Phase 2 PR 4 of docs/website/MODULE_SYSTEM.md §2.7. Adds server/src/modules/registries.js
and moves core's own notification streams, announce leg and users-detail routes
behind it, so the three seams §1.8 and §1.9 named are exercised on every boot
before any module depends on them.
Registering is validate-then-commit per registrant: the loader stages what a
module claims and the second pass commits it, so a module that throws halfway
through register() — or fails checkDeclared after it — leaves nothing behind.
That is the registry-side twin of PR 2's second-pass mount rule.
Four decisions, all the recommended option:
- announce legs became a child table. `announce_job_legs` replaces the
towncrier_*/discord_* column groups, so the leg set is data: core registers
`discord`, module-uo will register `towncrier`, and a module cannot ALTER a
core table to add its own. Backfill is guarded on information_schema (a
SELECT of a dropped column is a parse error, not a runtime one) and the
columns go with DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS. Verified against the live dev DB:
three legacy jobs migrated faithfully, three replays, no duplicates.
- `mapEvent` dropped from registerNotificationStreams. §1.8 already inverts the
push path so a module owns fromShardEvent and calls core's publish() with a
stream id it resolved; a second mapping mechanism was a leftover. The public
safety filter, the kinds it reads and the streams it protects now live in one
file and move together.
- core registers through the same staging area a module uses, via an explicit
registries.registerCore() in app.js before modules.load().
- core's six /admin/users/:id/shard/* paths now go through the
`admin.users.detail` slot, and getUser moved back to admin.controller.js.
Found on the way, and the reason two build tools changed:
- scripts/routeManifest.js could not decode a parameterised mount. Its
unwinder expected `(?:([^\/]+?))`; express 4.22 emits `(?:\/([^/]+?))` with
the separator inside the group. The branch had never run. It threw rather
than guessing, which is what it is for.
- swagger-autogen cannot follow a route into an extension slot — the slot's
router is created by declareSlot() and filled later, so there is no literal
mount for a static parse. Regenerating deleted 407 lines and printed
`Swagger-autogen: Success`, the spike's exact failure (MODULE_API.md §7.4).
swagger/slotSpecs.js generates a fragment per filled slot and re-roots it at
the prefix the router actually hangs at in the live app — read from the
express stack via routeManifest's own mountPath, so the manifest and the spec
cannot disagree. swagger/mergeSpec.js is the merge helper core owes for
module fragments anyway (§6.1a), proved here against core's own slot first.
884 tests pass (856 before). routes.manifest.json is unchanged at 229 routes.
The OpenAPI spec diff is two lines of intent: the retry endpoint's summary, and
its `leg` no longer being a fixed enum.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 PR 2 of docs/website/MODULE_SYSTEM.md 2.7. Adds
server/src/modules/{loader,semver,version}.js: the synchronous scan of
MODULES_DIR, manifest validation, prefix and table-name collision
rejection, per-module try/catch and the mount into the three tier
routers behind the MODULE_API.md 4.5 dispatch guard.
Two decisions the contract left open, both now written up there:
- The load trigger is one explicit modules.load(tierRouters) call in
app.js, not a lazy scan (API 7.6). Accessors throw until it has run,
because "no modules installed" is a real answer a caller must not be
handed by accident.
- Whether core owns a prefix is asked of the live tier routers via
express's own layer.match(), skipping root-mounted layers, rather than
a hardcoded table -- the spike's was already stale when written
(API 4.3).
Mounting is a second pass after every module is validated. Doing it
inside the scan loop makes the first module's layers indistinguishable
from core's, so the second module claiming a taken prefix is told it
collided with core and the module-versus-module check is unreachable.
registerExtension/NotificationStreams/AnnounceLeg and onBoot/onShutdown
throw "not available until phase 2 PR 4/5" rather than no-op; an
accepting stub would let a module believe it had registered something.
No schema replay, no boot dispatch, no installed_modules reconcile --
those are PRs 3 and 5, and until PR 5 a record's state is in memory only.
No module ships on the volume, so nothing an operator or client can see
changes: 842 tests pass, routes.manifest.json is unchanged at 229 routes
and swagger-output.json regenerates byte-identical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 5 of docs/website/THEMING_AND_NAV.md: uploaded logo/hero/favicon
overrides on top of the BRAND_* env defaults, delivered through an HTML
shell that is no longer built once at boot.
- utils/htmlShell.js owns the shell lifecycle: rendered lazily, cached per
process, invalidated on a brand_assets/theme_visual write with a 5-minute
TTL so other workers converge. A settings-read failure renders the
env-only shell and caches that, so a DB outage is not a failing query per
page view, and with no rows the output is byte-identical to what app.js
served before.
- POST /admin/settings/brand-asset/:slot uploads one asset and writes the
row in the same call, so an upload never leaves an unreferenced file. It
reuses the shared multer allowlist and only tightens it per slot: favicons
are PNG-only and capped at 512 KB, logos at 1 MB, heroes at 8 MB. Refused
files are unlinked before the response.
- utils/brandAssets.js constrains a stored asset to a same-origin path under
/uploads, /brand or /assets — these are the only settings values written
straight into the page as a URL. Strict on write, forgiving on read.
- The shell also carries the resolved theme as a <style id="theme-boot">
block, removing the first-paint flash phases 3-4 deferred; SiteContext
drops that block once a successful settings fetch has been applied.
- BrandLogo renders beside the MoonDot on all six shells and renders nothing
when no logo is set, which is the shipped default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1 of docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md. The tightened policy ships on
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only alongside the unchanged enforced one for a
release; a follow-up PR flips it after the soak comes back clean.
The plan expected a two-directive delta. It is one. `form-action 'self'` was
described as absent because it is not in the directives object in app.js — but
the middleware runs with `useDefaults: true` and helmet's defaults already
supply it, so the header served in production has carried it all along. Caught
by capturing the live header from the running app instead of reading the config.
It is now written out explicitly in config/csp.js regardless: a security
directive should not depend on a third-party library's default surviving its
next major version. The enforced header's contents do not change at all, and a
test pins it verbatim.
So the whole behavioural delta is `frame-ancestors 'self'` -> `'none'`. That is
still the directive most worth soaking: a frame-ancestors report is generated by
the browser of whoever framed the site, which is the only way to find out that
something legitimately embeds us before an enforcing policy breaks it.
The policies move to config/csp.js, with the report-only one derived by spread
from the enforced one so the two cannot drift and the object reads as a diff.
`report-to` needs somewhere to point, so this adds POST /api/csp-report --
same-origin on purpose, since reports describe attacks against this site and
should not go to a third-party collector. It is mounted outside /api/v1 next to
/api/health: the browser learns the path from the policy header, never from a
client build, so it is not versioned client contract.
It is necessarily unauthenticated -- browsers send reports with no session, and
gating it would silence exactly the anonymous visitors worth hearing about -- so
it is bounded on every axis:
* both wire formats, since report-uri (Firefox/Safari) sends hyphenated keys
in application/csp-report and report-to (Chrome) sends camelCase envelopes
in application/reports+json; handling one silently drops half the browsers,
* report-to also needs the Reporting-Endpoints response header or it is inert,
* 16 KB body cap, per-IP rate limit, fixed field allowlist, every logged field
truncated (script-sample is attacker-influenced and can carry a whole inline
script),
* always 204, even for malformed input: a 4xx would reach the global error
handler, which logs the offending body -- turning an open endpoint into a
log-flood primitive.
Nothing is persisted; reports go to the `csp` log tag.
routes.manifest.json moves 199 -> 200, which is the freeze from PR 0 working as
designed: the one new URL is visible as a reviewed +1 rather than slipping
through. Swagger regenerated to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address SonarQube security hotspots on the website:
- server/src/app.js: replace `contentSecurityPolicy: false` with a helmet CSP
tuned for the built React SPA (script-src 'self'; style-src adds 'unsafe-inline'
for React inline styles + the Google Fonts stylesheet; font-src gstatic; img-src
allows data:/https: for uploads, embedded body images and BRAND_* assets;
connect-src 'self' for REST+SSE). upgrade-insecure-requests is intentionally
omitted (TLS terminates at the proxy; keeps local `npm start` over http working).
The /api/docs Swagger UI route gets a scoped looser policy (inline script/style)
since swagger-ui-express injects an inline bootstrap.
- client/vite.config.js: disable the inline module-preload polyfill so code-split
builds keep `script-src 'self'` valid (RichTextEditor is a separate chunk).
- bot/src/app.js, server/src/internalApp.js: disable x-powered-by on the two
internal-only listeners (the public app already strips it via helmet).
- shardEvents dedupe key: SHA-1 -> SHA-256 truncated to 40 hex chars (fits the
existing CHAR(40) column, no migration; it is a content fingerprint, not a
security value). schema.sql comment updated to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Add the server side of Android App Links (M9 follow-up, docs/android/APP_LINKS.md):
- GET /.well-known/assetlinks.json at the web root, gated by the new admin
setting `mobile_app_links_enabled` (default off -> 404; on-but-no-fingerprint
-> 404). Emits the Digital Asset Links statement for the fixed published
package (MOBILE_APP_PACKAGE) + MOBILE_APP_CERT_SHA256 fingerprint(s).
- mobileSso `/start` additionally accepts this shard's own self-origin
https://<host>/mobile/callback when App Links are enabled — one additive
exact-match entry, derived from APP_BASE_URL/request origin, never client
input; the custom-scheme allowlist is never narrowed. The settings lookup is
short-circuited for non-https redirects so custom-scheme rejections stay fast.
- settings.isMobileAppLinksEnabled() (fail-closed) + getPublic().mobileAppLinks;
admin updateSettings validates the boolean; seed default off.
Tests: test/appLinks.test.js (route gating + allowlist). Full suite 284 pass.
Swagger unchanged (web-root verification file is #swagger.ignore'd).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Replace baked-in UOM/MysticMoon/UOMysticmoon branding with a BRAND_* env
scheme so one prebuilt image runs as any shard; UOMysticmoon becomes the
first tenant that sets these vars rather than a special case in the code.
Architecture (chosen because the app ships as a prebuilt image):
- server/src/config/brand.js + bot/src/brand.js read BRAND_* once at boot,
with Runic Gateway defaults.
- Text/colors reach the SPA at RUNTIME through the existing public settings
API (settings.model.getPublic -> SiteContext), so no client rebuild. The
admin-editable site title + contact email still override BRAND_NAME/email.
- SiteContext applies BRAND_ACCENT_COLOR to the --accent CSS var at runtime.
- Express templates the built index.html <title>/description/OG/favicon at
serve time from BRAND_* (renderIndexHtml in app.js).
- Server-side consumers read brand directly: emails, TOTP issuer, API docs,
boot logs, HTML error page. Bot uses it for embed color + logs.
Assets: logo/hero/favicon delivered from a ./brand:/app/brand bind-mount
(BRAND_LOGO/HERO/FAVICON), with neutral defaults baked in; hero falls back
to a built-in image when unset.
Scope: also genericized package.json names (uomysticmoon-* -> runic-gateway-*)
and the DB_NAME/DB_USER/COOKIE_NAME code defaults (runic_gateway/runic/
rg_token). Production keeps its real values by pinning them in .env — see
.env.uomysticmoon.example, which reproduces the exact UOMysticmoon identity
(proof the substitution works). Changing a deployed COOKIE_NAME invalidates
existing sessions, so UOMysticmoon pins uomm_token.
Verified: 193 server tests pass, client builds, app.js loads + templates the
built index.html, brand transform injects title/description/OG/favicon.
Generate an OpenAPI 3.0 spec from route annotations and serve it with
Swagger UI so the full REST API is browsable and testable.
- Add swagger-ui-express (runtime) and swagger-autogen (dev) deps, plus
an `npm run swagger` script.
- server/swagger/swagger.js: generator config with API metadata, servers,
14 tag groups, cookie + bearer security schemes, and 28 reusable
component schemas. Follows the Express mount chain from src/app.js so
generated paths are fully-qualified (/api/v1/...).
- Annotate every route (auth, mobile, sso, public, admin, health) with
#swagger tags/summaries/parameters/request bodies/security and the
actual response codes each handler returns (400/401/403/404/409/429/
302/502, multipart uploads).
- Serve Swagger UI at /api/docs and the raw spec at /api/docs.json,
guarded so a missing spec disables docs instead of crashing.
- Commit the generated swagger-output.json so docs work with no build
step; swagger-autogen stays dev-only and is not needed at runtime.
- README: new "API documentation (Swagger)" section plus tech-stack and
project-structure entries.
Covers 51 paths / 64 operations. Existing test suite (83) still passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a layered set of protections around the admin login and the app edge.
Trust proxy (server/src/utils/trustProxy.js)
- Configurable via TRUST_PROXY; pin to the newt agent ("ptero") LAN IP so
X-Forwarded-For is trusted ONLY from that peer. A blanket "true" is
rejected (coerced to 1) to prevent XFF spoofing that would dodge every
IP-based control. DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY logs peer/XFF/req.ip to re-verify the
proxy IP without a redeploy. Documents the Omada static-reservation
assumption.
Login throttling (server/src/middleware/loginProtection.js, rateLimit.js)
- express-slow-down progressive delay + the existing hard rate cap + a
separate per-IP exponential backoff that persists across the rate window.
All failures return one generic message (no user/pass disclosure).
Honeypot (login form + auth.controller)
- Hidden, plausibly-named field ("company"); a filled value fails
generically and is scored as an unambiguous bot.
Optional per-user TOTP 2FA (speakeasy/qrcode)
- totp_secret/totp_enabled columns (+ idempotent migration). Self-service
Account page: enroll via QR, confirm a code to enable, code-gated disable.
- Login is two-step for enrolled users: after the password, a short-lived
signed challenge (stage:'totp', not a session) is required before the
real session is issued.
Bot / scanner scoring + IP ban (server/src/middleware/botScore.js)
- Weighted CMS-scanner paths (this app uses none). Junk paths 404 FIRST,
unconditionally — independent of score/ban state, so a scanner rotating
through fresh Cloudflare IPs gets no free pass. /wp-admin/install.php is
the top-weighted near-1-hit ban (worst offender in prod logs). Per-IP
score with quiet-period decay temp-bans an IP from ALL routes once past a
(deliberately low) threshold, to protect /admin from credential stuffing.
Failed logins and honeypot hits feed the same score.
- Periodic sweep evicts stale, unbanned, quiet entries so the in-memory
store can't grow unbounded; the interval is unref'd and cleared on
graceful shutdown.
Tests: node --test suite (40) covering trust-proxy parsing + live req.ip
(incl. pinned-IP), rate limiter + exponential backoff, honeypot rejection,
TOTP verify (enabled/disabled) + challenge-isn't-a-session, bot-score
threshold/decay/ban + junk-404-independence + install.php + store sweep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The multer filename kept path.extname(file.originalname), while the
fileFilter only checked the spoofable client-supplied mimetype. An
attacker could send Content-Type: image/png with originalname x.html,
landing an .html file in /uploads that express.static serves as
text/html — same-origin stored XSS.
- Store the extension from a whitelist keyed by the accepted mimetype
(MIME_EXT), never from originalname. The fileFilter uses the same map
as its single source of truth, so only mimetypes with a safe mapped
extension pass.
- Use crypto.randomBytes for the random filename component.
- Serve /uploads with an explicit X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
(defense in depth alongside helmet's global setting).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
