Add a Mobile SSO Authorization Bridge so the native app can "Sign in with Google/Discord" without shipping any OAuth secret. It EXTENDS the existing /auth/sso/* redirect flow (same PKCE-vs-IdP, link-only + opt-in provisioning, TOTP gate) and terminates in the existing mobile bearer tokens — not a parallel auth path. - Schema: mobile_auth_sessions + mobile_auth_codes (short-lived, self-pruning; authorization code stored hash-only, PKCE challenge is a hash by construction). - GET /auth/mobile/sso/start: validate provider enabled + redirect_uri by EXACT allowlist match (never prefix), seed a bridge session, reuse the SSO redirect tagged mode:'mobile' (new redirectToIdp helper extracted from beginFlow). - SSO callback + finishSsoTotp gain a mode:'mobile' branch: mint a single-use, hashed, PKCE-bound code and redirect to the fixed app callback (code + echoed state, never a token) instead of setting a cookie. 2FA keeps full parity via the existing web TOTP form (now carrying the bridge session). - POST /auth/mobile/sso/exchange: verify Layer-B PKCE (before burning the code), single-use consume, then issue the SAME pair as /auth/mobile/login. - Discovery reuses GET /auth/providers; refresh/logout reuse /auth/mobile/*. - Rate limits: /start per-IP+provider, /exchange per-IP. Boot-time + opportunistic prune of both tables (no cron, mirrors revoked_sessions). - Redirect allowlist is MOBILE_AUTH_REDIRECT_URIS (default the one fixed runicgateway://auth/callback); App Link URIs can be appended per shard later. - Swagger regenerated; 39 tests (model single-use/gating + full controller matrix: bad/expired/reused code, PKCE mismatch, disabled provider, redirect allowlist, TOTP-through-bridge). Full suite green (271). Refs docs/website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md, docs/android/PLAN.md §9 (M9). Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
152 lines
6.8 KiB
JavaScript
152 lines
6.8 KiB
JavaScript
// ── Mobile SSO authorization bridge — start + exchange ─────────────────────
|
|
//
|
|
// The native app's "Sign in with Google/Discord" without shipping any OAuth
|
|
// secret. This controller owns the two app-facing endpoints; the SSO redirect
|
|
// mechanics and the callback branch live in sso.controller (reused, not
|
|
// duplicated), and the bridge state lives in the mobileAuthBridge model.
|
|
//
|
|
// GET /auth/mobile/sso/start → seed a bridge session, reuse the SSO redirect
|
|
// POST /auth/mobile/sso/exchange → code + PKCE verifier → mobile bearer tokens
|
|
//
|
|
// Two PKCE layers are in play (see docs BACKEND_DESIGN §4): Layer A (website↔IdP,
|
|
// handled entirely inside the reused SSO flow) and Layer B (app↔website, verified
|
|
// here at /exchange). Do not conflate them.
|
|
|
|
const crypto = require('crypto')
|
|
|
|
const users = require('../../../model/users/users.model')
|
|
const activity = require('../../../model/activity/activity.model')
|
|
const mobileSessions = require('../../../model/mobileSessions/mobileSessions.model')
|
|
const mobileBridge = require('../../../model/mobileAuthBridge/mobileAuthBridge.model')
|
|
const sessionService = require('../../../auth/session.service')
|
|
const ssoState = require('../../../auth/ssoState')
|
|
const ssoController = require('./sso.controller')
|
|
|
|
const log = require('../../../utils/logger')('auth-mobile-sso')
|
|
|
|
// Exact-match allowlist of app callback URIs. Default is the one fixed
|
|
// application-owned custom scheme; HTTPS App Link URIs can be appended per shard
|
|
// later (see docs/android/APP_LINKS.md). EXACT match only — never a prefix match
|
|
// (prefix matching on custom schemes is a known open-redirect vector on mobile).
|
|
const REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST = new Set(
|
|
(process.env.MOBILE_AUTH_REDIRECT_URIS || 'runicgateway://auth/callback')
|
|
.split(',')
|
|
.map((s) => s.trim())
|
|
.filter(Boolean),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
const PROVIDER_ID_RE = /^[a-z0-9-]+$/
|
|
|
|
// Append query params to an (already-allowlisted) app callback URI.
|
|
function appDeepLink(redirectUri, params) {
|
|
const sep = redirectUri.includes('?') ? '&' : '?'
|
|
const qs = Object.entries(params)
|
|
.map(([k, v]) => `${k}=${encodeURIComponent(v)}`)
|
|
.join('&')
|
|
return `${redirectUri}${sep}${qs}`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Constant-time string compare (equal-length guard first).
|
|
function safeEqual(a, b) {
|
|
const bufA = Buffer.from(String(a))
|
|
const bufB = Buffer.from(String(b))
|
|
return bufA.length === bufB.length && crypto.timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GET /auth/mobile/sso/start?provider&code_challenge&state&redirect_uri
|
|
// Opened by the app in a Custom Tab. Validates the request, seeds a bridge
|
|
// session carrying the app's PKCE challenge + state + callback, then reuses the
|
|
// existing SSO redirect (tagged mode:'mobile') to hand off to the IdP.
|
|
async function start(req, res) {
|
|
const { provider, code_challenge: codeChallenge, state, redirect_uri: redirectUri } = req.query
|
|
try {
|
|
// redirect_uri must be exactly one of the registered app callbacks. Validate
|
|
// it FIRST — everything else can only be surfaced to the app by redirecting
|
|
// to a trusted callback, so an untrusted one is a hard 400 (no redirect).
|
|
if (!REDIRECT_ALLOWLIST.has(redirectUri)) {
|
|
log.warn('mobile sso start: redirect_uri not in allowlist', { ip: req.ip })
|
|
return res.status(400).json({ message: 'Unrecognized redirect URI.' })
|
|
}
|
|
if (!PROVIDER_ID_RE.test(provider || '')) {
|
|
return res.redirect(appDeepLink(redirectUri, { error: 'invalid_provider', state }))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const { sessionId } = await mobileBridge.startSession({ provider, codeChallenge, redirectUri, state })
|
|
const ok = await ssoController.redirectToIdp(req, res, provider, {
|
|
mode: 'mobile',
|
|
mobileSessionId: sessionId,
|
|
})
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
log.warn('mobile sso start: provider unavailable', { provider })
|
|
return res.redirect(appDeepLink(redirectUri, { error: 'provider_unavailable', state }))
|
|
}
|
|
// redirectToIdp already issued the 302 on success.
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
log.error('mobile sso start', err)
|
|
// We validated redirect_uri above, so it's safe to bounce the error to the app.
|
|
return res.redirect(appDeepLink(redirectUri, { error: 'server_error', state }))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// POST /auth/mobile/sso/exchange { code, code_verifier }
|
|
// Trades the one-time authorization code (+ its PKCE verifier) for the SAME mobile
|
|
// access + refresh pair as /auth/mobile/login. Single-use, PKCE-bound.
|
|
async function exchange(req, res) {
|
|
const { code, code_verifier: codeVerifier } = req.body
|
|
try {
|
|
const codeRow = await mobileBridge.findRedeemableCode(code)
|
|
if (!codeRow) {
|
|
log.warn('mobile sso exchange: code unknown/expired/used', { ip: req.ip })
|
|
return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Invalid or expired authorization code.' })
|
|
}
|
|
const sess = await mobileBridge.getSession(codeRow.session_id)
|
|
if (!sess) {
|
|
return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Invalid or expired authorization code.' })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// PKCE Layer B: the app proves it holds the verifier for the challenge it
|
|
// registered at /start. Check BEFORE burning the code so a caller lacking the
|
|
// verifier (e.g. a callback interceptor) can't consume a legitimate code.
|
|
if (!safeEqual(ssoState.codeChallengeFor(codeVerifier || ''), sess.code_challenge)) {
|
|
log.warn('mobile sso exchange: PKCE verifier mismatch', { ip: req.ip })
|
|
return res.status(401).json({ message: 'PKCE verification failed.' })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Atomic single-use gate: only the winner of a concurrent double-redeem
|
|
// proceeds; a losing/replayed attempt sees false here.
|
|
if (!(await mobileBridge.consumeCode(code))) {
|
|
log.warn('mobile sso exchange: code already used', { ip: req.ip })
|
|
return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Invalid or expired authorization code.' })
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const user = await users.getById(codeRow.user_id) // fresh row; 401 if the account vanished
|
|
if (!user) {
|
|
return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Invalid or expired authorization code.' })
|
|
}
|
|
await mobileBridge.finishSession(codeRow.session_id)
|
|
|
|
const meta = sessionService.sessionMeta(req)
|
|
const out = sessionService.createMobileSession(user, meta)
|
|
await mobileSessions.store({
|
|
userId: user.id,
|
|
tokenHash: out.refreshHash,
|
|
deviceHash: out.deviceHash,
|
|
userAgent: out.userAgent,
|
|
expiresAt: out.refreshExpiresAt,
|
|
})
|
|
await activity.log({ req, userId: user.id, action: 'auth.mobile.login', detail: { sso: sess.provider } })
|
|
log.info('mobile sso exchange success', { id: user.id, provider: sess.provider, ip: req.ip })
|
|
return res.json({
|
|
accessToken: out.accessToken,
|
|
refreshToken: out.refreshToken,
|
|
expiresIn: out.expiresIn,
|
|
user: { id: user.id, username: user.username, role: user.role },
|
|
})
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
log.error('mobile sso exchange', err)
|
|
return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
module.exports = { start, exchange }
|