TEAMS.md §3.3, as the eighth member of MODULE_API 1.6.0 — amended in place per
the org lead, on the rule Protocol 4 was given in phase 2: a contract owes a
bump only once it has landed on `main`.
Two questions meet on the roster and they belong to different owners. WHICH
ROWS a viewer may see is the module's, because the audience rungs and their
configuration live there and core does not know what a rung is. WHAT A ROW
LOOKS LIKE stays core's.
So `projectRoster` answers with member KEYS, not rows. §3.3 said rows, and rows
would let a module widen what is published — handing back a `userId` core had
withheld — leaving core's field guarantee resting on every module's good
behaviour. Core asks which rows and re-normalises the answer through its own
public shape, so a module can narrow and cannot widen.
"The module declines" needed splitting before it could be implemented. No
module at all and a module whose rungs could not be consulted are opposite
situations: the first withholds nothing and must serve the roster whole, the
second must serve none of it. The refusal carries `projects`, and only
`projects: true` fails closed. Without the split, bare core serves an empty
roster on every Team page.
This is also the first public route whose CONTENT depends on identity, which
needed a middleware core did not have. `attachSession` only decodes a token, so
a banned account, a password change or a logout would have kept working against
the private half of a feed until the JWT expired. `optionalAuth` runs
requireAuth's full database re-validation and, on any failure, continues
ANONYMOUSLY rather than rejecting — a caller whose session is no longer good
sees the public view, which is what they are entitled to.
`GET /public/teams/:slug/activity` lands here for the same reason: §2.11's route
table had no activity endpoint though §4.3 describes a filtered feed. Paged,
with the visibility resolved from the session and never from a parameter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Web sessions were stateless JWTs with no server-side store: the revocation
hooks in session.service were stubs that only logged. As a result web logout
was client-side only (a copied cookie stayed valid until natural JWT expiry)
and a password change never invalidated existing sessions. The mobile bearer
flow already had revocable, DB-stored tokens; this brings the web/cookie flow
to parity.
Two-layer revocation, both enforced in requireAuth (which already loads the
fresh user row each request):
- Per-session denylist: new `revoked_sessions` table keyed on the JWT `jti`
(already minted per session). A single logout adds this session's jti;
rows self-expire at the token's own exp and are pruned on boot. New model
`revokedSessions` mirrors the `mobileSessions` db/model split.
- Per-user cutoff: new `users.tokens_valid_after` column. A password change
(and the new `invalidateSessions` helper) bumps it to NOW(); any token whose
iat is at or before the cutoff is rejected. The comparison is inclusive so a
token minted in the same wall-clock second as the change is still revoked.
Wiring:
- session.service: revokeSession / invalidateSession / invalidateAllUserSessions
now delegate to the stores; sessions carry `expiresAt` (JWT exp) so logout can
set a self-pruning denylist row.
- /logout gains best-effort attachSession so the controller can revoke this
session's jti and log auth.logout; stays a no-op for anonymous callers.
- users.model.update bumps the cutoff whenever the password hash is rotated.
- schema.sql: revoked_sessions table + tokens_valid_after column, added to the
CREATE and to the idempotent migration block (ensureSchema on boot).
Verified end-to-end against the local dev DB: a captured cookie is rejected
after logout, and an existing session is rejected after a password change while
re-login with the new password succeeds. Full server test suite green (96).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
Refactor authentication into a provider-agnostic session layer and build
two new auth surfaces on top of it, without changing local password/TOTP
behavior. Every flow now issues sessions through
sessionService.createSession(user, authMethod).
Part 1 — Session abstraction (backward-compatible refactor):
- New server/src/auth/: token.js (JWT/cookie primitives), session.service.js
(create/validate/partial-TOTP/revoke), session.middleware.js
(attachSession/requireAuth/requireRole). utils/auth.js is now a thin
compat facade so existing imports are unchanged.
Part 2 — Mobile bearer auth (additive):
- /api/v1/auth/mobile/{login,refresh,logout}: short-lived access JWT +
long-lived refresh token, stored hashed and rotated on use, in a new
mobile_refresh_tokens table. Reuses web bot-scoring/backoff; single-request
TOTP. token.signToken gains a backward-compatible expiresIn option.
Part 3 — Pluggable SSO (Google, Discord, generic OIDC):
- OAuth2Provider base + built-in Google/Discord (fixed endpoints) + generic
OIDC, a registry with health/validation, PKCE+CSRF transaction state, and
discovery (GET /auth/providers), start/link/callback routes.
- Link-only policy: SSO signs in only to an already-linked account; external
identities are never auto-provisioned. Client secrets encrypted at rest
(AES-256-GCM, utils/secretBox.js). Admin CRUD (/admin/auth/providers) and
account linking (/admin/account/identities). New auth_providers +
user_identities tables.
Frontend:
- Login page renders provider buttons from /auth/providers (inline SVG icons,
graceful with zero providers). New Authentication admin view
(Local/Google/Discord/Custom). Account page linked-accounts section.
Tests: 83 passing (session, mobile, providers, registry, secretBox, ssoState,
ssoCallback) — all DB-free via fetch mocks + model stubs. README + .env.example
updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
