2 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
wtclaude	b30e82cde2	feat(modules): install, uninstall, purge and restart (phase 4, slice 1) ... The consumer half of a release module-uo's CI has been publishing since phase 3 closed. Before this, core had the installed_modules provenance columns and no code that could ever fill them: nothing fetched, verified, unpacked, removed or purged anything, and there was no admin route at all. Adds modules/archive.js, modules/install.js, schema.runPurge(), lifecycle.stop(), loader.stopHook(), and /api/v1/admin/modules with eight routes. 797 server tests (+76), manifest 158 -> 166 + 2 internal, OpenAPI gains 8 operations and loses nothing. Reject, never sanitise ---------------------- The download is the easy part: an https-only allowlist re-checked on every redirect hop, a declared sha256 compared against the bytes that arrived, and a byte cap. Unpacking is where the archive chooses the filenames, and core writes into a directory bind-mounted from the host, so an escape is not confined to the container. archive.js inspects the whole archive before a byte is unpacked and refuses absolute and drive-absolute paths, `..` segments, NUL bytes, backslashes, anything that is not a regular file or a directory, more than one top-level entry, and anything over the entry or byte caps. Refusing symlinks and hardlinks outright is what keeps this off the majority of node-tar's published advisories rather than depending on the library to contain them. That two-pass shape is load-bearing, and it was measured rather than assumed: extracting an archive whose fourth member escapes upward throws under node-tar 7.5.22 -- and leaves the first three members on disk. The loader scans that directory at require time on the next boot, so a half-unpacked module is a module. Everything therefore happens in a scratch directory that is removed on any failure, and the move into place is the last step. `tar` is pinned to ^7.5.22 rather than the ^6 that installs by default: 6.x is flagged critical, and reading the advisory list is what the file's header now says out loud -- almost all of it is hardlink or symlink traversal and PAX header interpretation differentials, which is exactly this feature's threat model. Two things the plan had wrong ----------------------------- The bundle's top-level directory is `module-uo-<version>`, not the module id -- so "the top-level name must equal the id" was checked against nothing real. The extractor strips that level instead, because its name belongs to whoever published the bundle and the directory it lands in is core's. What is checked instead is the unpacked module.json: a manifest promising `uo` and delivering something else is refused rather than installed under the name it promised. And purge cannot be a follow-up action (decision 5): purge.sql lives inside the directory uninstall deletes. It is offered in the uninstall flow and as a standalone action on a still-installed module, and the standalone one refuses unless the module is already disabled -- dropping tables under something that is still serving leaves it answering out of a world that no longer exists. Disable now means stopped ------------------------- lifecycle.stop() dispatches that one module's onShutdown before flipping the guard, so a module an operator switches off actually releases its sockets and closes its streams instead of merely becoming unreachable. The hook runs first and the state moves after it, because while onShutdown runs the module is still `started` and that is the only state in which its routes and the world it is tearing down agree. A hook that throws does not stop the disable -- the opposite of the boot path's rule, and deliberately. Enable is not its mirror and there is no start(id) beside it. There is no onBoot re-dispatch and the hooks were never promised re-entrant, so enable moves the row and the restart route starts it. A test pins that enable does not touch the loader, because "fixing" it is a one-line change that would put a module with closed sockets back on the nav. Restart raises SIGTERM against its own process rather than calling the shutdown path directly, so server.js's handler stays the one graceful-shutdown path and this route cannot drift from it. The allowlist bootstraps from MODULE_SOURCE_HOSTS into a settings row and is admin-managed after that (decision 6); seedDefault is INSERT IGNORE, so changing the variable on an existing deployment is a no-op by design. An empty list forbids every install rather than allowing every host -- the safe direction for a value someone might blank by accident. Verified against the real v0.3.0 release ---------------------------------------- Not a fixture: fetched the published install manifest over the real Gitea host and its redirect chain, verified the sha256, inspected and unpacked the 252,517-byte artifact to 82 files, and then booted core against the result -- the module registered its five mounts, seven streams and eight capabilities and resolved its client chunk, with no scratch directory left behind. Two defects this slice's own tooling caught, both of which had already been written down as classes: - the controller destructured runPurge at require time, capturing the function rather than the module, which made the one dependency whose ORDER matters the one that could not be substituted; - two swagger annotations carried an apostrophe inside a quoted string, dropped silently by swagger-autogen before slice 5 taught it to fail loudly. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-12 03:09:45 -05:00
wtclaude	2892d01b24	feat(modules): replay module schema fragments after core's ... Phase 2, PR 3 of docs/website/MODULE_SYSTEM.md 2.7. ensureSchema() now replays every installed module's schema fragment immediately after core's schema.sql, per MODULE_API.md 2.6. The work splits across two files on the line of whether a database is needed to know the answer. loader.js VALIDATES a fragment at load time, before anything is mounted, because every rule 2.6 states about the SQL is knowable by reading it; a module that breaks one never mounts (4.4, left column). modules/schema.js EXECUTES it, so the only failures there are the ones the database alone could report, and those are post-mount and answer 503 (4.4, right column). Validation is a leading-verb allowlist -- CREATE, ALTER, INSERT, UPDATE, the four core's own schema.sql uses -- rather than the DROP denylist 2.6 words it as. A fragment is replayed on every boot, so TRUNCATE and DELETE would empty a table at each restart and RENAME would fail at the second one; a denylist only ever bans what somebody thought of. A CREATE TABLE missing IF NOT EXISTS is rejected for the same reason: it works once and fails every boot after, which presents to an operator as a module that broke on restart. The splitter moves to utils/sqlStatements.js so core's schema and a fragment are split by literally the same code, which is what 2.6 promises. It is its own file rather than an export of utils/db.js because the loader validates fragments at require time and must not drag the mariadb pool into app.js's require chain. The replay sits outside ensureSchema's wait-for-the-database retry loop: a fragment that throws is one module's failure, not a signal the database is coming up, and retrying core's whole schema nine more times over one module's bad SQL would turn a 503'd module into a two-minute boot. Found while wiring it: db/seed.js calls ensureSchema() standalone for `npm run seed`, without ever requiring app.js, so the loader has not scanned and fragments()'s 7.6 throw would have broken seeding outright. The replay asks isLoaded() and logs the skip rather than swallowing it -- a booting server quietly getting no module tables is the thing 7.6 exists to prevent. Verification: - 856 server tests pass, 14 new. moduleSchema.test.js injects the query fn, so the exact statements and their order are asserted with the pool at a dead port like every other suite. - routes.manifest.json and routes.guards.json diffs are zero lines, 229 routes -- the phase 2 exit criterion. swagger-output.json regenerates byte-identical. - Run for real against the local MariaDB with two fixture modules: a good fragment created its table, applied its ALTER and seeded its row; a fragment whose SQL passes validation but the server rejects (`id NOTATYPE`) marked only that module startup_failed, its route answering 503 while the other answered 200; a second ensureSchema on the same database was a clean no-op. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-10 16:56:58 -05:00