feat(teams): the four-path access resolver and staff leadership overrides

The four authority paths of docs/website/TEAMS.md §2.5, and the rule that they
stay four: four tables answering four questions, and no resolver reads another
path's table.

  1. Is this account a member?        module  team_members
  2. Does this account lead the Team?  module  team_members.is_leader + override
  3. May it use the Team forum?        CORE    team_forum_grants OR path 1
  4. May it get external access?       CORE    derived, nothing of its own

The temptation this resists is collapsing 1 and 3 into one boolean. They answer
different questions about different populations: a forum grant may name any
Runic Gateway account, including one with no game identity at all -- that is the
point of it, since letting an unlinked guildmate into a forum must not require a
staff ticket. Reading "has forum access" as "is a member" would put that person
on the public roster, into every membership count, and into the external-platform
grant, which is where a modelling preference becomes an impersonation risk.

Path 4 is deliberately blind to path 3, and the reason is written down so nobody
"fixes" it: an integration cannot verify that an unlinked, forum-granted account
corresponds to a real game member, so it must not hand that account a privilege
on a platform where impersonation has consequences. A forum is a room on the
operator's own site with a known moderator; a Discord role is an identity claim
in someone else's space.

Leadership overrides are applied ON TOP of the synced value at read time, never
written into the projection. The sync owns that column and rewrites it every
interval, so an override stored there would be undone fifteen minutes after
staff set it -- which is the whole reason §2.5.1 is a separate table. The roster
carries both the resolved answer and `is_leader_synced`, so an admin sees that a
decision was made rather than being shown it as fact.

Three tests are named INVARIANT rather than for behaviour, because what they
protect is structural and a reasonable-looking refactor destroys it silently: a
grant never writes the membership projection, a granted user is absent from the
roster, and a grant does not confer external eligibility. None of those failures
appears on a screen as a bug -- the first shows up as a stranger on a public
roster, the second as a Discord role handed to an account nobody can tie to a
real player.

Every unit test here stubs the db layer, so the SQL itself was verified
separately: all 44 statements across teams.db.js and teamAccess.db.js were run
against MariaDB 11 with a throwaway module id and cleaned up after. That run
also confirmed live what the reconciler's tests could only assert against a
stub -- an upsert does not overwrite is_leader, a revoked grant frees the unique
key for a new one while the ledger keeps both, and an archived team stays
resolvable at its old slug while its external_id is free for the successor row.

19 tests. Full suite 828 passed, 0 failed.

Refs docs/website/TEAMS.md §2.5, §2.5.1, §2.6, Part 12 phase 2

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-17 14:57:23 -05:00
parent 92631347f9
commit bfd844e8fb
3 changed files with 434 additions and 0 deletions

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// SQL for the two tables the access resolver reads: forum grants (path 3) and
// staff leadership overrides (§2.5.1).
//
// Kept separate from teams.db.js on purpose. The four authority paths are four
// tables answering four questions, and the single most important structural rule
// in TEAMS.md is that no resolver reads another path's table — a file boundary is
// a cheap way to make crossing one visible in a diff.
const { query } = require('../../utils/db')
// ── team_forum_grants (path 3) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
const GRANT_COLUMNS = `
id, team_id, user_id, username, granted_by, granted_username, granted_at, reason,
revoked_by, revoked_username, revoked_at, revoke_reason`
/** The caller's ACTIVE grant on a team, or undefined. At most one, by the unique key. */
async function activeGrant(teamId, userId) {
const rows = await query(
`SELECT ${GRANT_COLUMNS} FROM team_forum_grants
WHERE team_id = ? AND user_id = ? AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
[teamId, userId],
)
return rows[0]
}
/** The whole ledger for a team, revoked rows included — the admin grant view. */
async function grantLedger(teamId) {
return query(
`SELECT ${GRANT_COLUMNS} FROM team_forum_grants WHERE team_id = ? ORDER BY granted_at DESC, id DESC`,
[teamId],
)
}
/** Active grants only, for the "Forum guests" list and the per-team cap. */
async function activeGrants(teamId) {
return query(
`SELECT ${GRANT_COLUMNS} FROM team_forum_grants WHERE team_id = ? AND revoked_at IS NULL
ORDER BY granted_at`,
[teamId],
)
}
// ── team_leader_overrides (§2.5.1) ─────────────────────────────────────────
const OVERRIDE_COLUMNS = 'team_id, member_key, effect, actor_user_id, actor_username, reason, created_at'
async function overridesForTeam(teamId) {
return query(`SELECT ${OVERRIDE_COLUMNS} FROM team_leader_overrides WHERE team_id = ? ORDER BY member_key`,
[teamId])
}
async function overrideFor(teamId, memberKey) {
const rows = await query(
`SELECT ${OVERRIDE_COLUMNS} FROM team_leader_overrides WHERE team_id = ? AND member_key = ?`,
[teamId, memberKey],
)
return rows[0]
}
/**
* Set or replace one override.
*
* The projection is never touched by this — `team_members.is_leader` keeps saying
* what the game says and this keeps saying what staff decided, which is the entire
* point (§2.5.1). An override applied INTO the projection would be clobbered by
* the next sync, fifteen minutes later.
*/
async function setOverride({ teamId, memberKey, effect, actorUserId, actorUsername, reason }) {
await query(
`INSERT INTO team_leader_overrides (team_id, member_key, effect, actor_user_id, actor_username, reason)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE
effect = VALUES(effect), actor_user_id = VALUES(actor_user_id),
actor_username = VALUES(actor_username), reason = VALUES(reason), created_at = NOW()`,
[teamId, memberKey, effect, actorUserId, actorUsername, reason],
)
}
async function clearOverride(teamId, memberKey) {
const res = await query('DELETE FROM team_leader_overrides WHERE team_id = ? AND member_key = ?',
[teamId, memberKey])
return res.affectedRows > 0
}
module.exports = {
activeGrant,
grantLedger,
activeGrants,
overridesForTeam,
overrideFor,
setOverride,
clearOverride,
}

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// ── The four authority paths ───────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// The single most important structural rule in TEAMS.md (§2.5): these are four
// tables answering four questions, and **no resolver reads another path's table.**
//
// 1. Is this account a member? module team_members
// 2. Does this account lead the Team? module team_members.is_leader,
// plus a staff override
// 3. May it use the Team forum? CORE team_forum_grants OR path 1
// 4. May it get external-platform CORE, nothing of its own
// access? derived
//
// The temptation this file exists to resist is collapsing 1 and 3 into one
// boolean. They answer different questions about different populations: a forum
// grant may name any Runic Gateway account, including one with no game identity
// at all — that is the point of it, since letting an unlinked guildmate into the
// forum must not require a staff ticket. Treating "has forum access" as "is a
// member" would put that person on the roster, in the member count, and into the
// external-platform grant, which is where it stops being a modelling preference
// and becomes an impersonation risk (path 4 below).
//
// Non-contamination is the invariant: a manual grant never writes the membership
// projection, in either direction, ever. Both facts coexist and neither migrates
// into the other.
const accessDb = require('./teamAccess.db')
const teamsDb = require('./teams.db')
const identities = require('../userIdentities/userIdentities.model')
/**
* Path 3 — forum access. Two reads, OR'd, and nothing else.
*
* `viaGrant` is reported even when membership also holds, deliberately: both
* facts are true, the UI presents membership as the current reason, and the grant
* survives as audit history. Collapsing them into one boolean is what loses the
* record of who let this person in and why.
*/
async function forumAccess(teamId, userId) {
if (!userId) return { allowed: false, viaMembership: false, viaGrant: false, isLeader: false }
const [grant, member] = await Promise.all([
accessDb.activeGrant(teamId, userId), // path 3's own table
teamsDb.activeByUser(teamId, userId), // path 1
])
return {
allowed: Boolean(grant) || Boolean(member),
viaMembership: Boolean(member),
viaGrant: Boolean(grant),
isLeader: member ? await isLeader(teamId, member) : false,
}
}
/**
* Path 2 — leadership, with the staff override applied ON TOP of the synced value
* at read time (§2.5.1).
*
* Applied at read rather than written into the projection because the sync owns
* that column and rewrites it every interval. An override that lived in
* `team_members` would be undone fifteen minutes after staff set it, which is the
* whole reason this is a separate table read here.
*/
async function isLeader(teamId, member) {
if (!member) return false
const override = await accessDb.overrideFor(teamId, member.member_key)
if (override) return override.effect === 'grant'
return Boolean(member.is_leader)
}
/** Leadership for a caller identified by user id rather than by a member row. */
async function isLeaderByUser(teamId, userId) {
if (!userId) return false
const member = await teamsDb.activeByUser(teamId, userId)
return isLeader(teamId, member)
}
/**
* Path 4 — external-platform eligibility. Computed, no table of its own, and
* deliberately blind to path 3.
*
* The reason, stated so nobody "fixes" it later: an integration cannot verify
* that an unlinked, forum-granted account corresponds to a real game member, so
* it must not hand that account a privilege on a platform where impersonation has
* consequences. A forum is a room on the operator's own site with a known
* moderator; a Discord role is an identity claim in someone else's space.
*/
async function externalEligible(teamId, userId, platform) {
if (!userId || !platform) return false
const member = await teamsDb.activeByUser(teamId, userId) // path 1 ONLY
if (!member || member.user_id == null) return false // must be a LINKED game member
const linked = await identities.listForUser(userId)
return linked.some((i) => i.provider === platform)
}
/**
* A team's roster with overrides folded in, for the admin view and the Team page.
*
* The rows returned carry `is_leader` as RESOLVED — synced value plus override —
* and `is_leader_synced` as what the game actually said, so the admin surface can
* show that a decision was made rather than silently presenting it as fact.
*/
async function rosterWithOverrides(teamId, { includeDeparted = false } = {}) {
const [members, overrides] = await Promise.all([
teamsDb.membersByTeam(teamId, { includeDeparted }),
accessDb.overridesForTeam(teamId),
])
const byKey = new Map(overrides.map((o) => [o.member_key, o]))
return members.map((m) => {
const override = byKey.get(m.member_key)
return {
...m,
is_leader_synced: Boolean(m.is_leader),
is_leader: override ? override.effect === 'grant' : Boolean(m.is_leader),
leader_override: override
? { effect: override.effect, reason: override.reason, by: override.actor_username, at: override.created_at }
: null,
}
})
}
module.exports = {
forumAccess,
isLeader,
isLeaderByUser,
externalEligible,
rosterWithOverrides,
setLeaderOverride: accessDb.setOverride,
clearLeaderOverride: accessDb.clearOverride,
grantLedger: accessDb.grantLedger,
activeGrants: accessDb.activeGrants,
}