wtclaude
60ebacff2c
Add opt-in "Trust this device" so a browser/app skips the TOTP step (never the password) for 30 days, single-use bcrypt recovery codes as a 2FA-lockout fallback, and admin trusted-device/MFA-reset management — backend, web UI, OpenAPI spec, and tests. - Schema: trusted_devices (sha256 token hash, looked up by unique index) and recovery_codes (bcrypt, single-use). Both additive/idempotent. - Session service: trust-token mint/hash/resolve + cap helpers; new rg_trust httpOnly cookie (survives logout, revoked on untrust/password change/reset/ TOTP disable). JWTs stay stateless — trust is a server-side row, not a claim. - Web + mobile login accept a trusted-device token / recovery code; login/totp gains trustDevice + recoveryCode. Cap of 10/user with NO silent pruning — an over-cap trust returns 409/trustLimitReached and the client prompts to revoke. - Self-service /auth/me/trusted-devices* + recovery-codes*; admin /admin/users/:id/trusted-devices* + /mfa/reset. All actions audit-logged. - Client: "Trust this device" + recovery-code login options, one-time recovery code display, Trusted Devices + Recovery Codes account panels, a TOTP-styled revoke-to-continue cap modal, and admin per-user security controls. - OpenAPI regenerated; 33 new server tests (all suites green). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
50 lines
2.2 KiB
JavaScript
50 lines
2.2 KiB
JavaScript
// Point the DB at a closed port BEFORE requiring anything that builds the pool,
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// so any stray DB path fails fast instead of holding the process open. The cases
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// here reject at requireAuth (no session token) before any query runs.
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process.env.DB_HOST = '127.0.0.1'
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process.env.DB_PORT = '59999'
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const { test, after } = require('node:test')
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const assert = require('node:assert/strict')
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const { startApp } = require('./_helper')
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const authRouter = require('../src/router/v1/auth/auth.routes')
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const db = require('../src/utils/db')
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after(() => db.close())
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// The role-agnostic /auth/me/* self surface must be gated: every route sits behind
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// requireAuth (any role), so an unauthenticated caller gets 401 — never a 404
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// (which would mean the route isn't mounted) and never a 200.
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test('/auth/me/account* rejects unauthenticated callers with 401', async () => {
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const app = await startApp((a) => a.use('/api/v1/auth', authRouter))
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try {
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const calls = [
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['GET', '/api/v1/auth/me/account'],
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['GET', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/identities'],
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['PATCH', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/username', { username: 'someone' }],
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['PATCH', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/password', { newPassword: 'abcd1234' }],
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['POST', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/totp/setup'],
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['POST', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/totp/enable', { code: '123456' }],
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['DELETE', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/identities/google'],
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// Trusted devices + recovery codes are self-service too — same gate.
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['GET', '/api/v1/auth/me/trusted-devices'],
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['POST', '/api/v1/auth/me/trusted-devices', { deviceName: 'X' }],
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['DELETE', '/api/v1/auth/me/trusted-devices'],
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['DELETE', '/api/v1/auth/me/trusted-devices/1'],
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['GET', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/recovery-codes/status'],
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['POST', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/recovery-codes/generate', { currentPassword: 'x' }],
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]
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for (const [method, path, body] of calls) {
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const res = await fetch(app.url + path, {
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method,
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headers: body ? { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } : {},
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body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,
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})
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assert.equal(res.status, 401, `${method} ${path} should be 401, got ${res.status}`)
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}
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} finally {
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await app.close()
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}
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})
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