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website/client/src/contexts/AuthContext.jsx
wtclaude 620781b7bc
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feat(auth): honor and establish trusted devices on the SSO login paths
"Trust this device" did nothing for anyone who signs in with Google or Discord.
sso.controller went straight from needsTotp(user) to staging a pending-TOTP
challenge and never consulted resolveTrustedDevice, so an SSO user was asked for
a code on EVERY sign-in no matter how many times they had ticked the box — and
POST /auth/sso/totp accepted only `code`, so that step could not establish a
trust either. The password paths (web + native) were unaffected and already
worked; this closes the gap for SSO, on the website AND in the Android app.

Server:
- finishLogin and finishMobileLogin now run the same trusted-device check as
  auth.controller.login, via one shared helper: honor a trust that belongs to
  THIS user, stamp last_used_at, log auth.login.trusted_device. A store error
  falls through to the challenge — fail closed to asking for the code.
- POST /auth/sso/totp gains optional trustDevice + deviceName, sets the rg_trust
  cookie, and mirrors the password path's { trustLimitReached, devices } response
  at the cap (the sign-in still completes). Recovery codes stay password-only.

Android coverage, without leaking a secret into a URL:
- The app opens SSO in a Custom Tab, which shares the system browser's cookie
  jar, so the rg_trust cookie set on that TOTP form is presented back on the next
  app sign-in. That alone makes native SSO skip the code. Passing the app's token
  into the start URL was rejected — it would put a 256-bit secret in query
  strings, Referer headers and access logs.
- To also cover the app's NATIVE password login, ticking the box sets
  mobile_auth_sessions.trust_device (a boolean; never the token), and
  /auth/mobile/sso/exchange mints a platform:'mobile' trust and returns
  { trustToken }. Minting there keeps the raw token on an authenticated
  app→server call, out of the deep link and out of the bridge row. Best-effort:
  at the cap the response just omits it rather than failing a good sign-in.

Client: the trust checkbox is no longer hidden on the SSO second step, on both
the admin and player login screens. On the mobile bridge the deep-link redirect
takes priority over the cap prompt — the sign-in succeeded and the link is
single-use, so stalling there would strand the app.

Tests: 8 new cases in server/test/ssoTrustedDevice.test.js (verified to fail
against the pre-fix controller). Full suites green — server 445, client 43 —
and routes.manifest.json is a zero-line diff: no URL moved, only +2 handlers on
/auth/sso/totp in routes.guards.json for the two new validators. Swagger
regenerated. Verified live against the running server and real MariaDB: the TOTP
step issues rg_trust and persists the row, a subsequent SSO callback carrying it
skips the code, and an invalid trust is still challenged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 01:01:12 -05:00

88 lines
2.9 KiB
JavaScript

import { createContext, useContext, useEffect, useState, useCallback, useMemo } from 'react'
import { api } from '../api/client.js'
const AuthContext = createContext(null)
export function AuthProvider({ children }) {
const [user, setUser] = useState(null)
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true)
const refresh = useCallback(async () => {
try {
const data = await api.me()
setUser(data.user)
} catch {
setUser(null)
} finally {
setLoading(false)
}
}, [])
useEffect(() => {
refresh()
}, [refresh])
// Step 1. Returns { user } on success, or { totpRequired, challenge } when the
// account has 2FA on (caller then calls loginTotp). `extra` carries honeypot.
const login = useCallback(async (username, password, extra) => {
const data = await api.login(username, password, extra)
if (data.user) setUser(data.user)
return data
}, [])
// Public self-registration (player). Creates the account, sets the session
// cookie, and returns { user }. `extra` carries the honeypot + optional email.
const register = useCallback(async (username, password, extra) => {
const data = await api.register(username, password, extra)
if (data.user) setUser(data.user)
return data
}, [])
// Step 2 for TOTP users: exchange the challenge + a second factor (TOTP code or a
// recovery code) for a real session. `extra` carries recoveryCode + the
// trustDevice/deviceName opt-in. Returns the full payload ({ user,
// trustLimitReached?, devices? }) so the caller can handle the device-cap prompt.
const loginTotp = useCallback(async (challenge, code, extra) => {
const data = await api.loginTotp(challenge, code, extra)
setUser(data.user)
return data
}, [])
// Step 2 for SSO logins whose account has 2FA on. The pending challenge lives in
// an httpOnly cookie, so only the code is sent. `extra` carries the trustDevice/
// deviceName opt-in. Returns the full payload ({ user, returnTo,
// trustLimitReached?, devices? }) so the caller can handle the device-cap prompt.
const ssoLoginTotp = useCallback(async (code, extra) => {
const data = await api.ssoLoginTotp(code, extra)
setUser(data.user)
return data
}, [])
const logout = useCallback(async () => {
try {
await api.logout()
} finally {
setUser(null)
}
}, [])
// Memoized so consumers don't re-render on every provider render (the callbacks
// are already stable via useCallback).
const value = useMemo(
() => ({ user, loading, login, register, loginTotp, ssoLoginTotp, logout, refresh }),
[user, loading, login, register, loginTotp, ssoLoginTotp, logout, refresh],
)
return (
<AuthContext.Provider value={value}>
{children}
</AuthContext.Provider>
)
}
export function useAuth() {
const ctx = useContext(AuthContext)
if (!ctx) throw new Error('useAuth must be used within AuthProvider')
return ctx
}