ limit: BODY_LIMIT }),
+  // Swallow malformed / oversized bodies here rather than letting them reach the
+  // global error handler, which would answer 400 and write an ERROR line quoting the
+  // junk — turning "POST garbage at the open endpoint" into a log-flood primitive.
+  // A browser has nothing useful to do with a 4xx from a report sink anyway.
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
+  (err, req, res, next) => res.status(204).end(),
+]
+
+module.exports = { receive, parsers, normalize }