- Widen users.role enum to include 'player'; make password_hash nullable; add email/email_verified/status/last_login_ip; pin username _ci collation. - POST /auth/register (honeypot + registerLimiter + botScore, reserved-name blocklist, duplicate->409, auto-login). player_registration setting gates it. - SSO auto-provision in finishLogin (setting-gated); return/portal-aware SSO redirects for the player portal; status refusal on login + requireAuth. - New /player self-service group (account, change username/password, TOTP, identities), reusing account.controller; accountChangeLimiter. - Admin: 'player' role + status/email on user create/update, role/status audit, player_registration enum validation, derived public registration flags. - usernamePolicy module (reserved, sanitize, derive, dedup) + unit tests; extend SSO callback tests. 133 server tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
97 lines
4.4 KiB
JavaScript
97 lines
4.4 KiB
JavaScript
// ── Session middleware ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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//
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// Express middleware built on the session service. Three pieces:
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//
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// attachSession — best-effort: decorate the request with session info if a
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// valid token is present, but never reject. For routes that
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// behave differently for anon vs authed callers.
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// requireAuth — the gate for protected routes. Preserves the exact behavior
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// of the old isLoggedIn: re-validate the user against the DB on
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// every request so a demoted/deleted user loses access
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// immediately, and set req.user to the fresh DB row.
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// requireRole — role gate factory, unchanged from the original.
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const sessionService = require('./session.service')
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const users = require('../model/users/users.model')
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const log = require('../utils/logger')('session')
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// True if this session was issued at or before the user's tokens_valid_after
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// cutoff (i.e. revoked by a password change / log-out-everywhere). Both the JWT
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// iat and the cutoff are second-granular, so the comparison is inclusive: a token
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// minted in the same second as the bump must still be revoked (otherwise it would
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// survive its full lifetime through that 1s alignment). The only cost is that a
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// re-login within the same second as the change is rejected until the next second
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// — a self-healing blip, and far preferable to leaving a stale token valid.
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function isBeforeCutoff(session, tokensValidAfter) {
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if (!tokensValidAfter || session.createdAt == null) return false
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return session.createdAt <= new Date(tokensValidAfter).getTime()
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}
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// Best-effort: if the request carries a valid session token, attach the decoded
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// session (no DB hit), its auth method, and request metadata. Never rejects —
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// anonymous requests simply pass through with req.session undefined.
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function attachSession(req, res, next) {
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const session = sessionService.validateSession(req)
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if (session) {
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req.session = session
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req.authMethod = session.authMethod
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req.sessionMeta = sessionService.sessionMeta(req)
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}
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return next()
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}
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// Gate middleware for protected (admin) routes. Re-validates the token against
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// the database on every request so a demoted or deleted user loses access
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// immediately, instead of keeping their old role (or a working session) until
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// the JWT expires. req.user carries the fresh DB row, not the token payload.
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async function requireAuth(req, res, next) {
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const session = sessionService.validateSession(req)
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if (!session) return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Unauthorized' })
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try {
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const user = await users.getById(session.userId)
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if (!user) return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Unauthorized' }) // deleted since token issued
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// Status gate, enforced on every request (same immediacy as the cutoff
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// below): a player disabled/banned by staff loses access on their very next
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// request, not when their JWT eventually expires.
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if (user.status && user.status !== 'active') {
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return res.status(403).json({ message: 'Account disabled' })
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}
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// Revocation, enforced here (not in stateless token verification):
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// 1. per-user cutoff — password change / "log out everywhere" bumps
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// tokens_valid_after; any token issued before it is dead.
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// 2. per-session denylist — a single logout adds this jti to revoked_sessions.
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if (isBeforeCutoff(session, user.tokens_valid_after)) {
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return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Unauthorized' })
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}
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if (await sessionService.isSessionRevoked(session.sessionId)) {
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return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Unauthorized' })
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}
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req.user = user
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req.session = session
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req.authMethod = session.authMethod
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return next()
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} catch (err) {
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log.error('requireAuth', err)
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return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
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}
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}
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// Gate middleware factory: allow only the listed roles. Assumes requireAuth ran
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// first so req.user is populated. Use for admin-only endpoints (users, site
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// mode, settings) so a lower-privilege editor cannot reach them.
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function requireRole(...roles) {
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return (req, res, next) => {
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if (roles.includes(req.user?.role)) return next()
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return res.status(403).json({ message: 'Forbidden' })
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}
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}
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module.exports = {
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attachSession,
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requireAuth,
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requireRole,
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}
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