Harden admin login: RBAC-safe controls, 2FA, bot-scoring, rate limits (#9)

Adds a layered set of protections around the admin login and the app edge.

Trust proxy (server/src/utils/trustProxy.js)
- Configurable via TRUST_PROXY; pin to the newt agent ("ptero") LAN IP so
  X-Forwarded-For is trusted ONLY from that peer. A blanket "true" is
  rejected (coerced to 1) to prevent XFF spoofing that would dodge every
  IP-based control. DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY logs peer/XFF/req.ip to re-verify the
  proxy IP without a redeploy. Documents the Omada static-reservation
  assumption.

Login throttling (server/src/middleware/loginProtection.js, rateLimit.js)
- express-slow-down progressive delay + the existing hard rate cap + a
  separate per-IP exponential backoff that persists across the rate window.
  All failures return one generic message (no user/pass disclosure).

Honeypot (login form + auth.controller)
- Hidden, plausibly-named field ("company"); a filled value fails
  generically and is scored as an unambiguous bot.

Optional per-user TOTP 2FA (speakeasy/qrcode)
- totp_secret/totp_enabled columns (+ idempotent migration). Self-service
  Account page: enroll via QR, confirm a code to enable, code-gated disable.
- Login is two-step for enrolled users: after the password, a short-lived
  signed challenge (stage:'totp', not a session) is required before the
  real session is issued.

Bot / scanner scoring + IP ban (server/src/middleware/botScore.js)
- Weighted CMS-scanner paths (this app uses none). Junk paths 404 FIRST,
  unconditionally — independent of score/ban state, so a scanner rotating
  through fresh Cloudflare IPs gets no free pass. /wp-admin/install.php is
  the top-weighted near-1-hit ban (worst offender in prod logs). Per-IP
  score with quiet-period decay temp-bans an IP from ALL routes once past a
  (deliberately low) threshold, to protect /admin from credential stuffing.
  Failed logins and honeypot hits feed the same score.
- Periodic sweep evicts stale, unbanned, quiet entries so the in-memory
  store can't grow unbounded; the interval is unref'd and cleared on
  graceful shutdown.

Tests: node --test suite (40) covering trust-proxy parsing + live req.ip
(incl. pinned-IP), rate limiter + exponential backoff, honeypot rejection,
TOTP verify (enabled/disabled) + challenge-isn't-a-session, bot-score
threshold/decay/ban + junk-404-independence + install.php + store sweep.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-02 23:22:35 -05:00
parent ad9c556c9a
commit d38c98ad9e
30 changed files with 2038 additions and 54 deletions

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,42 @@
const express = require('express')
const { body } = require('express-validator')
const { login, logout, me } = require('./auth.controller')
const { login, loginTotp, logout, me, HONEYPOT_FIELD } = require('./auth.controller')
const { isLoggedIn } = require('../../../utils/auth')
const { loginLimiter } = require('../../../middleware/rateLimit')
const { slowLogin, backoffGuard } = require('../../../middleware/loginProtection')
const validate = require('../../../middleware/validate')
const authRouter = express.Router()
// Login protection order (cheapest rejection first):
// backoffGuard → per-IP exponential lockout on repeated failures
// slowLogin → progressive per-request delay within the window
// loginLimiter → hard 10-per-15-min cap
const loginGuards = [backoffGuard, slowLogin, loginLimiter]
authRouter.post(
'/login',
loginLimiter,
...loginGuards,
body('username').isString().trim().notEmpty(),
body('password').isString().notEmpty(),
// Honeypot must be absent/empty for humans; bots that fill it are caught in
// the controller. Accept-but-ignore here so a filled value still reaches it.
body(HONEYPOT_FIELD).optional(),
validate,
login,
)
// Second factor: same throttling, since it's a code-guessing surface too.
authRouter.post(
'/login/totp',
...loginGuards,
body('challenge').isString().notEmpty(),
body('code').isString().trim().isLength({ min: 6, max: 8 }),
validate,
loginTotp,
)
authRouter.post('/logout', logout)
authRouter.get('/me', isLoggedIn, me)