Every subject and body moves out of `mailer.js` into `engagement_templates` rows an
operator can edit. A relocation, not a regression: nothing that sends mail today
starts depending on an operator authoring something first.
- `email.*` block family in its own registry, sharing the page family's envelope
walk and validate-then-sanitize order by binding rather than by copy.
- A server-side renderer producing both parts of a multipart message; the text
part is byte-identical to the literals this commit deletes.
- Nine seeded templates, six of them wired now; the seeder's `customized = 0`
guard lives in the UPDATE's own WHERE.
- `renderByKey` falls back to the shipped seed when a row is missing or unusable,
so no failure of the table can stop a password reset.
Also fixes `check:hosts` reading the template key `auth.email-verify` as the
hostname `auth.email`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Makes `users.email` unique, de-duplicates the addresses an upgrade will find,
and builds the self-service change-and-verify flow that did not exist.
The uniqueness index is on a generated `email_norm AS (LOWER(email)) STORED`
column under `utf8mb4_bin`, NOT on `email` under a `_ci` collation as the plan
specified. Every case-insensitive collation this server offers is also
accent-insensitive: `josé@x.com` and `jose@x.com` compare equal, and those are
two different mailboxes. The plan's index would have refused the second address
forever and the de-duplication would have nulled a legitimate account's.
A requested address is STAGED in `email_pending` and only a tokened link
installs it, so a typo cannot silently redirect account-recovery mail.
`isDuplicateUsername()` now distinguishes the two indexes. All five call sites
branch on it; each answers differently on purpose, because a public form, an
IdP callback, a half-completed invite and an admin screen do not owe the same
person the same amount of truth.
SSO reads the IdP's actual `email_verified`/`verified` claim instead of
inferring verification from an address merely being present.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Engagement Phase 1 (docs/website/ENGAGEMENT.md §1.2a, §3.1, §3.2). A
subtraction and a replacement in one commit, because leaving the OAuth2
flow half-wired across a release is worse than either end state.
Deleted, per the §1.2a inventory: GET /admin/email/connect/start and
/connect/callback, the connectStart/connectCallback controllers with the
email_oauth_tx signed cookie, the PKCE verifier and CSRF nonce plumbing,
the https://mail.google.com/ scope, the borrowed `google` auth-providers
client, the OAuth2 nodemailer transport with its smtp.gmail.com:465
literals, the refresh-token decrypt in the model, and the client's
Connect Gmail button, redirect banner and six Gmail error strings.
`provider` and `refresh_token_enc` stay as columns under the
additive-only discipline, unread.
Added: a mail transport registry (server/src/engagement/transports) with
`smtp` as the sole registration. `credentialFields` is the single
declaration the admin form renders, the sanitizer filters against, and
the "is it secret" answer comes from, so adding a transport is a
registration rather than four edits. email_config gains transport /
credential_enc (one encrypted JSON blob, since the field list is the
transport's to declare) / reply_to.
All six call sites keep their exact failure contracts: the contact
form's mailto fallback, the invite's copyable link, the reset's generic
200, and sendTeamNotification's never-throws. One deliberate behaviour
change: `enabled` now gates every sender rather than only isConfigured()
— the connect flow used to set it as a side effect, and with a credential
form the toggle has to mean what it says.
Send-test becomes the real verification. Under OAuth2 the sender came
back from Google and was guaranteed to belong to the credential;
operator-typed, it can be refused, so failures name the sender and the
SPF/DMARC reason (§1.2a consequence 2).
G22, the silent degradation: an upgraded deployment backfills to smtp
with no credentials and every sink politely does nothing. The admin
dashboard now warns when the deprecated Gmail token is present and no
replacement credential is, so the one deployment this happens to is told.
A fresh install has never had mail and is not nagged.
Guardrails: new `npm run check:hosts` (§3.2 rule 4) with its own
self-test, wired into pr-checks before the install; routes.manifest and
routes.guards regenerated (-2 routes).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
A web-only user on a deployment running neither the Android app nor Discord gets
no notification that someone replied to their own thread — which is most users on
most deployments, and a forum where replies are invisible is a forum nobody
returns to. Email is a third consumer of the recipient set the previous commit
builds, not a fourth pipeline.
Unlike a push tickle, an email carries content: a mailbox is a destination the
recipient chose, not an untrusted relay reached by an unguessable topic. It
carries a title and an excerpt, never a full post.
The digest COMPUTES AT SEND TIME and keeps no pending-items queue. The only state
is `last_digest_at`. Three properties fall out, and the third is why it was chosen:
a deployment down for two days sends one correct digest rather than replaying a
backlog; a post a moderator hid after it was written is simply not in the query;
and a user who lost forum access between the post and the send is no longer in
the recipient set, so they are not emailed content they can no longer read.
`last_digest_at` is stamped only on a SUCCESSFUL send — stamping first would
quietly eat a day of somebody's notifications every time the mail provider had a
bad minute.
One-click unsubscribe is a stateless HMAC rather than a token table. Every
property that makes a password-reset token a row is absent: the link sits in a
mailbox for months so it has no useful expiry, and clicking it twice must mean
what clicking it once meant. Its whole capability is setting `muted` for one
(user, Team) pair.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a full password-reset flow — the prerequisite for the Android app
(docs/android/PLAN.md §8.2), which hands off to the website for reset
rather than shipping a native screen.
Backend:
- password_resets table: stores only the sha256 hash of an opaque 32-byte
token (mirrors user_invites / mobile_refresh_tokens), single-use, ~1h TTL.
- model/passwordResets + users.getActiveByEmail (email is non-unique, so a
request can match several accounts, each emailed its own link).
- mailer.sendPasswordReset (fails soft when email is unconfigured).
- Endpoints: POST /auth/password/forgot (always a generic 200 — no account
enumeration), GET|POST /auth/password/reset/:token. Confirming rotates the
hash and revokes every session (web cutoff + mobile refresh tokens); it does
not auto-login, so a 2FA account still passes TOTP next sign-in. Also serves
SSO-only accounts (null hash) as their set-initial-password path.
- Dedicated request/confirm rate limiters. Swagger regenerated.
Web:
- ForgotPassword + ResetPassword pages, routes /account/forgot and
/account/reset/:token, and a "Forgot your password?" link on the login page.
Tests: test/passwordResets.test.js (5). All server tests pass; client builds;
end-to-end smoketest against MariaDB passes (no-enumeration, single-use, hash
rotation, session revoke, login with the new password).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Replace baked-in UOM/MysticMoon/UOMysticmoon branding with a BRAND_* env
scheme so one prebuilt image runs as any shard; UOMysticmoon becomes the
first tenant that sets these vars rather than a special case in the code.
Architecture (chosen because the app ships as a prebuilt image):
- server/src/config/brand.js + bot/src/brand.js read BRAND_* once at boot,
with Runic Gateway defaults.
- Text/colors reach the SPA at RUNTIME through the existing public settings
API (settings.model.getPublic -> SiteContext), so no client rebuild. The
admin-editable site title + contact email still override BRAND_NAME/email.
- SiteContext applies BRAND_ACCENT_COLOR to the --accent CSS var at runtime.
- Express templates the built index.html <title>/description/OG/favicon at
serve time from BRAND_* (renderIndexHtml in app.js).
- Server-side consumers read brand directly: emails, TOTP issuer, API docs,
boot logs, HTML error page. Bot uses it for embed color + logs.
Assets: logo/hero/favicon delivered from a ./brand:/app/brand bind-mount
(BRAND_LOGO/HERO/FAVICON), with neutral defaults baked in; hero falls back
to a built-in image when unset.
Scope: also genericized package.json names (uomysticmoon-* -> runic-gateway-*)
and the DB_NAME/DB_USER/COOKIE_NAME code defaults (runic_gateway/runic/
rg_token). Production keeps its real values by pinning them in .env — see
.env.uomysticmoon.example, which reproduces the exact UOMysticmoon identity
(proof the substitution works). Changing a deployed COOKIE_NAME invalidates
existing sessions, so UOMysticmoon pins uomm_token.
Verified: 193 server tests pass, client builds, app.js loads + templates the
built index.html, brand transform injects title/description/OG/favicon.
Phase 5: the account-provisioning backend — link-only stays, plus hybrid
self-signup, an admin email-invite tool, and site-side unlink.
- uoLinkClient.createAccount / unlinkAccount (v2). Password is forwarded to the
shard (hashed there) and never stored/logged; the end-user browser IP is passed
for the shard's per-IP cap; actor is stamped server-side.
- Hybrid signup: POST /player/shard/account provisions a game account (its own
username + password) for the signed-in user and mirrors the link locally. Gated
by the new game_account_signup setting AND the shard's own mode (mapped 403/409/
429/400/503). Serves both self-serve signup and the invite-accept game step.
- Email invites: user_invites table (sha256 token hash, single-use, expiring);
invites model + admin CRUD (POST/GET/DELETE /admin/invites, admin-only) +
mailer.sendInvite (falls back to returning the accept link if email is off);
public token-gated accept (GET /auth/invite/:token, POST .../accept) creates the
user at the invite's preset role and logs them in, bypassing the registration
gate. Accept is race-safe (atomic single-use; rolls back the user if it loses).
- Admin unlink: DELETE /admin/users/:id/shard/link/:account (admin-only) + local
mirror drop; account.unlinked ingest reconciles the mirror when a player runs
[unlink in game. account.audit / account.unlinked are logged (admin channel
only — never on the public SSE allowlist).
Tests: invites model (hashing, single-use, expiry, revoke) + account.* ingest
reconcile/visibility. Full suite 193/193; swagger regenerated.
Refs .plans/protocol2-integration.md (Phase 5).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Retire env-var SMTP basic-auth and send the contact form through Gmail over
OAuth2 (SMTP XOAUTH2), configured in Admin -> Settings -> Email via an in-app
"Connect Gmail" consent flow. Reuses the existing google SSO OAuth client; the
captured refresh token is stored AES-GCM-encrypted (write-only over the API,
never returned), mirroring the auth-provider and Discord-bot secret patterns.
- schema: new email_config singleton table (mirrors bot_config)
- model: emailConfig.{db,model} with encrypted refresh token + getSafe/getWithSecret
- mailer: nodemailer OAuth2 transport (client id/secret from the google provider
row), contact recipient = contact_email setting, mailto: fallback preserved,
plus sendTest()
- routes/controller: /admin/email config, connect start+callback (ssoState CSRF
+ PKCE), test, disconnect
- client: EmailDelivery section on the Settings page + api methods; Settings copy
now spells out that contact_email is the delivery recipient
- docs/env: drop SMTP_*/CONTACT_TO from env examples; update README/BACKEND_DESIGN
- tests: emailConfig.model + mailer suites (8 new; full suite 142 pass)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XKeCQEJZr1AFJN4Bgcmvh3
