Makes `users.email` unique, de-duplicates the addresses an upgrade will find, and builds the self-service change-and-verify flow that did not exist. The uniqueness index is on a generated `email_norm AS (LOWER(email)) STORED` column under `utf8mb4_bin`, NOT on `email` under a `_ci` collation as the plan specified. Every case-insensitive collation this server offers is also accent-insensitive: `josé@x.com` and `jose@x.com` compare equal, and those are two different mailboxes. The plan's index would have refused the second address forever and the de-duplication would have nulled a legitimate account's. A requested address is STAGED in `email_pending` and only a tokened link installs it, so a typo cannot silently redirect account-recovery mail. `isDuplicateUsername()` now distinguishes the two indexes. All five call sites branch on it; each answers differently on purpose, because a public form, an IdP callback, a half-completed invite and an admin screen do not owe the same person the same amount of truth. SSO reads the IdP's actual `email_verified`/`verified` claim instead of inferring verification from an address merely being present. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
56 lines
2.6 KiB
JavaScript
56 lines
2.6 KiB
JavaScript
// Point the DB at a closed port BEFORE requiring anything that builds the pool,
|
|
// so any stray DB path fails fast instead of holding the process open. The cases
|
|
// here reject at requireAuth (no session token) before any query runs.
|
|
process.env.DB_HOST = '127.0.0.1'
|
|
process.env.DB_PORT = '59999'
|
|
|
|
const { test, after } = require('node:test')
|
|
const assert = require('node:assert/strict')
|
|
|
|
const { startApp } = require('./_helper')
|
|
const authRouter = require('../src/router/v1/auth')
|
|
const db = require('../src/utils/db')
|
|
|
|
after(() => db.close())
|
|
|
|
// The role-agnostic /auth/me/* self surface must be gated: every route sits behind
|
|
// requireAuth (any role), so an unauthenticated caller gets 401 — never a 404
|
|
// (which would mean the route isn't mounted) and never a 200.
|
|
test('/auth/me/account* rejects unauthenticated callers with 401', async () => {
|
|
const app = await startApp((a) => a.use('/api/v1/auth', authRouter))
|
|
try {
|
|
const calls = [
|
|
['GET', '/api/v1/auth/me/account'],
|
|
['GET', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/identities'],
|
|
['PATCH', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/username', { username: 'someone' }],
|
|
['PATCH', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/password', { newPassword: 'abcd1234' }],
|
|
// Engagement Phase 1b — the email change/verify request half is self-service
|
|
// and must be gated exactly like the rest. (The CONFIRM half is public by
|
|
// design and lives at /auth/email/verify/:token, tested separately.)
|
|
['PATCH', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/email', { email: 'new@example.com' }],
|
|
['POST', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/email/resend'],
|
|
['DELETE', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/email/pending'],
|
|
['POST', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/totp/setup'],
|
|
['POST', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/totp/enable', { code: '123456' }],
|
|
['DELETE', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/identities/google'],
|
|
// Trusted devices + recovery codes are self-service too — same gate.
|
|
['GET', '/api/v1/auth/me/trusted-devices'],
|
|
['POST', '/api/v1/auth/me/trusted-devices', { deviceName: 'X' }],
|
|
['DELETE', '/api/v1/auth/me/trusted-devices'],
|
|
['DELETE', '/api/v1/auth/me/trusted-devices/1'],
|
|
['GET', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/recovery-codes/status'],
|
|
['POST', '/api/v1/auth/me/account/recovery-codes/generate', { currentPassword: 'x' }],
|
|
]
|
|
for (const [method, path, body] of calls) {
|
|
const res = await fetch(app.url + path, {
|
|
method,
|
|
headers: body ? { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } : {},
|
|
body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,
|
|
})
|
|
assert.equal(res.status, 401, `${method} ${path} should be 401, got ${res.status}`)
|
|
}
|
|
} finally {
|
|
await app.close()
|
|
}
|
|
})
|