Commit Graph

24 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
7a08546da6 feat(brand): BRAND_* env scheme — instance branding without a rebuild
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Replace baked-in UOM/MysticMoon/UOMysticmoon branding with a BRAND_* env
scheme so one prebuilt image runs as any shard; UOMysticmoon becomes the
first tenant that sets these vars rather than a special case in the code.

Architecture (chosen because the app ships as a prebuilt image):
- server/src/config/brand.js + bot/src/brand.js read BRAND_* once at boot,
  with Runic Gateway defaults.
- Text/colors reach the SPA at RUNTIME through the existing public settings
  API (settings.model.getPublic -> SiteContext), so no client rebuild. The
  admin-editable site title + contact email still override BRAND_NAME/email.
- SiteContext applies BRAND_ACCENT_COLOR to the --accent CSS var at runtime.
- Express templates the built index.html <title>/description/OG/favicon at
  serve time from BRAND_* (renderIndexHtml in app.js).
- Server-side consumers read brand directly: emails, TOTP issuer, API docs,
  boot logs, HTML error page. Bot uses it for embed color + logs.

Assets: logo/hero/favicon delivered from a ./brand:/app/brand bind-mount
(BRAND_LOGO/HERO/FAVICON), with neutral defaults baked in; hero falls back
to a built-in image when unset.

Scope: also genericized package.json names (uomysticmoon-* -> runic-gateway-*)
and the DB_NAME/DB_USER/COOKIE_NAME code defaults (runic_gateway/runic/
rg_token). Production keeps its real values by pinning them in .env — see
.env.uomysticmoon.example, which reproduces the exact UOMysticmoon identity
(proof the substitution works). Changing a deployed COOKIE_NAME invalidates
existing sessions, so UOMysticmoon pins uomm_token.

Verified: 193 server tests pass, client builds, app.js loads + templates the
built index.html, brand transform injects title/description/OG/favicon.
2026-07-18 02:20:04 -05:00
1629796235 feat(houses): tier house visibility — public IDOC-only, staff full, player own
Per request, split the single public house registry into three role-scoped views:

- Public /site/houses → only houses in DANGER (IDOC), by LOCATION (region + map/
  coords). No owner, price, co-owners or decay detail. Renamed "Houses in danger";
  kept live via the public house.decay feed. The full-registry deltas
  (house.update / house.remove — which carry owner/price) are REMOVED from the
  public SSE allowlist so they never reach the public channel.
- Staff full registry → new /admin/houses (admin + moderator, RoleGate + MOD_PATHS)
  backed by GET /admin/shard/houses (modAccess), with owner/price/co-owners/decay
  and search, kept live on the admin SSE channel.
- Player portal → "My houses" home-status section (own houses only, with decay/
  IDOC status) via GET /player/shard/houses, scoped to the caller's linked accounts.

Server tests green, client build clean, swagger regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 16:50:37 -05:00
91c206bf76 feat(provisioning): game-account signup, admin email invites, unlink (2.0)
Phase 5: the account-provisioning backend — link-only stays, plus hybrid
self-signup, an admin email-invite tool, and site-side unlink.

- uoLinkClient.createAccount / unlinkAccount (v2). Password is forwarded to the
  shard (hashed there) and never stored/logged; the end-user browser IP is passed
  for the shard's per-IP cap; actor is stamped server-side.
- Hybrid signup: POST /player/shard/account provisions a game account (its own
  username + password) for the signed-in user and mirrors the link locally. Gated
  by the new game_account_signup setting AND the shard's own mode (mapped 403/409/
  429/400/503). Serves both self-serve signup and the invite-accept game step.
- Email invites: user_invites table (sha256 token hash, single-use, expiring);
  invites model + admin CRUD (POST/GET/DELETE /admin/invites, admin-only) +
  mailer.sendInvite (falls back to returning the accept link if email is off);
  public token-gated accept (GET /auth/invite/:token, POST .../accept) creates the
  user at the invite's preset role and logs them in, bypassing the registration
  gate. Accept is race-safe (atomic single-use; rolls back the user if it loses).
- Admin unlink: DELETE /admin/users/:id/shard/link/:account (admin-only) + local
  mirror drop; account.unlinked ingest reconciles the mirror when a player runs
  [unlink in game. account.audit / account.unlinked are logged (admin channel
  only — never on the public SSE allowlist).

Tests: invites model (hashing, single-use, expiry, revoke) + account.* ingest
reconcile/visibility. Full suite 193/193; swagger regenerated.

Refs .plans/protocol2-integration.md (Phase 5).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 15:50:49 -05:00
55a3adea99 feat(news): auto-push published news to the in-game Town Cryer News gump (2.1)
Phase 4: sync the site's published news posts into the Protocol 2.1 News gump.

- uoLinkClient.postNews / deleteNews.
- utils/newsGump.js — a STATE SYNC (not a one-shot announce leg): an article
  stays in the gump while its post is published news and is pulled when it leaves
  that state. buildArticle renders a compact gump-HTML block (centred title +
  plain-text excerpt — the gump supports only a small HTML subset) with a
  "more info" link to /site/news and an optional gump image from the
  `news_gump_image` setting. Every call is best-effort / never-throws.
- Hooked into the posts pipeline alongside the existing announce enqueue:
  syncPost on create/update/publish (fresh publish announces; edits refresh
  silently; leaving published-news pulls the article), removePost on delete.
- reassertAll() runs in uoLinkSocket.backfill on every WS (re)connect —
  reconciles the gump to our source of truth and recovers any article whose
  original live push failed (silent, so a reconnect never re-proclaims old news).

Server 185/185, swagger regenerated. Refs .plans/protocol2-integration.md (Phase 4).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 15:40:47 -05:00
080478c4a1 feat(shard): ingest Protocol 2.0 boards — guilds, governors, presence, houses
Phase 1 of the Protocol 2.0/2.1 integration: the read/ingest backend for the four
new uo-link boards, following the established champs/pages pattern (ingest → our
MariaDB + snapshot-on-reconnect + public SSE + token-free public endpoint).

- Schema: shard_guilds, shard_governors, shard_governor_terms, shard_presence;
  extend shard_houses with the house.update registry columns (owner_name,
  co_owners, friends, price, decay, in_registry) so the decay-transition and
  registry feeds share one house row without clobbering each other.
- Ingest: route guild.update/remove, city.update, presence.online,
  house.update/remove; log guild.join (real-time joins feed); region.enter is
  broadcast-only. All new public kinds added to the SSE allowlist.
- Governor term history captured from day one: on every observed governor CHANGE
  the open term is closed and a new one opened, idempotent so backfill/duplicate
  city.update never spawn spurious terms. votes stays NULL (the feed carries only
  candidate count, not tallies) — we never fabricate vote numbers.
- Client + backfill: getGuilds/getGovernors/getHouses/getPresence; snapshot each
  board on every WS (re)connect, independently guarded so an empty/failed board
  (e.g. no City Loyalty) never wipes another.
- Public endpoints: /shard/{guilds,governors,governors/:city/history,presence,houses}.
- Tests: ingest routing for all new kinds + governor term-capture idempotency
  (15 new; full suite 179/179). Swagger regenerated.

Refs .plans/protocol2-integration.md (Phase 1).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 12:28:54 -05:00
c31553aeb6 feat(shard): admin write plane, help-page queue, and public champion board
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Wire up the three uo-link sidecar surfaces that weren't integrated yet.

Champion spawns
- Ingest champ.update/champ.remove into a new shard_champs table (served from
  our own store, like online/houses); public /site/champs board with a nav link,
  live via the existing SSE feed (champ.* added to the public allowlist).

Staff write plane (admin + moderator)
- kick / ban / unban / broadcast via /admin/shard/*; actor is stamped server-side
  from the session, never the browser. Sidecar status codes mapped (403 disabled/
  protected, 404 unknown, 503/504 transient). admin.audit events are logged and
  surfaced at /admin/shard/audit.
- New admin "In-Game Ops" view (/admin/shard-ops), plus per-account Kick/Ban/Unban
  on the user-detail and character views (ShardAccountActions, self-gated to staff).

Help-page (support) queue
- Ingest page.new/updated/closed into a new shard_pages table; respond/close via
  /admin/shard/pages/*. Champ board and page queue are snapshotted from the
  sidecar's /champs and /pages on every WS (re)connect (guarded so a failed call
  never wipes local state).

Verified live end-to-end against MariaDB + the Rust sidecar + ServUO; unit tests
cover ingest routing (shardIngest.champsPages.test.js). Swagger regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0114TpmrNW4wNXsHq5CR72jQ
2026-07-14 13:16:10 -05:00
ba4d758eab feat(admin): view a user's shard footprint at /admin/users/:id
Add a "View" action beside Edit in the users table that opens a dedicated,
read-only page showing everything the uo-link shard knows about a user,
scoped to their linked game accounts: character rosters, currently-online
characters, houses (IDOC-first), and recent vendor sales.

Backend (admin-only, under the existing /users adminOnly gate):
- GET /admin/users/:id — single sanitized user (page is deep-linkable)
- GET /admin/users/:id/shard/{accounts,sales,houses,online}
- shardState: listHousesByAccounts / listOnlineByAccounts (+ model shapers)
- Extract salesForAccounts into utils/shardSales; reuse in player getSales
- Live rosters reuse the existing admin-bypass /admin/shard/* endpoints,
  so no new routes for roster/vendors/char

Frontend:
- UserDetail page reusing CharacterStats / GameAccounts / VendorSales
- GameAccounts gains a readOnly prop (drops link form + self-voice copy)
- api.admin.getUser + api.admin.userShard(id) scope; route + layout title

Tests: adminUserShard.test.js (404, account scoping, empty accounts,
salesForAccounts cap/filter). Full server suite 164 pass; client builds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0114TpmrNW4wNXsHq5CR72jQ
2026-07-12 09:36:43 -05:00
986a8d5d86 News post → town crier + Discord announcement pipeline
Replace the fire-and-forget Discord-only announce on publish with a
retry-safe, two-leg pipeline. When a post transitions into published-news
(false→true publish while in news, or category→news while published), an
announce_jobs row is enqueued with two INDEPENDENT delivery legs:

  • town crier — sidecar POST /towncrier via uoLinkClient (stable id
    `post-<id>` so a retry replaces rather than duplicates)
  • discord    — bot POST /internal/announce via botInternalClient
    (single source of truth for the #news channel stays in the bot)

An in-process poller (utils/announceWorker) sweeps the table every
ANNOUNCE_POLL_MS and dispatches each due leg with its own exponential
backoff (30s→2h, 6 attempts). A leg is retried on transient failures
(503/504/network) and failed fast on data/config errors (400 over-cap,
401/409). Publishing never blocks on the sidecar or Discord — enqueue is
local DB only. Parent `status` is a done/partial/failed rollup of the two
legs; posts.announced_at is stamped once both deliver.

Admin visibility: GET /admin/posts/:id/announce + a per-leg Retry
(POST .../announce/retry) surfaced in the PostEditor for news posts.

Pure decisions (text build/caps, classification, backoff, rollup) live in
announceJobs.logic and are unit-tested (server/test/announceJobs.test.js,
10 tests). The old manual /admin/uo-link/towncrier form is untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0114TpmrNW4wNXsHq5CR72jQ
2026-07-11 16:25:25 -05:00
c4245e3f6a Restrict public presence to staff + let admins view any character
Public "Online now" now lists only players whose game account is linked
to a STAFF website user (admin/editor/moderator) — linked players are no
longer exposed publicly with their name and location. listOnlineLinked
joins through to users and filters on role; the section is relabeled
"Staff online".

Character/roster/vendor reads gain an admin bypass: admins may view any
character's data, while players (and editor/moderator staff) stay limited
to accounts they have personally linked. The bypass lives in the shared
player controller and only ever widens access for genuine admins.

Also finalizes the uo-link character/vendor front end (player + admin
character sheets, VendorSales component, ShardChar removed) and
regenerates swagger-output.json.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kj5s1QCKobuFPYmqxjy1q
2026-07-11 09:15:18 -05:00
9d9f5aac28 Add uo-link WS ingest, storage tables and SSE broadcaster (phase 1)
The site now ingests the sidecar's live WebSocket feed and persists it to its
own MariaDB, and re-broadcasts curated events to browsers over SSE.

- schema: shard_events (append-only notable-kind log, sha1 dedupe_key +
  INSERT IGNORE for idempotent reconnect backfill), shard_online (current
  players, upsert/refresh/remove), shard_economy (gold-supply series),
  shard_houses (per-house decay stage + derived is_idoc).
- model/shardEvents + model/shardState: the .db.js/.model.js split; writes
  take camelCase event data, reads are shaped; online upsert uses COALESCE so
  a partial char.vitals refresh never blanks login fields.
- utils/shardIngest: single dispatcher routing each kind to state writes
  and/or the event log, then the broadcaster. High-frequency kinds
  (char.vitals, economy.supply) update state only. A changed server.hello
  bootId clears the stale online roster. Deps are injected for unit testing.
- utils/uoLinkSocket: the server's first outbound WS client (ws dep). Verifies
  the ws.hello protocol, backfills via /history + /economy on every
  (re)connect (dedupe handles overlap), reconnects with capped backoff, and
  mirrors connection state into uo_link_config. Self-guards: only connects when
  the integration is enabled with a token.
- utils/shardBroadcast: SSE fan-out with public (safe kinds only) and admin
  (all) channels, keepalive pings, per-client cleanup.
- server.js: start the ingest socket on boot (no-op until configured) and stop
  it + close SSE streams on graceful shutdown.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011qPmpmVH1xGCiZoz9m9vW3
2026-07-11 02:08:56 -05:00
ab647756f0 Add uo-link sidecar foundation: config store + REST client (phase 0)
Introduces the DB-backed connection config for the uo-link sidecar (the
HTTP + WebSocket bridge to the ServUO shard) and a never-throw REST client,
mirroring the existing Discord-bot integration:

- uo_link_config singleton table (base/ws URL, AES-256-GCM-encrypted shared
  token, protocol pin, enabled, and last-known status/plugin_connected/
  last_event_at/boot_id mirrors for the admin panel).
- model/uoLinkConfig: getSafe (never returns the token — only hasToken),
  getWithToken (server-side decrypt), save (blank token = unchanged),
  recordStatus (mirror the sidecar's reported state).
- utils/uoLinkClient: never-throw fetch client returning {ok,data,status,
  error}; Bearer token + X-UOLink-Version on every call; brief config cache;
  helpers for health/char/roster/vendors/history/economy/link/towncrier.
- .env.example: UOLINK_BASE_URL/WS_URL/PROTOCOL defaults (token stays
  admin-managed in the DB, never an env var).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011qPmpmVH1xGCiZoz9m9vW3
2026-07-11 02:02:40 -05:00
6180e8a071 Add rich-text alignment controls (left/center/right)
Shared RichTextEditor gains @tiptap/extension-text-align for heading and
paragraph nodes, serializing alignment as inline text-align on the block
node so it round-trips through save/reload. Fixed once at the shared
component so it also flows into the upcoming rich_text and two_column
page blocks.

Server sanitize allowlist now permits `style` on p/h1-h6, constrained by
allowedStyles to text-align (left/right/center/justify) only; all other
CSS properties and values are stripped.

Step 1 of the CMS Page Builder spec.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 20:21:17 -05:00
f8652c2399 Modernize email: Gmail OAuth2 sending, configured under Settings
Retire env-var SMTP basic-auth and send the contact form through Gmail over
OAuth2 (SMTP XOAUTH2), configured in Admin -> Settings -> Email via an in-app
"Connect Gmail" consent flow. Reuses the existing google SSO OAuth client; the
captured refresh token is stored AES-GCM-encrypted (write-only over the API,
never returned), mirroring the auth-provider and Discord-bot secret patterns.

- schema: new email_config singleton table (mirrors bot_config)
- model: emailConfig.{db,model} with encrypted refresh token + getSafe/getWithSecret
- mailer: nodemailer OAuth2 transport (client id/secret from the google provider
  row), contact recipient = contact_email setting, mailto: fallback preserved,
  plus sendTest()
- routes/controller: /admin/email config, connect start+callback (ssoState CSRF
  + PKCE), test, disconnect
- client: EmailDelivery section on the Settings page + api methods; Settings copy
  now spells out that contact_email is the delivery recipient
- docs/env: drop SMTP_*/CONTACT_TO from env examples; update README/BACKEND_DESIGN
- tests: emailConfig.model + mailer suites (8 new; full suite 142 pass)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XKeCQEJZr1AFJN4Bgcmvh3
2026-07-07 22:29:27 -05:00
5df943095d Isolate internal bot-config route from the public listener (#33)
The GET /internal/bot-config route returns the DECRYPTED Discord bot
token and was mounted on the same Express app / port 3000 that Pangolin
proxies publicly. Its only guard was the BOT_INTERNAL_KEY shared secret,
and .env.example shipped a placeholder default — so a forwarded path or a
weak/unrotated key would expose the plaintext token to the internet.

Move server<->bot internal traffic onto its own listener and fail fast on
a weak key:

- Add server/src/internalApp.js: a standalone Express app mounting
  requireInternalKey + /internal (and a no-secret /health), mirroring the
  bot's unpublished port-4100 pattern.
- server.js starts a second listener on INTERNAL_PORT (default 3001),
  closed on graceful shutdown.
- Remove the /internal mount from the public v1.router; the public app now
  404s /api/v1/internal/bot-config even with a valid key.
- Fail fast: new utils/botInternalKey.js rejects an empty, placeholder, or
  <16-char BOT_INTERNAL_KEY — fatal in production (exit 1), warning in dev.
- docker-compose: bot SITE_INTERNAL_URL -> app:3001/internal/bot-config;
  document that INTERNAL_PORT stays unpublished.
- .env.example (root/server/bot): document INTERNAL_PORT, the fail-fast
  behavior, and a defense-in-depth Pangolin deny rule for /api/v1/internal.

Tests: add requireInternalKey.test.js and botInternalKey.test.js
(node --test: 93 pass).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
2026-07-04 17:35:07 -05:00
7a21cc636c Add Discord bot (moderation, filters, scheduling, roles, invites, site integration)
Standalone bot/ service (its own package.json/Dockerfile) managed entirely
through a new admin-only Discord Bot panel — token stored encrypted in the
DB and pushed to the bot process in-memory, never an env var. Built in
phases, each independently verified against a live Discord guild:

- Bot skeleton: gateway connection, internal shared-secret API, self-heals
  on its own restart by pulling config from the site
- Moderation core: /ban /kick /mute /warn /warnings + mod-log channel
- Word/invite/spam filtering with leetspeak-resistant normalization and a
  staff role/channel allowlist
- Scheduled messages: recurring (cron) and one-off channel posts
- Role assignment: button role menus, auto-role on join, temp roles,
  bulk role ops
- Auto-rotating primary invite with an audit log
- Site integration: news-publish -> Discord announce webhook, manual
  /announce, read-only /wiki search

Also fixes a pre-existing bug in both DB pools (server + bot): the mariadb
driver defaulted to timezone 'local', silently mis-serializing bound Date
params by the host's local offset instead of the DB's UTC session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 15:54:41 -05:00
31b31c3a17 Add session abstraction, mobile bearer auth, and pluggable SSO
Refactor authentication into a provider-agnostic session layer and build
two new auth surfaces on top of it, without changing local password/TOTP
behavior. Every flow now issues sessions through
sessionService.createSession(user, authMethod).

Part 1 — Session abstraction (backward-compatible refactor):
- New server/src/auth/: token.js (JWT/cookie primitives), session.service.js
  (create/validate/partial-TOTP/revoke), session.middleware.js
  (attachSession/requireAuth/requireRole). utils/auth.js is now a thin
  compat facade so existing imports are unchanged.

Part 2 — Mobile bearer auth (additive):
- /api/v1/auth/mobile/{login,refresh,logout}: short-lived access JWT +
  long-lived refresh token, stored hashed and rotated on use, in a new
  mobile_refresh_tokens table. Reuses web bot-scoring/backoff; single-request
  TOTP. token.signToken gains a backward-compatible expiresIn option.

Part 3 — Pluggable SSO (Google, Discord, generic OIDC):
- OAuth2Provider base + built-in Google/Discord (fixed endpoints) + generic
  OIDC, a registry with health/validation, PKCE+CSRF transaction state, and
  discovery (GET /auth/providers), start/link/callback routes.
- Link-only policy: SSO signs in only to an already-linked account; external
  identities are never auto-provisioned. Client secrets encrypted at rest
  (AES-256-GCM, utils/secretBox.js). Admin CRUD (/admin/auth/providers) and
  account linking (/admin/account/identities). New auth_providers +
  user_identities tables.

Frontend:
- Login page renders provider buttons from /auth/providers (inline SVG icons,
  graceful with zero providers). New Authentication admin view
  (Local/Google/Discord/Custom). Account page linked-accounts section.

Tests: 83 passing (session, mobile, providers, registry, secretBox, ssoState,
ssoCallback) — all DB-free via fetch mocks + model stubs. README + .env.example
updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 10:31:29 -05:00
073c010d72 Fail fast when JWT_SECRET is missing in production (#14)
auth.js previously only logged a warning when JWT_SECRET was unset and
then continued to boot. With no secret, jwt.sign/jwt.verify cannot
produce or validate a usable token, so every login silently fails while
the server appears healthy — and booting a production instance without a
configured secret is a safety hazard.

Resolve the secret through resolveJwtSecret():
  - production (NODE_ENV=production): throw, so the process refuses to
    start without a real secret instead of running unusable.
  - dev/other: fall back to a known insecure secret so local login keeps
    working, with a loud warning to set JWT_SECRET before deploying.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 00:55:07 -05:00
d38c98ad9e Harden admin login: RBAC-safe controls, 2FA, bot-scoring, rate limits (#9)
Adds a layered set of protections around the admin login and the app edge.

Trust proxy (server/src/utils/trustProxy.js)
- Configurable via TRUST_PROXY; pin to the newt agent ("ptero") LAN IP so
  X-Forwarded-For is trusted ONLY from that peer. A blanket "true" is
  rejected (coerced to 1) to prevent XFF spoofing that would dodge every
  IP-based control. DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY logs peer/XFF/req.ip to re-verify the
  proxy IP without a redeploy. Documents the Omada static-reservation
  assumption.

Login throttling (server/src/middleware/loginProtection.js, rateLimit.js)
- express-slow-down progressive delay + the existing hard rate cap + a
  separate per-IP exponential backoff that persists across the rate window.
  All failures return one generic message (no user/pass disclosure).

Honeypot (login form + auth.controller)
- Hidden, plausibly-named field ("company"); a filled value fails
  generically and is scored as an unambiguous bot.

Optional per-user TOTP 2FA (speakeasy/qrcode)
- totp_secret/totp_enabled columns (+ idempotent migration). Self-service
  Account page: enroll via QR, confirm a code to enable, code-gated disable.
- Login is two-step for enrolled users: after the password, a short-lived
  signed challenge (stage:'totp', not a session) is required before the
  real session is issued.

Bot / scanner scoring + IP ban (server/src/middleware/botScore.js)
- Weighted CMS-scanner paths (this app uses none). Junk paths 404 FIRST,
  unconditionally — independent of score/ban state, so a scanner rotating
  through fresh Cloudflare IPs gets no free pass. /wp-admin/install.php is
  the top-weighted near-1-hit ban (worst offender in prod logs). Per-IP
  score with quiet-period decay temp-bans an IP from ALL routes once past a
  (deliberately low) threshold, to protect /admin from credential stuffing.
  Failed logins and honeypot hits feed the same score.
- Periodic sweep evicts stale, unbanned, quiet entries so the in-memory
  store can't grow unbounded; the interval is unref'd and cleared on
  graceful shutdown.

Tests: node --test suite (40) covering trust-proxy parsing + live req.ip
(incl. pinned-IP), rate limiter + exponential backoff, honeypot rejection,
TOTP verify (enabled/disabled) + challenge-isn't-a-session, bot-score
threshold/decay/ban + junk-404-independence + install.php + store sweep.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 23:22:35 -05:00
81318ae264 Merge branch 'main' into fix/stale-jwt-revalidation 2026-07-03 02:31:59 +00:00
8ad18140d0 Re-validate JWT against the DB in isLoggedIn (#12)
isLoggedIn trusted id and role straight from the JWT and never
re-checked the database, so a demoted admin kept their old role and a
deleted user kept a working session until the token expired (up to
JWT_EXPIRES_IN). This also undercut the "last admin" guards.

isLoggedIn now loads the user from the DB by the token's id on every
request: a missing user returns 401 (deleted), and req.user carries the
fresh DB row so the current role is always used downstream.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 21:16:43 -05:00
20d7150ab4 Enforce role-based authorization on admin-only routes (#10)
isLoggedIn only verified a valid JWT, so an authenticated editor could
call any admin endpoint (create/promote/delete users, flip site mode,
change settings). Add a requireRole middleware factory and gate the
sensitive routes with admin-only:

- PUT  /site-mode
- GET/PUT /settings
- all /users/* (list/create/update/delete)

Content routes (posts, wiki, categories, tags, uploads, dashboard,
activity) remain available to editors.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 21:15:12 -05:00
a5a8c1930c RTE Posts upgrade: TipTap editor + sanitization for posts
Extend the wiki's RichTextEditor to the Posts editor and close the
stored-XSS gap on public post bodies.

- RichTextEditor: add `variant` prop — `full` (wiki), `post` (no
  internal wiki-page link picker), `minimal` (image-only, for
  Screenshots captions). Toolbar sections rendered conditionally.
- PostEditor: replace the body textarea with a lazy-loaded
  RichTextEditor in Suspense; variant chosen by category
  (minimal for screenshots, post otherwise).
- posts.model: sanitize body via shared cleanBody on create/update,
  treat an empty TipTap `<p></p>` as null, and auto-derive the
  excerpt from the body (max 280 chars) when left blank.
- sanitizeHtml util: add deriveExcerpt() helper.
- FiveOnFriday / NewsletterIssue: wrap dangerouslySetInnerHTML with
  DOMPurify.sanitize() as defense-in-depth on render.

No schema or dependency changes. Verified end-to-end against the
local stack: 24/24 API assertions and a full UI round-trip across
all four post categories.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-30 13:14:54 -05:00
b925114923 Wiki Phase 1: categories, drafts/publish, HTML sanitization
Foundation & safety phase of the wiki upgrade (see WIKI_UPGRADE.md).

Schema (additive, idempotent via ensureSchema):
- new wiki_categories table; wiki_pages gains category_id, excerpt,
  published, published_at, sort_order, and a FULLTEXT index
- migration ALTERs guarded with IF NOT EXISTS for existing databases
- seed reworked into 4 sections with the 8 starter pages assigned

Security:
- new utils/sanitizeHtml.js (sanitize-html allowlist); wiki bodies are
  sanitized on every save, and the article renders through DOMPurify
- strips <script>, event handlers (onerror), and javascript: URLs

Backend:
- public: published-only list with ?category filter + /wiki/categories
- admin: extended page CRUD, PATCH publish toggle, category CRUD;
  drafts visible to admin, hidden from public
- all writes logged to activity_log

Frontend:
- data-driven public wiki index (sections + real descriptions; removed
  hardcoded blurbs/Roman numerals) with ?category filtering
- article: category breadcrumb + sanitized render
- admin: Section/Status columns, draft/publish + section + excerpt in the
  editor, and a Manage sections modal

Verified end-to-end against MariaDB 11: migration clean, XSS neutralized,
drafts hidden, client builds, server boots.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-27 10:45:21 -05:00
eef79e2403 Initial commit: UOMysticmoon backend (Express + MariaDB + JWT)
- Layered API (router -> controller -> model -> db), serverlinkr pattern
- Public / auth / admin route groups; posts, wiki, settings, users, activity models
- JWT httpOnly-cookie auth (Secure auto-detected: LAN HTTP + Pangolin HTTPS)
- Site LIVE/MAINTENANCE mode with admin preview bypass
- Dual file+console logging (info/warn/error/debug) + HTTP access logs
- Docker Compose (app + MariaDB), schema.sql + seed, .env.example
- Verified end-to-end against MariaDB (27/27 smoke checks)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-26 20:58:32 -05:00