// ── The forum's own HTML profile, and core's image renderer ────────────────
//
// TEAMS.md §5.5.3, which is the load-bearing decision of the whole forum design
// and is deliberately NOT how the rest of the site works.
//
// **The author never writes an `<img>` tag.** Core's shared sanitizer
// (utils/sanitizeHtml.js) allows `<img>` from any http/https host — it is tuned
// for rich text from the ADMIN editor, where the author is already trusted.
// Handing that profile to arbitrary players would make `teams_forum_images`
// unenforceable: every post could hotlink in every mode and the setting would be
// decoration. So the forum derives its own profile in which `img` is never an
// allowed tag, in any mode.
//
// What an author writes is a URL. What decides whether it becomes a picture is
// this file's renderer, at READ time:
//
//   author types:  https://example.com/banner.png
//   stored HTML:   <a href="…" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow">https://…</a>
//   rendered:      that link, and — in `remote`/`uploads` mode only — a
//                  core-generated <img> beneath it
//
// Five properties fall out, and they are the reason for the design:
//
//   1. The policy is ENFORCEABLE, because the only code that can emit an <img>
//      is this file.
//   2. Flipping the setting back to `disabled` retroactively un-renders every
//      image on every existing post, with NO data migration — the images were
//      never in the stored HTML.
//   3. No attribute smuggling: no author-supplied srcset, onerror, width=99999
//      or style. Core emits a fixed attribute set.
//   4. The link always survives. A blocked, dead or 404ing image degrades to the
//      URL the author actually wrote, which is what the reader wanted anyway.
//   5. It matches how forums conventionally behave.
//
// **Never proxy or cache a remote image server-side.** The moment the server
// fetches a user-supplied URL it is an SSRF vector, and an allow-set is useless
// here because the whole point is arbitrary hosts. The browser fetches; the
// server never does. Written down so nobody adds a proxy "for performance".

const sanitizeHtml = require('sanitize-html')

// Derived from the shared profile with the image family removed. `figure` and
// `figcaption` go with `img` rather than surviving it: without an image inside,
// a figure is an empty box, and leaving them would let an author build a caption
// for a picture core decided not to render.
const FORUM_OPTIONS = {
  allowedTags: [
    'h3', 'h4', 'h5', 'h6',
    'p', 'br', 'hr', 'blockquote', 'pre', 'code',
    'ul', 'ol', 'li',
    'strong', 'b', 'em', 'i', 'u', 's', 'sup', 'sub', 'mark', 'span',
    'a',
    'table', 'thead', 'tbody', 'tr', 'th', 'td',
  ],
  allowedAttributes: {
    // `rel` is allowed only so the transform below can WRITE it — an author's own
    // rel is overwritten, not merged. Without it here, sanitize-html strips the
    // very attribute the transform just added and every link ships without
    // noopener.
    a: ['href', 'title', 'rel'],
    th: ['colspan', 'rowspan'],
    td: ['colspan', 'rowspan'],
  },
  // No `style` at all, and therefore no allowedStyles. The shared profile permits
  // text-align for the admin editor's block alignment; a forum post has no such
  // editor and every style attribute a player could send is one more thing to
  // reason about.
  allowedSchemes: ['http', 'https', 'mailto'],
  allowProtocolRelative: false,
  transformTags: {
    a: sanitizeHtml.simpleTransform('a', { rel: 'noopener noreferrer nofollow' }, true),
  },
  disallowedTagsMode: 'discard',
}

// What may become a picture. Conservative on purpose: guessing wrong renders an
// <img> pointed at something that is not an image, which reads as a broken site.
const IMAGE_EXTENSIONS = ['.png', '.jpg', '.jpeg', '.gif', '.webp', '.avif']

// Tags whose text is left alone by the linkifier. Inside an anchor because
// nesting one is invalid; inside code/pre because a URL in a code sample is
// being shown, not offered.
const NO_LINKIFY = new Set(['a', 'code', 'pre'])

// Absolute http(s) URLs, and root-relative `/uploads/…` paths.
//
// The second alternative is not a nicety. In `uploads` mode the composer hands
// the author a path like `/uploads/1787…-ab12.png`, puts it in the body as TEXT
// (the author never writes markup — that is the whole design), and the renderer
// only ever rewrites ANCHORS. Without this branch the write path cannot produce
// the anchor the read path looks for, so an uploaded image could never become a
// picture — even though `isEmbeddableImageUrl` was written to accept exactly
// these paths. The two halves disagreed, and only a real upload showed it.
//
// Deliberately narrow: `/uploads/` and nothing else, so ordinary prose that
// happens to contain a slash is left alone.
const BARE_URL = /\bhttps?:\/\/[^\s<>"']+|(?:^|(?<=[\s(]))\/uploads\/[A-Za-z0-9._~-]+(?:\/[A-Za-z0-9._~-]+)*/g

/**
 * Sanitise a forum post body. Runs on WRITE; the stored value is already safe and
 * is served without re-sanitising — the same contract the wiki and the CMS follow.
 */
function cleanForumBody(html) {
  if (html == null || html === '') return html
  return linkify(sanitizeHtml(String(html), FORUM_OPTIONS))
}

/**
 * Turn bare URLs in text into anchors.
 *
 * Runs AFTER sanitising, over the sanitiser's own output, and only on text
 * outside tags. That ordering is what makes it safe: every text node has already
 * been HTML-escaped, so the matched URL can go into both the href and the link
 * text unchanged — `&` is already `&amp;`, which is what an attribute wants.
 */
function linkify(html) {
  const tokens = String(html).split(/(<[^>]+>)/)
  const openStack = []
  return tokens
    .map((token) => {
      if (token.startsWith('<')) {
        const match = /^<\s*(\/?)\s*([a-zA-Z0-9]+)/.exec(token)
        if (match) {
          const [, closing, name] = match
          const tag = name.toLowerCase()
          if (closing) {
            const at = openStack.lastIndexOf(tag)
            if (at !== -1) openStack.splice(at, 1)
          } else if (!token.endsWith('/>')) {
            openStack.push(tag)
          }
        }
        return token
      }
      if (openStack.some((tag) => NO_LINKIFY.has(tag))) return token
      return token.replace(BARE_URL, (url) => {
        // Trailing punctuation is far more likely to be the sentence's than the
        // URL's — "see https://example.com." should not link the full stop.
        const trimmed = url.replace(/[.,;:!?)\]]+$/, '')
        const tail = url.slice(trimmed.length)
        return `<a href="${trimmed}" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow">${trimmed}</a>${tail}`
      })
    })
    .join('')
}

/**
 * May this URL become a picture?
 *
 * `https:` only, because the CSP is `img-src 'self' data: https:` (config/csp.js)
 * — an `http:` image is blocked by the browser and renders as a broken picture,
 * so an `http:` URL stays a plain link. This is a real mismatch with the SHARED
 * sanitizer, which permits `http` for `img`, and it is exactly the sort of thing
 * that presents as "images are broken on my forum" with nothing in any log.
 *
 * Same-origin `/uploads/…` paths are embeddable too — that is where `uploads`
 * mode puts a file, and `'self'` covers them under the same CSP.
 */
function isEmbeddableImageUrl(href) {
  if (typeof href !== 'string' || href === '') return false
  const decoded = href.replace(/&amp;/g, '&')
  let pathname
  if (decoded.startsWith('/uploads/')) {
    pathname = decoded.split(/[?#]/)[0]
  } else {
    let url
    try {
      url = new URL(decoded)
    } catch {
      return false
    }
    if (url.protocol !== 'https:') return false
    pathname = url.pathname
  }
  const lower = pathname.toLowerCase()
  return IMAGE_EXTENSIONS.some((ext) => lower.endsWith(ext))
}

/**
 * Render a stored body for one viewer under one image policy.
 *
 * `disabled` returns the stored HTML byte-for-byte. The other two append a core-
 * generated <img> after each anchor whose href looks like an image — which is why
 * the stored HTML is identical between the three modes, the property this whole
 * design exists to give.
 */
function renderForumBody(storedHtml, mode) {
  if (storedHtml == null || storedHtml === '') return storedHtml
  if (mode !== 'remote' && mode !== 'uploads') return storedHtml
  return String(storedHtml).replace(/<a\s[^>]*href="([^"]*)"[^>]*>.*?<\/a>/gi, (anchor, href) => {
    if (!isEmbeddableImageUrl(href)) return anchor
    // A fixed attribute set, every time. `no-referrer` limits what leaks to the
    // third-party host — it cannot prevent the request itself, which is the
    // privacy cost stated in the admin help text rather than hidden.
    //
    // `class` rather than an inline style, for two things the live rig showed:
    // the embed has to sit BENEATH the link (§5.5.3) and an <img> is inline, so
    // without it the picture lands beside the URL; and a remote image is any size
    // its host chooses, so it needs a max-width or one post can blow the column
    // out. Both live in core's stylesheet (`.forum-embed`) because a style
    // attribute would then have to survive the client's DOMPurify pass, and its
    // CSS sanitiser is a larger thing to reason about than one class name.
    return `${anchor}<img class="forum-embed" src="${href}" loading="lazy" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" alt="">`
  })
}

module.exports = {
  cleanForumBody,
  renderForumBody,
  isEmbeddableImageUrl,
  IMAGE_EXTENSIONS,
  FORUM_OPTIONS,
}