2 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
wtclaude	732927a6bb	fix(modules): three defects a real install exposed (phase 4, slice 1) ... Standing the slice-2 screen up against a live server and installing the published module-uo v0.3.0 through it found three things, none of which any unit test in this repo could have caught. Two of them are older than this phase. 1. The boot refresh nulled every install's provenance -------------------------------------------------------- `installed_modules.source` and `.sha256` exist so the admin panel can say where a module came from. They never survived a restart. `lifecycle.boot()` re-records every scanned module with no source and no sha256 -- correctly, because a scan finds a directory and never where it came from -- and `upsert` assigned both columns unconditionally. So an install's provenance lasted exactly until the restart that install asked for, and the screen then described a module installed from a URL as "placed on the volume by hand". Verified live: install, restart, provenance gone. Nothing could have caught it before now. Phase 4 wrote the first non-null value these columns had ever had, so lifecycle.js's comment asserting that "recordInstalled leaves what it is not given" described an intention rather than the statement below it -- and modules.model.test.js's fake reproduced the defect faithfully, assigning unconditionally just like the SQL. Fixed with COALESCE(VALUES(col), col): a value overwrites, a NULL leaves what is there. The fake now matches, and two tests pin both directions -- a boot refresh must not wipe it, and a re-install from a new URL must still replace it, or the column would become write-once and an upgrade would for ever show where the first version came from. 2. The restart killed the server on Windows instead of stopping it ------------------------------------------------------------------ The route called `process.kill(process.pid, 'SIGTERM')` to reach server.js's graceful-shutdown handler. That works on Linux. **Windows has no POSIX signals, and Node documents SIGTERM there as unconditional termination of the target process** -- so on a Windows host the restart killed the server outright: no module onShutdown, no listener close, no pool close, no log flush. Observed exactly that: the process was gone and the shutdown handler had logged nothing at all. `process.on('SIGTERM', ...)` is an ordinary EventEmitter listener, so `process.emit('SIGTERM')` reaches the same handler on every platform without involving the OS. One shutdown path, still; it just gets there by an event. Deployment is Linux containers and would never have shown this. Development is not, and neither is the smoke that found it. The test was worse than useless: it stubbed `process.kill` and asserted it had been called with SIGTERM, which is precisely the call whose MEANING differs by platform. It now waits for the SIGTERM EVENT -- what server.js is actually subscribed to -- so a pass here means the handler would run. 3. `present()` did not publish the running version -------------------------------------------------- An upgrade writes new files and a new row while the old code stays loaded, so the row's version is a promise about the next boot rather than a description of this one. Adds `liveVersion` from the loader beside `liveState`, so the screen can tell the two apart instead of reporting the new version as running. 723 server tests (+2), manifest and OpenAPI both unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-12 03:48:27 -05:00
wtclaude	b30e82cde2	feat(modules): install, uninstall, purge and restart (phase 4, slice 1) ... The consumer half of a release module-uo's CI has been publishing since phase 3 closed. Before this, core had the installed_modules provenance columns and no code that could ever fill them: nothing fetched, verified, unpacked, removed or purged anything, and there was no admin route at all. Adds modules/archive.js, modules/install.js, schema.runPurge(), lifecycle.stop(), loader.stopHook(), and /api/v1/admin/modules with eight routes. 797 server tests (+76), manifest 158 -> 166 + 2 internal, OpenAPI gains 8 operations and loses nothing. Reject, never sanitise ---------------------- The download is the easy part: an https-only allowlist re-checked on every redirect hop, a declared sha256 compared against the bytes that arrived, and a byte cap. Unpacking is where the archive chooses the filenames, and core writes into a directory bind-mounted from the host, so an escape is not confined to the container. archive.js inspects the whole archive before a byte is unpacked and refuses absolute and drive-absolute paths, `..` segments, NUL bytes, backslashes, anything that is not a regular file or a directory, more than one top-level entry, and anything over the entry or byte caps. Refusing symlinks and hardlinks outright is what keeps this off the majority of node-tar's published advisories rather than depending on the library to contain them. That two-pass shape is load-bearing, and it was measured rather than assumed: extracting an archive whose fourth member escapes upward throws under node-tar 7.5.22 -- and leaves the first three members on disk. The loader scans that directory at require time on the next boot, so a half-unpacked module is a module. Everything therefore happens in a scratch directory that is removed on any failure, and the move into place is the last step. `tar` is pinned to ^7.5.22 rather than the ^6 that installs by default: 6.x is flagged critical, and reading the advisory list is what the file's header now says out loud -- almost all of it is hardlink or symlink traversal and PAX header interpretation differentials, which is exactly this feature's threat model. Two things the plan had wrong ----------------------------- The bundle's top-level directory is `module-uo-<version>`, not the module id -- so "the top-level name must equal the id" was checked against nothing real. The extractor strips that level instead, because its name belongs to whoever published the bundle and the directory it lands in is core's. What is checked instead is the unpacked module.json: a manifest promising `uo` and delivering something else is refused rather than installed under the name it promised. And purge cannot be a follow-up action (decision 5): purge.sql lives inside the directory uninstall deletes. It is offered in the uninstall flow and as a standalone action on a still-installed module, and the standalone one refuses unless the module is already disabled -- dropping tables under something that is still serving leaves it answering out of a world that no longer exists. Disable now means stopped ------------------------- lifecycle.stop() dispatches that one module's onShutdown before flipping the guard, so a module an operator switches off actually releases its sockets and closes its streams instead of merely becoming unreachable. The hook runs first and the state moves after it, because while onShutdown runs the module is still `started` and that is the only state in which its routes and the world it is tearing down agree. A hook that throws does not stop the disable -- the opposite of the boot path's rule, and deliberately. Enable is not its mirror and there is no start(id) beside it. There is no onBoot re-dispatch and the hooks were never promised re-entrant, so enable moves the row and the restart route starts it. A test pins that enable does not touch the loader, because "fixing" it is a one-line change that would put a module with closed sockets back on the nav. Restart raises SIGTERM against its own process rather than calling the shutdown path directly, so server.js's handler stays the one graceful-shutdown path and this route cannot drift from it. The allowlist bootstraps from MODULE_SOURCE_HOSTS into a settings row and is admin-managed after that (decision 6); seedDefault is INSERT IGNORE, so changing the variable on an existing deployment is a no-op by design. An empty list forbids every install rather than allowing every host -- the safe direction for a value someone might blank by accident. Verified against the real v0.3.0 release ---------------------------------------- Not a fixture: fetched the published install manifest over the real Gitea host and its redirect chain, verified the sha256, inspected and unpacked the 252,517-byte artifact to 82 files, and then booted core against the result -- the module registered its five mounts, seven streams and eight capabilities and resolved its client chunk, with no scratch directory left behind. Two defects this slice's own tooling caught, both of which had already been written down as classes: - the controller destructured runPurge at require time, capturing the function rather than the module, which made the one dependency whose ORDER matters the one that could not be substituted; - two swagger annotations carried an apostrophe inside a quoted string, dropped silently by swagger-autogen before slice 5 taught it to fail loudly. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-12 03:09:45 -05:00