# UOMysticmoon Website Public site, wiki, and protected admin panel for the **UOMysticmoon** private Ultima Online shard — a full-stack app in one repo: - **Backend** — Node.js + Express REST API (layered `router → controller → model → db`), MariaDB, a provider-agnostic session layer (JWT cookie for web, bearer tokens for mobile, pluggable SSO). - **Frontend** — React + Vite single-page app (public site, wiki, and the admin panel), dark "gothic" theme (Cinzel + Georgia). - **Deploy** — Docker Compose (app + MariaDB) behind a Pangolin reverse proxy. Express serves the built SPA in production. - **Shard link** — a live bridge to the in-game ServUO shard through the **uo-link** sidecar ([RunicGateway/link](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/link)): the site ingests a live event feed and makes server-side REST calls to show shard status, economy, staff presence, IDOCs, live activity, and per-character sheets. See [Shard integration (uo-link)](#shard-integration-uo-link). The design reference is [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) (API contract, schema, security). --- ## Contents - [Tech stack](#tech-stack) - [Project structure](#project-structure) - [Prerequisites](#prerequisites) - [Setup & run](#setup--run) - [Option A — Docker Compose (full stack)](#option-a--docker-compose-full-stack) - [Option B — Local development (hot reload)](#option-b--local-development-hot-reload) - [Option C — Production build without Docker](#option-c--production-build-without-docker) - [First admin & site mode](#first-admin--site-mode) - [Pages & routes](#pages--routes) - [API endpoints](#api-endpoints) - [API documentation (Swagger)](#api-documentation-swagger) - [Shard integration (uo-link)](#shard-integration-uo-link) - [Environment variables](#environment-variables) - [Security](#security) - [Logging](#logging) - [Deployment behind Pangolin](#deployment-behind-pangolin) --- ## Tech stack | Layer | Tech | |---|---| | Backend | Node.js 20+, Express 4, `mariadb` driver (parameterized SQL, no ORM) | | Auth | Session service over JWT: httpOnly cookie (web) + bearer access/refresh tokens (mobile), bcrypt hashing, optional TOTP 2FA (`speakeasy` + `qrcode`), pluggable OAuth2/OIDC SSO (built-in Google & Discord + generic) | | Database | MariaDB 11 (own container) | | Frontend | React 18, Vite 5, React Router 6 | | Email | Nodemailer via Gmail OAuth2 (configured in admin), with a `mailto:` fallback | | API docs | OpenAPI 3.0 via `swagger-autogen`, served with `swagger-ui-express` at `/api/docs` | | Deploy | Docker Compose, Pangolin reverse proxy | --- ## Project structure ``` UOMSITE/ ├─ server/ Express API │ ├─ src/ │ │ ├─ server.js bootstrap: ensure schema → seed → listen (0.0.0.0) │ │ ├─ app.js middleware + static SPA + routes │ │ ├─ auth/ session layer: session.service · token (JWT/cookies) · session.middleware · ssoState (PKCE/CSRF) · providers/ (base · oauth2 · google · discord · genericOidc · registry) │ │ ├─ router/v1/ auth (web · mobile · sso) / public / admin route groups │ │ ├─ model/ users · posts · wiki · settings · activity · mobileSessions · authProviders · userIdentities (.model + .db) │ │ ├─ middleware/ siteMode · noindex · rateLimit · loginProtection · botScore · validate │ │ └─ utils/ auth (compat facade) · totp (2FA) · secretBox (AES-GCM secrets) · db (pool) · mailer · logger │ ├─ db/ schema.sql + seed.js │ ├─ swagger/ swagger.js (OpenAPI generator config) + swagger-output.json (generated spec) │ └─ .env.example ├─ client/ React + Vite SPA │ ├─ src/ │ │ ├─ routes/public/ Portal, Website, News, Screenshots, FiveOnFriday, Newsletter(+Issue), Status, About, Maintenance │ │ ├─ routes/wiki/ Wiki landing + WikiArticle │ │ ├─ routes/admin/ AdminLogin (password + TOTP + SSO buttons), AdminLayout, views/ (Dashboard, Posts, Wiki, Settings, Activity, Bot Activity, Authentication, Users, Account) + editors │ │ ├─ components/ SiteHeader, SiteFooter, layout, guards, Modal, ProviderIcon (inline SSO SVGs), … │ │ ├─ contexts/ AuthContext, SiteContext │ │ ├─ api/client.js fetch wrapper (sends cookies) │ │ └─ styles/theme.css design tokens │ └─ public/assets/img/ hero image ├─ Dockerfile builds client → serves via Express ├─ docker-compose.yml app + MariaDB ├─ .env.example root env (used by Compose) └─ package.json workspace scripts ``` --- ## Prerequisites - **Node.js 20+** and npm (Node 22/24 are fine). - **Docker Desktop** (for MariaDB, and for the full Compose deploy). --- ## Setup & run ### Option A — Docker Compose (full stack) `docker-compose.yml` is **production-shaped**: it *pulls* the prebuilt `app` and `bot` images from the Gitea container registry (published by `.gitea/workflows/build-images.yml` on every merge to `main`) — it never builds. Each image already bundles the server deps and the built React client, which Express serves. MariaDB runs in its own container; tables + defaults + the first admin are created automatically on first boot. ```bash cp .env.example .env # Edit .env and set at least: # DB_PASSWORD, DB_ROOT_PASSWORD (any strong values) # JWT_SECRET (a long random string) # ADMIN_USERNAME, ADMIN_PASSWORD (your first admin login) docker compose pull && docker compose up -d # IMAGE_TAG defaults to `latest` # pin a specific build (reproducible deploy / rollback): IMAGE_TAG=sha-042a151 docker compose pull && docker compose up -d ``` - App: **http://localhost:3000** (binds `0.0.0.0`) - Health check: `GET http://localhost:3000/api/health` → `{ "status": "ok" }` - Logs: `docker compose logs -f app` (and `./logs/app.log` on the host) - Stop: `docker compose down` (add `-v` to also wipe the database + uploads volumes) **Build the images locally instead of pulling** (offline, or to test an unmerged change) — overlay the dev file, which adds `build:` back: ```bash docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.dev.yml up -d --build ``` Keeping `build:` out of the base file means a production host can only ever pull — it can never accidentally build. ### Option B — Local development (hot reload) Run the API and the Vite dev server separately. The Vite server proxies `/api` and `/uploads` to the backend, so the SPA stays same-origin (cookies work). **1. Start a MariaDB the backend can reach** (published on `localhost:3306`): ```bash docker run -d --name uomm-db -p 3306:3306 -e MARIADB_DATABASE=uomysticmoon -e MARIADB_USER=uomm -e MARIADB_PASSWORD=devpass -e MARIADB_ROOT_PASSWORD=rootpass mariadb:11 ``` **2. Configure + start the backend** (terminal 1): ```bash cp server/.env.example server/.env # Set DB_HOST=127.0.0.1, DB_PORT=3306, DB_USER=uomm, DB_PASSWORD=devpass, # JWT_SECRET=, ADMIN_USERNAME=admin, ADMIN_PASSWORD= npm run install-server npm run server # nodemon → http://localhost:3000 ``` **3. Start the frontend** (terminal 2): ```bash npm run install-client npm run client # Vite → http://localhost:5173 ``` Develop at **http://localhost:5173** (hot reload). On Windows, the Vite proxy targets `127.0.0.1:3000` to avoid the IPv6-`localhost` pitfall. > Tip: `npm run install-all` installs both server and client deps in one go. ### Option C — Production build without Docker Build the SPA and let Express serve it on a single port (still needs a MariaDB + `server/.env`): ```bash npm run install-all npm run build # → client/dist npm start # node server → serves API + SPA at http://localhost:3000 ``` --- ## First admin & site mode - On first boot, if the `users` table is empty and `ADMIN_USERNAME` / `ADMIN_PASSWORD` are set, the first admin is created automatically. You can also run `npm run seed`. After it exists you may blank those env vars. - The site **starts in `maintenance` mode**: public visitors see the polished "coming soon" page; the admin login and panel are always reachable. - Sign in at **`/admin/login`**, then flip **Maintenance → Live** from the Dashboard. A logged-in admin can preview the live site even while it's in maintenance. --- ## Pages & routes **Public** (gated by site mode): | Route | Page | |---|---| | `/` | Portal landing (hero + destinations) | | `/site` | Website index (section cards) | | `/site/news` | News feed | | `/site/screenshots` | Screenshot gallery | | `/site/five-on-friday` | Five on Friday | | `/site/newsletter` · `/site/newsletter/:id` | Newsletter list + issue | | `/site/about` · `/site/status` | About · Shard status | | `/wiki` · `/wiki/:slug` | Wiki landing + article (auto table-of-contents) | **Admin** (cookie auth, `noindex`): | Route | View | |---|---| | `/admin/login` | Sign in | | `/admin` | Dashboard (mode toggle, stats, recent activity) | | `/admin/posts` | Posts CRUD + publish + image upload | | `/admin/wiki` | Wiki pages CRUD | | `/admin/settings` | Site settings | | `/admin/activity` | Activity log | | `/admin/bot-activity` | Bot activity — banned IPs + recent scoring events, emergency unban (admin only) | | `/admin/auth-providers` | Authentication — enable/configure SSO providers: built-in Google & Discord + custom OIDC/OAuth2 (admin only) | | `/admin/users` | User management | | `/admin/account` | Account security (self-service TOTP two-factor + linked SSO accounts) | --- ## API endpoints | Group | Base | Auth | |---|---|---| | Auth (web) | `/api/v1/auth` (`login`, `login/totp`, `logout`, `me`) | cookie | | Auth (mobile) | `/api/v1/auth/mobile` (`login`, `refresh`, `logout`) | bearer (access + refresh tokens) | | SSO | `/api/v1/auth` (`providers` — public discovery; `sso/:provider/start`, `sso/:provider/link`, `sso/:provider/callback`) | redirect flow | | Public | `/api/v1/public` (`settings`, `status`, `posts/:category`, `posts/:category/:idOrSlug`, `wiki`, `wiki/:slug`, `contact`) | none | | Admin | `/api/v1/admin` (`dashboard`, `site-mode`, `posts`, `posts/upload`, `wiki`, `settings`, `activity`, `bot-activity`, `bot-activity/unban`, `auth/providers` (CRUD), `users`, `account`, `account/totp/*`, `account/identities`) | cookie (admin) | | Public · Shard | `/api/v1/public/shard` (`status`, `feed`, `economy`, `online`, `idoc`, `stream`) | none | | Player · Shard | `/api/v1/player/shard` (`link`, `accounts`, `roster/:account`, `vendors/:account`, `char/:serial`, `sales`) | cookie/bearer (player) | | Admin · Shard | `/api/v1/admin/shard` (self linking, same as player) · `/api/v1/admin/uo-link` (`config`, `towncrier`, `stream`) | cookie (staff / admin) | Post categories (URL form): `news`, `five-on-friday`, `newsletter`, `screenshots`. `authMethod` on a session ∈ `local · totp · mobile · google · discord · oidc`. See [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) §4 for the full contract, or the interactive Swagger docs below for a per-endpoint reference (parameters, request bodies, response codes). --- ## API documentation (Swagger) The full API is documented as an **OpenAPI 3.0** spec and served with **Swagger UI**: | URL | What | |---|---| | `http://localhost:3000/api/docs` | Interactive Swagger UI (try-it-out, auth) | | `http://localhost:3000/api/docs.json` | Raw OpenAPI 3.0 spec (JSON) | Every endpoint is tagged and grouped (Auth, Auth · Mobile, Auth · SSO, Public, and the Admin groups) with its summary, parameters, request body, security requirement, and the response codes it actually returns (`400` validation, `401`/`403` auth, `404`, `409` conflicts, `429` rate limits, …). **Authentication in the UI** — click **Authorize** and provide either: - `cookieAuth` — the `uomm_token` session cookie (set automatically in the browser after `POST /api/v1/auth/login`), or - `bearerAuth` — a mobile access token from `POST /api/v1/auth/mobile/login` (sent as `Authorization: Bearer `). **Regenerating the spec** — the spec is generated from `#swagger.*` annotations next to each route (`server/src/router/**`) plus the shared definitions in `server/swagger/swagger.js` ([swagger-autogen](https://github.com/davibaltar/swagger-autogen)). The output `server/swagger/swagger-output.json` is committed so the docs work with no build step. After adding or changing a route, regenerate it: ```bash cd server npm run swagger # → server/swagger/swagger-output.json ``` If the generated spec is missing, the server logs a warning and simply disables `/api/docs` (it does not crash). --- ## Shard integration (uo-link) The site is wired to the live in-game world through **uo-link**, a standalone sidecar service that runs next to the ServUO shard. Its source lives in a separate repo: **[RunicGateway/link](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/link)**. uo-link speaks the shard's internals and exposes a small, authenticated HTTP + WebSocket API; this website is a *client* of it. The shard itself is never exposed to the internet — only the sidecar is, and only the website's backend talks to it. ### How it works ``` ServUO shard ──▶ uo-link sidecar (RunicGateway/link) ──▶ website backend ──▶ browser REST + WebSocket, bearer-auth ingest + REST same-origin JSON/SSE ``` - **Connection is admin-managed, not env.** The sidecar's base URL, WebSocket URL, shared-secret token, and protocol version are stored in the database (`uoLinkConfig`), edited from the **Admin → Shard** panel. The token is **encrypted at rest** (AES-256-GCM) and is **write-only** in the API — it is never returned to any client and never sent to the browser. Every call the backend makes carries `Authorization: Bearer ` and an `X-UOLink-Version` header (a protocol mismatch fails fast with `409` instead of being mis-parsed). - **Live ingest (WebSocket).** When enabled, the backend opens an outbound WebSocket to the sidecar and receives a stream of game events — `mob.login`/`logout`, `char.vitals`, `economy.supply`, `vendor.sale`, `player.death`/`murdered`, `house.decay` (IDOC), staff `audit.*`/`cheat.*`, `link.request`, and `server.hello`/`shutdown`. A single dispatcher (`utils/shardIngest.js`) routes each event: state-changing kinds update `shard_online` / `shard_economy` / `shard_houses`; notable kinds are appended to an append-only `shard_events` log; high-frequency kinds (vitals, supply ticks) only update state and are not logged. A changed boot id on `server.hello` is detected as a restart and stale "online" rows are cleared. On reconnect the backend backfills missed events via the sidecar's `/history`. - **Live round-trips (REST).** For point-in-time reads the backend calls the sidecar directly — `/char/serial/:serial`, `/roster/:account`, `/vendors/:account`, `/economy`, `/history` — plus commands `/link/confirm` and `/towncrier`. The REST client (`utils/uoLinkClient.js`) **never throws**: every call returns `{ ok, data, status }`, so a shard that is down or mid-restart degrades to a `503`/retry banner instead of a 500. - **Fan-out to the browser.** Ingested events are pushed to browsers over **Server-Sent Events**. Two channels exist: a **public** stream carrying only a safe allowlist of kinds, and an **admin-only** stream that also includes sensitive kinds (staff audit, cheat detection, login attempts, IPs). Sensitive kinds can never leak onto the public channel. ### Account linking A player (or staff member) proves ownership of a game account without sharing any game credentials: 1. In game, the player runs **`[link`** and receives a one-time code. 2. On the website (Player portal, or Admin → Account for staff) they enter the code. 3. The backend confirms the code with the sidecar (`POST /link/confirm`), which permanently tags the game account with the website user id, and mirrors the link locally in `shard_account_links`. That mirror is the authorization basis for character reads: roster/vendor/character-sheet endpoints are **ownership-checked** so a user only sees accounts they linked. **Admins may view any character**; players and editor/moderator staff are limited to their own linked accounts. ### What each audience sees | Surface | Endpoints | Who | Data | |---|---|---|---| | **Public** | `/api/v1/public/shard/*` (`status`, `feed`, `economy`, `online`, `idoc`, `stream`) | anyone | Shard up/down, gold-supply series, IDOC houses, a curated live feed, and **"Staff online"** — only players whose account is linked to a **staff** user (admin/editor/moderator), shown with name + map location. Linked *players* are never listed publicly; no vitals or account are exposed. | | **Player** | `/api/v1/player/shard/*` (`link`, `accounts`, `roster/:account`, `vendors/:account`, `char/:serial`, `sales`) | logged-in player | Their own linked accounts: character rosters, character sheets, player-vendor snapshots, and recent vendor sales. | | **Admin** | `/api/v1/admin/shard/*` (self-linking, same as player) · `/api/v1/admin/uo-link/*` (`config`, `towncrier`, `stream`) | staff / admin | Staff link their own accounts like players; **admins** additionally read *any* character's data, edit the sidecar connection config, publish/remove **town-crier** messages, and subscribe to the full event stream (incl. audit/cheat). | The sidecar URL and token are set once in **Admin → Shard**; if uo-link is not configured (or the shard is offline), every shard surface degrades gracefully — the public page still renders, showing the shard as offline. --- ## Environment variables Copy `.env.example` (Compose) or `server/.env.example` (local) and fill in. **`.env` is git-ignored.** | Var | Default | Notes | |---|---|---| | `NODE_ENV` | `production` | | | `PORT` | `3000` | server listens on `0.0.0.0:PORT` | | `UPLOAD_DIR` | `/uploads` | where post images are written (`/app/uploads`, volume-mounted, in Compose) | | `DB_HOST` / `DB_PORT` | `db` / `3306` | `db` in Compose; `127.0.0.1` for local dev | | `DB_NAME` / `DB_USER` / `DB_PASSWORD` | `uomysticmoon` / `uomm` / — | app database credentials | | `DB_ROOT_PASSWORD` | — | MariaDB root (Compose only) | | `JWT_SECRET` | — | **required** — long random string; signs session, mobile, and SSO-flow tokens | | `JWT_EXPIRES_IN` | `1d` | web session token + cookie lifetime | | `COOKIE_SECURE` | `auto` | `auto` = Secure only over HTTPS (works on LAN HTTP + Pangolin HTTPS) | | `COOKIE_NAME` | `uomm_token` | | | `SECRET_ENC_KEY` | — | **required in prod** — key for AES-256-GCM encryption of stored OAuth client secrets. Dev falls back to a key derived from `JWT_SECRET` (with a warning) | | `APP_BASE_URL` | — | public base URL, used to build the SSO OAuth `redirect_uri` (`${APP_BASE_URL}/api/v1/auth/sso/:provider/callback`). Set in prod to match what you register with Google/Discord; if unset it is derived from the request (fine for local dev) | | `MOBILE_ACCESS_TTL` | `15m` | mobile bearer **access** token lifetime (short-lived) | | `MOBILE_REFRESH_TTL_DAYS` | `30` | mobile **refresh** token lifetime (long-lived, rotated on use) | | `TRUST_PROXY` | `1` | reverse-proxy trust for correct `req.ip` / `req.secure` (rate limiting, backoff, bot-ban). Pin to the proxy hop's LAN IP in prod. A blanket `true` is rejected (coerced to `1`) to block `X-Forwarded-For` spoofing | | `DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY` | `0` | `1` logs raw peer address + `X-Forwarded-For` + resolved `req.ip` per request (to verify/refresh the proxy IP). Noisy — leave off | | `TOTP_ISSUER` | `UOMysticmoon` | label shown in authenticator apps for optional per-user 2FA | | `TOTP_CHALLENGE_TTL` | `5m` | lifetime of the short-lived post-password "awaiting code" step | | `ADMIN_USERNAME` / `ADMIN_PASSWORD` | — | first-admin bootstrap (first boot only) | | _Email_ | — | configured in Admin → Settings → Email (Gmail OAuth2), not via env; recipient = `contact_email` setting | | `CLIENT_ORIGIN` | `http://localhost:5173` | enables CORS in dev only | | `LOG_LEVEL` / `FILE_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` / `debug` | console / file verbosity | | `LOG_TO_FILE` / `LOG_DIR` / `LOG_FILE` | `true` / `/logs` / `app.log` | log file (bind-mounted to `./logs` in Docker) | | `ANNOUNCE_POLL_MS` | `15000` | how often the news-announcement dispatcher sweeps `announce_jobs` for due/retry legs (town crier + Discord) | | `TOWNCRIER_DURATION_SEC` | `3600` | how long a news post's in-game town-crier message stays up (≤ `86400`) | --- ## Security **Session & authorization** - All auth flows go through one **session service** (`server/src/auth/`): controllers call `sessionService.createSession(user, authMethod)` and middleware calls `validateSession()`, so web cookies, mobile bearer tokens, and SSO all produce the *same* authenticated session model. `utils/auth.js` remains a thin backward-compat facade. - JWT in an httpOnly, `SameSite=Lax` cookie (`Secure` auto-detected), bcrypt password hashing. - Admin routes are **re-validated against the database on every request**, so a demoted or deleted user loses access immediately instead of keeping their old role until the token expires. - **Role-based authorization** — admin-only endpoints (users, site mode, settings, auth providers) are gated by a `requireRole` check, so a lower-privilege editor can't reach them. **Mobile bearer auth** - Native clients use `/api/v1/auth/mobile/*`: a short-lived **access token** (bearer JWT, validated by the same middleware as the cookie) plus a long-lived, **server-stored, revocable refresh token** that is **rotated on every refresh** (a replayed refresh token is single-use). Refresh tokens are stored **hashed** (never in the clear); logout revokes one or all. Mobile login reuses the same bot-scoring + backoff defenses as web, with single-request TOTP. **Single sign-on (OAuth2 / OIDC)** - Pluggable providers — built-in **Google** and **Discord** (endpoints fixed in code; admins supply only client id/secret) plus fully-configurable **custom OIDC/OAuth2** providers, managed from the **Authentication** admin panel. Only `enabled` + fully-configured providers are shown to users. - **Link-only** by policy: an SSO login succeeds *only* if the external identity is already linked to an existing account (linked by the user from **Account**). External identities are **never auto-provisioned** — no one gains access without an account you created. - The redirect flow is CSRF-protected with a signed, httpOnly, short-lived transaction cookie plus **PKCE**; OAuth client secrets are **encrypted at rest** (AES-256-GCM) and never returned to any client. SSO logins go through the same `sessionService`, so login/activity logging, RBAC, and bot protection are identical to a local login. **Login hardening** - **Optional per-user TOTP two-factor** (opt-in, self-service on `/admin/account`). When enabled, the password step issues only a short-lived, non-session `stage:'totp'` challenge; a session cookie is granted only after the second factor verifies. - **Login throttling** — `express-slow-down` + a hard rate cap + a separate per-IP exponential backoff, with generic error messages that don't reveal whether the username exists. - **Honeypot** field on the login form; submissions that fill it are treated as bots. - **Bot-scoring + automatic IP ban** — weighted scoring of CMS-scanner paths and junk 404s (with a periodic sweep of stale entries) bans hostile scanners; failed logins and honeypot hits feed the score. Admins get visibility into this on the **Bot Activity** panel: currently banned IPs and a recent-events feed (in-memory, most-recent-first), plus a logged emergency **unban** for false positives — read + unban only, not a scoring-config surface. **Uploads & input** - Uploaded file extensions are derived from the **validated mimetype**, not the client-supplied filename (prevents a disguised-extension upload). - `express-validator` on all writes; usernames are validated **and** uniqueness-checked on update. **Platform** - `helmet`, admin routes `noindex` + `robots.txt` disallow, `trust proxy` for correct client IPs behind Pangolin (see `TRUST_PROXY`), first admin seeded from env (no hardcoded credentials), `.env` git-ignored. Passwords and request bodies are never logged. Email sends through Gmail OAuth2 configured in the admin (refresh token stored AES-GCM-encrypted, never in env); the contact form falls back to a `mailto:` link when unconfigured. --- ## Logging Every log line goes to **both the console and a log file**, timestamped and leveled (`error` / `warn` / `info` / `debug`): ``` 2026-06-26T18:55:01.123Z INFO [server] listening on http://0.0.0.0:3000 ... 2026-06-26T18:55:09.880Z INFO [http] 192.168.1.40 admin POST /api/v1/auth/login 200 12 ms - 48 bytes 2026-06-26T18:55:14.402Z WARN [auth] login failed {"username":"root","ip":"192.168.1.40"} 2026-06-26T18:55:20.110Z ERROR [error] GET /api/v1/public/wiki -> 500 ... {"stack":"..."} ``` Captured: startup config banner, schema/seed steps, **HTTP access logs** (real client IP via `trust proxy`, the authenticated admin, method/URL/status/time/size), login success/failure, rate-limit hits, site-mode changes, all errors with stack traces, and graceful shutdown. Console verbosity is `LOG_LEVEL`; the file keeps the fuller `FILE_LOG_LEVEL` record. In Docker the file is bind-mounted to `./logs/app.log` and `docker compose logs -f app` shows the console stream. --- ## Deployment behind Pangolin `docker compose up -d --build` exposes the `app` container on `0.0.0.0:3000` (no `127.0.0.1` binding) so Pangolin can reach it. Point a Pangolin resource at `app:3000`. Because `COOKIE_SECURE` defaults to `auto`, the admin login works both directly via the LAN IP over HTTP **and** through Pangolin over HTTPS — no config change needed. MariaDB stays on the private Compose network (no published port by default); data persists in the `dbdata` volume, uploads in `uploads`.