Harden admin login: RBAC-safe controls, 2FA, bot-scoring, rate limits (#9)
Adds a layered set of protections around the admin login and the app edge.
Trust proxy (server/src/utils/trustProxy.js)
- Configurable via TRUST_PROXY; pin to the newt agent ("ptero") LAN IP so
X-Forwarded-For is trusted ONLY from that peer. A blanket "true" is
rejected (coerced to 1) to prevent XFF spoofing that would dodge every
IP-based control. DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY logs peer/XFF/req.ip to re-verify the
proxy IP without a redeploy. Documents the Omada static-reservation
assumption.
Login throttling (server/src/middleware/loginProtection.js, rateLimit.js)
- express-slow-down progressive delay + the existing hard rate cap + a
separate per-IP exponential backoff that persists across the rate window.
All failures return one generic message (no user/pass disclosure).
Honeypot (login form + auth.controller)
- Hidden, plausibly-named field ("company"); a filled value fails
generically and is scored as an unambiguous bot.
Optional per-user TOTP 2FA (speakeasy/qrcode)
- totp_secret/totp_enabled columns (+ idempotent migration). Self-service
Account page: enroll via QR, confirm a code to enable, code-gated disable.
- Login is two-step for enrolled users: after the password, a short-lived
signed challenge (stage:'totp', not a session) is required before the
real session is issued.
Bot / scanner scoring + IP ban (server/src/middleware/botScore.js)
- Weighted CMS-scanner paths (this app uses none). Junk paths 404 FIRST,
unconditionally — independent of score/ban state, so a scanner rotating
through fresh Cloudflare IPs gets no free pass. /wp-admin/install.php is
the top-weighted near-1-hit ban (worst offender in prod logs). Per-IP
score with quiet-period decay temp-bans an IP from ALL routes once past a
(deliberately low) threshold, to protect /admin from credential stuffing.
Failed logins and honeypot hits feed the same score.
- Periodic sweep evicts stale, unbanned, quiet entries so the in-memory
store can't grow unbounded; the interval is unref'd and cleared on
graceful shutdown.
Tests: node --test suite (40) covering trust-proxy parsing + live req.ip
(incl. pinned-IP), rate limiter + exponential backoff, honeypot rejection,
TOTP verify (enabled/disabled) + challenge-isn't-a-session, bot-score
threshold/decay/ban + junk-404-independence + install.php + store sweep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
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"start": "node src/server.js",
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"dev": "nodemon src/server.js",
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"seed": "node db/seed.js",
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"test": "echo \"no tests yet\" && exit 0"
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"test": "node --test"
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},
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"keywords": [
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"express",
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@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
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"dotenv": "^16.4.5",
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"express": "^4.19.2",
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"express-rate-limit": "^7.4.0",
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"express-slow-down": "^3.1.0",
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"express-validator": "^7.2.0",
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"helmet": "^7.1.0",
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"jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.2",
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@@ -31,7 +32,9 @@
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"morgan": "^1.10.0",
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"multer": "^2.0.1",
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"nodemailer": "^9.0.1",
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"sanitize-html": "^2.17.5"
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"qrcode": "^1.5.4",
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"sanitize-html": "^2.17.5",
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"speakeasy": "^2.0.0"
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},
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"devDependencies": {
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"nodemon": "^3.1.4"
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