50d719cf46d9a95a9c026b199ba5396045471703
7 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| b30e82cde2 |
feat(modules): install, uninstall, purge and restart (phase 4, slice 1)
The consumer half of a release module-uo's CI has been publishing since
phase 3 closed. Before this, core had the installed_modules provenance
columns and no code that could ever fill them: nothing fetched, verified,
unpacked, removed or purged anything, and there was no admin route at all.
Adds modules/archive.js, modules/install.js, schema.runPurge(),
lifecycle.stop(), loader.stopHook(), and /api/v1/admin/modules with eight
routes. 797 server tests (+76), manifest 158 -> 166 + 2 internal, OpenAPI
gains 8 operations and loses nothing.
Reject, never sanitise
----------------------
The download is the easy part: an https-only allowlist re-checked on every
redirect hop, a declared sha256 compared against the bytes that arrived, and
a byte cap. Unpacking is where the archive chooses the filenames, and core
writes into a directory bind-mounted from the host, so an escape is not
confined to the container.
archive.js inspects the whole archive before a byte is unpacked and refuses
absolute and drive-absolute paths, `..` segments, NUL bytes, backslashes,
anything that is not a regular file or a directory, more than one top-level
entry, and anything over the entry or byte caps. Refusing symlinks and
hardlinks outright is what keeps this off the majority of node-tar's
published advisories rather than depending on the library to contain them.
That two-pass shape is load-bearing, and it was measured rather than assumed:
extracting an archive whose fourth member escapes upward throws under
node-tar 7.5.22 -- and leaves the first three members on disk. The loader
scans that directory at require time on the next boot, so a half-unpacked
module is a module. Everything therefore happens in a scratch directory that
is removed on any failure, and the move into place is the last step.
`tar` is pinned to ^7.5.22 rather than the ^6 that installs by default: 6.x
is flagged critical, and reading the advisory list is what the file's header
now says out loud -- almost all of it is hardlink or symlink traversal and
PAX header interpretation differentials, which is exactly this feature's
threat model.
Two things the plan had wrong
-----------------------------
The bundle's top-level directory is `module-uo-<version>`, not the module id
-- so "the top-level name must equal the id" was checked against nothing real.
The extractor strips that level instead, because its name belongs to whoever
published the bundle and the directory it lands in is core's. What is checked
instead is the unpacked module.json: a manifest promising `uo` and delivering
something else is refused rather than installed under the name it promised.
And purge cannot be a follow-up action (decision 5): purge.sql lives inside
the directory uninstall deletes. It is offered in the uninstall flow and as a
standalone action on a still-installed module, and the standalone one refuses
unless the module is already disabled -- dropping tables under something that
is still serving leaves it answering out of a world that no longer exists.
Disable now means stopped
-------------------------
lifecycle.stop() dispatches that one module's onShutdown before flipping the
guard, so a module an operator switches off actually releases its sockets and
closes its streams instead of merely becoming unreachable. The hook runs
first and the state moves after it, because while onShutdown runs the module
is still `started` and that is the only state in which its routes and the
world it is tearing down agree. A hook that throws does not stop the disable
-- the opposite of the boot path's rule, and deliberately.
Enable is not its mirror and there is no start(id) beside it. There is no
onBoot re-dispatch and the hooks were never promised re-entrant, so enable
moves the row and the restart route starts it. A test pins that enable does
not touch the loader, because "fixing" it is a one-line change that would put
a module with closed sockets back on the nav.
Restart raises SIGTERM against its own process rather than calling the
shutdown path directly, so server.js's handler stays the one graceful-shutdown
path and this route cannot drift from it.
The allowlist bootstraps from MODULE_SOURCE_HOSTS into a settings row and is
admin-managed after that (decision 6); seedDefault is INSERT IGNORE, so
changing the variable on an existing deployment is a no-op by design. An empty
list forbids every install rather than allowing every host -- the safe
direction for a value someone might blank by accident.
Verified against the real v0.3.0 release
----------------------------------------
Not a fixture: fetched the published install manifest over the real Gitea
host and its redirect chain, verified the sha256, inspected and unpacked the
252,517-byte artifact to 82 files, and then booted core against the result --
the module registered its five mounts, seven streams and eight capabilities
and resolved its client chunk, with no scratch directory left behind.
Two defects this slice's own tooling caught, both of which had already been
written down as classes:
- the controller destructured runPurge at require time, capturing the
function rather than the module, which made the one dependency whose
ORDER matters the one that could not be substituted;
- two swagger annotations carried an apostrophe inside a quoted string,
dropped silently by swagger-autogen before slice 5 taught it to fail loudly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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| 7a08546da6 |
feat(brand): BRAND_* env scheme — instance branding without a rebuild
Replace baked-in UOM/MysticMoon/UOMysticmoon branding with a BRAND_* env scheme so one prebuilt image runs as any shard; UOMysticmoon becomes the first tenant that sets these vars rather than a special case in the code. Architecture (chosen because the app ships as a prebuilt image): - server/src/config/brand.js + bot/src/brand.js read BRAND_* once at boot, with Runic Gateway defaults. - Text/colors reach the SPA at RUNTIME through the existing public settings API (settings.model.getPublic -> SiteContext), so no client rebuild. The admin-editable site title + contact email still override BRAND_NAME/email. - SiteContext applies BRAND_ACCENT_COLOR to the --accent CSS var at runtime. - Express templates the built index.html <title>/description/OG/favicon at serve time from BRAND_* (renderIndexHtml in app.js). - Server-side consumers read brand directly: emails, TOTP issuer, API docs, boot logs, HTML error page. Bot uses it for embed color + logs. Assets: logo/hero/favicon delivered from a ./brand:/app/brand bind-mount (BRAND_LOGO/HERO/FAVICON), with neutral defaults baked in; hero falls back to a built-in image when unset. Scope: also genericized package.json names (uomysticmoon-* -> runic-gateway-*) and the DB_NAME/DB_USER/COOKIE_NAME code defaults (runic_gateway/runic/ rg_token). Production keeps its real values by pinning them in .env — see .env.uomysticmoon.example, which reproduces the exact UOMysticmoon identity (proof the substitution works). Changing a deployed COOKIE_NAME invalidates existing sessions, so UOMysticmoon pins uomm_token. Verified: 193 server tests pass, client builds, app.js loads + templates the built index.html, brand transform injects title/description/OG/favicon. |
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| 9d9f5aac28 |
Add uo-link WS ingest, storage tables and SSE broadcaster (phase 1)
The site now ingests the sidecar's live WebSocket feed and persists it to its own MariaDB, and re-broadcasts curated events to browsers over SSE. - schema: shard_events (append-only notable-kind log, sha1 dedupe_key + INSERT IGNORE for idempotent reconnect backfill), shard_online (current players, upsert/refresh/remove), shard_economy (gold-supply series), shard_houses (per-house decay stage + derived is_idoc). - model/shardEvents + model/shardState: the .db.js/.model.js split; writes take camelCase event data, reads are shaped; online upsert uses COALESCE so a partial char.vitals refresh never blanks login fields. - utils/shardIngest: single dispatcher routing each kind to state writes and/or the event log, then the broadcaster. High-frequency kinds (char.vitals, economy.supply) update state only. A changed server.hello bootId clears the stale online roster. Deps are injected for unit testing. - utils/uoLinkSocket: the server's first outbound WS client (ws dep). Verifies the ws.hello protocol, backfills via /history + /economy on every (re)connect (dedupe handles overlap), reconnects with capped backoff, and mirrors connection state into uo_link_config. Self-guards: only connects when the integration is enabled with a token. - utils/shardBroadcast: SSE fan-out with public (safe kinds only) and admin (all) channels, keepalive pings, per-client cleanup. - server.js: start the ingest socket on boot (no-op until configured) and stop it + close SSE streams on graceful shutdown. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011qPmpmVH1xGCiZoz9m9vW3 |
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| a1f0675577 |
Add Swagger/OpenAPI API docs (swagger-ui + swagger-autogen)
Generate an OpenAPI 3.0 spec from route annotations and serve it with Swagger UI so the full REST API is browsable and testable. - Add swagger-ui-express (runtime) and swagger-autogen (dev) deps, plus an `npm run swagger` script. - server/swagger/swagger.js: generator config with API metadata, servers, 14 tag groups, cookie + bearer security schemes, and 28 reusable component schemas. Follows the Express mount chain from src/app.js so generated paths are fully-qualified (/api/v1/...). - Annotate every route (auth, mobile, sso, public, admin, health) with #swagger tags/summaries/parameters/request bodies/security and the actual response codes each handler returns (400/401/403/404/409/429/ 302/502, multipart uploads). - Serve Swagger UI at /api/docs and the raw spec at /api/docs.json, guarded so a missing spec disables docs instead of crashing. - Commit the generated swagger-output.json so docs work with no build step; swagger-autogen stays dev-only and is not needed at runtime. - README: new "API documentation (Swagger)" section plus tech-stack and project-structure entries. Covers 51 paths / 64 operations. Existing test suite (83) still passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| d38c98ad9e |
Harden admin login: RBAC-safe controls, 2FA, bot-scoring, rate limits (#9)
Adds a layered set of protections around the admin login and the app edge.
Trust proxy (server/src/utils/trustProxy.js)
- Configurable via TRUST_PROXY; pin to the newt agent ("ptero") LAN IP so
X-Forwarded-For is trusted ONLY from that peer. A blanket "true" is
rejected (coerced to 1) to prevent XFF spoofing that would dodge every
IP-based control. DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY logs peer/XFF/req.ip to re-verify the
proxy IP without a redeploy. Documents the Omada static-reservation
assumption.
Login throttling (server/src/middleware/loginProtection.js, rateLimit.js)
- express-slow-down progressive delay + the existing hard rate cap + a
separate per-IP exponential backoff that persists across the rate window.
All failures return one generic message (no user/pass disclosure).
Honeypot (login form + auth.controller)
- Hidden, plausibly-named field ("company"); a filled value fails
generically and is scored as an unambiguous bot.
Optional per-user TOTP 2FA (speakeasy/qrcode)
- totp_secret/totp_enabled columns (+ idempotent migration). Self-service
Account page: enroll via QR, confirm a code to enable, code-gated disable.
- Login is two-step for enrolled users: after the password, a short-lived
signed challenge (stage:'totp', not a session) is required before the
real session is issued.
Bot / scanner scoring + IP ban (server/src/middleware/botScore.js)
- Weighted CMS-scanner paths (this app uses none). Junk paths 404 FIRST,
unconditionally — independent of score/ban state, so a scanner rotating
through fresh Cloudflare IPs gets no free pass. /wp-admin/install.php is
the top-weighted near-1-hit ban (worst offender in prod logs). Per-IP
score with quiet-period decay temp-bans an IP from ALL routes once past a
(deliberately low) threshold, to protect /admin from credential stuffing.
Failed logins and honeypot hits feed the same score.
- Periodic sweep evicts stale, unbanned, quiet entries so the in-memory
store can't grow unbounded; the interval is unref'd and cleared on
graceful shutdown.
Tests: node --test suite (40) covering trust-proxy parsing + live req.ip
(incl. pinned-IP), rate limiter + exponential backoff, honeypot rejection,
TOTP verify (enabled/disabled) + challenge-isn't-a-session, bot-score
threshold/decay/ban + junk-404-independence + install.php + store sweep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| b925114923 |
Wiki Phase 1: categories, drafts/publish, HTML sanitization
Foundation & safety phase of the wiki upgrade (see WIKI_UPGRADE.md). Schema (additive, idempotent via ensureSchema): - new wiki_categories table; wiki_pages gains category_id, excerpt, published, published_at, sort_order, and a FULLTEXT index - migration ALTERs guarded with IF NOT EXISTS for existing databases - seed reworked into 4 sections with the 8 starter pages assigned Security: - new utils/sanitizeHtml.js (sanitize-html allowlist); wiki bodies are sanitized on every save, and the article renders through DOMPurify - strips <script>, event handlers (onerror), and javascript: URLs Backend: - public: published-only list with ?category filter + /wiki/categories - admin: extended page CRUD, PATCH publish toggle, category CRUD; drafts visible to admin, hidden from public - all writes logged to activity_log Frontend: - data-driven public wiki index (sections + real descriptions; removed hardcoded blurbs/Roman numerals) with ?category filtering - article: category breadcrumb + sanitized render - admin: Section/Status columns, draft/publish + section + excerpt in the editor, and a Manage sections modal Verified end-to-end against MariaDB 11: migration clean, XSS neutralized, drafts hidden, client builds, server boots. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| eef79e2403 |
Initial commit: UOMysticmoon backend (Express + MariaDB + JWT)
- Layered API (router -> controller -> model -> db), serverlinkr pattern - Public / auth / admin route groups; posts, wiki, settings, users, activity models - JWT httpOnly-cookie auth (Secure auto-detected: LAN HTTP + Pangolin HTTPS) - Site LIVE/MAINTENANCE mode with admin preview bypass - Dual file+console logging (info/warn/error/debug) + HTTP access logs - Docker Compose (app + MariaDB), schema.sql + seed, .env.example - Verified end-to-end against MariaDB (27/27 smoke checks) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
