8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
8771a1cf6c feat(shard): the player-vendor marketplace
Protocol 3.0 §8, the website half. Ingests vendor.listing / vendor.listing.remove
into shard_vendors + shard_vendor_items, serves a searchable public API over
them, and ships /site/market and /site/market/vendors/:serial.

Three things the pages have to say out loud, all consequences of how the data is
gathered:

- The prices are NOT live. The shard sweeps vendors round-robin, so a shop can be
  a full cycle behind. The banner is driven by the OLDEST vendor row, not the
  newest — the one stale shop is the one that wastes somebody's trip.
- A shop can be truncated. `total` exceeding `count` means the shop holds more
  than the shard publishes per frame; the vendor page says "showing 250 of 3,104"
  rather than presenting a partial shop as complete.
- An item may have no name. On a shard with no cliloc table the honest render is
  the item id, never an invented label.

## The pre-wired visibility rules, re-checked

Part A pre-wired market.ownerName and market.location before the frame existed,
and the sibling rule it pre-wired for leaderboards (`characterName`) turned out
to be INERT because projectValue matches literal JSON keys. Both market rules
were checked against the real frame this time:

- `ownerName` is a real key. Kept.
- `location` is a real key ONLY because the frame nests it. Flat map/x/y/region
  would have made the rule match nothing — the same failure, one part later. It
  is nested on the wire and on the read model so one rule hides the facet, the
  coordinates, the region and the house together; five flat keys would be five
  rules that drift apart.
- `ownerSerial` was ADDED. An admin who hides the owner's name and leaves a
  serial that the leaderboards and guild boards resolve back to that same name
  has not hidden anything.

Tests assert all three bite, on the stored read model AND on the raw frame —
the market's SSE stream is off by default but an admin can turn it on, and a rule
that worked on only one path is exactly the leak §3.6.1 records.

## Notable

- **No payload column on shard_vendors**, unlike shard_points_boards next door.
  The board's top-N is a fixed-size list read whole; here the items ARE the
  searchable rows, so they are normalized and nothing is left worth duplicating.
- **display_name is denormalized at ingest** (literal name preferred over the
  cliloc — a player set it, so it is more specific). Resolving at query time
  would put the cliloc table on the hot path and make search-by-name impossible.
  Because the shard's diff sweep will not re-send an unchanged shop just because
  the site learned what its items are called, a cliloc import now triggers a bulk
  re-resolution — 50 ms per thousand rows, never throws.
- **updated_at is written explicitly** on every upsert. MariaDB does not fire ON
  UPDATE CURRENT_TIMESTAMP when every column is written back unchanged, and a
  shop re-published identically is still freshly confirmed — without this the
  staleness banner would age a perfectly current shop forever.
- **LIKE wildcards in `q` are escaped.** `%` and `_` are LIKE metacharacters, not
  SQL ones, so parameterization does not neutralize them: `?q=%` would otherwise
  match every listing on the shard.
- **Rate-limited** (60/min/IP), the only limited public read. Every other public
  GET is an indexed lookup of bounded size; this is a LIKE scan plus a COUNT over
  the largest shard_* table, anonymous by default.
- Reconnect backfill pages /market, bounded by MARKET_SNAPSHOT_MAX = 5000 and
  stopping on a short page as well as on `total`, so a concurrent sweep shrinking
  the index cannot spin the walk.

## How it was tested

673 server tests pass (27 new). Client builds clean; swagger-output.json,
routes.manifest.json and routes.guards.json regenerated.

Verified full-stack against the live MariaDB and a real shard, not only units:

- 27 real vendors / 1,040 listings swept off the ServUO tree, through the Rust
  sidecar, into the site — names resolving through the cliloc table ("longsword",
  "katana"), real facets and regions in the filters.
- `?q=sword` 682, `?q=%` and `?q=_` **0** (the escape), map/region/price/sort
  filters, paging, and the vendor detail route.
- Visibility live: fields gated to staff vanish for an anonymous caller while
  shopName and price survive; audience=player 403s; enabled=0 404s; and
  /shard/features correctly drops `market` so the nav hides it.
- Re-publishing a shop smaller leaves no orphan items; an identical re-publish
  moves updated_at.
- The limiter fires (38x200 then 32x429 on a 70-request burst).

Not covered by an automated test: the two React pages are presentational and this
repo's client suite covers pure-logic modules only. They were driven against the
live API above, but not rendered in a DOM harness.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 09:51:50 -05:00
b61a4d6721 feat(shard): resolve cliloc names for items and reward titles
Protocol 3.0 §8.6 (docs/link/v3.md), the dependency order 5 was sequenced
behind. Items on the wire carry a LabelNumber, not a name — the bridge has
always sent it (char.profile.equipment.cliloc, reward titles as a cliloc
number in string form, and one per marketplace listing) but the site had no
table to resolve it against, so a character sheet could only render
`id 1023721` where the game renders "quarter staff".

The number was never the missing piece. The table was.

Sourced from a file the operator converts once from their own client, at a
path from the `cliloc_client_path` setting falling back to UO_CLIENT_PATH.
Nothing client-derived is committed: UO's strings are EA's, exactly as the
creature sprites are. A shard with nothing configured is fully supported —
names render as ids, as they did before.

The conversion step is not avoidable, and that is the substantive finding
here: every current client ships its cliloc files COMPRESSED (first DWORD's
high byte 0x8E, the Mythic container), and ServUO's own bundled
Ultima.StringList cannot read that either — so VendorSearch.GetItemName is
already inert on such a shard and the plugin could not supply names instead.
v3.md's original "read the client's Cliloc.enu" recommendation was therefore
not implementable as written, and its committed db/data/clilocs.json artifact
also predates the Part C corrections (no committed derived snapshots, nothing
EA-derived shipped). Replaced with the spawn-atlas pattern: parse on boot from
an operator-configured path, hash-gated, output gitignored.

- utils/clilocParse.js — pure parsers, fs-free so the suite runs in CI.
  Accepts the plain binary layout and delimited text, sniffed by header rather
  than extension. Rejects a compressed file BY NAME: without that check the
  plain parser reads it as ~19k records of negative ids and 60 KB "strings"
  before dying mid-file, and the resulting error names the wrong problem.
  displayText() drops the ~1_val~ arguments the bridge never sends.
- utils/clilocSource.js — the fs layer. hashSource reports `compressed` so the
  admin panel can flag an unconverted file WITHOUT parsing 5 MB per poll;
  otherwise pointing at a client directory reports a healthy file with pending
  drift ("ready to import") and the operator only finds out on failure.
- model/shardClilocs — refresh/status/lookup. All-or-nothing replace (DELETE,
  not TRUNCATE — TRUNCATE is DDL in MariaDB and implicitly commits). Batched
  server-side resolution behind a capped cache; never throws, because a cliloc
  lookup is decoration on a character sheet.
- Deliberately NO staged-approval flow, unlike the atlas: the atlas escalates
  facet loss because a half-copied tree and a real map change are
  indistinguishable from inside the process, whereas a partial cliloc copy
  makes the parser fail on a truncated record. The ambiguity the atlas must
  escalate is one this parser simply detects.
- No public route. The table is never served AS a table: 67k rows would dwarf
  any page using them, and the Android client consumes the same resolved JSON.

Two parser bugs found by building it, both now covered by tests: trimming a
text line before splitting ate the trailing separator on empty-text entries
and silently dropped 55,994 of 123,490 while still reporting success; and
Number('') is 0, not NaN, so a line starting with a separator imported as a
bogus cliloc 0.

Verified against the real client table (123,490 entries) and the live MariaDB:
import 663 ms, hash-gated boot no-op 14 ms, cold resolve 4.2 ms / warm 0.015 ms.
Binary and TSV imports converge on the same 67,496 rows with identical keys
(blank entries — half the table — are dropped at import). A file truncated to
half its length is refused with TRUNCATED and leaves the previous table
serving. Boot logs verified for both the import and the compressed-file
warning; neither blocks startup. All three admin routes exercised over HTTP
with a real session. 629 server tests pass; client builds clean; swagger,
routes.manifest.json and routes.guards.json regenerated.

Not covered by an automated test: the character sheet renders resolved names
in presentational React with no DOM test harness in this repo, and was not
rendered against a live linked-player profile — that needs a logged-in player
with a linked game account and a shard answering a profile RPC.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 04:21:38 -05:00
26094459ae feat(shard): ingest points.board and publish the leaderboards
Protocol 3.0 §7 (docs/link/v3.md). The shard publishes ~25 points/loyalty
leaderboards — Queen's Loyalty, Void Pool, the nine city loyalties, Clean Up
Britannia — and the site renders them, plus each character's own standings on
their sheet.

Server
  - shard_points_boards: one row per system, keyed by the shard's PointsType
    name. The top-N list stays inside `payload` — a fixed-size list read whole,
    exactly like shard_governors.candidates. Normalizing into an entries table
    buys nothing until something needs a per-character reverse lookup, and a
    character's own standings already ride inside char.profile.
  - shardIngest routes points.board to upsertPointsBoard and deliberately does
    NOT log it: this is board state like guild.update, and the shard emits a
    frame every time anyone's score moves a top ten.
  - uoLinkSocket backfills /points through snapshot() with ingestEach rather
    than a replace*: there is no points.remove and the system set is fixed, so
    upserting IS the reconciliation, and a system the operator later excludes
    keeps its last-known board rather than vanishing.
  - GET /public/shard/points and /points/:system behind
    requireFeature('leaderboards'), both projected per §3.6.1. :system is
    constrained to an identifier before any query runs; 404 for a system never
    published, distinct from a published board nobody has scored in (200, empty
    top).

The leaderboards field rule now keys on `name`, not `characterName`
  Part A pre-wired FEATURES.leaderboards.fields = { characterName: ... }, but
  projectValue matches on the LITERAL JSON key and the wire key is `name`. As
  written the rule was inert: an admin tightening character names would have got
  no enforcement and no error — precisely the failure §3.6.1 records for the
  flattened `ownerAcct` spelling. Fixed, with a test that fails if it is renamed
  back, and the admin panel's FIELD_LABEL carries the meaning instead.

Client
  - routes/public/Leaderboards.jsx at /site/leaderboards. A points.board frame
    describes ONE system, so live frames merge over the fetched set by system
    key rather than replacing it wholesale the way the ruleset does. Filter
    matches board name, system key, or any ranked player — the last is what
    makes it useful ("where do I appear?").
  - A "Loyalty & Points" section in CharacterSheet.jsx, one edit serving both
    PlayerCharacter and AdminCharacter.
  - Both treat maxPoints: 0 as UNCAPPED and both fall back to humanising the
    system key when nameString is null. Neither is defensive padding: on a real
    shard uncapped and cliloc-only names are the majority case.

Verified end to end against the local MariaDB, the Rust sidecar, and the real
ServUO shard: backfill from /points, live SSE delivery (a board absent from the
initial fetch appearing without a reload, and an existing one updating in
place), REST reflecting the overwrite, and the gate at every rung — 200 by
default with names, names stripped but points kept at fieldRules name=staff, 403
plus dropped from /features at audience=staff, 404 when disabled. Page rendered
clean, no console errors beyond the pre-existing React Router v7 warnings.

605 server tests pass; routes.manifest.json, routes.guards.json and the OpenAPI
spec regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 21:04:44 -05:00
7c769ea8fd feat(atlas): serve the spawn atlas and give operators a panel for it
Protocol 3.0 order 3 (Part C), second of two website PRs. #112 built the data
pipeline; this makes it reachable — six public routes, five admin ones, two
public pages and an admin panel. Still website-only: no plugin, no sidecar, no
new event kinds, no wire change.

The API sits at /api/v1/public/atlas, not under /public/shard. Nothing here
touches the sidecar, so the pages stay complete while the shard is down, and a
/shard prefix would imply a dependency the atlas does not have. Unlike /shard/*
it IS site-mode gated, like /posts and /wiki: a bestiary is site content.

Every route carries requireFeature('atlas') and projects its response. The atlas
feature declares no sensitive fields, so the projection is a no-op today — the
call is there because v3.md 3.6.1's rule is that the FIRST field needing a gate
should be covered by construction rather than by a retrofit.

Two bugs the UI surfaced, both fixed here:

Respawn delays were stored in the wrong unit, sometimes. XmlSpawner writes
MinDelay/MaxDelay in minutes and switches to seconds only when a delay does not
divide into whole minutes, flagging it per record with DelayInSec. A `5` means
five minutes on one spawner and five seconds on the next, both plausible, and
the pipeline stored the raw number. 170 of 6,455 stock spawners are second
flagged. The parser normalises to seconds; the API and UI carry seconds.

That exposed the hash gate as a trap. "Has the tree changed?" is the wrong
question on its own: an install whose maps never change would have kept serving
the old readings forever, because the only thing compared was the tree.
PARSER_VERSION is now stored beside the source hashes and a mismatch counts as
drift, so any future parse correction lands on the next boot.

Also renamed the detail route's spawn-point array to `spawners` — it was
`points`, which is the COUNT on the search route, so one key meant a number in
one place and an array in the other.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U7CBg11prhLimL9iHSX1bP
2026-07-28 19:51:22 -05:00
61d6bfaca2 feat(shard): ingest world.ruleset and publish it at /site/rules
Protocol 3.0 §5 (docs/link/v3.md). The shard publishes its own ruleset —
expansion, which optional systems are on, skill/stat caps, account and house
limits, champion scroll rules, the save/restart schedule — and the site renders
it, so the rules page cannot drift from how the shard actually plays.

Server
  - shard_ruleset: a singleton table (id = 1) holding the whole frame in
    `payload`, with `rev` and `expansion` hoisted. Nothing is normalized out:
    the frame is a flat description of config read as one page, and splitting it
    into columns would mean a schema change every time the shard grows a block.
  - shardIngest routes world.ruleset to setRuleset and deliberately does NOT
    log it — the shard re-emits the whole ruleset on every sidecar connect, so
    logging would append a duplicate row per reconnect, and server.hello already
    marks each of those.
  - uoLinkSocket backfills GET /ruleset explicitly rather than via snapshot(),
    which asserts an array; this covers the order where the sidecar was already
    up and holding the ruleset when we reconnected.
  - GET /public/shard/ruleset behind requireFeature('ruleset') and projected,
    per §3.6.1's rule that a shard read which doesn't project is a bug. `null`
    means the shard has never published one — a real answer, distinct from a
    published ruleset, and the page says so.

Client
  - routes/public/Rules.jsx at /site/rules, live via world.ruleset (a frame is a
    complete ruleset, not a delta, so the newest one wins outright). Caps are
    rendered from tenths — 7000 is 700.0, and showing the raw number would
    mislead. A systems key this build doesn't know still renders, humanised, so
    a newer plugin can't go invisible against an older client.
  - Nav entry gated on the `ruleset` feature, so it hides rather than 403s.

Verified end to end against the local MariaDB and a sidecar fed by a fake shard:
backfill snapshot, live SSE delivery of a changed ruleset, REST reflecting the
overwrite, an empty /feed (not logged), and the gate — 200 by default, 403 at
audience=staff (and dropped from /features so nav hides it), 404 when disabled.
Page rendered clean at all breakpoints checked, no console errors.

497 server tests pass; routes.manifest.json, routes.guards.json and the OpenAPI
spec regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 14:35:24 -05:00
f3450686e0 feat(shard): admin-configurable visibility for every shard surface
Protocol 3.0 Part A. Replaces the static PUBLIC_KINDS allowlist - which
was the entire public/admin boundary - with per-feature, per-field
audience control an admin owns from Admin -> Shard Visibility.

Closes a live leak. BridgeJson.Actor() writes acct and webId;
shapeGuild() returned the stored payload verbatim; GET
/api/v1/public/shard/guilds is anonymous. Guild leaders' game account
names and website user ids were readable by anyone, and the same path
existed for governors. Both are now projected.

The ladder is anonymous < logged_in < player < staff < admin, each rung
implying the ones below. Staff satisfy `player` without a linked account
(as /player/* already does); `editor` is a content role and gets no
shard privilege, since mapping it to staff would silently widen what
editors see.

Two invariants are code, not configuration, and both reject rather than
silently ignore:

  1. acct/webId are admin-only always - not configurable, discarded on
     read as well as rejected on write.
  2. A kind absent from KIND_FEATURE never reaches anyone below admin.
     Fail closed, so a shard emitting a new event degrades to staff-only
     rather than to public.

Enforcement is three points over one config: requireFeature() on routes
(404 disabled, 403 out-of-rung) plus field projection; per-connection
filtering on SSE, where a subscriber's rung is resolved once at subscribe
time and frozen so a long-open stream cannot gain privilege; and
/public/shard/features so the SPA hides links it cannot follow.

PUBLIC_KINDS still exists and is still exported (/feed filtering,
notificationStreams) but is now derived from the kind map, so the two
can no longer drift. Defaults reproduce pre-3.0 behavior exactly - a
test pins the derived set against the old allowlist.

Also fixes an SSE resource leak found while testing: a client dropped
because its write threw was removed from the bucket but its keepalive
interval was never cleared, firing forever on a dead socket. Both paths
now go through one drop().

Tests: 478 server (33 new across shardVisibility + shardBroadcast),
43 client. Route manifest and OpenAPI spec regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 10:04:48 -05:00
9b74999610 feat(security): soak the tightened CSP on report-only, with a same-origin sink
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Phase 1 of docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md. The tightened policy ships on
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only alongside the unchanged enforced one for a
release; a follow-up PR flips it after the soak comes back clean.

The plan expected a two-directive delta. It is one. `form-action 'self'` was
described as absent because it is not in the directives object in app.js — but
the middleware runs with `useDefaults: true` and helmet's defaults already
supply it, so the header served in production has carried it all along. Caught
by capturing the live header from the running app instead of reading the config.
It is now written out explicitly in config/csp.js regardless: a security
directive should not depend on a third-party library's default surviving its
next major version. The enforced header's contents do not change at all, and a
test pins it verbatim.

So the whole behavioural delta is `frame-ancestors 'self'` -> `'none'`. That is
still the directive most worth soaking: a frame-ancestors report is generated by
the browser of whoever framed the site, which is the only way to find out that
something legitimately embeds us before an enforcing policy breaks it.

The policies move to config/csp.js, with the report-only one derived by spread
from the enforced one so the two cannot drift and the object reads as a diff.

`report-to` needs somewhere to point, so this adds POST /api/csp-report --
same-origin on purpose, since reports describe attacks against this site and
should not go to a third-party collector. It is mounted outside /api/v1 next to
/api/health: the browser learns the path from the policy header, never from a
client build, so it is not versioned client contract.

It is necessarily unauthenticated -- browsers send reports with no session, and
gating it would silence exactly the anonymous visitors worth hearing about -- so
it is bounded on every axis:

  * both wire formats, since report-uri (Firefox/Safari) sends hyphenated keys
    in application/csp-report and report-to (Chrome) sends camelCase envelopes
    in application/reports+json; handling one silently drops half the browsers,
  * report-to also needs the Reporting-Endpoints response header or it is inert,
  * 16 KB body cap, per-IP rate limit, fixed field allowlist, every logged field
    truncated (script-sample is attacker-influenced and can carry a whole inline
    script),
  * always 204, even for malformed input: a 4xx would reach the global error
    handler, which logs the offending body -- turning an open endpoint into a
    log-flood primitive.

Nothing is persisted; reports go to the `csp` log tag.

routes.manifest.json moves 199 -> 200, which is the freeze from PR 0 working as
designed: the one new URL is visible as a reviewed +1 rather than slipping
through. Swagger regenerated to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 15:19:26 -05:00
1079b3fc05 chore(server): freeze the URL surface with a generated route manifest
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PR 0 of the router domain split (docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md § Phase 2). The
split promises that admin.routes.js can be carved into one router file per
business capability without moving a single URL. That promise has to be proved
by a diff, not asserted in review — this lands the tool that proves it, with no
router file moved.

scripts/routeManifest.js walks the live Express stack (runtime introspection,
not source parsing: route paths in admin.routes.js sit on the line *after*
`adminRouter.get(`, which defeats greps) and writes a sorted { method, path }
list to routes.manifest.json. It reproduces the frozen baseline in
docs/website/api-route-inventory.json byte-for-byte — 199 public routes plus 2
on the internal listener — so the freeze is confirmed accurate, not just
claimed.

Scope is /api/** and /.well-known/** plus the internal app. The SPA catch-all,
/uploads and /brand are filesystem-conditional static mounts, so including them
would make the output depend on whether CI had built the client. Static mounts
are not API contract.

Also emits routes.guards.json — a review aid, not a contract: per route, the
handler count and the *named* middleware on its mount chain. Router-level
`use(noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly)` gates never appear in an individual
route's own stack, so an extracted capability router that forgot to re-apply
one would otherwise publish authenticated endpoints silently. Names are a hint
only (requireRole(...) returns an anonymous arrow), but a vanished requireAuth
is unambiguous — and the test suite asserts every /admin/** and /player/**
route still carries it.

The plan's optional unauthenticated-status snapshot was tried and dropped, as
it allowed: against the dead-port mariadb pool the tests use, the sweep sits on
the pool's acquire timeout and had not finished after two minutes. A flaky
two-minute gate is worse than none; the requireAuth assertion covers the same
regression deterministically.

CI runs `npm run routes:manifest -- --check` on every PR, so a URL change can
only merge by deliberately committing the new manifest.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 14:55:38 -05:00