"Trust this device" did nothing for anyone who signs in with Google or Discord.
sso.controller went straight from needsTotp(user) to staging a pending-TOTP
challenge and never consulted resolveTrustedDevice, so an SSO user was asked for
a code on EVERY sign-in no matter how many times they had ticked the box — and
POST /auth/sso/totp accepted only `code`, so that step could not establish a
trust either. The password paths (web + native) were unaffected and already
worked; this closes the gap for SSO, on the website AND in the Android app.
Server:
- finishLogin and finishMobileLogin now run the same trusted-device check as
auth.controller.login, via one shared helper: honor a trust that belongs to
THIS user, stamp last_used_at, log auth.login.trusted_device. A store error
falls through to the challenge — fail closed to asking for the code.
- POST /auth/sso/totp gains optional trustDevice + deviceName, sets the rg_trust
cookie, and mirrors the password path's { trustLimitReached, devices } response
at the cap (the sign-in still completes). Recovery codes stay password-only.
Android coverage, without leaking a secret into a URL:
- The app opens SSO in a Custom Tab, which shares the system browser's cookie
jar, so the rg_trust cookie set on that TOTP form is presented back on the next
app sign-in. That alone makes native SSO skip the code. Passing the app's token
into the start URL was rejected — it would put a 256-bit secret in query
strings, Referer headers and access logs.
- To also cover the app's NATIVE password login, ticking the box sets
mobile_auth_sessions.trust_device (a boolean; never the token), and
/auth/mobile/sso/exchange mints a platform:'mobile' trust and returns
{ trustToken }. Minting there keeps the raw token on an authenticated
app→server call, out of the deep link and out of the bridge row. Best-effort:
at the cap the response just omits it rather than failing a good sign-in.
Client: the trust checkbox is no longer hidden on the SSO second step, on both
the admin and player login screens. On the mobile bridge the deep-link redirect
takes priority over the cap prompt — the sign-in succeeded and the link is
single-use, so stalling there would strand the app.
Tests: 8 new cases in server/test/ssoTrustedDevice.test.js (verified to fail
against the pre-fix controller). Full suites green — server 445, client 43 —
and routes.manifest.json is a zero-line diff: no URL moved, only +2 handlers on
/auth/sso/totp in routes.guards.json for the two new validators. Swagger
regenerated. Verified live against the running server and real MariaDB: the TOTP
step issues rg_trust and persists the row, a subsequent SSO callback carrying it
skips the code, and an invalid trust is still challenged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add opt-in "Trust this device" so a browser/app skips the TOTP step (never
the password) for 30 days, single-use bcrypt recovery codes as a 2FA-lockout
fallback, and admin trusted-device/MFA-reset management — backend, web UI,
OpenAPI spec, and tests.
- Schema: trusted_devices (sha256 token hash, looked up by unique index) and
recovery_codes (bcrypt, single-use). Both additive/idempotent.
- Session service: trust-token mint/hash/resolve + cap helpers; new rg_trust
httpOnly cookie (survives logout, revoked on untrust/password change/reset/
TOTP disable). JWTs stay stateless — trust is a server-side row, not a claim.
- Web + mobile login accept a trusted-device token / recovery code; login/totp
gains trustDevice + recoveryCode. Cap of 10/user with NO silent pruning — an
over-cap trust returns 409/trustLimitReached and the client prompts to revoke.
- Self-service /auth/me/trusted-devices* + recovery-codes*; admin
/admin/users/:id/trusted-devices* + /mfa/reset. All actions audit-logged.
- Client: "Trust this device" + recovery-code login options, one-time recovery
code display, Trusted Devices + Recovery Codes account panels, a TOTP-styled
revoke-to-continue cap modal, and admin per-user security controls.
- OpenAPI regenerated; 33 new server tests (all suites green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Clears the 124 CODE_SMELL findings from the SonarQube scan (server, client,
and bot). All changes are behaviour-preserving refactors — no route, protocol,
schema, or config changes — verified against the full server (381) and client
(43) test suites plus a clean client build.
By rule:
- S3776 (20, cognitive complexity): extract helpers/handlers so each function
drops under the threshold — shard model upsert builders, page/wiki update,
block validation, notification stream mapping (dispatch table), SSO mobile
login, shard ingest deps, uo-link socket backfill/connect, the bot slash-
command dispatchers + discord manager, and the Shard/UserDetail/HeroEditor/
CharacterStats React components.
- S4624 (34, nested template literals): pull inner templates into locals /
a withQs() helper; rewrite shardEvents.describe() as a formatter table.
- S3358 (35, nested ternaries): lift to if/else vars, lookup maps, small
components, or guarded JSX expressions.
- S6479 (12, array-index React keys): key by stable content instead of index
(two in-editor lists left as-is; index matches their by-index edit model).
- S6353 (6): [0-9]/[^0-9] -> \d/\D. S125 (5): reword state-shape comments that
parsed as code. S3800/S3782 (botScore): JSDoc-type PATH_WEIGHTS tuples.
- S6481 (2): memoize Auth/Site context values (and SiteContext brand).
- S4144: dedupe HeroEditor upload handler into useImageUpload().
- S1126 (2), S6035, S5869 (redundant A-Z under /i), S5843 (town-name regex ->
prefix list): assorted one-liners.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Player portal: RequirePlayer guard, /account routes (login, register,
settings) with shared PlayerShell; register reads /public/settings derived
flags; AuthContext.register; api.register + api.player.* namespace.
- Admin UI: player role + status/email + reset-password hint in UserEditor,
status column + badge-player in UsersAdmin, player_registration select in
SettingsAdmin; 'disabled' SSO error copy.
- Swagger: Player tag + RegisterRequest/ChangeUsername/ChangePassword/
PlayerAccount/OkFlag schemas; regenerated swagger-output.json.
- Fix: remove a semicolon from a schema.sql inline comment that broke the
statement splitter in ensureSchema.
Verified against the live dev DB: schema migrations apply (player enum,
nullable password_hash, email/status/last_login_ip, seeded setting); 21-check
controller smoke (register gating, dup/reserved, null-hash rules, self change
username/password with session re-issue surviving the cutoff, SSO-only initial
password, banned-login refusal); case-insensitive uniqueness; public settings
expose only derived registration flags. Client builds; 133 server tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
SSO login minted a full session immediately, ignoring the account's
totp_enabled flag — so a 2FA admin with a linked Google/Discord/OIDC
identity could sign in without their authenticator code, silently
downgrading the account to single-factor (the strength of the IdP login).
The local password flow already gates on needsTotp(); SSO did not.
Wire SSO through the same staged-TOTP gate:
- ssoState: createTotpPending/verifyTotpPending + a short-lived httpOnly
sso_totp cookie. The pending token carries stage:'totp' (session
validation rejects it) + kind:'sso_totp' (scoped to the SSO endpoint)
plus the resolved context (userId, provider, authMethod, returnTo).
- sso.controller: finishLogin now stages the challenge and redirects to
/admin/login?sso_totp=1 instead of creating a session when the account
has TOTP on. New finishSsoTotp verifies the code (backoff + bot-scoring
on failure, mirroring loginTotp) and only then mints the session.
- sso.routes: POST /auth/sso/totp behind the same backoff/slow/limiter
stack and code validation as the local TOTP endpoint.
- client: AdminLogin detects ?sso_totp=1 and completes over fetch via
api.ssoLoginTotp; the challenge never touches the URL or JS.
Keeps the second factor httpOnly throughout, consistent with the SSO tx
cookie. 12 new tests; full suite 106/106.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
Adds a layered set of protections around the admin login and the app edge.
Trust proxy (server/src/utils/trustProxy.js)
- Configurable via TRUST_PROXY; pin to the newt agent ("ptero") LAN IP so
X-Forwarded-For is trusted ONLY from that peer. A blanket "true" is
rejected (coerced to 1) to prevent XFF spoofing that would dodge every
IP-based control. DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY logs peer/XFF/req.ip to re-verify the
proxy IP without a redeploy. Documents the Omada static-reservation
assumption.
Login throttling (server/src/middleware/loginProtection.js, rateLimit.js)
- express-slow-down progressive delay + the existing hard rate cap + a
separate per-IP exponential backoff that persists across the rate window.
All failures return one generic message (no user/pass disclosure).
Honeypot (login form + auth.controller)
- Hidden, plausibly-named field ("company"); a filled value fails
generically and is scored as an unambiguous bot.
Optional per-user TOTP 2FA (speakeasy/qrcode)
- totp_secret/totp_enabled columns (+ idempotent migration). Self-service
Account page: enroll via QR, confirm a code to enable, code-gated disable.
- Login is two-step for enrolled users: after the password, a short-lived
signed challenge (stage:'totp', not a session) is required before the
real session is issued.
Bot / scanner scoring + IP ban (server/src/middleware/botScore.js)
- Weighted CMS-scanner paths (this app uses none). Junk paths 404 FIRST,
unconditionally — independent of score/ban state, so a scanner rotating
through fresh Cloudflare IPs gets no free pass. /wp-admin/install.php is
the top-weighted near-1-hit ban (worst offender in prod logs). Per-IP
score with quiet-period decay temp-bans an IP from ALL routes once past a
(deliberately low) threshold, to protect /admin from credential stuffing.
Failed logins and honeypot hits feed the same score.
- Periodic sweep evicts stale, unbanned, quiet entries so the in-memory
store can't grow unbounded; the interval is unref'd and cleared on
graceful shutdown.
Tests: node --test suite (40) covering trust-proxy parsing + live req.ip
(incl. pinned-IP), rate limiter + exponential backoff, honeypot rejection,
TOTP verify (enabled/disabled) + challenge-isn't-a-session, bot-score
threshold/decay/ban + junk-404-independence + install.php + store sweep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
