# ─── UOMysticmoon — root environment (used by docker-compose) ───
# Copy to .env and fill in. NEVER commit the real .env.

# App
NODE_ENV=production
PORT=3000
# Separate, UNPUBLISHED port for server<->bot internal traffic (the decrypted
# bot-token route). Must match the port in the bot's SITE_INTERNAL_URL
# (docker-compose.yml) and must NEVER be published/proxied. See issue #33.
INTERNAL_PORT=3001
UPLOAD_DIR=/app/uploads
# Logging — written to BOTH the console and a log file.
LOG_LEVEL=info          # console verbosity: error | warn | info | debug
FILE_LOG_LEVEL=debug    # file verbosity (keep a full record on disk)
LOG_TO_FILE=true        # set false for console-only
LOG_DIR=/app/logs       # log directory inside the container (bind-mounted to ./logs)
LOG_FILE=app.log

# Database (the values here are shared by the `db`, `app`, and `bot` containers —
# the bot only ever touches its own tables: guild_config, mod_actions, warnings)
DB_HOST=db
DB_PORT=3306
DB_NAME=uomysticmoon
DB_USER=uomm
DB_PASSWORD=change-me-db-password
DB_ROOT_PASSWORD=change-me-root-password

# Auth
JWT_SECRET=change-me-to-a-long-random-string
JWT_EXPIRES_IN=1d
# auto = Secure cookie only when the request arrives over HTTPS (Pangolin).
# Leave as auto so login works both via the LAN IP (HTTP) and the proxy (HTTPS).
COOKIE_SECURE=auto
COOKIE_NAME=uomm_token

# Reverse-proxy trust (req.ip / req.secure for rate limiting, backoff, bot-ban).
# Path: client -> Pangolin -> newt agent "ptero" (separate VM) -> app. Pin this
# to ptero's LAN IP (e.g. 10.0.0.42) so XFF is only trusted from ptero. Requires
# a static DHCP reservation for ptero in Omada, else a lease change breaks it.
# Integer hop count or "false" also accepted; a blanket "true" is rejected
# (coerced to 1) to prevent X-Forwarded-For spoofing.
TRUST_PROXY=1
# Set to 1 to log raw peer address + X-Forwarded-For + resolved req.ip per
# request (to verify/refresh ptero's IP without redeploying). Noisy; keep off.
DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY=0

# Optional TOTP two-factor (opt-in per user).
TOTP_ISSUER=UOMysticmoon
TOTP_CHALLENGE_TTL=5m

# First admin bootstrap — created only if no users exist yet.
# Set, run once, then you can blank these out.
ADMIN_USERNAME=
ADMIN_PASSWORD=

# Email is configured in Admin → Settings → Email (Gmail over OAuth2), not via
# env. It reuses the Google auth provider's OAuth client and stores an encrypted
# refresh token in the DB. Until it's connected, the contact form falls back to
# a mailto: link (recipient = the `contact_email` site setting).

# CORS — only needed for local dev when the Vite dev server is a different origin.
CLIENT_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5173

# Discord bot — internal API (server <-> bot/, see docker-compose.yml's `bot`
# service). BOT_INTERNAL_KEY MUST be byte-for-byte identical to the same
# variable in bot/.env.example — it is the only auth on both sides' /internal/*
# routes, so a mismatch silently breaks every server<->bot call with 401s.
# It also guards the server's /internal/bot-config route, which returns the
# DECRYPTED Discord token; with NODE_ENV=production the app REFUSES TO START if
# this is left blank, at this placeholder, or shorter than 16 chars. Generate a
# long random string. The Discord bot TOKEN itself is not an env var — it's
# entered in the admin panel (Discord Bot page) and stored encrypted in the DB.
#
# Defense in depth: even with a strong key, configure Pangolin/your reverse
# proxy to DENY /api/v1/internal (and never forward INTERNAL_PORT). The route no
# longer rides the public listener, but an explicit deny rule is belt-and-braces.
BOT_INTERNAL_URL=http://bot:4100
BOT_INTERNAL_KEY=change-me-to-a-long-random-string