Harden admin login: RBAC-safe controls, 2FA, bot-scoring, rate limits (#9)
Adds a layered set of protections around the admin login and the app edge.
Trust proxy (server/src/utils/trustProxy.js)
- Configurable via TRUST_PROXY; pin to the newt agent ("ptero") LAN IP so
X-Forwarded-For is trusted ONLY from that peer. A blanket "true" is
rejected (coerced to 1) to prevent XFF spoofing that would dodge every
IP-based control. DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY logs peer/XFF/req.ip to re-verify the
proxy IP without a redeploy. Documents the Omada static-reservation
assumption.
Login throttling (server/src/middleware/loginProtection.js, rateLimit.js)
- express-slow-down progressive delay + the existing hard rate cap + a
separate per-IP exponential backoff that persists across the rate window.
All failures return one generic message (no user/pass disclosure).
Honeypot (login form + auth.controller)
- Hidden, plausibly-named field ("company"); a filled value fails
generically and is scored as an unambiguous bot.
Optional per-user TOTP 2FA (speakeasy/qrcode)
- totp_secret/totp_enabled columns (+ idempotent migration). Self-service
Account page: enroll via QR, confirm a code to enable, code-gated disable.
- Login is two-step for enrolled users: after the password, a short-lived
signed challenge (stage:'totp', not a session) is required before the
real session is issued.
Bot / scanner scoring + IP ban (server/src/middleware/botScore.js)
- Weighted CMS-scanner paths (this app uses none). Junk paths 404 FIRST,
unconditionally — independent of score/ban state, so a scanner rotating
through fresh Cloudflare IPs gets no free pass. /wp-admin/install.php is
the top-weighted near-1-hit ban (worst offender in prod logs). Per-IP
score with quiet-period decay temp-bans an IP from ALL routes once past a
(deliberately low) threshold, to protect /admin from credential stuffing.
Failed logins and honeypot hits feed the same score.
- Periodic sweep evicts stale, unbanned, quiet entries so the in-memory
store can't grow unbounded; the interval is unref'd and cleared on
graceful shutdown.
Tests: node --test suite (40) covering trust-proxy parsing + live req.ip
(incl. pinned-IP), rate limiter + exponential backoff, honeypot rejection,
TOTP verify (enabled/disabled) + challenge-isn't-a-session, bot-score
threshold/decay/ban + junk-404-independence + install.php + store sweep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,21 +1,42 @@
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const express = require('express')
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const { body } = require('express-validator')
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const { login, logout, me } = require('./auth.controller')
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const { login, loginTotp, logout, me, HONEYPOT_FIELD } = require('./auth.controller')
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const { isLoggedIn } = require('../../../utils/auth')
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const { loginLimiter } = require('../../../middleware/rateLimit')
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const { slowLogin, backoffGuard } = require('../../../middleware/loginProtection')
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const validate = require('../../../middleware/validate')
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const authRouter = express.Router()
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// Login protection order (cheapest rejection first):
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// backoffGuard → per-IP exponential lockout on repeated failures
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// slowLogin → progressive per-request delay within the window
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// loginLimiter → hard 10-per-15-min cap
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const loginGuards = [backoffGuard, slowLogin, loginLimiter]
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authRouter.post(
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'/login',
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loginLimiter,
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...loginGuards,
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body('username').isString().trim().notEmpty(),
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body('password').isString().notEmpty(),
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// Honeypot must be absent/empty for humans; bots that fill it are caught in
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// the controller. Accept-but-ignore here so a filled value still reaches it.
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body(HONEYPOT_FIELD).optional(),
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validate,
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login,
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)
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// Second factor: same throttling, since it's a code-guessing surface too.
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authRouter.post(
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'/login/totp',
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...loginGuards,
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body('challenge').isString().notEmpty(),
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body('code').isString().trim().isLength({ min: 6, max: 8 }),
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validate,
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loginTotp,
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)
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authRouter.post('/logout', logout)
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authRouter.get('/me', isLoggedIn, me)
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