Claude
5df943095d
The GET /internal/bot-config route returns the DECRYPTED Discord bot token and was mounted on the same Express app / port 3000 that Pangolin proxies publicly. Its only guard was the BOT_INTERNAL_KEY shared secret, and .env.example shipped a placeholder default — so a forwarded path or a weak/unrotated key would expose the plaintext token to the internet. Move server<->bot internal traffic onto its own listener and fail fast on a weak key: - Add server/src/internalApp.js: a standalone Express app mounting requireInternalKey + /internal (and a no-secret /health), mirroring the bot's unpublished port-4100 pattern. - server.js starts a second listener on INTERNAL_PORT (default 3001), closed on graceful shutdown. - Remove the /internal mount from the public v1.router; the public app now 404s /api/v1/internal/bot-config even with a valid key. - Fail fast: new utils/botInternalKey.js rejects an empty, placeholder, or <16-char BOT_INTERNAL_KEY — fatal in production (exit 1), warning in dev. - docker-compose: bot SITE_INTERNAL_URL -> app:3001/internal/bot-config; document that INTERNAL_PORT stays unpublished. - .env.example (root/server/bot): document INTERNAL_PORT, the fail-fast behavior, and a defense-in-depth Pangolin deny rule for /api/v1/internal. Tests: add requireInternalKey.test.js and botInternalKey.test.js (node --test: 93 pass). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
82 lines
3.5 KiB
Plaintext
82 lines
3.5 KiB
Plaintext
# ─── UOMysticmoon — root environment (used by docker-compose) ───
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# Copy to .env and fill in. NEVER commit the real .env.
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# App
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NODE_ENV=production
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PORT=3000
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# Separate, UNPUBLISHED port for server<->bot internal traffic (the decrypted
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# bot-token route). Must match the port in the bot's SITE_INTERNAL_URL
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# (docker-compose.yml) and must NEVER be published/proxied. See issue #33.
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INTERNAL_PORT=3001
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UPLOAD_DIR=/app/uploads
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# Logging — written to BOTH the console and a log file.
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LOG_LEVEL=info # console verbosity: error | warn | info | debug
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FILE_LOG_LEVEL=debug # file verbosity (keep a full record on disk)
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LOG_TO_FILE=true # set false for console-only
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LOG_DIR=/app/logs # log directory inside the container (bind-mounted to ./logs)
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LOG_FILE=app.log
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# Database (the values here are shared by the `db`, `app`, and `bot` containers —
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# the bot only ever touches its own tables: guild_config, mod_actions, warnings)
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DB_HOST=db
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DB_PORT=3306
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DB_NAME=uomysticmoon
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DB_USER=uomm
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DB_PASSWORD=change-me-db-password
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DB_ROOT_PASSWORD=change-me-root-password
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# Auth
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JWT_SECRET=change-me-to-a-long-random-string
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JWT_EXPIRES_IN=1d
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# auto = Secure cookie only when the request arrives over HTTPS (Pangolin).
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# Leave as auto so login works both via the LAN IP (HTTP) and the proxy (HTTPS).
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COOKIE_SECURE=auto
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COOKIE_NAME=uomm_token
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# Reverse-proxy trust (req.ip / req.secure for rate limiting, backoff, bot-ban).
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# Path: client -> Pangolin -> newt agent "ptero" (separate VM) -> app. Pin this
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# to ptero's LAN IP (e.g. 10.0.0.42) so XFF is only trusted from ptero. Requires
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# a static DHCP reservation for ptero in Omada, else a lease change breaks it.
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# Integer hop count or "false" also accepted; a blanket "true" is rejected
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# (coerced to 1) to prevent X-Forwarded-For spoofing.
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TRUST_PROXY=1
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# Set to 1 to log raw peer address + X-Forwarded-For + resolved req.ip per
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# request (to verify/refresh ptero's IP without redeploying). Noisy; keep off.
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DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY=0
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# Optional TOTP two-factor (opt-in per user).
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TOTP_ISSUER=UOMysticmoon
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TOTP_CHALLENGE_TTL=5m
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# First admin bootstrap — created only if no users exist yet.
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# Set, run once, then you can blank these out.
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ADMIN_USERNAME=
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ADMIN_PASSWORD=
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# Email (optional). If SMTP_HOST is blank, the contact endpoint tells the
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# client to fall back to a mailto: link instead.
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SMTP_HOST=
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SMTP_PORT=587
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SMTP_USER=
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SMTP_PASS=
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CONTACT_TO=UOMysticmoon@gmail.com
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# CORS — only needed for local dev when the Vite dev server is a different origin.
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CLIENT_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5173
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# Discord bot — internal API (server <-> bot/, see docker-compose.yml's `bot`
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# service). BOT_INTERNAL_KEY MUST be byte-for-byte identical to the same
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# variable in bot/.env.example — it is the only auth on both sides' /internal/*
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# routes, so a mismatch silently breaks every server<->bot call with 401s.
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# It also guards the server's /internal/bot-config route, which returns the
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# DECRYPTED Discord token; with NODE_ENV=production the app REFUSES TO START if
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# this is left blank, at this placeholder, or shorter than 16 chars. Generate a
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# long random string. The Discord bot TOKEN itself is not an env var — it's
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# entered in the admin panel (Discord Bot page) and stored encrypted in the DB.
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#
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# Defense in depth: even with a strong key, configure Pangolin/your reverse
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# proxy to DENY /api/v1/internal (and never forward INTERNAL_PORT). The route no
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# longer rides the public listener, but an explicit deny rule is belt-and-braces.
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BOT_INTERNAL_URL=http://bot:4100
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BOT_INTERNAL_KEY=change-me-to-a-long-random-string
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