Add the server side of Android App Links (M9 follow-up, docs/android/APP_LINKS.md):
- GET /.well-known/assetlinks.json at the web root, gated by the new admin
setting `mobile_app_links_enabled` (default off -> 404; on-but-no-fingerprint
-> 404). Emits the Digital Asset Links statement for the fixed published
package (MOBILE_APP_PACKAGE) + MOBILE_APP_CERT_SHA256 fingerprint(s).
- mobileSso `/start` additionally accepts this shard's own self-origin
https://<host>/mobile/callback when App Links are enabled — one additive
exact-match entry, derived from APP_BASE_URL/request origin, never client
input; the custom-scheme allowlist is never narrowed. The settings lookup is
short-circuited for non-https redirects so custom-scheme rejections stay fast.
- settings.isMobileAppLinksEnabled() (fail-closed) + getPublic().mobileAppLinks;
admin updateSettings validates the boolean; seed default off.
Tests: test/appLinks.test.js (route gating + allowlist). Full suite 284 pass.
Swagger unchanged (web-root verification file is #swagger.ignore'd).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Adds the self-service device-session surface the mobile-SSO spec requires, on
top of the existing mobile_refresh_tokens store.
- Schema: device_name + last_used_at columns on mobile_refresh_tokens (nullable,
additive via the ALTER section; seeded to now on insert). With single-use
rotation each login/refresh inserts a fresh row, so the active row's timestamp
is the session's last activity, and the label is carried forward on refresh.
- Model: listActiveForUser (one row per live device, no token hash) +
revokeByIdForUser (ownership-scoped, idempotent).
- GET /auth/me/sessions + DELETE /auth/me/sessions/:id (role-agnostic, behind
requireAuth). Named distinctly from /auth/me/devices (push endpoints).
- device_name is an optional field on /auth/mobile/login and
/auth/mobile/sso/exchange so the app can label a device.
- Client: an "Active Devices" panel on the player account page (list + sign a
device out), plus the PlayerLogin change to honor the mobile SSO bridge's
{ redirect } deep link on a 2FA completion.
- Swagger DeviceSession schema + regenerated spec; 3 controller tests. Full
server suite green (274); client builds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a Mobile SSO Authorization Bridge so the native app can "Sign in with
Google/Discord" without shipping any OAuth secret. It EXTENDS the existing
/auth/sso/* redirect flow (same PKCE-vs-IdP, link-only + opt-in provisioning,
TOTP gate) and terminates in the existing mobile bearer tokens — not a parallel
auth path.
- Schema: mobile_auth_sessions + mobile_auth_codes (short-lived, self-pruning;
authorization code stored hash-only, PKCE challenge is a hash by construction).
- GET /auth/mobile/sso/start: validate provider enabled + redirect_uri by EXACT
allowlist match (never prefix), seed a bridge session, reuse the SSO redirect
tagged mode:'mobile' (new redirectToIdp helper extracted from beginFlow).
- SSO callback + finishSsoTotp gain a mode:'mobile' branch: mint a single-use,
hashed, PKCE-bound code and redirect to the fixed app callback (code + echoed
state, never a token) instead of setting a cookie. 2FA keeps full parity via
the existing web TOTP form (now carrying the bridge session).
- POST /auth/mobile/sso/exchange: verify Layer-B PKCE (before burning the code),
single-use consume, then issue the SAME pair as /auth/mobile/login.
- Discovery reuses GET /auth/providers; refresh/logout reuse /auth/mobile/*.
- Rate limits: /start per-IP+provider, /exchange per-IP. Boot-time +
opportunistic prune of both tables (no cron, mirrors revoked_sessions).
- Redirect allowlist is MOBILE_AUTH_REDIRECT_URIS (default the one fixed
runicgateway://auth/callback); App Link URIs can be appended per shard later.
- Swagger regenerated; 39 tests (model single-use/gating + full controller
matrix: bad/expired/reused code, PKCE mismatch, disabled provider, redirect
allowlist, TOTP-through-bridge). Full suite green (271).
Refs docs/website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md, docs/android/PLAN.md §9 (M9).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Additive, v1-only backend contract for the Android app's opt-in push (Part 1 of
M7; docs/android/PLAN.md §11). The app is a pure consumer — this lands the
endpoints, fan-out, and relay it needs.
- Schema: push_devices (per-device endpoint) + notification_subscriptions
(per-user opted-in streams), FK→users ON DELETE CASCADE.
- Stream catalog + event→stream mapping (config/notificationStreams.js): public
streams (news.post, server.status, idoc.warning, champ.start, governor.election)
drawn ONLY from the SSE PUBLIC_KINDS allowlist; personal owner-keyed streams
(vendor.sale, house.idoc, account.login). Full-state upserts (champ/city) fire
only on a real transition via an injectable tracker.
- Fan-out (utils/pushDispatch.js): content-free tickles ({ stream, ref }) POSTed
to each subscribed device; never throws. Two producers — shardIngest.ingest
(beside the SSE broadcast) and the create/publish-post path (news.post).
Personal events resolve to the owner via shardLinks. SSRF guard: endpoints must
be HTTPS, non-private, and on the NTFY_BASE_URL/NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS allow-set —
enforced at registration and every publish.
- Routes under the role-agnostic self surface (never /admin): POST|GET
/auth/me/devices, DELETE /auth/me/devices/:id, GET
/auth/me/notifications/streams, GET|PUT /auth/me/notifications/subscriptions.
Swagger regenerated (4 paths, PushDevice/NotificationStreams/etc. schemas).
- ntfy service in docker-compose.yml: pinned image, declarative ./ntfy/server.yml,
no published host port, anonymous unguessable topics (no accounts) — zero
interactive setup. No publish token required (content-free design); optional
NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN honored.
- Tests: pushDispatch (mapping, PUBLIC_KINDS gate, owner-keying, SSRF guard,
content-free payload) + notifications route auth gate. Full suite green (247).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a full password-reset flow — the prerequisite for the Android app
(docs/android/PLAN.md §8.2), which hands off to the website for reset
rather than shipping a native screen.
Backend:
- password_resets table: stores only the sha256 hash of an opaque 32-byte
token (mirrors user_invites / mobile_refresh_tokens), single-use, ~1h TTL.
- model/passwordResets + users.getActiveByEmail (email is non-unique, so a
request can match several accounts, each emailed its own link).
- mailer.sendPasswordReset (fails soft when email is unconfigured).
- Endpoints: POST /auth/password/forgot (always a generic 200 — no account
enumeration), GET|POST /auth/password/reset/:token. Confirming rotates the
hash and revokes every session (web cutoff + mobile refresh tokens); it does
not auto-login, so a 2FA account still passes TOTP next sign-in. Also serves
SSO-only accounts (null hash) as their set-initial-password path.
- Dedicated request/confirm rate limiters. Swagger regenerated.
Web:
- ForgotPassword + ResetPassword pages, routes /account/forgot and
/account/reset/:token, and a "Forgot your password?" link on the login page.
Tests: test/passwordResets.test.js (5). All server tests pass; client builds;
end-to-end smoketest against MariaDB passes (no-enumeration, single-use, hash
rotation, session revoke, login with the new password).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Players whose linked Discord identity was banned or muted can now submit
an appeal from the portal and track it; staff get a queue in the admin
moderation section to claim and resolve (approve/deny) appeals. Approving
a ban/mute appeal best-effort asks the Discord bot to reverse the action
(unban / clear timeout) via the internal API and posts a mod-log embed; a
down bot never fails the resolution (reversal_status is recorded).
- Schema: new server-owned `appeals` table (no cross-owner FK to
mod_actions; existence validated in app code).
- Server: model/appeals/* + player appeals controller (submit/mine/
eligible/withdraw) and admin queue handlers (list/claim/resolve/
per-user) under the existing admin+moderator gate; one-active-appeal
enforced app-side; eligibility keyed on the caller's linked Discord id.
- 6d: bot POST /internal/mod-reverse (+ modLog.postReversal) and
server botInternalClient.reverseModAction, wired into resolve().
- Client: admin Appeals queue + resolve modal, ModerationUser appeals
tab, player Appeals page (submit/withdraw), nav + routes + api methods.
- Docs: swagger annotations + component schemas, regenerated output.
- Tests: appeals controller + pure suites (server npm test 224 green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XmHdsbnLzDMAVQkAoTQSBe
Replace baked-in UOM/MysticMoon/UOMysticmoon branding with a BRAND_* env
scheme so one prebuilt image runs as any shard; UOMysticmoon becomes the
first tenant that sets these vars rather than a special case in the code.
Architecture (chosen because the app ships as a prebuilt image):
- server/src/config/brand.js + bot/src/brand.js read BRAND_* once at boot,
with Runic Gateway defaults.
- Text/colors reach the SPA at RUNTIME through the existing public settings
API (settings.model.getPublic -> SiteContext), so no client rebuild. The
admin-editable site title + contact email still override BRAND_NAME/email.
- SiteContext applies BRAND_ACCENT_COLOR to the --accent CSS var at runtime.
- Express templates the built index.html <title>/description/OG/favicon at
serve time from BRAND_* (renderIndexHtml in app.js).
- Server-side consumers read brand directly: emails, TOTP issuer, API docs,
boot logs, HTML error page. Bot uses it for embed color + logs.
Assets: logo/hero/favicon delivered from a ./brand:/app/brand bind-mount
(BRAND_LOGO/HERO/FAVICON), with neutral defaults baked in; hero falls back
to a built-in image when unset.
Scope: also genericized package.json names (uomysticmoon-* -> runic-gateway-*)
and the DB_NAME/DB_USER/COOKIE_NAME code defaults (runic_gateway/runic/
rg_token). Production keeps its real values by pinning them in .env — see
.env.uomysticmoon.example, which reproduces the exact UOMysticmoon identity
(proof the substitution works). Changing a deployed COOKIE_NAME invalidates
existing sessions, so UOMysticmoon pins uomm_token.
Verified: 193 server tests pass, client builds, app.js loads + templates the
built index.html, brand transform injects title/description/OG/favicon.
ensureSchema() splits schema.sql on ';' and is not comment-aware, so the inline
comments "epoch ms; NULL = current" and "not in the feed; reserved" shattered the
CREATE TABLE into invalid fragments (ER_PARSE_ERROR on a fresh boot). Reworded both
to drop the semicolons. Caught during live-stack bring-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 5: the account-provisioning backend — link-only stays, plus hybrid
self-signup, an admin email-invite tool, and site-side unlink.
- uoLinkClient.createAccount / unlinkAccount (v2). Password is forwarded to the
shard (hashed there) and never stored/logged; the end-user browser IP is passed
for the shard's per-IP cap; actor is stamped server-side.
- Hybrid signup: POST /player/shard/account provisions a game account (its own
username + password) for the signed-in user and mirrors the link locally. Gated
by the new game_account_signup setting AND the shard's own mode (mapped 403/409/
429/400/503). Serves both self-serve signup and the invite-accept game step.
- Email invites: user_invites table (sha256 token hash, single-use, expiring);
invites model + admin CRUD (POST/GET/DELETE /admin/invites, admin-only) +
mailer.sendInvite (falls back to returning the accept link if email is off);
public token-gated accept (GET /auth/invite/:token, POST .../accept) creates the
user at the invite's preset role and logs them in, bypassing the registration
gate. Accept is race-safe (atomic single-use; rolls back the user if it loses).
- Admin unlink: DELETE /admin/users/:id/shard/link/:account (admin-only) + local
mirror drop; account.unlinked ingest reconciles the mirror when a player runs
[unlink in game. account.audit / account.unlinked are logged (admin channel
only — never on the public SSE allowlist).
Tests: invites model (hashing, single-use, expiry, revoke) + account.* ingest
reconcile/visibility. Full suite 193/193; swagger regenerated.
Refs .plans/protocol2-integration.md (Phase 5).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1 of the Protocol 2.0/2.1 integration: the read/ingest backend for the four
new uo-link boards, following the established champs/pages pattern (ingest → our
MariaDB + snapshot-on-reconnect + public SSE + token-free public endpoint).
- Schema: shard_guilds, shard_governors, shard_governor_terms, shard_presence;
extend shard_houses with the house.update registry columns (owner_name,
co_owners, friends, price, decay, in_registry) so the decay-transition and
registry feeds share one house row without clobbering each other.
- Ingest: route guild.update/remove, city.update, presence.online,
house.update/remove; log guild.join (real-time joins feed); region.enter is
broadcast-only. All new public kinds added to the SSE allowlist.
- Governor term history captured from day one: on every observed governor CHANGE
the open term is closed and a new one opened, idempotent so backfill/duplicate
city.update never spawn spurious terms. votes stays NULL (the feed carries only
candidate count, not tallies) — we never fabricate vote numbers.
- Client + backfill: getGuilds/getGovernors/getHouses/getPresence; snapshot each
board on every WS (re)connect, independently guarded so an empty/failed board
(e.g. no City Loyalty) never wipes another.
- Public endpoints: /shard/{guilds,governors,governors/:city/history,presence,houses}.
- Tests: ingest routing for all new kinds + governor term-capture idempotency
(15 new; full suite 179/179). Swagger regenerated.
Refs .plans/protocol2-integration.md (Phase 1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wire up the three uo-link sidecar surfaces that weren't integrated yet.
Champion spawns
- Ingest champ.update/champ.remove into a new shard_champs table (served from
our own store, like online/houses); public /site/champs board with a nav link,
live via the existing SSE feed (champ.* added to the public allowlist).
Staff write plane (admin + moderator)
- kick / ban / unban / broadcast via /admin/shard/*; actor is stamped server-side
from the session, never the browser. Sidecar status codes mapped (403 disabled/
protected, 404 unknown, 503/504 transient). admin.audit events are logged and
surfaced at /admin/shard/audit.
- New admin "In-Game Ops" view (/admin/shard-ops), plus per-account Kick/Ban/Unban
on the user-detail and character views (ShardAccountActions, self-gated to staff).
Help-page (support) queue
- Ingest page.new/updated/closed into a new shard_pages table; respond/close via
/admin/shard/pages/*. Champ board and page queue are snapshotted from the
sidecar's /champs and /pages on every WS (re)connect (guarded so a failed call
never wipes local state).
Verified live end-to-end against MariaDB + the Rust sidecar + ServUO; unit tests
cover ingest routing (shardIngest.champsPages.test.js). Swagger regenerated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0114TpmrNW4wNXsHq5CR72jQ
Replace the fire-and-forget Discord-only announce on publish with a
retry-safe, two-leg pipeline. When a post transitions into published-news
(false→true publish while in news, or category→news while published), an
announce_jobs row is enqueued with two INDEPENDENT delivery legs:
• town crier — sidecar POST /towncrier via uoLinkClient (stable id
`post-<id>` so a retry replaces rather than duplicates)
• discord — bot POST /internal/announce via botInternalClient
(single source of truth for the #news channel stays in the bot)
An in-process poller (utils/announceWorker) sweeps the table every
ANNOUNCE_POLL_MS and dispatches each due leg with its own exponential
backoff (30s→2h, 6 attempts). A leg is retried on transient failures
(503/504/network) and failed fast on data/config errors (400 over-cap,
401/409). Publishing never blocks on the sidecar or Discord — enqueue is
local DB only. Parent `status` is a done/partial/failed rollup of the two
legs; posts.announced_at is stamped once both deliver.
Admin visibility: GET /admin/posts/:id/announce + a per-leg Retry
(POST .../announce/retry) surfaced in the PostEditor for news posts.
Pure decisions (text build/caps, classification, backoff, rollup) live in
announceJobs.logic and are unit-tested (server/test/announceJobs.test.js,
10 tests). The old manual /admin/uo-link/towncrier form is untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0114TpmrNW4wNXsHq5CR72jQ
Ties an in-game account to a website user and gates reads on ownership.
- schema: shard_account_links (account PK → user_id, char_name, linked_at;
FK users ON DELETE CASCADE) — the site-side mirror of the sidecar's
authoritative link.
- model/shardLinks: upsert/list/ownership-check/getByAccount/unlink.
- player/shard.controller.js:
- POST /player/shard/link — confirm a one-time [link code via
uoLinkClient.confirmLink(code, req.user.id); on link.ok mirror the link and
activity.log it; bad/expired codes → 400, shard down → 503.
- GET /player/shard/accounts — the caller's linked accounts.
- GET /player/shard/roster/:account and /vendors/:account — live round-trips,
ownership-checked against the mirror (403 otherwise), 503 on shard restart.
- player.routes.js: mounted under the existing requireRole('player') gate with
express-validator guards + #swagger annotations; new "Player · Shard" tag and
ShardLinkRequest/ShardLinkResult/ShardLink schemas; spec regenerated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011qPmpmVH1xGCiZoz9m9vW3
The site now ingests the sidecar's live WebSocket feed and persists it to its
own MariaDB, and re-broadcasts curated events to browsers over SSE.
- schema: shard_events (append-only notable-kind log, sha1 dedupe_key +
INSERT IGNORE for idempotent reconnect backfill), shard_online (current
players, upsert/refresh/remove), shard_economy (gold-supply series),
shard_houses (per-house decay stage + derived is_idoc).
- model/shardEvents + model/shardState: the .db.js/.model.js split; writes
take camelCase event data, reads are shaped; online upsert uses COALESCE so
a partial char.vitals refresh never blanks login fields.
- utils/shardIngest: single dispatcher routing each kind to state writes
and/or the event log, then the broadcaster. High-frequency kinds
(char.vitals, economy.supply) update state only. A changed server.hello
bootId clears the stale online roster. Deps are injected for unit testing.
- utils/uoLinkSocket: the server's first outbound WS client (ws dep). Verifies
the ws.hello protocol, backfills via /history + /economy on every
(re)connect (dedupe handles overlap), reconnects with capped backoff, and
mirrors connection state into uo_link_config. Self-guards: only connects when
the integration is enabled with a token.
- utils/shardBroadcast: SSE fan-out with public (safe kinds only) and admin
(all) channels, keepalive pings, per-client cleanup.
- server.js: start the ingest socket on boot (no-op until configured) and stop
it + close SSE streams on graceful shutdown.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011qPmpmVH1xGCiZoz9m9vW3
Introduces the DB-backed connection config for the uo-link sidecar (the
HTTP + WebSocket bridge to the ServUO shard) and a never-throw REST client,
mirroring the existing Discord-bot integration:
- uo_link_config singleton table (base/ws URL, AES-256-GCM-encrypted shared
token, protocol pin, enabled, and last-known status/plugin_connected/
last_event_at/boot_id mirrors for the admin panel).
- model/uoLinkConfig: getSafe (never returns the token — only hasToken),
getWithToken (server-side decrypt), save (blank token = unchanged),
recordStatus (mirror the sidecar's reported state).
- utils/uoLinkClient: never-throw fetch client returning {ok,data,status,
error}; Bearer token + X-UOLink-Version on every call; brief config cache;
helpers for health/char/roster/vendors/history/economy/link/towncrier.
- .env.example: UOLINK_BASE_URL/WS_URL/PROTOCOL defaults (token stays
admin-managed in the DB, never an env var).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011qPmpmVH1xGCiZoz9m9vW3
New `pages` table: slug/title/blocks(JSON-as-text)/status/protected, author
FK, grouped SEO metadata + layout/nav settings columns (added up front per
spec — cheap now, painful to retrofit), published_at mirroring posts.
Block registry scaffold, server and client, defining the pattern without
any block types yet (Wave 1 lands in step 3):
- server/src/blocks: registry (register/get/list, reserved envelope keys,
container metadata) + validateBlocks (authoritative save-time gate:
envelope, registered-type, per-block schema, one-level nesting cap) +
index entrypoint that will register Wave 1 defs.
- client/src/blocks: mirror registry carrying renderer/editor/palette +
makeBlockId, plus index entrypoint.
Verified: schema applies idempotently against the dev DB (pages table +
indexes present); validator exercised for empty/non-array/unknown-type/
bad-envelope/duplicate-id/nested-container cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Retire env-var SMTP basic-auth and send the contact form through Gmail over
OAuth2 (SMTP XOAUTH2), configured in Admin -> Settings -> Email via an in-app
"Connect Gmail" consent flow. Reuses the existing google SSO OAuth client; the
captured refresh token is stored AES-GCM-encrypted (write-only over the API,
never returned), mirroring the auth-provider and Discord-bot secret patterns.
- schema: new email_config singleton table (mirrors bot_config)
- model: emailConfig.{db,model} with encrypted refresh token + getSafe/getWithSecret
- mailer: nodemailer OAuth2 transport (client id/secret from the google provider
row), contact recipient = contact_email setting, mailto: fallback preserved,
plus sendTest()
- routes/controller: /admin/email config, connect start+callback (ssoState CSRF
+ PKCE), test, disconnect
- client: EmailDelivery section on the Settings page + api methods; Settings copy
now spells out that contact_email is the delivery recipient
- docs/env: drop SMTP_*/CONTACT_TO from env examples; update README/BACKEND_DESIGN
- tests: emailConfig.model + mailer suites (8 new; full suite 142 pass)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XKeCQEJZr1AFJN4Bgcmvh3
- Player portal: RequirePlayer guard, /account routes (login, register,
settings) with shared PlayerShell; register reads /public/settings derived
flags; AuthContext.register; api.register + api.player.* namespace.
- Admin UI: player role + status/email + reset-password hint in UserEditor,
status column + badge-player in UsersAdmin, player_registration select in
SettingsAdmin; 'disabled' SSO error copy.
- Swagger: Player tag + RegisterRequest/ChangeUsername/ChangePassword/
PlayerAccount/OkFlag schemas; regenerated swagger-output.json.
- Fix: remove a semicolon from a schema.sql inline comment that broke the
statement splitter in ensureSchema.
Verified against the live dev DB: schema migrations apply (player enum,
nullable password_hash, email/status/last_login_ip, seeded setting); 21-check
controller smoke (register gating, dup/reserved, null-hash rules, self change
username/password with session re-issue surviving the cutoff, SSO-only initial
password, banned-login refusal); case-insensitive uniqueness; public settings
expose only derived registration flags. Client builds; 133 server tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
Light up the moderation dashboard's previously-empty widgets by persisting the
event streams the bot only reacted to in-memory before.
Schema (bot-owned)
- member_events: join/leave, with invite_code/inviter_* for best-effort invite
attribution on joins
- filter_hits: word / foreign-invite filter deletions (matched + action_taken)
- spam_hits: rate_limit / mass_mention / mass_emoji detections
Bot
- new models memberEvents/filterHits/spamHits
- guildMemberAdd records the join with invite attribution; new inviteTracker.js
keeps an invite-use cache (GuildInvites intent + inviteCreate/inviteDelete) and
diffs it on join to find which invite was used — best-effort, never blocks
auto-role
- new guildMemberRemove records leaves
- messageFilter records filter/spam hits alongside the existing warn/mute;
inviteFilter now returns the offending code; detectSpam identifies which spam
rule tripped (preserving the rate-limit-first side-effect order)
- mod_actions still logs the resulting warn/mute — the new tables are additive
Server
- summary extended with joins/leaves/invite_joins/filter_hits/spam_hits per window
- new feeds: /api/v1/admin/moderation/{members,filter-hits,spam-hits}
Client
- overview now shows 8 tiles (mod actions + joins/leaves/filter/spam, joins tile
notes "N via invite") plus an Events panel with Members/Filter/Spam tabs;
removed the coming-soon note
Verified: 119 server unit tests, client build, 14-check DB-backed smoke, and a
browser click-through of every tile and events tab (incl. invite attribution).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
Surface the Discord bot's moderation data on the admin panel: a read-only
staff dashboard over the existing mod_actions log, per-user history, staff
notes, and a new moderator role. No bot changes.
Schema
- users.role ENUM gains 'moderator' (CREATE + idempotent ALTER for existing DBs)
- new server-owned mod_notes table (staff_only/admin_only visibility)
Server
- model/moderation: read mod_actions via the shared pool (documented read-only
cross of the bot/server ownership boundary), correlate accounts through
user_identities (provider='discord'), flag automated actions via
staff_user_id === bot_config.application_id; pure reshaping helpers isolated
in moderation.pure.js so they unit-test without opening a DB pool
- model/modNotes: list/add with role-gated admin_only visibility
- admin/moderation.controller + routes under /api/v1/admin/moderation/* gated by
requireRole('admin','moderator'); admin_only note writes require admin
- allow assigning 'moderator' in the user create/update validators
Client
- /admin/moderation overview (window tiles, type-filterable recent feed, user
lookup) and /user/:discordId history (tabs + notes with add-note)
- RoleGate; AdminLayout filters nav and confines moderators to their section
- moderator badge + action-type/auto badges
Deferred (see plan): 6b bot event capture (joins/leaves/filter/spam), 6c appeals
(needs public accounts), 6d /internal/mod-reverse bot reversal callback.
Verified: 116 server unit tests, client build, DB-backed model smoke, full
HTTP/RBAC e2e, and a browser click-through of the dashboard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
Web sessions were stateless JWTs with no server-side store: the revocation
hooks in session.service were stubs that only logged. As a result web logout
was client-side only (a copied cookie stayed valid until natural JWT expiry)
and a password change never invalidated existing sessions. The mobile bearer
flow already had revocable, DB-stored tokens; this brings the web/cookie flow
to parity.
Two-layer revocation, both enforced in requireAuth (which already loads the
fresh user row each request):
- Per-session denylist: new `revoked_sessions` table keyed on the JWT `jti`
(already minted per session). A single logout adds this session's jti;
rows self-expire at the token's own exp and are pruned on boot. New model
`revokedSessions` mirrors the `mobileSessions` db/model split.
- Per-user cutoff: new `users.tokens_valid_after` column. A password change
(and the new `invalidateSessions` helper) bumps it to NOW(); any token whose
iat is at or before the cutoff is rejected. The comparison is inclusive so a
token minted in the same wall-clock second as the change is still revoked.
Wiring:
- session.service: revokeSession / invalidateSession / invalidateAllUserSessions
now delegate to the stores; sessions carry `expiresAt` (JWT exp) so logout can
set a self-pruning denylist row.
- /logout gains best-effort attachSession so the controller can revoke this
session's jti and log auth.logout; stays a no-op for anonymous callers.
- users.model.update bumps the cutoff whenever the password hash is rotated.
- schema.sql: revoked_sessions table + tokens_valid_after column, added to the
CREATE and to the idempotent migration block (ensureSchema on boot).
Verified end-to-end against the local dev DB: a captured cookie is rejected
after logout, and an existing session is rejected after a password change while
re-login with the new password succeeds. Full server test suite green (96).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
Standalone bot/ service (its own package.json/Dockerfile) managed entirely
through a new admin-only Discord Bot panel — token stored encrypted in the
DB and pushed to the bot process in-memory, never an env var. Built in
phases, each independently verified against a live Discord guild:
- Bot skeleton: gateway connection, internal shared-secret API, self-heals
on its own restart by pulling config from the site
- Moderation core: /ban /kick /mute /warn /warnings + mod-log channel
- Word/invite/spam filtering with leetspeak-resistant normalization and a
staff role/channel allowlist
- Scheduled messages: recurring (cron) and one-off channel posts
- Role assignment: button role menus, auto-role on join, temp roles,
bulk role ops
- Auto-rotating primary invite with an audit log
- Site integration: news-publish -> Discord announce webhook, manual
/announce, read-only /wiki search
Also fixes a pre-existing bug in both DB pools (server + bot): the mariadb
driver defaulted to timezone 'local', silently mis-serializing bound Date
params by the host's local offset instead of the DB's UTC session.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Refactor authentication into a provider-agnostic session layer and build
two new auth surfaces on top of it, without changing local password/TOTP
behavior. Every flow now issues sessions through
sessionService.createSession(user, authMethod).
Part 1 — Session abstraction (backward-compatible refactor):
- New server/src/auth/: token.js (JWT/cookie primitives), session.service.js
(create/validate/partial-TOTP/revoke), session.middleware.js
(attachSession/requireAuth/requireRole). utils/auth.js is now a thin
compat facade so existing imports are unchanged.
Part 2 — Mobile bearer auth (additive):
- /api/v1/auth/mobile/{login,refresh,logout}: short-lived access JWT +
long-lived refresh token, stored hashed and rotated on use, in a new
mobile_refresh_tokens table. Reuses web bot-scoring/backoff; single-request
TOTP. token.signToken gains a backward-compatible expiresIn option.
Part 3 — Pluggable SSO (Google, Discord, generic OIDC):
- OAuth2Provider base + built-in Google/Discord (fixed endpoints) + generic
OIDC, a registry with health/validation, PKCE+CSRF transaction state, and
discovery (GET /auth/providers), start/link/callback routes.
- Link-only policy: SSO signs in only to an already-linked account; external
identities are never auto-provisioned. Client secrets encrypted at rest
(AES-256-GCM, utils/secretBox.js). Admin CRUD (/admin/auth/providers) and
account linking (/admin/account/identities). New auth_providers +
user_identities tables.
Frontend:
- Login page renders provider buttons from /auth/providers (inline SVG icons,
graceful with zero providers). New Authentication admin view
(Local/Google/Discord/Custom). Account page linked-accounts section.
Tests: 83 passing (session, mobile, providers, registry, secretBox, ssoState,
ssoCallback) — all DB-free via fetch mocks + model stubs. README + .env.example
updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a layered set of protections around the admin login and the app edge.
Trust proxy (server/src/utils/trustProxy.js)
- Configurable via TRUST_PROXY; pin to the newt agent ("ptero") LAN IP so
X-Forwarded-For is trusted ONLY from that peer. A blanket "true" is
rejected (coerced to 1) to prevent XFF spoofing that would dodge every
IP-based control. DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY logs peer/XFF/req.ip to re-verify the
proxy IP without a redeploy. Documents the Omada static-reservation
assumption.
Login throttling (server/src/middleware/loginProtection.js, rateLimit.js)
- express-slow-down progressive delay + the existing hard rate cap + a
separate per-IP exponential backoff that persists across the rate window.
All failures return one generic message (no user/pass disclosure).
Honeypot (login form + auth.controller)
- Hidden, plausibly-named field ("company"); a filled value fails
generically and is scored as an unambiguous bot.
Optional per-user TOTP 2FA (speakeasy/qrcode)
- totp_secret/totp_enabled columns (+ idempotent migration). Self-service
Account page: enroll via QR, confirm a code to enable, code-gated disable.
- Login is two-step for enrolled users: after the password, a short-lived
signed challenge (stage:'totp', not a session) is required before the
real session is issued.
Bot / scanner scoring + IP ban (server/src/middleware/botScore.js)
- Weighted CMS-scanner paths (this app uses none). Junk paths 404 FIRST,
unconditionally — independent of score/ban state, so a scanner rotating
through fresh Cloudflare IPs gets no free pass. /wp-admin/install.php is
the top-weighted near-1-hit ban (worst offender in prod logs). Per-IP
score with quiet-period decay temp-bans an IP from ALL routes once past a
(deliberately low) threshold, to protect /admin from credential stuffing.
Failed logins and honeypot hits feed the same score.
- Periodic sweep evicts stale, unbanned, quiet entries so the in-memory
store can't grow unbounded; the interval is unref'd and cleared on
graceful shutdown.
Tests: node --test suite (40) covering trust-proxy parsing + live req.ip
(incl. pinned-IP), rate limiter + exponential backoff, honeypot rejection,
TOTP verify (enabled/disabled) + challenge-isn't-a-session, bot-score
threshold/decay/ban + junk-404-independence + install.php + store sweep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Final phase of the wiki upgrade (see WIKI_UPGRADE.md).
Schema (additive): wiki_revisions table (per-save content snapshots).
The FULLTEXT index on wiki_pages(title, body) shipped in Phase 1.
Search:
- MATCH ... AGAINST natural-language search over title + body, ordered by
relevance
- public: GET /public/wiki?q= (published only); admin: GET /admin/wiki?q=
(all statuses)
- public wiki index gains a search box; admin list gains a search field
Revision history:
- every create/update snapshots the page into wiki_revisions
- admin endpoints: list revisions, get one, and restore (restore overwrites
the page, rebuilds links, and appends a new revision — history stays
append-only); logged as wiki.revision.restore
- editor gains a History modal: revision list + word-level diff (jsdiff) of a
chosen revision against the current page, with one-click restore
Verified end-to-end: search matches body and title; two edits produce three
revisions; diff renders added/removed words; restore reverts and records a new
revision. No console errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Connectivity phase of the wiki upgrade (see WIKI_UPGRADE.md).
Schema (additive new tables): wiki_tags, wiki_page_tags, wiki_links.
Internal links & backlinks:
- new wiki.links.js parses a saved body for /wiki/<slug> (and data-wiki-slug)
targets; wiki_links is rebuilt on every save
- article shows a "Linked from" section (published backlinks) and renders
links to non-existent pages as red links (server returns missing_links)
- editor gains an internal-link picker listing existing pages
Tags:
- pages accept a tags[] array; tags upsert on save, page tag-set is replaced,
and orphaned tags are auto-pruned (on save and delete)
- public/admin list filter by ?tag=; /wiki/tags lists tags with published counts
- article shows tag chips; the index has a flat tag-filtered view; editor has a
comma-separated tags field
Verified end-to-end: A->B backlink appears, red link detected, link index
rebuilds on edit, tag filtering + chips + pruning all work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Foundation & safety phase of the wiki upgrade (see WIKI_UPGRADE.md).
Schema (additive, idempotent via ensureSchema):
- new wiki_categories table; wiki_pages gains category_id, excerpt,
published, published_at, sort_order, and a FULLTEXT index
- migration ALTERs guarded with IF NOT EXISTS for existing databases
- seed reworked into 4 sections with the 8 starter pages assigned
Security:
- new utils/sanitizeHtml.js (sanitize-html allowlist); wiki bodies are
sanitized on every save, and the article renders through DOMPurify
- strips <script>, event handlers (onerror), and javascript: URLs
Backend:
- public: published-only list with ?category filter + /wiki/categories
- admin: extended page CRUD, PATCH publish toggle, category CRUD;
drafts visible to admin, hidden from public
- all writes logged to activity_log
Frontend:
- data-driven public wiki index (sections + real descriptions; removed
hardcoded blurbs/Roman numerals) with ?category filtering
- article: category breadcrumb + sanitized render
- admin: Section/Status columns, draft/publish + section + excerpt in the
editor, and a Manage sections modal
Verified end-to-end against MariaDB 11: migration clean, XSS neutralized,
drafts hidden, client builds, server boots.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
