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e27c368234 feat(teams): the grant flow, announcements, and the routes behind both guards
Path 3's WRITE half. The resolver landed in phase 2; this is who may hand access
out, to whom, and what stops a leader turning a Team forum into open hosting on
the operator's site.

Two authorities, and not one authority with different reach. Staff may act on any
Team, uncapped, and may revoke anything. A leader may grant and revoke ordinary
access on their own Team, is capped at `teams_max_grants_per_team` (default 50),
is rate-limited, and may NOT revoke a staff-issued grant — which is what stops a
leader undoing a moderation decision. The issuer's role is checked at revoke time
rather than stored, so an account that has since lost its staff role stops
protecting the grants it made.

Nothing on this path writes team_members, in either direction. A grant may name any
account, including one with no linked game identity — that is the point of it — and
that account stays off the roster, out of every count, and ineligible for external
platforms.

Announcements are a degenerate thread rather than their own object, so phase 5 adds
no migration. Moderation records WHICH authority was exercised: a staff action also
writes activity_log, a leader's writes only the Team's own ledger. Merging the two
would make a guild leader locking a thread an appealable Discord sanction.

Every forum route answers 404 while the switch is off, and 404 — never 403 — to a
caller with no access: in a private room the contents and the existence are the
same secret. The grant routes deliberately answer even while the forum is OFF,
because a toggle-off revokes no grant and the access list has to stay manageable.

Under /player rather than /admin: a leader is a player, and the /admin tier gate is
requireRole('admin','editor','moderator') — putting a leader endpoint behind it
would mean widening that gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 07:23:47 -05:00
bfd844e8fb feat(teams): the four-path access resolver and staff leadership overrides
The four authority paths of docs/website/TEAMS.md §2.5, and the rule that they
stay four: four tables answering four questions, and no resolver reads another
path's table.

  1. Is this account a member?        module  team_members
  2. Does this account lead the Team?  module  team_members.is_leader + override
  3. May it use the Team forum?        CORE    team_forum_grants OR path 1
  4. May it get external access?       CORE    derived, nothing of its own

The temptation this resists is collapsing 1 and 3 into one boolean. They answer
different questions about different populations: a forum grant may name any
Runic Gateway account, including one with no game identity at all -- that is the
point of it, since letting an unlinked guildmate into a forum must not require a
staff ticket. Reading "has forum access" as "is a member" would put that person
on the public roster, into every membership count, and into the external-platform
grant, which is where a modelling preference becomes an impersonation risk.

Path 4 is deliberately blind to path 3, and the reason is written down so nobody
"fixes" it: an integration cannot verify that an unlinked, forum-granted account
corresponds to a real game member, so it must not hand that account a privilege
on a platform where impersonation has consequences. A forum is a room on the
operator's own site with a known moderator; a Discord role is an identity claim
in someone else's space.

Leadership overrides are applied ON TOP of the synced value at read time, never
written into the projection. The sync owns that column and rewrites it every
interval, so an override stored there would be undone fifteen minutes after
staff set it -- which is the whole reason §2.5.1 is a separate table. The roster
carries both the resolved answer and `is_leader_synced`, so an admin sees that a
decision was made rather than being shown it as fact.

Three tests are named INVARIANT rather than for behaviour, because what they
protect is structural and a reasonable-looking refactor destroys it silently: a
grant never writes the membership projection, a granted user is absent from the
roster, and a grant does not confer external eligibility. None of those failures
appears on a screen as a bug -- the first shows up as a stranger on a public
roster, the second as a Discord role handed to an account nobody can tie to a
real player.

Every unit test here stubs the db layer, so the SQL itself was verified
separately: all 44 statements across teams.db.js and teamAccess.db.js were run
against MariaDB 11 with a throwaway module id and cleaned up after. That run
also confirmed live what the reconciler's tests could only assert against a
stub -- an upsert does not overwrite is_leader, a revoked grant frees the unique
key for a new one while the ledger keeps both, and an archived team stays
resolvable at its old slug while its external_id is free for the successor row.

19 tests. Full suite 828 passed, 0 failed.

Refs docs/website/TEAMS.md §2.5, §2.5.1, §2.6, Part 12 phase 2

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 14:57:23 -05:00